Imitation dynamics predict vaccinating behaviour

There exists an interplay between vaccine coverage, disease prevalence and the vaccinating behaviour of individuals. Moreover, because of herd immunity, there is also a strategic interaction between individuals when they are deciding whether or not to vaccinate, because the probability that an individual becomes infected depends upon how many other individuals are vaccinated. To understand this potentially complex interplay, a game dynamic model is developed in which individuals adopt strategies according to an imitation dynamic (a learning process), and base vaccination decisions on disease prevalence and perceived risks of vaccines and disease. The model predicts that oscillations in vaccine uptake are more likely in populations where individuals imitate others more readily or where vaccinating behaviour is more sensitive to changes in disease prevalence. Oscillations are also more likely when the perceived risk of vaccines is high. The model reproduces salient features of the time evolution of vaccine uptake and disease prevalence during the whole-cell pertussis vaccine scare in England and Wales during the 1970s. This suggests that using game theoretical models to predict, and even manage, the population dynamics of vaccinating behaviour may be feasible.     

A game dynamic model for delayer strategies in vaccinating behaviour for pediatric infectious diseases

Several studies have found that some parents delay the age at which their children receive pediatric vaccines due to perception of higher vaccine risk at the recommended age of vaccination. This has been particularly apparently during the Measles-Mumps-Rubella scare in the United Kingdom. Under a voluntary vaccination policy, vaccine coverage in certain age groups is a potentially complex interplay between vaccinating behaviour, disease dynamics, and age-specific risk factors. Here, we construct an age-structured game dynamic model, where individuals decide whether to vaccinate according to imitation dynamics depending on age-dependent disease prevalence and perceived risk of vaccination. Individuals may be timely vaccinators, delayers, or non-vaccinators. The model exhibits multiple equilibria and a broad range of possible dynamics. For certain parameter regimes, the proportion of timely vaccinators and delayers oscillate in an anti-phase fashion in response to oscillations in infection prevalence. Under an exogenous change to the perceived risk of vaccination as might occur during a vaccine scare, the model can also capture an increase in delayer strategists similar in magnitude to that observed during the Measles-Mumps-Rubella vaccine scare in the United Kingdom. Our model also shows that number of delayers steadily increases with increasing severity of the scare, whereas it saturates to specific value with increases in duration of the scare. Finally, by comparing the model dynamics with and without the option of a delayer strategy, we show that adding a third delayer strategy can have a stabilizing effect on model dynamics. In an era where individual choice—rather than accessibility—is becoming an increasingly important determinant of vaccine uptake, more infectious disease models may need to use game theory or related techniques to determine vaccine uptake.     

Policy Resistance Undermines Superspreader Vaccination Strategies for Influenza

Theoretical models of infection spread on networks predict that targeting vaccination at individuals with a very large number of contacts (superspreaders) can reduce infection incidence by a significant margin. These models generally assume that superspreaders will always agree to be vaccinated. Hence, they cannot capture unintended consequences such as policy resistance, where the behavioral response induced by a new vaccine policy tends to reduce the expected benefits of the policy. Here, we couple a model of influenza transmission on an empirically-based contact network with a psychologically structured model of influenza vaccinating behavior, where individual vaccinating decisions depend on social learning and past experiences of perceived infections, vaccine complications and vaccine failures. We find that policy resistance almost completely undermines the effectiveness of superspreader strategies: the most commonly explored approaches that target a randomly chosen neighbor of an individual, or that preferentially choose neighbors with many contacts, provide at best a relative improvement over their non-targeted counterpart as compared to when behavioral feedbacks are ignored. Increased vaccine coverage in super spreaders is offset by decreased coverage in non-superspreaders, and superspreaders also have a higher rate of perceived vaccine failures on account of being infected more often. Including incentives for vaccination provides modest improvements in outcomes. We conclude that the design of influenza vaccine strategies involving widespread incentive use and/or targeting of superspreaders should account for policy resistance, and mitigate it whenever possible.     

Evolutionary game theory and social learning can determine how vaccine scares unfold

Immunization programs have often been impeded by vaccine scares, as evidenced by the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) autism vaccine scare in Britain. A "free rider" effect may be partly responsible: vaccine-generated herd immunity can reduce disease incidence to such low levels that real or imagined vaccine risks appear large in comparison, causing individuals to cease vaccinating. This implies a feedback loop between disease prevalence and strategic individual vaccinating behavior. Here, we analyze a model based on evolutionary game theory that captures this feedback in the context of vaccine scares, and that also includes social learning. Vaccine risk perception evolves over time according to an exogenously imposed curve. We test the model against vaccine coverage data and disease incidence data from two vaccine scares in England & Wales: the whole cell pertussis vaccine scare and the MMR vaccine scare. The model fits vaccine coverage data from both vaccine scares relatively well. Moreover, the model can explain the vaccine coverage data more parsimoniously than most competing models without social learning and/or feedback (hence, adding social learning and feedback to a vaccine scare model improves model fit with little or no parsimony penalty). Under some circumstances, the model can predict future vaccine coverage and disease incidence--up to 10 years in advance in the case of pertussis--including specific qualitative features of the dynamics, such as future incidence peaks and undulations in vaccine coverage due to the population's response to changing disease incidence. Vaccine scares could become more common as eradication goals are approached for more vaccine-preventable diseases. Such models could help us predict how vaccine scares might unfold and assist mitigation efforts.     

Rapid Emergence of Free-Riding Behavior in New Pediatric Immunization Programs

Background

Mathematical models have formalized how free-rider effects can threaten the stability of high vaccine coverage levels under established voluntary vaccination programs. However, little research has addressed the question of when free-riding begins to develop when a new vaccine is first introduced in a population.

Methodology/Principal Findings

Here, we combine a game theoretical model of vaccinating behavior with an age-structured compartmental model to analyze rational vaccinating behavior in the first years of a universal immunization program, where a new vaccine is free to all children of a specified age. The model captures how successive birth cohorts face different epidemiological landscapes that have been shaped by the vaccinating decisions of previous birth cohorts, resulting in a strategic interaction between individuals in different birth cohorts. The model predicts a Nash equilibrium coverage level of for the first few birth cohorts under the new program. However, free-riding behavior emerges very quickly, with the Nash equilibrium vaccine coverage dropping significantly within 2-5 years after program initiation. Subsequently, a rich set of coupled dynamics between infection prevalence and vaccinating behaviors is possible, ranging from relatively stable (but reduced) coverage in later birth cohorts to wide fluctuations in vaccine coverage from one birth cohort to the next. Individual tolerance for vaccine risk also starts out at relatively high levels before dropping significantly within a few years.

Conclusions/Significance

These results suggest that even relatively new immunization programs can be vulnerable to drops in vaccine coverage caused by vaccine scares and exacerbated by herd immunity effects, necessitating vigilance from the start.     

Evolving public perceptions and stability in vaccine uptake

Recent vaccine scares and sudden spikes in vaccine demand remind us that the effectiveness of mass vaccination programs is governed by the public perception of vaccination. Previous work has shown that the tendency of individuals to optimize self-interest can lead to vaccination levels that are suboptimal for a community. We use game theory to relate population-level demand for vaccines to decision-making by individuals with varied beliefs about the costs of infection and vaccination. In contrast to previous work proposing that universal vaccination is impossible in a game theoretic context, we show that optimal individual behavior can vary between universal vaccination and no vaccination, depending on the relative costs and benefits to individuals. By coupling game models and epidemic models, we demonstrate that the pursuit of self-interest often leads to stable dynamics but can lead to oscillations in vaccine uptake over time. The instability is exacerbated in populations that are more homogeneous with respect to their perceptions of vaccine and infection risks. This research illustrates the importance of applying temporal models to an inherently temporal situation, namely, the time evolution of vaccine coverage in an informed population with a voluntary vaccination policy.     

Seasonal Influenza Vaccination amongst Medical Students: A Social Network Analysis Based on a Cross-Sectional Study

Introduction

The Chief Medical Officer for England recommends that healthcare workers have a seasonal influenza vaccination in an attempt to protect both patients and NHS staff. Despite this, many healthcare workers do not have a seasonal influenza vaccination. Social network analysis is a well-established research approach that looks at individuals in the context of their social connections. We examine the effects of social networks on influenza vaccination decision and disease dynamics.

Methods

We used a social network analysis approach to look at vaccination distribution within the network of the Lancaster Medical School students and combined these data with the students’ beliefs about vaccination behaviours. We then developed a model which simulated influenza outbreaks to study the effects of preferentially vaccinating individuals within this network.

Results

Of the 253 eligible students, 217 (86%) provided relational data, and 65% of responders had received a seasonal influenza vaccination. Students who were vaccinated were more likely to think other medical students were vaccinated. However, there was no clustering of vaccinated individuals within the medical student social network. The influenza simulation model demonstrated that vaccination of well-connected individuals may have a disproportional effect on disease dynamics.

Conclusions

This medical student population exhibited vaccination coverage levels similar to those seen in other healthcare groups but below recommendations. However, in this population, a lack of vaccination clustering might provide natural protection from influenza outbreaks. An individual student’s perception of the vaccination coverage amongst their peers appears to correlate with their own decision to vaccinate, but the directionality of this relationship is not clear. When looking at the spread of disease within a population it is important to include social structures alongside vaccination data. Social networks influence disease epidemiology and vaccination campaigns designed with information from social networks could be a future target for policy makers.     

The Interplay of Public Intervention and Private Choices in Determining the Outcome of Vaccination Programmes

After a long period of stagnation, traditionally explained by the voluntary nature of the programme, a considerable increase in routine measles vaccine uptake has been recently observed in Italy after a set of public interventions aiming to promote MMR immunization, whilst retaining its voluntary aspect. To account for this take-off in coverage we propose a simple SIR transmission model with vaccination choice, where, unlike similar works, vaccinating behaviour spreads not only through the diffusion of “private” information spontaneously circulating among parents of children to be vaccinated, which we call imitation, but also through public information communicated by the public health authorities. We show that public intervention has a stabilising role which is able to reduce the strength of imitation-induced oscillations, to allow disease elimination, and to even make the disease-free equilibrium where everyone is vaccinated globally attractive. The available Italian data are used to evaluate the main behavioural parameters, showing that the proposed model seems to provide a much more plausible behavioural explanation of the observed take-off of uptake of vaccine against measles than models based on pure imitation alone.     

Dynamic vaccination games and variational inequalities on time-dependent sets

This paper presents a model of a dynamic vaccination game in a population consisting of a collection of groups, each of which holds distinct perceptions of vaccinating versus non-vaccinating risks. Vaccination is regarded here as a game due to the fact that the payoff to each population group depends on the so-called perceived probability of getting infected given a certain level of the vaccine coverage in the population, a level that is generally obtained by the vaccinating decisions of other members of a population. The novelty of this model resides in the fact that it describes a repeated vaccination game (over a finite time horizon) of population groups whose sizes vary with time. In particular, the dynamic game is proven to have solutions using a parametric variational inequality approach often employed in optimization and network equilibrium problems. Moreover, the model does not make any assumptions upon the level of the vaccine coverage in the population, but rather computes this level as a final result. This model could then be used to compute possible vaccine coverage scenarios in a population, given information about its heterogeneity with respect to perceived vaccine risks. In support of the model, some theoretical results were advanced (presented in the appendix) to ensure that computation of optimal vaccination strategies can take place; this means, the theory states the existence, uniqueness and regularity (in our case piecewise continuity) of the solution curves representing the evolution of optimal vaccination strategies of each population group.     

Dynamics of Vaccination Strategies via Projected Dynamical Systems

Previous game theoretical analyses of vaccinating behaviour have underscored the strategic interaction between individuals attempting to maximise their health states, in situations where an individual's health state depends upon the vaccination decisions of others due to the presence of herd immunity. Here, we extend such analyses by applying the theories of variational inequalities (VI) and projected dynamical systems (PDS) to vaccination games. A PDS provides a dynamics that gives the conditions for existence, uniqueness and stability properties of Nash equilibria. In this paper, it is used to analyse the dynamics of vaccinating behaviour in a population consisting of distinct social groups, where each group has different perceptions of vaccine and disease risks. In particular, we study populations with two groups, where the size of one group is strictly larger than the size of the other group (a majority/minority population). We find that a population with a vaccine-inclined majority group and a vaccine-averse minority group exhibits higher average vaccine coverage than the corresponding homogeneous population, when the vaccine is perceived as being risky relative to the disease. Our model also reproduces a feature of real populations: In certain parameter regimes, it is possible to have a majority group adopting high vaccination rates and simultaneously a vaccine-averse minority group adopting low vaccination rates. Moreover, we find that minority groups will tend to exhibit more extreme changes in vaccinating behaviour for a given change in risk perception, in comparison to majority groups. These results emphasise the important role played by social heterogeneity in vaccination behaviour, while also highlighting the valuable role that can be played by PDS and VI in mathematical epidemiology.     

Beyond Rational Decision-Making: Modelling the Influence of Cognitive Biases on the Dynamics of Vaccination Coverage

Background

Theoretical studies predict that it is not possible to eradicate a disease under voluntary vaccination because of the emergence of non-vaccinating “free-riders” when vaccination coverage increases. A central tenet of this approach is that human behaviour follows an economic model of rational choice. Yet, empirical studies reveal that vaccination decisions do not necessarily maximize individual self-interest. Here we investigate the dynamics of vaccination coverage using an approach that dispenses with payoff maximization and assumes that risk perception results from the interaction between epidemiology and cognitive biases.

Methods

We consider a behaviour-incidence model in which individuals perceive actual epidemiological risks as a function of their opinion of vaccination. As a result of confirmation bias, sceptical individuals (negative opinion) overestimate infection cost while pro-vaccines individuals (positive opinion) overestimate vaccination cost. We considered a feedback between individuals and their environment as individuals could change their opinion, and thus the way they perceive risks, as a function of both the epidemiology and the most common opinion in the population.

Results

For all parameter values investigated, the infection is never eradicated under voluntary vaccination. For moderately contagious diseases, oscillations in vaccination coverage emerge because individuals process epidemiological information differently depending on their opinion. Conformism does not generate oscillations but slows down the cultural response to epidemiological change.

Conclusion

Failure to eradicate vaccine preventable disease emerges from the model because of cognitive biases that maintain heterogeneity in how people perceive risks. Thus, assumptions of economic rationality and payoff maximization are not mandatory for predicting commonly observed dynamics of vaccination coverage. This model shows that alternative notions of rationality, such as that of ecological rationality whereby individuals use simple cognitive heuristics, offer promising new avenues for modelling vaccination behaviour.     

Achieving Population-Level Immunity to Rabies in Free-Roaming Dogs in Africa and Asia

Canine rabies can be effectively controlled by vaccination with readily available, high-quality vaccines. These vaccines should provide protection from challenge in healthy dogs, for the claimed period, for duration of immunity, which is often two or three years. It has been suggested that, in free-roaming dog populations where rabies is endemic, vaccine-induced protection may be compromised by immuno-suppression through malnutrition, infection and other stressors. This may reduce the proportion of dogs that seroconvert to the vaccine during vaccination campaigns and the duration of immunity of those dogs that seroconvert. Vaccination coverage may also be limited through insufficient vaccine delivery during vaccination campaigns and the loss of vaccinated individuals from populations through demographic processes. This is the first longitudinal study to evaluate temporal variations in rabies vaccine-induced serological responses, and factors associated with these variations, at the individual level in previously unvaccinated free-roaming dog populations. Individual-level serological and health-based data were collected from three cohorts of dogs in regions where rabies is endemic, one in South Africa and two in Indonesia. We found that the vast majority of dogs seroconverted to the vaccine; however, there was considerable variation in titres, partly attributable to illness and lactation at the time of vaccination. Furthermore, >70% of the dogs were vaccinated through community engagement and door-to-door vaccine delivery, even in Indonesia where the majority of the dogs needed to be caught by net on successive occasions for repeat blood sampling and vaccination. This demonstrates the feasibility of achieving population-level immunity in free-roaming dog populations in rabies-endemic regions. However, attrition of immune individuals through demographic processes and waning immunity necessitates repeat vaccination of populations within at least two years to ensure communities are protected from rabies. These findings support annual mass vaccination campaigns as the most effective means to control canine rabies.     

Impact of Imitation Processes on the Effectiveness of?Ring Vaccination

Ring vaccination can be a highly effective control strategy for an emerging disease or in the final phase of disease eradication, as witnessed in the eradication of smallpox. However, the impact of behavioural dynamics on the effectiveness of ring vaccination has not been explored in mathematical models. Here, we analyze a series of stochastic models of voluntary ring vaccination. Contacts of an index case base vaccinating decisions on their own individual payoffs to vaccinate or not vaccinate, and they can also imitate the behaviour of other contacts of the index case. We find that including imitation changes the probability of containment through ring vaccination considerably. Imitation can cause a strong majority of contacts to choose vaccination in some cases, or to choose non-vaccination in other cases-even when the equivalent solution under perfectly rational (non-imitative) behaviour yields mixed choices. Moreover, imitation processes can result in very different outcomes in different stochastic realizations sampled from the same parameter distributions, by magnifying moderate tendencies toward one behaviour or the other: in some realizations, imitation causes a strong majority of contacts not to vaccinate, while in others, imitation promotes vaccination and reduces the number of secondary infections. Hence, the effectiveness of ring vaccination can depend significantly and unpredictably on imitation processes. Therefore, our results suggest that risk communication efforts should be initiated early in an outbreak when ring vaccination is to be applied, especially among subpopulations that are heavily influenced by peer opinions.     

Estimation of Vaccine Efficacy in Non-Randomly Mixing Populations

A deterministic model for the transmission of an acute infectious disease in a heterogeneous, nonrandomly mixing population is developed. This model facilitates the estimation of transmission probabilities from the observed attack rates. If some of the members of the population are vaccinated, then the vaccine efficacy (VE), defined as the relative reduction in the transmission probability due to vaccination, can be estimated. We provide several estimators of VE, depending on the amount of information available on the mixing pattern and on the action of the vaccine. We show that if vaccinated persons increase the frequency of their contacts with infectious persons, then estimators ignoring this change in behavior may substantially underestimate the VE.     

Assessing the best time interval between doses in a two-dose vaccination regimen to reduce the number of deaths in an ongoing epidemic of SARS-CoV-2

The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic is a major concern all over the world and, as vaccines became available at the end of 2020, optimal vaccination strategies were subjected to intense investigation. Considering their critical role in reducing disease burden, the increasing demand outpacing production, and that most currently approved vaccines follow a two-dose regimen, the cost-effectiveness of delaying the second dose to increment the coverage of the population receiving the first dose is often debated. Finding the best solution is complex due to the trade-off between vaccinating more people with lower level of protection and guaranteeing higher protection to a fewer number of individuals. Here we present a novel extended age-structured SEIR mathematical model that includes a two-dose vaccination schedule with a between-doses delay modelled through delay differential equations and linear optimization of vaccination rates. By maintaining the minimum stock of vaccines under a given production rate, we evaluate the dose interval that minimizes the number of deaths. We found that the best strategy depends on an interplay between the vaccine production rate and the relative efficacy of the first dose. In the scenario of low first-dose efficacy, it is always better to vaccinate the second dose as soon as possible, while for high first-dose efficacy, the best strategy of time window depends on the production rate and also on second-dose efficacy provided by each type of vaccine. We also found that the rate of spread of the infection does not affect significantly the thresholds of the best window, but is an important factor in the absolute number of total deaths. These conclusions point to the need to carefully take into account both vaccine characteristics and roll-out speed to optimize the outcome of vaccination strategies.     

Vaccinating Girls and Boys with Different Human Papillomavirus Vaccines: Can It Optimise Population-Level Effectiveness?

Background

Decision-makers may consider vaccinating girls and boys with different HPV vaccines to benefit from their respective strengths; the quadrivalent (HPV4) prevents anogenital warts (AGW) whilst the bivalent (HPV2) may confer greater cross-protection. We compared, to a girls-only vaccination program with HPV4, the impact of vaccinating: 1) both genders with HPV4, and 2) boys with HPV4 and girls with HPV2.

Methods

We used an individual-based transmission-dynamic model of heterosexual HPV infection and diseases. Our base-case scenario assumed lifelong efficacy of 100% against vaccine types, and 46,29,8,18,6% and 77,43,79,8,0% efficacy against HPV-31,-33,-45,-52,-58 for HPV4 and HPV2, respectively.

Results

Assuming 70% vaccination coverage and lifelong cross-protection, vaccinating boys has little additional benefit on AGW prevention, irrespective of the vaccine used for girls. Furthermore, using HPV4 for boys and HPV2 for girls produces greater incremental reductions in SCC incidence than using HPV4 for both genders (12 vs 7 percentage points). At 50% vaccination coverage, vaccinating boys produces incremental reductions in AGW of 17 percentage points if both genders are vaccinated with HPV4, but increases female incidence by 16 percentage points if girls are switched to HPV2 (heterosexual male incidence is incrementally reduced by 24 percentage points in both scenarios). Higher incremental reductions in SCC incidence are predicted when vaccinating boys with HPV4 and girls with HPV2 versus vaccinating both genders with HPV4 (16 vs 12 percentage points). Results are sensitive to vaccination coverage and the relative duration of protection of the vaccines.

Conclusion

Vaccinating girls with HPV2 and boys with HPV4 can optimize SCC prevention if HPV2 has higher/longer cross-protection, but can increase AGW incidence if vaccination coverage is low among boys.     

Dynamic vaccination games and variational inequalities on time-dependent sets

This paper presents a model of a dynamic vaccination game in a population consisting of a collection of groups, each of which holds distinct perceptions of vaccinating versus non-vaccinating risks. Vaccination is regarded here as a game due to the fact that the payoff to each population group depends on the so-called perceived probability of getting infected given a certain level of the vaccine coverage in the population, a level that is generally obtained by the vaccinating decisions of other members of a population. The novelty of this model resides in the fact that it describes a repeated vaccination game (over a finite time horizon) of population groups whose sizes vary with time. In particular, the dynamic game is proven to have solutions using a parametric variational inequality approach often employed in optimization and network equilibrium problems. Moreover, the model does not make any assumptions upon the level of the vaccine coverage in the population, but rather computes this level as a final result. This model could then be used to compute possible vaccine coverage scenarios in a population, given information about its heterogeneity with respect to perceived vaccine risks. In support of the model, some theoretical results were advanced (presented in the appendix) to ensure that computation of optimal vaccination strategies can take place; this means, the theory states the existence, uniqueness and regularity (in our case piecewise continuity) of the solution curves representing the evolution of optimal vaccination strategies of each population group.     

Disease Interventions Can Interfere with One Another through Disease-Behaviour Interactions

Theoretical models of disease dynamics on networks can aid our understanding of how infectious diseases spread through a population. Models that incorporate decision-making mechanisms can furthermore capture how behaviour-driven aspects of transmission such as vaccination choices and the use of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) interact with disease dynamics. However, these two interventions are usually modelled separately. Here, we construct a simulation model of influenza transmission through a contact network, where individuals can choose whether to become vaccinated and/or practice NPIs. These decisions are based on previous experience with the disease, the current state of infection amongst one''s contacts, and the personal and social impacts of the choices they make. We find that the interventions interfere with one another: because of negative feedback between intervention uptake and infection prevalence, it is difficult to simultaneously increase uptake of all interventions by changing utilities or perceived risks. However, on account of vaccine efficacy being higher than NPI efficacy, measures to expand NPI practice have only a small net impact on influenza incidence due to strongly mitigating feedback from vaccinating behaviour, whereas expanding vaccine uptake causes a significant net reduction in influenza incidence, despite the reduction of NPI practice in response. As a result, measures that support expansion of only vaccination (such as reducing vaccine cost), or measures that simultaneously support vaccination and NPIs (such as emphasizing harms of influenza infection, or satisfaction from preventing infection in others through both interventions) can significantly reduce influenza incidence, whereas measures that only support expansion of NPI practice (such as making hand sanitizers more available) have little net impact on influenza incidence. (However, measures that improve NPI efficacy may fare better.) We conclude that the impact of interference on programs relying on multiple interventions should be more carefully studied, for both influenza and other infectious diseases.     

Should patients positive for HIV infection receive pneumococcal vaccine?

Pneumococcal vaccination effectively reduces the incidence of invasive pneumococcal disease in normal subjects. Such invasive pneumococcal disease is 100 times more common in patients with HIV infection than in healthy people, so it seems logical to target this group of patients for vaccination. Few clinics routinely vaccinate patients positive for HIV, despite Department of Health guidelines. This is because of uncertainty about the vaccine''s efficacy in HIV disease. There are many reasons to suspect that the vaccine will fail to protect these patients, including the fact that antibodies alone may not be sufficient protection against all serogroups of Pneumococcus and the vaccine works in healthy people but not immunocompromised subjects. Vaccination of HIV positive patients may not be indicated, at least for the time being. The cost of vaccinating such patients in the absence of data showing efficacy may well be less than the cost of a necessarily large and lengthy trial. But the truth must be sought to end current indecision.     

The influence of social norms on the dynamics of vaccinating behaviour for paediatric infectious diseases

Mathematical models that couple disease dynamics and vaccinating behaviour often assume that the incentive to vaccinate disappears if disease prevalence is zero. Hence, they predict that vaccine refusal should be the rule, and elimination should be difficult or impossible. In reality, countries with non-mandatory vaccination policies have usually been able to maintain elimination or very low incidence of paediatric infectious diseases for long periods of time. Here, we show that including injunctive social norms can reconcile such behaviour-incidence models to observations. Adding social norms to a coupled behaviour-incidence model enables the model to better explain pertussis vaccine uptake and disease dynamics in the UK from 1967 to 2010, in both the vaccine-scare years and the years of high vaccine coverage. The model also illustrates how a vaccine scare can perpetuate suboptimal vaccine coverage long after perceived risk has returned to baseline, pre-vaccine-scare levels. However, at other model parameter values, social norms can perpetuate depressed vaccine coverage during a vaccine scare well beyond the time when the population''s baseline vaccine risk perception returns to pre-scare levels. Social norms can strongly suppress vaccine uptake despite frequent outbreaks, as observed in some small communities. Significant portions of the parameter space also exhibit bistability, meaning long-term outcomes depend on the initial conditions. Depending on the context, social norms can either support or hinder immunization goals.