Virtual bargaining: a theory of social decision-making

An essential element of goal-directed decision-making in social contexts is that agents'' actions may be mutually interdependent. However, the most well-developed approaches to such strategic interactions, based on the Nash equilibrium concept in game theory, are sometimes too broad and at other times ‘overlook’ good solutions to fundamental social dilemmas and coordination problems. The authors propose a new theory of social decision-making—virtual bargaining—in which individuals decide among a set of moves on the basis of what they would agree to do if they could openly bargain. The core principles of a formal account are outlined (vis-à-vis the notions of ‘feasible agreement’ and explicit negotiation) and further illustrated with the introduction of a new game, dubbed the ‘Boobytrap game’ (a modification on the canonical Prisoner''s Dilemma paradigm). In the first empirical data of how individuals play the Boobytrap game, participants'' experimental choices accord well with a virtual bargaining perspective, but do not match predictions from a standard Nash account. Alternative frameworks are discussed, with specific empirical tests between these and virtual bargaining identified as future research directions. Lastly, it is proposed that virtual bargaining underpins a vast range of human activities, from social decision-making to joint action and communication.     

Emergence of Super Cooperation of Prisoner’s Dilemma Games on Scale-Free Networks

Recently, the authors proposed a quantum prisoner’s dilemma game based on the spatial game of Nowak and May, and showed that the game can be played classically. By using this idea, we proposed three generalized prisoner’s dilemma (GPD, for short) games based on the weak Prisoner’s dilemma game, the full prisoner’s dilemma game and the normalized Prisoner’s dilemma game, written by GPD_W, GPD_F and GPD_N respectively. Our games consist of two players, each of which has three strategies: cooperator (C), defector (D) and super cooperator (denoted by Q), and have a parameter γ to measure the entangled relationship between the two players. We found that our generalised prisoner’s dilemma games have new Nash equilibrium principles, that entanglement is the principle of emergence and convergence (i.e., guaranteed emergence) of super cooperation in evolutions of our generalised prisoner’s dilemma games on scale-free networks, that entanglement provides a threshold for a phase transition of super cooperation in evolutions of our generalised prisoner’s dilemma games on scale-free networks, that the role of heterogeneity of the scale-free networks in cooperations and super cooperations is very limited, and that well-defined structures of scale-free networks allow coexistence of cooperators and super cooperators in the evolutions of the weak version of our generalised prisoner’s dilemma games.     

Nodes Having a Major Influence to Break Cooperation Define a Novel Centrality Measure: Game Centrality

Cooperation played a significant role in the self-organization and evolution of living organisms. Both network topology and the initial position of cooperators heavily affect the cooperation of social dilemma games. We developed a novel simulation program package, called ‘NetworGame’, which is able to simulate any type of social dilemma games on any model, or real world networks with any assignment of initial cooperation or defection strategies to network nodes. The ability of initially defecting single nodes to break overall cooperation was called as ‘game centrality’. The efficiency of this measure was verified on well-known social networks, and was extended to ‘protein games’, i.e. the simulation of cooperation between proteins, or their amino acids. Hubs and in particular, party hubs of yeast protein-protein interaction networks had a large influence to convert the cooperation of other nodes to defection. Simulations on methionyl-tRNA synthetase protein structure network indicated an increased influence of nodes belonging to intra-protein signaling pathways on breaking cooperation. The efficiency of single, initially defecting nodes to convert the cooperation of other nodes to defection in social dilemma games may be an important measure to predict the importance of nodes in the integration and regulation of complex systems. Game centrality may help to design more efficient interventions to cellular networks (in forms of drugs), to ecosystems and social networks.     

Social structure of primate interaction networks facilitates the emergence of cooperation

Animal cooperation has puzzled biologists for a long time as its existence seems to contravene the basic notion of evolutionary biology that natural selection favours ‘selfish’ genes that promote only their own well-being. Evolutionary game theory has shown that cooperators can prosper in populations of selfish individuals if they occur in clusters, interacting more frequently with each other than with the selfish. Here we show that social networks of primates possess the necessary social structure to promote the emergence of cooperation. By simulating evolutionary dynamics of cooperative behaviour on interaction networks of 70 primate groups, we found that for most groups network reciprocity augmented the fixation probability for cooperation. The variation in the strength of this effect can be partly explained by the groups’ community modularity—a network measure for the groups’ heterogeneity. Thus, given selective update and partner choice mechanisms, network reciprocity has the potential to explain socially learned forms of cooperation in primate societies.     

Women Tend to Defect in a Social Dilemma Game in Southwest China

Cooperation theories assume that interacting individuals can change their strategies under different expected payoffs, depending on their social status or social situations. When looking at sex differences in cooperation, the existing studies have found that the genders cooperate at similar frequencies. However, the majority of the data originate within Western human societies. In this paper, we explore whether there are gender differences in cooperation in China. An Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a punishment option was used to gather data about Southwest Chinese subjects in a culture in which men have a hierarchical advantage over women. Results indicate that men invested into partners significantly more than women did (34% ♂ vs. 24% ♀) while women, in turn, were more likely to defect (65% ♀ vs. 50% ♂). In this region, women have customarily held less economic power and they are used to obtain a payoff typically lower than men. We suggest that the women’s willingness to invest in cooperation has decreased throughout evolutionary time, providing us with an illustration of a culturally-driven shift towards a disparity in gender cooperation interests.     

Brown spider monkeys (Ateles hybridus): a model for differentiating the role of social networks and physical contact on parasite transmission dynamics

Elevated risk of disease transmission is considered a major cost of sociality, although empirical evidence supporting this idea remains scant. Variation in spatial cohesion and the occurrence of social interactions may have profound implications for patterns of interindividual parasite transmission. We used a social network approach to shed light on the importance of different aspects of group-living (i.e. within-group associations versus physical contact) on patterns of parasitism in a neotropical primate, the brown spider monkey (Ateles hybridus), which exhibits a high degree of fission–fusion subgrouping. We used daily subgroup composition records to create a ‘proximity’ network, and built a separate ‘contact’ network using social interactions involving physical contact. In the proximity network, connectivity between individuals was homogeneous, whereas the contact network highlighted high between-individual variation in the extent to which animals had physical contact with others, which correlated with an individual''s age and sex. The gastrointestinal parasite species richness of highly connected individuals was greater than that of less connected individuals in the contact network, but not in the proximity network. Our findings suggest that among brown spider monkeys, physical contact impacts the spread of several common parasites and supports the idea that pathogen transmission is one cost associated with social contact.     

The Anterior Insula Tracks Behavioral Entropy during an Interpersonal Competitive Game

In competitive situations, individuals need to adjust their behavioral strategy dynamically in response to their opponent’s behavior. In the present study, we investigated the neural basis of how individuals adjust their strategy during a simple, competitive game of matching pennies. We used entropy as a behavioral index of randomness in decision-making, because maximizing randomness is thought to be an optimal strategy in the game, according to game theory. While undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), subjects played matching pennies with either a human or computer opponent in each block, although in reality they played the game with the same computer algorithm under both conditions. The winning rate of each block was also manipulated. Both the opponent (human or computer), and the winning rate, independently affected subjects’ block-wise entropy during the game. The fMRI results revealed that activity in the bilateral anterior insula was positively correlated with subjects’ (not opponent’s) behavioral entropy during the game, which indicates that during an interpersonal competitive game, the anterior insula tracked how uncertain subjects’ behavior was, rather than how uncertain subjects felt their opponent''s behavior was. Our results suggest that intuitive or automatic processes based on somatic markers may be a key to optimally adjusting behavioral strategies in competitive situations.     

The Study of Cognitive Characteristics in Asperger’s Disorder by Using a Modified Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with a Variable Payoff Matrix

Individuals with Asperger’s Disorder (ASP) have difficulties in social reciprocity and in providing appropriate cooperative behavior. The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a well-known model in game theory that illustrates the paradoxical disposition of interaction between two individuals with opposing interests, and may be a useful tool in the diagnosis of ASP in early childhood. In this study, we investigated the cognitive characteristics of ASP by using a modified PD game. The subjects were 29 individuals with ASP and 28 age- and IQ-matched controls. In the PD game, each of two players has two cards: card 1 represents cooperation and card 2 betrayal. The score each player obtains is decided according to a 2 x 2 payoff matrix and depends on the combination of their selections. The P-score (“P” for punishment) is defined as the score that is given when they both select betrayal. Comparing the two groups, the mean P-score at the end of the game and the mean total score were significantly higher in the ASP group, while the rate of selection of cooperative choice in both groups did not differ significantly. The classification of the shape of the graph according to fluctuation of the P-score revealed that in the ASP group only 2 cases (6.9%) showed continuous decrease of P-score compared to 8 control cases (28.6%) demonstrating similar results. However, the reasons were thought to be different: ASP subjects presumably selected card 2 because of a preference for the number itself, whereas control subjects preferentially chose this card to enhance their chance of winning the competition. It is often difficult to diagnose ASP in the young especially when they lack the distinctive clinical features of ASD in early childhood. Given the limited number of objective tools to evaluate the cognitive characteristics of ASP subjects, the PD game might be a useful diagnostic support tool for ASP.     

Coevolution of adaptive technology,maladaptive culture and population size in a producer–scrounger game

Technology (i.e. tools, methods of cultivation and domestication, systems of construction and appropriation, machines) has increased the vital rates of humans, and is one of the defining features of the transition from Malthusian ecological stagnation to a potentially perpetual rising population growth. Maladaptations, on the other hand, encompass behaviours, customs and practices that decrease the vital rates of individuals. Technology and maladaptations are part of the total stock of culture carried by the individuals in a population. Here, we develop a quantitative model for the coevolution of cumulative adaptive technology and maladaptive culture in a ‘producer–scrounger’ game, which can also usefully be interpreted as an ‘individual–social’ learner interaction. Producers (individual learners) are assumed to invent new adaptations and maladaptations by trial-and-error learning, insight or deduction, and they pay the cost of innovation. Scroungers (social learners) are assumed to copy or imitate (cultural transmission) both the adaptations and maladaptations generated by producers. We show that the coevolutionary dynamics of producers and scroungers in the presence of cultural transmission can have a variety of effects on population carrying capacity. From stable polymorphism, where scroungers bring an advantage to the population (increase in carrying capacity), to periodic cycling, where scroungers decrease carrying capacity, we find that selection-driven cultural innovation and transmission may send a population on the path of indefinite growth or to extinction.     

Development of a New Method to Track Multiple Honey Bees with Complex Behaviors on a Flat Laboratory Arena

A computer program that tracks animal behavior, thereby revealing various features and mechanisms of social animals, is a powerful tool in ethological research. Because honeybee colonies are populated by thousands of bees, individuals co-exist in high physical densities and are difficult to track unless specifically tagged, which can affect behavior. In addition, honeybees react to light and recordings must be made under special red-light conditions, which the eyes of bees perceive as darkness. The resulting video images are scarcely distinguishable. We have developed a new algorithm, K-Track, for tracking numerous bees in a flat laboratory arena. Our program implements three main processes: (A) The object (bee''s) region is detected by simple threshold processing on gray scale images, (B) Individuals are identified by size, shape and spatiotemporal positional changes, and (C) Centers of mass of identified individuals are connected through all movie frames to yield individual behavioral trajectories. The tracking performance of our software was evaluated on movies of mobile multi-artificial agents and of 16 bees walking around a circular arena. K-Track accurately traced the trajectories of both artificial agents and bees. In the latter case, K-track outperformed Ctrax, well-known software for tracking multiple animals. To investigate interaction events in detail, we manually identified five interaction categories; ‘crossing’, ‘touching’, ‘passing’, ‘overlapping’ and ‘waiting’, and examined the extent to which the models accurately identified these categories from bee''s interactions. All 7 identified failures occurred near a wall at the outer edge of the arena. Finally, K-Track and Ctrax successfully tracked 77 and 60 of 84 recorded interactive events, respectively. K-Track identified multiple bees on a flat surface and tracked their speed changes and encounters with other bees, with good performance.     

Evolution Characteristics of the Network Core in the Facebook

Statistical properties of the static networks have been extensively studied. However, online social networks are evolving dynamically, understanding the evolving characteristics of the core is one of major concerns in online social networks. In this paper, we empirically investigate the evolving characteristics of the Facebook core. Firstly, we separate the Facebook-link(FL) and Facebook-wall(FW) datasets into 28 snapshots in terms of timestamps. By employing the k-core decomposition method to identify the core of each snapshot, we find that the core sizes of the FL and FW networks approximately contain about 672 and 373 nodes regardless of the exponential growth of the network sizes. Secondly, we analyze evolving topological properties of the core, including the k-core value, assortative coefficient, clustering coefficient and the average shortest path length. Empirical results show that nodes in the core are getting more interconnected in the evolving process. Thirdly, we investigate the life span of nodes belonging to the core. More than 50% nodes stay in the core for more than one year, and 19% nodes always stay in the core from the first snapshot. Finally, we analyze the connections between the core and the whole network, and find that nodes belonging to the core prefer to connect nodes with high k-core values, rather than the high degrees ones. This work could provide new insights into the online social network analysis.     

How institutions shaped the last major evolutionary transition to large-scale human societies

What drove the transition from small-scale human societies centred on kinship and personal exchange, to large-scale societies comprising cooperation and division of labour among untold numbers of unrelated individuals? We propose that the unique human capacity to negotiate institutional rules that coordinate social actions was a key driver of this transition. By creating institutions, humans have been able to move from the default ‘Hobbesian’ rules of the ‘game of life’, determined by physical/environmental constraints, into self-created rules of social organization where cooperation can be individually advantageous even in large groups of unrelated individuals. Examples include rules of food sharing in hunter–gatherers, rules for the usage of irrigation systems in agriculturalists, property rights and systems for sharing reputation between mediaeval traders. Successful institutions create rules of interaction that are self-enforcing, providing direct benefits both to individuals that follow them, and to individuals that sanction rule breakers. Forming institutions requires shared intentionality, language and other cognitive abilities largely absent in other primates. We explain how cooperative breeding likely selected for these abilities early in the Homo lineage. This allowed anatomically modern humans to create institutions that transformed the self-reliance of our primate ancestors into the division of labour of large-scale human social organization.     

Self-Fulfilling Prophecies as a Link between Men’s Facial Width-to-Height Ratio and Behavior

The facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) has been identified as a reliable predictor of men’s behavior, with researchers focusing on evolutionary selection pressures as the underlying mechanism explaining these relationships. In this paper, we complement this approach and examine the extent to which social processes also determine the extent to which men’s fWHR serves as a behavioral cue. Specifically, we propose that observers’ treatment of target men based on the targets’ fWHR subsequently affects behavior, leading the targets to behave in ways that are consistent with the observers’ expectations (i.e., a self-fulfilling prophecy). Results from four studies demonstrate that individuals behave more selfishly when interacting with men with greater fWHRs, and this selfish behavior, in turn, elicits selfish behavior in others.     

Evolution of Conformity in Social Dilemmas

People often deviate from their individual Nash equilibrium strategy in game experiments based on the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game and the public goods game (PGG), whereas conditional cooperation, or conformity, is supported by the data from these experiments. In a complicated environment with no obvious “dominant” strategy, conformists who choose the average strategy of the other players in their group could be able to avoid risk by guaranteeing their income will be close to the group average. In this paper, we study the repeated PD game and the repeated m-person PGG, where individuals’ strategies are restricted to the set of conforming strategies. We define a conforming strategy by two parameters, initial action in the game and the influence of the other players’ choices in the previous round. We are particularly interested in the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, which is the well-known conforming strategy in theoretical and empirical studies. In both the PD game and the PGG, TFT can prevent the invasion of non-cooperative strategy if the expected number of rounds exceeds a critical value. The stability analysis of adaptive dynamics shows that conformity in general promotes the evolution of cooperation, and that a regime of cooperation can be established in an AllD population through TFT-like strategies. These results provide insight into the emergence of cooperation in social dilemma games.     

Dynamic Hubs Show Competitive and Static Hubs Non-Competitive Regulation of Their Interaction Partners

Date hub proteins have 1 or 2 interaction interfaces but many interaction partners. This raises the question of whether all partner proteins compete for the interaction interface of the hub or if the cell carefully regulates aspects of this process? Here, we have used real-time rendering of protein interaction networks to analyse the interactions of all the 1 or 2 interface hubs of Saccharomyces cerevisiae during the cell cycle. By integrating previously determined structural and gene expression data, and visually hiding the nodes (proteins) and their edges (interactions) during their troughs of expression, we predict when interactions of hubs and their partners are likely to exist. This revealed that 20 out of all 36 one- or two- interface hubs in the yeast interactome fell within two main groups. The first was dynamic hubs with static partners, which can be considered as ‘competitive hubs’. Their interaction partners will compete for the interaction interface of the hub and the success of any interaction will be dictated by the kinetics of interaction (abundance and affinity) and subcellular localisation. The second was static hubs with dynamic partners, which we term ‘non-competitive hubs’. Regulatory mechanisms are finely tuned to lessen the presence and/or effects of competition between the interaction partners of the hub. It is possible that these regulatory processes may also be used by the cell for the regulation of other, non-cell cycle processes.     

Effects of Conformism on the Cultural Evolution of Social Behaviour

Models of cultural evolution study how the distribution of cultural traits changes over time. The dynamics of cultural evolution strongly depends on the way these traits are transmitted between individuals by social learning. Two prominent forms of social learning are payoff-based learning (imitating others that have higher payoffs) and conformist learning (imitating locally common behaviours). How payoff-based and conformist learning affect the cultural evolution of cooperation is currently a matter of lively debate, but few studies systematically analyse the interplay of these forms of social learning. Here we perform such a study by investigating how the interaction of payoff-based and conformist learning affects the outcome of cultural evolution in three social contexts. First, we develop a simple argument that provides insights into how the outcome of cultural evolution will change when more and more conformist learning is added to payoff-based learning. In a social dilemma (e.g. a Prisoner’s Dilemma), conformism can turn cooperation into a stable equilibrium; in an evasion game (e.g. a Hawk-Dove game or a Snowdrift game) conformism tends to destabilize the polymorphic equilibrium; and in a coordination game (e.g. a Stag Hunt game), conformism changes the basin of attraction of the two equilibria. Second, we analyse a stochastic event-based model, revealing that conformism increases the speed of cultural evolution towards pure equilibria. Individual-based simulations as well as the analysis of the diffusion approximation of the stochastic model by and large confirm our findings. Third, we investigate the effect of an increasing degree of conformism on cultural group selection in a group-structured population. We conclude that, in contrast to statements in the literature, conformism hinders rather than promotes the evolution of cooperation.     

The hawk–dove game in a sexually reproducing species explains a colourful polymorphism of an endangered bird

The hawk–dove game famously introduced strategic game theory thinking into biology and forms the basis of arguments for limited aggression in animal populations. However, aggressive ‘hawks’ and peaceful ‘doves’, with strategies inherited in a discrete manner, have never been documented in a real animal population. Thus, the applicability of game-theoretic arguments to real populations might be contested. Here, we show that the head-colour polymorphism of red and black Gouldian finches (Erythrura gouldiae) provides a real-life example. The aggressive red morph is behaviourally dominant and successfully invades black populations, but when red ‘hawks’ become too common, their fitness is severely compromised (via decreased parental ability). We also investigate the effects of real-life deviations, particularly sexual reproduction, from the simple original game, which assumed asexual reproduction. A protected polymorphism requires mate choice to be sufficiently assortative. Assortative mating is adaptive for individuals because of genetic incompatibilities affecting hybrid offspring fitness, but by allowing red ‘hawks’ to persist, it also leads to significantly reduced population sizes. Because reductions in male contributions to parental care are generally known to lead to lower population productivity in birds, we expect zero-sum competition to often have wide ranging population consequences.     

The genetic network of greater sage‐grouse: Range‐wide identification of keystone hubs of connectivity

Genetic networks can characterize complex genetic relationships among groups of individuals, which can be used to rank nodes most important to the overall connectivity of the system. Ranking allows scarce resources to be guided toward nodes integral to connectivity. The greater sage‐grouse (Centrocercus urophasianus) is a species of conservation concern that breeds on spatially discrete leks that must remain connected by genetic exchange for population persistence. We genotyped 5,950 individuals from 1,200 greater sage‐grouse leks distributed across the entire species’ geographic range. We found a small‐world network composed of 458 nodes connected by 14,481 edges. This network was composed of hubs—that is, nodes facilitating gene flow across the network—and spokes—that is, nodes where connectivity is served by hubs. It is within these hubs that the greatest genetic diversity was housed. Using indices of network centrality, we identified hub nodes of greatest conservation importance. We also identified keystone nodes with elevated centrality despite low local population size. Hub and keystone nodes were found across the entire species’ contiguous range, although nodes with elevated importance to network‐wide connectivity were found more central: especially in northeastern, central, and southwestern Wyoming and eastern Idaho. Nodes among which genes are most readily exchanged were mostly located in Montana and northern Wyoming, as well as Utah and eastern Nevada. The loss of hub or keystone nodes could lead to the disintegration of the network into smaller, isolated subnetworks. Protecting both hub nodes and keystone nodes will conserve genetic diversity and should maintain network connections to ensure a resilient and viable population over time. Our analysis shows that network models can be used to model gene flow, offering insights into its pattern and process, with application to prioritizing landscapes for conservation.     

Early Social Experience Predicts Referential Communicative Adjustments in Five-Year-Old Children

A large body of work has focused on children’s ability to attribute mental states to other people, and whether these abilities are influenced by the extent and nature of children’s social interactions. However, it remains largely unknown which developmental factors shape children’s ability to influence the mental states of others. Building on the suggestion that collaborative experiences early in life might be crucial for the emergence of mental coordination abilities, here we assess the relative contribution of social exposure to familial and non-familial agents on children’s communicative adjustments to their mental model of an addressee (‘audience design’). During an online interactive game, five-year-olds spontaneously organized their non-verbal communicative behaviors according to their beliefs about an interlocutor. The magnitude of these communicative adjustments was predicted by the time spent at daycare, from birth until four years of age, over and above effects of familial social environment. These results suggest that the degree of non-familial social interaction early in life modulates the influence that children’s beliefs have on their referential communicative behavior.     

Electrophysiological Indices of Response Inhibition in a Go/NoGo Task Predict Self-Control in a Social Context

Recent research demonstrates that response inhibition—a core executive function—may subserve self-regulation and self-control. However, it is unclear whether response inhibition also predicts self-control in the multifaceted, high-level phenomena of social decision-making. Here we examined whether electrophysiological indices of response inhibition would predict self-control in a social context. Electroencephalography was recorded as participants completed a widely used Go/NoGo task (the cued Continuous Performance Test). Participants then interacted with a partner in an economic exchange game that requires self-control. Results demonstrated that greater NoGo-Anteriorization and larger NoGo-P300 peak amplitudes—two established electrophysiological indices of response inhibition—both predicted more self-control in this social game. These findings support continued integration of executive function and self-regulation and help extend prior research into social decision-making processes.