Physical explanations and biological explanations,empirical laws and a priori laws

Philosophers intent upon characterizing the difference between physics and biology often seize upon the purported fact that physical explanations conform more closely to the covering law model than biological explanations. Central to this purported difference is the role of laws of nature in the explanations of these two sciences. However, I argue that, although certain important differences between physics and biology can be highlighted by differences between physical and biological explanations, these differences are not differences in the degree to which those explanations conform to the covering law model, which fits biology about as well as it does physics.     

There May be Strict Empirical Laws in Biology, after All

This paper consists of four parts. Part 1 is an introduction. Part 2 evaluates arguments for the claim that there are no strict empirical laws in biology. I argue that there are two types of arguments for this claim and they are as follows: (1) Biological properties are multiply realized and they require complex processes. For this reason, it is almost impossible to formulate strict empirical laws in biology. (2) Generalizations in biology hold contingently but laws go beyond describing contingencies, so there cannot be strict laws in biology. I argue that both types of arguments fail. Part 3 considers some examples of biological laws in recent biological research and argues that they exemplify strict laws in biology. Part 4 considers the objection that the examples in part 3 may be strict laws but they are not distinctively biological laws. I argue that given a plausible account of what distinctively biological means, such laws are distinctively biological.     

Culture,biology, and human behavior

Social scientists have not integrated relevant knowledge from the biological sciences into their explanations of human behavior. This failure is due to a longstanding antireductionistic bias against the natural sciences, which follows on a commitment to the view that social facts must be explained by social laws. This belief has led many social scientists into the error of reifying abstract analytical constructs into entities that possess powers of agency. It has also led to a false nature-culture dichotomy that effectively undermines the place of biology in social scientific explanation. Following the principles of methodological individualism, we show how behavioral explanations supported by data and theory from the neurosciences can be used to correct the errors of reificationist thinking in the social sciences. We outline a mechanistic approach to the explanation of human behavior with the hope that the biological sciences will begin to find greater acceptance among social scientists.     

Complexity,adaptive complexity and the Creative View of natural selection

In this paper, I respond to arguments proposed by Brunnander in this journal issue concerning my position regarding the Creative View of natural selection (Razeto-Barry & Frick, 2011). Brunnander argues that (i) the Creative View we defend does not serve to answer William Paley’s question because (ii) Paley’s question is “why there are complex things rather than simple ones” and (iii) natural selection cannot answer this question. Brunnander’s arguments for (iii) defend a Non-creative View of natural selection (sensu Razeto-Barry & Frick, 2011). Here I claim that Brunnander’s arguments for (iii) are mistaken and I also argue that even accepting (iii) we do not have to accept (i), given that statement (ii) is historically and conceptually flawed. Thus here I analyze Paley’s question from a historical point of view and from a contemporary perspective in a quest for the potential conceptual relevance of Paley’s question today. In this vein I argue that from a contemporary point of view statement (iii) may be correct but for different reasons than those adduced by Brunnander.     

Physiology, biomedicine, medicine

The physiology throughout centuries was considered as the basic fundamental science in medicine. Rapid development of molecular biology, genetics and of some other natural sciences in 2nd half XX demanded century not only the answer to a question on the sciences defining the base of development of medicine, but also key problems of its progress. The biomedicine is formed, its methods are discussed, is frequent in system of natural sciences, parities with physiology. The special attention is given unconditional necessity of finding-out of molecular mechanisms of functions, targets of action of physiologically active substances and obligatory correlation of data of modeling with the same processes in conditions in vivo in whole body. The role of various sciences in the decision of fundamental problems of medicine, a place and role of physiology in modern medicine is shown.     

Beneficence, determinism and justice: an engagement with the argument for the genetic selection of intelligence

In 2001, Julian Savulescu wrote an article entitled 'Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children', in which he argued for the genetic selection of intelligence in children. That article contributes to a debate on whether genetic research on intelligence should be undertaken at all and, if so, should intelligence selection be available to potential parents. As such, the question of intelligence selection relates to wider issues concerning the genetic determinism of behavioural traits, i.e. alcoholism. This article is designed as an engagement in the intelligence selection debate using an analysis of Savulescu's arguments to raise a series of problematic issues in relation to the ethics of parental selection of intelligence. These problematic issues relate to wider assumptions that are made in order to put forward intelligence selection as a viable ethical option. Such assumptions are more generic in character, but still relate to Savulescu's article, concerning issues of genetic determinism, private allocation and inequality, and, finally, individual versus aggregate justice. The conclusion focuses on what the implications are for the question of agency, especially if intelligence selection is allowed.     

Cell molecular computer. VII. Cell biophysics and realistic or information physics (1)]

Living organisms measure many parameters in order to have orientation in the outer medium. That is why biophysics cannot use the ordinary laws of physics and must take into account the influence on the phenomena to be studied not only of a measurement but also of a calculation process in the real physical and biophysical device predicting the future. Science taking into account the effects of the calculating process-realistical or informative (RI) physics-has different (laws) for different times, distances and numbers of measuring and predicting parameters. RI-physics deals with unreproducible events and considers only such time intervals and distances for which the prediction can be made on the basis of earlier measurements and calculations according to the laws with optimal difficulty. It is suggested that the living cell uses the laws which are close to these optimal (limiting) laws of RI-physics. Physics and quantum mechanics can be considered as a limiting case of RI-physics. In this case values of distances and times are large enough and the number of simultaneously measured independent parameters is such that the heat effect of the calculating device would become negligible. Molecular cell computer (MCC) [I] cannot calculate the interaction of a great quantity of different molecules, using the equations of quantum mechanics because the expense of the (price of action) would be very large and both MCC and the surrounding world could change.     

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF SENSORY EVALUATION AND ITS POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS TO THE VARIOUS DISCIPLINES OF HOME ECONOMICS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Sensory evaluation is a scientific method that deals with precision, accuracy and sensitivity. Its basic principles are in large part anchored on the natural sciences, such as biology, chemistry, mathematics and physics. However, sensory evaluation goes beyond such platforms and has its own social, economic and cultural facets. Sensory evaluation has been extensively used in the study of consumer items such as food and clothing, and lately on behavioral and physiological reactions. It has been an integral part of the food science curriculum in various universities. However, the other disciplines of home economics, such as clothing technology, family life and child development, home economics education, hotel, restaurant and institution management, interior design and community nutrition, which deal with the needs of families and consumers, have not fully maximized the use of sensory evaluation. The multidisciplinary nature of home economics will push sensory evaluation to a more diverse level of relevance and purpose. This paper presented the social, economic and cultural dimensions of sensory evaluation along with its possible applications in the various disciplines of home economics in the Philippines.

PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

The paper provided a wholistic view of sensory evaluation not merely as a scientific method but its important social, cultural and economic dimensions. This document can serve as a guide for students, teachers and professionals in the conduct of sensory assessments. Likewise, this will help home economists not only in the Philippines but also in other countries to maximize the use of sensory evaluation in improving the quality of life of families and consumers. Moreover, this can drive multidisciplinary undertakings utilizing sensory evaluation as the key concept and thus enrich the pool of knowledge both in the natural and social sciences and their interaction.     

On long range non-bonded forces in the double helix for frequencies between tens of kilohertz and 100 wavenumbers

In this paper we point out a number of observations which bear on the question of long range nonbonded forces in the double helix. One class of arguments depend on successes of a particular model and other arguments are model independent. The conclusion is that such forces should be taken seriously.     

Theoretical approaches to holistic biological features: Pattern formation,neural networks and the brain-mind relation

The topic of this article is the relation between bottom-up and top-down, reductionist and “holistic” approaches to the solution of basic biological problems. While there is no doubt that the laws of physics apply to all events in space and time, including the domains of life, understanding biology depends not only on elucidating the role of the molecules involved, but, to an increasing extent, on systems theoretical approaches in diverse fields of the life sciences. Examples discussed in this article are the generation of spatial patterns in development by the interplay of autocatalysis and lateral inhibition; the evolution of integrating capabilities of the human brain, such as cognition-based empathy; and both neurobiological and epistemological aspects of scientific theories of consciousness and the mind.     

Ethical dimensions of therapeutic human cloning

Therapeutic human cloning has the potential significantly to reduce human suffering and enhance human happiness. This is the main ethical argument in its favour. The main ethical arguments against it centre on questions to do with the moral status of the human embryo. A subsidiary set of arguments arises from the connections between therapeutic human cloning and reproductive cloning. Most of the ethical questions concerning the status of the human embryo have long been examined in the context of abortion, though they are being re-examined in the context of genetic screening and embryo research. A consensus on such matters seems extremely unlikely to result in the near future. The current role of ethicists may not, therefore, be so much to attempt to produce a definitive answer to the question of the status of the human embryo at the very early developmental stages at which therapeutic human cloning would take place, but more to help clarify arguments and indicate the implications of particular approaches. That is what this paper seeks to do.     

Physics,biology, and sociology: A reappraisal

To the extent that all biological phenomena are perceivable only through their physical manifestations, it may be justified to assume that all biological phenomena will be eventually represented in terms of physics; perhaps not of present day physics, but of some “extended” form of it. However, even if this should be correct, it must be kept in mind that representing individual biological phenomena in terms of physics is not the same as deducing from known physical laws the necessity of biological phenomena. Drawing an analogy from pure mathematics, it is possible that while every biological phenomenon may be represented in terms of physics, yet biological statements represent a class of “undecidable” statements within the framework of physics. Such a conjecture is reinforced by the history of physics itself and illustrated on several examples. The 19th century physicists tried in vain todeduce electromagnetic phenomena from mechanical ones. A similar situation may exist in regard to biological and social sciences. Quite generally, the possibility of representing a class B phenomena in terms of class A phenomena does not imply that the phenomena of class B can be deduced from those of class A. The consequences of the above on the relation between physics, biology, and sociology are studied. A tentative postulational formulation of basic biological principles are given and some consequences are discussed. It is pointed out that not only can the study of biological phenomena throw light on some physical phenomena, but that the study of social phenomena may be of value for the understanding of the structures and functions of living organisms. The possibility of a sort of “socionics” is indicated.     

Nomothetics and idiography in developmental biology

Successions of space-temporal structures arisen during development of multicellular organisms are the most regular, complex and reproducible ones among all taking place in the entire nature without a human's intervention. Therefore, the question whether it would be possible to embrace them by a common physicalistic law (nomothetic approach) or they can be only enumerated and described one after another (idiography) is of an overall importance for the natural sciences in general. We review several nomothetic attempts performed in XX century biology and suggest that such laws may have a structure of feedback contours between the active and passive mechanical stresses generated in developing embryos. We trace several steps towards creating such contours and show that they couple mechanics with geometry providing thus a progressive complication of embryonic structure. Then we discuss, in what way genome can influence these morphomechanical laws. We speculate that the main developmental function of genome is to set up the values of the parameters, introduced in these laws. We emphasize that these parameters values acquire a definite meaning only within the context of the laws into which they are introduced.     

On Long Range Non-bonded Forces in the Double Helix for Frequencies Between Tens of Kilohertz and 100 Wavenumbers

Abstract

In this paper we point out a number of observations which bear on the question of long range nonbonded forces in the double helix. One class of arguments depend on successes of a particular model and other arguments are model independent. The conclusion is that such forces should be taken seriously.     

Middle Palaeolithic burial is not a dead issue: the view from Qafzeh, Saint-Césaire, Kebara, Amud, and Dederiyeh.

Inferences of purposeful Middle Palaeolithic (MP) burial are almost universally accepted, despite published arguments that the pre-1960s discoveries are equally well explained by natural processes. In the modern human origins debate (perhaps the most hotly disputed question in palaeoanthropology) inferences of MP burial are crucial in arguments for an early Upper Pleistocene emergence of modern humans. The present paper contributed to that debate by re-examining a number of post-1960s excavations of MP hominid remains. Because these were excavated with meticulous attention to depositional circumstances and stratigraphic context, most palaeoanthropologists consider these inferences of purposeful burial to be based on irrefutable evidence. This paper focuses on the reasoning behind such claims, especially the assumption that articulated sketetal material is prima facie evidence for deliberate burial. First it reviews a range of processes operating in caves and rockshelters that condition the probability of articulated skeletal material preserving without hominid intervention. Processes such as deposition, decomposition, and disturbance are inherently more variable in caves and rockshelters than is usually acknowledged. The first section concludes that purposeful protection is not necessary to account for the preservation of articulated skeletal remains. The second part of the paper examines the published record from Qafzeh, Saint-Césaire, Kebara, Amud and Dederiyeh, where the majority of the remains claimed to have been buried are fragmented, incomplete, and disarticulated. This re-examination suggests that in all of the post-1960s cases of putative burial, the hominid remains occur in special depositional circumstances, which by themselves are sufficient to account for the preservation in evidence at these sites. This conclusion severely weakens arguments for purposeful burial at the five sites. Moreover, the equivocal nature of the evidence in the more recent cases renders even less secure the similar claims made for discoveries of hominid skeletal remains at La Chapelle-aux-Saints, Le Mousterier, La Ferrassie, Teshik-Tash, La Grotte du Régourdou, Shanidar, and several others. Finally, by highlighting the equivocal nature of the evidence, this paper underscores the ongoing need for palaeoanthropologists to specify as wide a range of taphonomic processes as possible when interpreting the archaeological record. This will aid in producing robust inferences, and will bring about increasingly accurate knowledge of when hominids became human.     

Laws of nature and laws of ecology

We address the question of whether there are laws in ecology. Although there has been a great deal of recent interest in this topic, much of the relevant debate has been conducted under some common misconceptions about what laws of nature are. Once these misconceptions are cleared up, the case for ecology having laws is much stronger. Indeed, we suggest that the case for laws in ecology is no better or worse than the case for laws in physics.     

The other side of molecular biology

The question is raised whether in addition to the well-known causal processes of molecular mechanics there are other effects of atomic physics which might appear significantly in biology. We find one, namely the process of molecular synthesis that involves ambiguities due to the competition of isomers. The ambiguities, mathematically called bifurcations, represent binary decisions buried in noise. The assumption is made that collectively there are enough causally undefined decisions to speak of the creativity of the organism as a basic phenomenon in its own right. Creativity, in the past a purely literary term, becomes then a scientific one for which exact definitions are required. We point out that in such a case theory can only specify necessary conditions of phenomena not sufficient ones, as distinct from physics. A very brief survey is made of the major features of a biological theory based on such assumptions.