Mind and matter as asymptotically disjoint,inequivalent representations with broken time-reversal symmetry

Many philosophical and scientific discussions of topics of mind-matter research make implicit assumptions, in various guises, about the distinction between mind and matter. Currently predominant positions are based on either reduction or emergence, providing either monistic or dualistic scenarios. A more-involved framework of thinking, which can be traced back to Spinoza and Leibniz, combines the two scenarios, dualistic (with mind and matter separated) and monistic (with mind and matter unseparated), in one single picture. Based on such a picture, the transition from a domain with mind and matter unseparated to separate mental and material domains can be viewed as a result of a general kind of symmetry breaking, which can be described formally in terms of inequivalent representations. The possibility of whether this symmetry breaking might be connected to the emergence of temporal directions from temporally non-directed or even non-temporal levels of reality will be discussed. Correlations between mental and material aspects of reality could then be imagined as remnants of such primordial levels. Different conceivable types of inequivalent representations would lead to correlations with different characteristics.     

Quantum-like brain: "Interference of minds"

We present a contextualist statistical realistic model for quantum-like representations in physics, cognitive science, and psychology. We apply this model to describe cognitive experiments to check quantum-like structures of mental processes. The crucial role is played by interference of probabilities for mental observables. Recently one such experiment based on recognition of images was performed. This experiment confirmed our prediction on the quantum-like behavior of mind. In our approach "quantumness of mind" has no direct relation to the fact that the brain (as any physical body) is composed of quantum particles. We invented a new terminology "quantum-like (QL) mind." Cognitive QL-behavior is characterized by a nonzero coefficient of interference lambda. This coefficient can be found on the basis of statistical data. There are predicted not only cos theta-interference of probabilities, but also hyperbolic cosh theta-interference. This interference was never observed for physical systems, but we could not exclude this possibility for cognitive systems. We propose a model of brain functioning as a QL-computer (there is a discussion on the difference between quantum and QL computers).     

Party competition and the production of nationhood in the immigration context: particularizing the universal for political gain in France and Québec

Analysing parties’ media representations in the context of France’s 2010 legal ban of Islamic facial coverings and Québec’s (rejected) Charter of Values in 2013, this paper foregrounds the neglected role that party competition plays in shaping the construction of nationhood in public debates around immigrant religious practices. Our findings show that in these debates, political parties aim to maintain their distinct identities by generating a particular universalism, in which purportedly “universal” values, such as gender equality, are imbricated with particularistic images of nationhood.     

Dancing into Being: The Tjapukai Aboriginal Cultural Park and the Laura Dance Festival

Focusing on the connection between dance performance and the politics of identity, I explore the problem of human agency and interrogate the concept of a dualistic split between mind and body. I interpret dance as a form of corporeal politics and use the example of dance in two tourist arenas—the Tjapukai Aboriginal Cultural Park and the Laura Dance and Cultural Festival—to illustrate Aboriginal agency in both participating in and resisting structures of state bureaucratic practice, and representations of cultural authenticity.     

Thinking about mind and matter from biology

In biology, man is an object of research; therefore the question might be asked whether inspirations can go from biological data to the reflections on the mind-matter relation in man. The social aspect of man, as treated by sociobiology, is left out of consideration. The knowledge that man is mind, or has a mind, is no result of biological research. It is a datum from philosophy. The biologist, however, is living in a culture which knows about the mental character of man, and this is incorporated in his investigations. He knows that mental activities are connected with processes in the central nervous system and that, especially in the brain, localizations of mental activities are found. As a result of the split-brain experiments with patients and animals, some have arrived at the conclusion that there is a double consciousness. An approach from biology can lead to statements of a philosophical character, as, for example, statements about the unity, or even identity, of mind and matter. The theories of identity meet with great interest in scientific circles, and the truth value of identity statements is investigated. The system theory is taken into consideration. On a philosophical level a revaluation of the concept of matter can lead to a different sort of identity theory.     

THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESSWILLIAM JAMES'S UNRESOLVED PROBLEM

Part I of this article shows that, for different reasons, neither traditional interactionist dualism nor more modern theories of the mind/body relationship — including functional-state identity theory — provide a satisfactory explanation of the evolution of consciousness. Interactionist dualism leaves us with a philosophical impasse; the more modern theories have not yet succeeded in providing adequate answers to the difficulties that were raised by William James in 1879.
Part II of the article disputes Kripke's claim that identity theories are, anyway, untenable because the relevant identities would have to be necessary rather than contingent.     

Cognitive Tracks of Cultural Inheritance: How Evolved Intuitive Ontology Governs Cultural Transmission

"Acquired culture" depends on social transmission and displays salient cross-cultural variability. It seems unconnected to adaptive fitness. It is, however, constrained by evolved properties of the mind. Recurrent—not necessarily universal—features of acquired culture can be explained by taking into account the early development and constraining power of intuitive ontology , a set of principled domain-specific inferential capacities. These allow us to predict recurrent trends in domains as diverse as folk-psychology, representations of natural kinds, the uses of literacy, the acquisition of scientific beliefs, and even the limiting-case of religious ontologies. In all these domains the notion of cultural transmission along domainspecific cognitive tracks governed by intuitive ontology is supported by independent psychological evidence and provides testable explanations for recurrent features in the anthropological record, [ evolution, culture, cultural universal, cognitive development, evolutionary psychology ]     

Effects of development and enculturation on number representation in the brain

A striking way in which humans differ from non-human primates is in their ability to represent numerical quantity using abstract symbols and to use these 'mental tools' to perform skills such as exact calculations. How do functional brain circuits for the symbolic representation of numerical magnitude emerge? Do neural representations of numerical magnitude change as a function of development and the learning of mental arithmetic? Current theories suggest that cultural number symbols acquire their meaning by being mapped onto non-symbolic representations of numerical magnitude. This Review provides an evaluation of this contention and proposes hypotheses to guide investigations into the neural mechanisms that constrain the acquisition of cultural representations of numerical magnitude.     

Bridging consciousness and cognition in memory and perception: evidence for both state and strength processes

Subjective experience indicates that mental states are discrete, in the sense that memories and perceptions readily come to mind in some cases, but are entirely unavailable to awareness in others. However, a long history of psychophysical research has indicated that the discrete nature of mental states is largely epiphenomenal and that mental processes vary continuously in strength. We used a novel combination of behavioral methodologies to examine the processes underlying perception of complex images: (1) analysis of receiver operating characteristics (ROCs), (2) a modification of the change-detection flicker paradigm, and (3) subjective reports of conscious experience. These methods yielded converging results showing that perceptual judgments reflect the combined, yet functionally independent, contributions of two processes available to conscious experience: a state process of conscious perception and a strength process of knowing; processes that correspond to recollection and familiarity in long-term memory. In addition, insights from the perception experiments led to the discovery of a new recollection phenomenon in a long-term memory change detection paradigm. The apparent incompatibility between subjective experience and theories of cognition can be understood within a unified state-strength framework that links consciousness to cognition across the domains of perception and memory.     

Examining Effects of Anticipated Stigma,Centrality, Salience,Internalization, and Outness on Psychological Distress for People with Concealable Stigmatized Identities

Understanding how stigmatized identities contribute to increased rates of depression and anxiety is critical to stigma reduction and mental health treatment. There has been little research testing multiple aspects of stigmatized identities simultaneously. In the current study, we collected data from a diverse, urban, adult community sample of people with a concealed stigmatized identity (CSI). We targeted 5 specific CSIs – mental illness, substance abuse, experience of domestic violence, experience of sexual assault, and experience of childhood abuse – that have been shown to put people at risk for increased psychological distress. We collected measures of the anticipation of being devalued by others if the identity became known (anticipated stigma), the level of defining oneself by the stigmatized identity (centrality), the frequency of thinking about the identity (salience), the extent of agreement with negative stereotypes about the identity (internalized stigma), and extent to which other people currently know about the identity (outness). Results showed that greater anticipated stigma, greater identity salience, and lower levels of outness each uniquely and significantly predicted variance in increased psychological distress (a composite of depression and anxiety). In examining communalities and differences across the five identities, we found that mean levels of the stigma variables differed across the identities, with people with substance abuse and mental illness reporting greater anticipated and internalized stigma. However, the prediction pattern of the variables for psychological distress was similar across the substance abuse, mental illness, domestic violence, and childhood abuse identities (but not sexual assault). Understanding which components of stigmatized identities predict distress can lead to more effective treatment for people experiencing psychological distress.     

The emergence of Nervennahrung: Nerves, mind and metabolism in the long eighteenth century

Morphological assumptions concerning the form, structure and internal life of the brain and nervous system profoundly influenced contemporary physiological concepts about nerve actions throughout the 'long eighteenth century'. This article investigates some early theories of mind and metabolism. In a bottom-up fashion, it asks how eighteenth-century theories regarding the physiological actions of the body organs shaped the conceptions of the structure of the brain and nervous tissue themselves. These proposed that a healthy Nervennahrung (the German word for 'nerve nutrition', which might be rendered as brain food in modern English), not only guaranteed the integrity and stability of neuronal structures in the body, but also explained the complex texture of the brain and spinal cord in physiological terms. Eighteenth-century nerve theories already embodied a Leitmotiv of neurology and brain psychiatry from the later nineteenth century: 'Without phosphorus there is no thought!'     

Shifting to structures in physics and biology: a prophylactic for promiscuous realism

Within the philosophy of science, the realism debate has been revitalised by the development of forms of structural realism. These urge a shift in focus from the object oriented ontologies that come and go through the history of science to the structures that remain through theory change. Such views have typically been elaborated in the context of theories of physics and are motivated by, first of all, the presence within such theories of mathematical equations that allow straightforward representation of the relevant structures; and secondly, the implications of such theories for the individuality and identity of putative objects. My aim in this paper is to explore the possibility of extending such views to biological theories. An obvious concern is that within the context of the latter it is typically insisted that we cannot find the kinds of highly mathematised structures that structural realism can point to in physics. I shall indicate how the model-theoretic approach to theories might help allay such concerns. Furthermore, issues of identity and individuality also arise within biology. Thus Dupré has recently noted that there exists a 'General Problem of Biological Individuality' which relates to the issue of how one divides 'massively integrated and interconnected' systems into discrete components. In response Dupré advocates a form of 'Promiscuous Realism' that holds, for example, that there is no unique way of dividing the phylogenetic tree into kinds. Instead I shall urge serious consideration of those aspects of the work of Dupré and others that lean towards a structuralist interpretation. By doing so I hope to suggest possible ways in which a structuralist stance might be extended to biology.     

Blushing and the philosophy of mind

The introduction, an imaginary dialogue between a philosopher and a scientist, is followed by a brief discussion of the interactions between science, philosophy, and religion. Next comes an analysis of the three most popular philosophies of mind: classical mind-body dualism, computerism, and psychoneural monism. It is argued that the latter, held by medical psychologists since Hippocrates, and formulated explicitly by Cajal and Hebb, is the philosophy of mind that underlies contemporary cognitive and affective neuroscience. The standard objections to psychoneural monism (or materialism) are examined. Evolutionary psychology, though promissory, is judged to be more fancy than fact at its present stage. The conclusion is that the philosophy of mind is still in a poor shape, but that it can advance if it learns more from the science of mind. It would also help if scientific psychologists were to replace such tacitly dualistic expressions as "organ N instantiates (or subserves) mental function M" with "organ N performs mental function M", just as we say "the legs walk" instead of "walking is subserved by legs," and "the lungs breathe" instead of "the lungs instantiate breathing."     

Human cognitive ecology: an instructive framework for comparative primatology

In this review, research on human cognitive ecology is compared with studies of the cognitive ecologies of apes-especially the common chimpanzee. The objective was to assess the feasibility of extending an activity-theory framework developed in studies of humans to an integrated approach for studying the cognitive accomplishments and skills of other primates living in the wild. Six generalizations were abstracted from studies of humans: 1) Social and material environments are arranged to facilitate production. 2) Human activity is shaped by conceptual and cultural principles that provide underlying logic for working knowledge and practice. 3) Schemata (multimodal, mental representations of procedures, strategies, and techniques) govern performance in a domain. 4) Working knowledge, skills, and social identities are co-constructed in communities of practice. 5) Rehearsal improves skilled performances, from which reputations as well as material products are derived. 6) Planning and emergence are in productive tension in human practices. These generalizations are applied to findings in the literature regarding the behavior of chimpanzees and other apes in the wild to assess the potential utility of a situated-activity approach for comparative studies of primate cognition. It is argued in the Discussion that schemata constitute a common core of higher primate intelligence. Planning, emergence, and alterations of the environment to facilitate production further characterize human and chimpanzee or gorilla behaviors to varying degrees. Less apparent in the nonhuman-primate literature is evidence of governing principles, rehearsal, and skill-based reputations or identities entailing theories of mind. Nonetheless, recent observations in the wild suggest that further research is warranted to explore the rudiments of each of these components to enhance our understanding of the ecology of primate cognition and its evolutionary history.     

The philosophical "mind-body problem" and its relevance for the relationship between psychiatry and the neurosciences

Parallel to psychiatry, "philosophy of mind" investigates the relationship between mind (mental domain) and body/brain (physical domain). Unlike older forms of philosophy of mind, contemporary analytical philosophy is not exclusively based on introspection and conceptual analysis, but also draws upon the empirical methods and findings of the sciences. This article outlines the conceptual framework of the "mind-body problem" as formulated in contemporary analytical philosophy and argues that this philosophical debate has potentially far-reaching implications for psychiatry as a clinical-scientific discipline, especially for its own autonomy and its relationship to neurology/neuroscience. This point is illustrated by a conceptual analysis of the five principles formulated in Kandel's 1998 article "A New Intellectual Framework for Psychiatry." Kandel's position in the philosophical mind-body debate is ambiguous, ranging from reductive physicalism (psychophysical identity theory) to non-reductive physicalism (in which the mental "supervenes" on the physical) to epiphenomenalist dualism or even emergent dualism. We illustrate how these diverging interpretations result in radically different views on the identity of psychiatry and its relationship with the rapidly expanding domain of neurology/neuroscience.     

Brand Discrimination: An Implicit Measure of the Strength of Mental Brand Representations

While mental associations between a brand and its marketing elements are an important part of brand equity, previous research has yet to provide a sound methodology to measure the strength of these links. The following studies present the development and validation of an implicit measure to assess the strength of mental representations of brand elements in the mind of the consumer. The measure described in this paper, which we call the Brand Discrimination task, requires participants to identify whether images of brand elements (e.g. color, logo, packaging) belong to a target brand or not. Signal detection theory (SDT) is used to calculate a Brand Discrimination index which gives a measure of overall recognition accuracy for a brand’s elements in the context of its competitors. A series of five studies shows that the Brand Discrimination task can discriminate between strong and weak brands, increases when mental representations of brands are experimentally strengthened, is relatively stable across time, and can predict brand choice, independently and while controlling for other explicit and implicit brand evaluation measures. Together, these studies provide unique evidence for the importance of mental brand representations in marketing and consumer behavior, along with a research methodology to measure this important consumer-based brand attribute.     

Gender and ethnic identity among second-generation Indo-Caribbeans

This article discusses second-generation Indo-Caribbean (West Indian of Indian descent) teenagers’ ethnic identities, through a look at their taste preferences and self assertions of identity. Both Indo-Caribbean young men and women draw from multiple influences on their identities. In terms of tastes in clothing and movies, however, girls are more interested in things Indian, and in “Indian culture”. Boys, on the other hand, choose to distance themselves from an Indian identity. Three factors explain these gender differences in choices about ethnic identity: (1) different media images for South Asian men and women; (2) a school context lending different levels of peer symbolic status to perceived Indian boys and girls; and (3) a gendered process of migration by which women maintain stronger cultural roots in the new country. The findings in this article point to the need to pay attention to gender differences when considering ethnic incorporation.     

The psychology of primate cooperation and competition: a call for realigning research agendas

Cooperation and competition are two key components of social life. Current research agendas investigating the psychological underpinnings of competition and cooperation in non-human primates are misaligned. The majority of work on competition has been done in the context of theory of mind and deception, while work on cooperation has mostly focused on collaboration and helping. The current impression that theory of mind is not necessarily implicated in cooperative activities and that helping could not be an integral part of competition might therefore be rather misleading. Furthermore, theory of mind research has mainly focused on cognitive aspects like the type of stimuli controlling responses, the nature of representation and how those representations are acquired, while collaboration and helping have focused primarily on motivational aspects like prosociality, common goals and a sense of justice and other-regarding concerns. We present the current state of these two bodies of research paying special attention to how they have developed and diverged over the years. We propose potential directions to realign the research agendas to investigate the psychological underpinnings of cooperation and competition in primates and other animals.     

Language and learning: the cognitive revolution at 60-odd

Around the middle of the last century, the prevailing psychological paradigm of behaviourism was challenged by what is now known as the cognitive revolution. Behaviourists viewed learning as changes in patterns of behaviour through reinforcement. By contrast, advocates of the cognitive approach argued that such behavioural changes were outward manifestations of computational operations on mental representations. Here we consider the current state of the cognitive revolution, focusing on the two most contentious issues in the debate: language and learning. The cognitive approach has proved to be extremely fruitful in both fields. Although contemporary learning theory has almost completely embraced the cognitive approach, the study of language has witnessed a clear empiricist trend to revert back to a kind of neo-behaviourism. Many contemporary authors contend that language is a means of communication that is learned solely through the observation of external events, and culturally transmitted to successive generations. Here, we argue that learning and language can only be properly understood from a cognitive perspective, where the mind is conceived of as a biologically underpinned computational system. As is the case in learning theory, there is abundant evidence showing that language is subserved by an autonomous cognitive system in the mind. We conclude that the cognitive revolution has fundamentally changed our understanding of the mind.     

The Dolezal affair: race,gender, and the micropolitics of identity

ABSTRACT

This article treats the pairing of “transgender” and “transracial” in the intertwined discussion of Caitlyn Jenner and Rachel Dolezal as an intellectual opportunity rather than a political provocation. I situate the Dolezal affair in the context of the massive destabilization of long taken-for-granted categorical frameworks, which has significantly enlarged the scope for choice and self-fashioning in the domains of race, ethnicity, sex, gender, and sexuality. Anxieties about opportunistic, exploitative, or fraudulent identity claims have generated efforts to “police” unorthodox claims – as well as efforts to defend such claims against policing – in the name of authentic, objective, and unchosen identities. Instead of a shift from given to chosen identities, as posited by theories of reflexive modernity, we see a sharpened tension between idioms of choice, autonomy, subjectivity, and self-fashioning on the one hand and idioms of givenness, essence, objectivity, and nature on the other.