Genetic relatedness in viscous populations

Summary Hamilton's inclusive fitness rule shows that the evolution of altruism is facilitated by high genetic relatedness of altruists to their beneficiaries. But the evolution of altruism is inhibited when the beneficiaries are also close competitors of the altruist, as will often be true in structured or viscous populations. However, Hamilton's rule still gives the correct condition for the evolution of altruism if relatedness is measured with respect to the local competitive neighbourhood.     

Helping in cooperatively breeding long-tailed tits: a test of Hamilton's rule

Inclusive fitness theory provides the conceptual framework for our current understanding of social evolution, and empirical studies suggest that kin selection is a critical process in the evolution of animal sociality. A key prediction of inclusive fitness theory is that altruistic behaviour evolves when the costs incurred by an altruist (c) are outweighed by the benefit to the recipient (b), weighted by the relatedness of altruist to recipient (r), i.e. Hamilton''s rule rb > c. Despite its central importance in social evolution theory, there have been relatively few empirical tests of Hamilton''s rule, and hardly any among cooperatively breeding vertebrates, leading some authors to question its utility. Here, we use data from a long-term study of cooperatively breeding long-tailed tits Aegithalos caudatus to examine whether helping behaviour satisfies Hamilton''s condition for the evolution of altruism. We show that helpers are altruistic because they incur survival costs through the provision of alloparental care for offspring. However, they also accrue substantial benefits through increased survival of related breeders and offspring, and despite the low average relatedness of helpers to recipients, these benefits of helping outweigh the costs incurred. We conclude that Hamilton''s rule for the evolution of altruistic helping behaviour is satisfied in this species.     

Unifying the theories of inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism

Inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism are widely thought to be distinct explanations for how altruism evolves. Here we show that they rely on the same underlying mechanism. We demonstrate this commonality by applying Hamilton's rule, normally associated with inclusive fitness, to two simple models of reciprocal altruism: one, an iterated prisoner's dilemma model with conditional behavior; the other, a mutualistic symbiosis model where two interacting species differ in conditional behaviors, fitness benefits, and costs. We employ Queller's generalization of Hamilton's rule because the traditional version of this rule does not apply when genotype and phenotype frequencies differ or when fitness effects are nonadditive, both of which are true in classic models of reciprocal altruism. Queller's equation is more general in that it applies to all situations covered by earlier versions of Hamilton's rule but also handles nonadditivity, conditional behavior, and lack of genetic similarity between altruists and recipients. Our results suggest changes to standard interpretations of Hamilton's rule that focus on kinship and indirect fitness. Despite being more than 20 years old, Queller's generalization of Hamilton's rule is not sufficiently appreciated, especially its implications for the unification of the theories of inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism.     

The genetical theory of kin selection

Natural selection operates both directly, via the impact of a trait upon the individual's own fitness, and indirectly, via the impact of the trait upon the fitness of the individual's genetically related social partners. These effects are often framed in terms of Hamilton's rule, rb - c > 0, which provides the central result of social-evolution theory. However, a number of studies have questioned the generality of Hamilton's rule, suggesting that it requires restrictive assumptions. Here, we use Fisher's genetical paradigm to demonstrate the generality of Hamilton's rule and to clarify links between different studies. We show that confusion has arisen owing to researchers misidentifying model parameters with the b and c terms in Hamilton's rule, and misidentifying measures of genotypic similarity or genealogical relationship with the coefficient of genetic relatedness, r. More generally, we emphasize the need to distinguish between general kin-selection theory that forms the foundations of social evolution, and streamlined kin-selection methodology that is used to solve specific problems.     

Hamilton's rule and the causes of social evolution

Hamilton''s rule is a central theorem of inclusive fitness (kin selection) theory and predicts that social behaviour evolves under specific combinations of relatedness, benefit and cost. This review provides evidence for Hamilton''s rule by presenting novel syntheses of results from two kinds of study in diverse taxa, including cooperatively breeding birds and mammals and eusocial insects. These are, first, studies that empirically parametrize Hamilton''s rule in natural populations and, second, comparative phylogenetic analyses of the genetic, life-history and ecological correlates of sociality. Studies parametrizing Hamilton''s rule are not rare and demonstrate quantitatively that (i) altruism (net loss of direct fitness) occurs even when sociality is facultative, (ii) in most cases, altruism is under positive selection via indirect fitness benefits that exceed direct fitness costs and (iii) social behaviour commonly generates indirect benefits by enhancing the productivity or survivorship of kin. Comparative phylogenetic analyses show that cooperative breeding and eusociality are promoted by (i) high relatedness and monogamy and, potentially, by (ii) life-history factors facilitating family structure and high benefits of helping and (iii) ecological factors generating low costs of social behaviour. Overall, the focal studies strongly confirm the predictions of Hamilton''s rule regarding conditions for social evolution and their causes.     

Quantitative genetic versions of Hamilton's rule with empirical applications

Hamilton''s theory of inclusive fitness revolutionized our understanding of the evolution of social interactions. Surprisingly, an incorporation of Hamilton''s perspective into the quantitative genetic theory of phenotypic evolution has been slow, despite the popularity of quantitative genetics in evolutionary studies. Here, we discuss several versions of Hamilton''s rule for social evolution from a quantitative genetic perspective, emphasizing its utility in empirical applications. Although evolutionary quantitative genetics offers methods to measure each of the critical parameters of Hamilton''s rule, empirical work has lagged behind theory. In particular, we lack studies of selection on altruistic traits in the wild. Fitness costs and benefits of altruism can be estimated using a simple extension of phenotypic selection analysis that incorporates the traits of social interactants. We also discuss the importance of considering the genetic influence of the social environment, or indirect genetic effects (IGEs), in the context of Hamilton''s rule. Research in social evolution has generated an extensive body of empirical work focusing—with good reason—almost solely on relatedness. We argue that quantifying the roles of social and non-social components of selection and IGEs, in addition to relatedness, is now timely and should provide unique additional insights into social evolution.     

Altruism via kin-selection strategies that rely on arbitrary tags with which they coevolve

Hamilton's rule explains when natural selection will favor altruism between conspecifics, given their degree of relatedness. In practice, indicators of relatedness (such as scent) coevolve with strategies based on these indicators, a fact not included in previous theories of kin recognition. Using a combination of simulation modeling and mathematical extension of Hamilton's rule, we demonstrate how altruism can emerge and be sustained in a coevolutionary setting where relatedness depends on an individual's social environment and varies from one locus to another. The results support a very general expectation of widespread, and not necessarily weak, conditional altruism in nature.     

INTERACTING PHENOTYPES AND THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS. III. SOCIAL EVOLUTION

Interactions among conspecifics influence social evolution through two distinct but intimately related paths. First, they provide the opportunity for indirect genetic effects (IGEs), where genes expressed in one individual influence the expression of traits in others. Second, interactions can generate social selection when traits expressed in one individual influence the fitness of others. Here, we present a quantitative genetic model of multivariate trait evolution that integrates the effects of both IGEs and social selection, which have previously been modeled independently. We show that social selection affects evolutionary change whenever the breeding value of one individual covaries with the phenotype of its social partners. This covariance can be created by both relatedness and IGEs, which are shown to have parallel roles in determining evolutionary response. We show that social selection is central to the estimation of inclusive fitness and derive a version of Hamilton's rule showing the symmetrical effects of relatedness and IGEs on the evolution of altruism. We illustrate the utility of our approach using altruism, greenbeards, aggression, and weapons as examples. Our model provides a general predictive equation for the evolution of social phenotypes that encompasses specific cases such as kin selection and reciprocity. The parameters can be measured empirically, and we emphasize the importance of considering both IGEs and social selection, in addition to relatedness, when testing hypotheses about social evolution.     

Effects of information and group structure on evolution of altruism: analysis of two-score model by covariance and contextual analyses

An altruistic individual has to gamble on cooperation to a stranger because it does not know whether the stranger is trustworthy before direct interaction. Nowak and Sigmund (Nature 393 (1998a) 573; J. Theor. Biol. 194 (1998b) 561) presented a new theoretical framework of indirect reciprocal altruism by image scoring game where all individuals are informed about a partner's behavior from its image score without direct interaction. Interestingly, in a simplified version of the image scoring game, the evolutionarily stability condition for altruism became a similar form of Hamilton's rule, i.e. inequality that the probability of getting correct information is more than the ratio of cost to benefit. Since the Hamilton's rule was derived by evolutionarily stable analysis, the evolutionary meaning of the probability of getting correct information has not been clearly examined in terms of kin and group selection. In this study, we applied covariance analysis to the two-score model for deriving the Hamilton's rule. We confirmed that the probability of getting correct information was proportional to the bias of altruistic interactions caused by using information about a partner's image score. The Hamilton's rule was dependent on the number of game bouts even though the information reduced the risk of cooperation to selfish one at the first encounter. In addition, we incorporated group structure to the two-score model to examine whether the probability of getting correct information affect selection for altruism by group selection. We calculated a Hamilton's rule of group selection by contextual analysis. Group selection is very effective when either the probability of getting correct information or that of future interaction, or both are low. The two Hamilton's rules derived by covariance and contextual analyses demonstrated the effects of information and group structure on the evolution of altruism. We inferred that information about a partner's behavior and group structure can produce flexible pathways for the evolution of altruism.     

The evolution of altruism: game theory in multilevel selection and inclusive fitness

Although the prisoner's dilemma (PD) has been used extensively to study reciprocal altruism, here we show that the n-player prisoner's dilemma (NPD) is also central to two other prominent theories of the evolution of altruism: inclusive fitness and multilevel selection. An NPD model captures the essential factors for the evolution of altruism directly in its parameters and integrates important aspects of these two theories such as Hamilton's rule, Simpson's paradox, and the Price covariance equation. The model also suggests a simple interpretation of the Price selection decomposition and an alternative decomposition that is symmetrical and complementary to it. In some situations this alternative shows the temporal changes in within- and between-group selection more clearly than the Price equation. In addition, we provide a new perspective on strong vs. weak altruism by identifying their different underlying game structures (based on absolute fitness) and showing how their evolutionary dynamics are nevertheless similar under selection (based on relative fitness). In contrast to conventional wisdom, the model shows that both strong and weak altruism can evolve in periodically formed random groups of non-conditional strategies if groups are multigenerational. An integrative approach based on the NPD helps unify different perspectives on the evolution of altruism.     

Demography, altruism, and the benefits of budding

It is now widely appreciated that competition between kin inhibits the evolution of altruism. In standard population genetics models, it is difficult for indiscriminate altruism towards social partners to be favoured at all. The reason is that while limited dispersal increases the kinship of social partners it also intensifies local competition. One solution that has received very little attention is if individuals disperse as groups (budding dispersal), as this relaxes local competition without reducing kinship. Budding behaviour is widespread through all levels of biological organization, from early protocellular life to cooperatively breeding vertebrates. We model the effects of individual dispersal, budding dispersal, soft selection and hard selection to examine the conditions under which altruism is favoured. More generally, we examine how these various demographic details feed into relatedness and scale of competition parameters that can be included into Hamilton's rule.     

The robustness of Hamilton's rule with inbreeding and dominance: kin selection and fixation probabilities under partial sib mating

Assessing the validity of Hamilton's rule when there is both inbreeding and dominance remains difficult. In this article, we provide a general method based on the direct fitness formalism to address this question. We then apply it to the question of the evolution of altruism among diploid full sibs and among haplodiploid sisters under inbreeding resulting from partial sib mating. In both cases, we find that the allele coding for altruism always increases in frequency if a condition of the form rb>c holds, where r depends on the rate of sib mating alpha but not on the frequency of the allele, its phenotypic effects, or the dominance of these effects. In both examples, we derive expressions for the probability of fixation of an allele coding for altruism; comparing these expressions with simulation results allows us to test various approximations often made in kin selection models (weak selection, large population size, large fecundity). Increasing alpha increases the probability of fixation of recessive altruistic alleles (h<1/2), while it can increase or decrease the probability of fixation of dominant altruistic alleles (h>1/2).     

The evolution of altruism between siblings: Hamilton's rule revisited

This paper explores the validity of Hamilton's rule in the case of other-only altruism in which the benefits are shared by other members of the sibling group excluding the donor. It presents a model of competition between two alleles which code for different kinds of altruism. It derives a simple replicator equation for allele frequencies under conditions of strong selection. This equation does not depend on the size of the sibling group. In mathematical form, the equation is similar to Hamilton's original rule in the case of inbreeding, although the causal mechanism is different. The paper derives a simple criterion to determine whether there will be a polymorphism in which both alleles coexist permanently. Such an event is rare and victory will normally go to the allele with the higher value of 1/2b-c, where b is the total benefit which an offspring confers on its siblings and c is the cost to the donor. The paper also considers how an offspring will behave in particular circumstances. Using a specialized version of the basic model, it shows how, in the absence of polymorphism, natural selection should take the system towards the point of 50% marginal altruism. With this type of altruism, an offspring will perform any act for which the expected cost to the donor is at most half the expected benefit to its siblings. Acts which do not satisfy this criterion are not performed. This accords with Haldane's quip that he would sacrifice his own life for two of his brothers, but not for less. Numerical simulation is used to explore these issues in greater depth. The paper also examines briefly the implications of heterozygote advantage for Hamilton's rule. It concludes with a brief discussion of the connection between other-only altruism and whole-group altruism, in which the donor gains some benefit from its actions.     

How life history and demography promote or inhibit the evolution of helping behaviours

In natural populations, dispersal tends to be limited so that individuals are in local competition with their neighbours. As a consequence, most behaviours tend to have a social component, e.g. they can be selfish, spiteful, cooperative or altruistic as usually considered in social evolutionary theory. How social behaviours translate into fitness costs and benefits depends considerably on life-history features, as well as on local demographic and ecological conditions. Over the last four decades, evolutionists have been able to explore many of the consequences of these factors for the evolution of social behaviours. In this paper, we first recall the main theoretical concepts required to understand social evolution. We then discuss how life history, demography and ecology promote or inhibit the evolution of helping behaviours, but the arguments developed for helping can be extended to essentially any social trait. The analysis suggests that, on a theoretical level, it is possible to contrast three critical benefit-to-cost ratios beyond which costly helping is selected for (three quantitative rules for the evolution of altruism). But comparison between theoretical results and empirical data has always been difficult in the literature, partly because of the perennial question of the scale at which relatedness should be measured under localized dispersal. We then provide three answers to this question.     

Detecting kin selection at work using inclusive fitness

A recent model shows that altruism can evolve with limited migration and variable group sizes, and the authors claim that kin selection cannot provide a sufficient explanation of their results. It is demonstrated, using a recent reformulation of Hamilton's original arguments, that the model falls squarely within the scope of inclusive fitness theory, which furthermore shows how to calculate inclusive fitness and the relevant relatedness. A distinction is drawn between inclusive fitness, which is a method of analysing social behaviour; and kin selection, a process that operates through genetic similarity brought about by common ancestry, but not by assortation by genotype or by direct assessment of genetic similarity. The recent model is analysed, and it turns out that kin selection provides a sufficient explanation to considerable quantitative accuracy, contrary to the authors' claims. A parallel analysis is possible and would be illuminating for all models of social behaviour in which individuals' effects on each other's offspring numbers combine additively.     

Kin selection-mutation balance: a model for the origin, maintenance, and consequences of social cheating

Social conflict, in the form of intraspecific selfish "cheating," has been observed in a number of natural systems. However, a formal, evolutionary genetic theory of social cheating that provides an explanatory, predictive framework for these observations is lacking. Here we derive the kin selection-mutation balance, which provides an evolutionary null hypothesis for the statics and dynamics of cheating. When social interactions have linear fitness effects and Hamilton's rule is satisfied, selection is never strong enough to eliminate recurrent cheater mutants from a population, but cheater lineages are transient and do not invade. Instead, cheating lineages are eliminated by kin selection but are constantly reintroduced by mutation, maintaining a stable equilibrium frequency of cheaters. The presence of cheaters at equilibrium creates a "cheater load" that selects for mechanisms of cheater control, such as policing. We find that increasing relatedness reduces the cheater load more efficiently than does policing the costs and benefits of cooperation. Our results provide new insight into the effects of genetic systems, mating systems, ecology, and patterns of sex-limited expression on social evolution. We offer an explanation for the widespread cheater/altruist polymorphism found in nature and suggest that the common fear of conflict-induced social collapse is unwarranted.     

Investment and relatedness: A cost/benefit analysis of breeding and helping in the pied kingfisher (Ceryle rudis)

Helping at the nest in birds is often termed altruism. However, so far, no study has ever demonstrated high costs to a helper's own lifetime reproductive success (=direct fitness), nor its compensation through benefits from relatives other than its own offspring (=indirect fitness). In this paper on pied kingfishers (Ceryle rudis) the relationship between investment, relatedness and inclusive fitness (expressed in terms of genetic equivalents) is investigated for breeding males, and males that help either relatives (=primary helpers) or strangers (=secondary helpers). With respect to guarding nests against predators and feeding young, primary helpers invest as much as breeders, but secondary helpers contribute significantly less. These differences in status and investment (measured in energy expenditure) affect the birds' future to such an extent that primary helpers have a lower chance of surviving and mating than secondary helpers. However, their costs in direct fitness are compensated by pronounced benefits to indirect fitness, resulting from improved survival of siblings and parents. An attempt is made to calculate the inclusive fitness of birds following different strategies over a 2-year period. It is concluded that (a) breeding is superior to helping and helping superior to doing nothing and (b) that kin-selection must be invoked to explain why surplus males choose the more costly primary helper strategy instead of the cheaper secondary helper strategy. Alternative explanations, including group selection, parental manipulation and reciprocity, are discussed.     

A simple and general explanation for the evolution of altruism

We present a simple framework that highlights the most fundamental requirement for the evolution of altruism: assortment between individuals carrying the cooperative genotype and the helping behaviours of others with which these individuals interact. We partition the fitness effects on individuals into those due to self and those due to the 'interaction environment', and show that it is the latter that is most fundamental to understanding the evolution of altruism. We illustrate that while kinship or genetic similarity among those interacting may generate a favourable structure of interaction environments, it is not a fundamental requirement for the evolution of altruism, and even suicidal aid can theoretically evolve without help ever being exchanged among genetically similar individuals. Using our simple framework, we also clarify a common confusion made in the literature between alternative fitness accounting methods (which may equally apply to the same biological circumstances) and unique causal mechanisms for creating the assortment necessary for altruism to be favoured by natural selection.     

Kin selection versus sexual selection: why the ends do not meet

I redevelop the hypothesis that lifetime monogamy is a fundamental condition for the evolution of eusocial lineages with permanent non-reproductive castes, and that later elaborations--such as multiply-mated queens and multi-queen colonies--arose without the re-mating promiscuity that characterizes non-social and cooperative breeding. Sexually selected traits in eusocial lineages are therefore peculiar, and their evolution constrained. Indirect (inclusive) fitness benefits in cooperatively breeding vertebrates appear to be negatively correlated with promiscuity, corroborating that kin selection and sexual selection tend to generally exclude each other. The monogamy window required for transitions from solitary and cooperative breeding towards eusociality implies that the relatedness and benefit-cost variables of Hamilton's rule do not vary at random, but occur in distinct and only partly overlapping combinations in cooperative, eusocial, and derived eusocial breeding systems.