Psychological Traces of China's Socio-Economic Reforms in the Ultimatum and Dictator Games

Can traces of rapid socio-economic changes within a society be reflected in experimental games? The post-Mao reforms in China provide a unique natural quasi-experiment to study people from the same society who were raised with radically different values about distribution of wealth and altruistic behavior. We tested whether the size of offers in the ultimatum and dictator games are an increasing function of the number of years Chinese citizens experienced of the Mao era (“planned economy”). For the cohort that lived throughout the entire Mao era, we found that mean offers in the two games were substantially higher than what is typically offered in laboratory studies. These offers were also higher than those of two younger Chinese cohorts. In general, the amount offered decreased with less time spent under Mao, while in the oldest group in which every member spent the same amount of time under Mao, the younger members tended to offer more, suggesting an additional effect of early education under Mao and contradicting the alternative hypothesis that generosity increases with age. These results suggest that some of the observed individual differences in the offers made in experimental games can be traced back to the values of the socio-economic era in which individuals grew up.     

Stability of Mixed-Strategy-Based Iterative Logit Quantal Response Dynamics in Game Theory

Using the Logit quantal response form as the response function in each step, the original definition of static quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is extended into an iterative evolution process. QREs remain as the fixed points of the dynamic process. However, depending on whether such fixed points are the long-term solutions of the dynamic process, they can be classified into stable (SQREs) and unstable (USQREs) equilibriums. This extension resembles the extension from static Nash equilibriums (NEs) to evolutionary stable solutions in the framework of evolutionary game theory. The relation between SQREs and other solution concepts of games, including NEs and QREs, is discussed. Using experimental data from other published papers, we perform a preliminary comparison between SQREs, NEs, QREs and the observed behavioral outcomes of those experiments. For certain games, we determine that SQREs have better predictive power than QREs and NEs.     

An ESS maximum principle for matrix games

Previous work has demonstrated that for games defined by differential or difference equations with a continuum of strategies, there exists a G-function, related to individual fitness, that must take on a maximum with respect to a virtual variable v whenever v is one of the vectors in the coalition of vectors which make up the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). This result, called the ESS maximum principle, is quite useful in determining candidates for an ESS. This principle is reformulated here, so that it may be conveniently applied to matrix games. In particular, we define a matrix game to be one in which fitness is expressed in terms of strategy frequencies and a matrix of expected payoffs. It is shown that the G-function in the matrix game setting must again take on a maximum value at all the strategies which make up the ESS coalition vector. The reformulated maximum principle is applicable to both bilinear and nonlinear matrix games. One advantage in employing this principle to solve the traditional bilinear matrix game is that the same G-function is used to find both pure and mixed strategy solutions by simply specifying an appropriate strategy space. Furthermore we show how the theory may be used to solve matrix games which are not in the usual bilinear form. We examine in detail two nonlinear matrix games: the game between relatives and the sex ratio game. In both of these games an ESS solution is determined. These examples not only illustrate the usefulness of this approach to finding solutions to an expanded class of matrix games, but aids in understanding the nature of the ESS as well.     

Natural selection and veridical perceptions

Does natural selection favor veridical perceptions, those that more accurately depict the objective environment? Students of perception often claim that it does. But this claim, though influential, has not been adequately tested. Here we formalize the claim and a few alternatives. To test them, we introduce “interface games,” a class of evolutionary games in which perceptual strategies compete. We explore, in closed-form solutions and Monte Carlo simulations, some simpler games that assume frequency-dependent selection and complete mixing in infinite populations. We find that veridical perceptions can be driven to extinction by non-veridical strategies that are tuned to utility rather than objective reality. This suggests that natural selection need not favor veridical perceptions, and that the effects of selection on sensory perception deserve further study.     

The influence of cultural framing on play in the trust game: a Maasai example

The effects of cultural framing on behavior in experimental games were explored with a trust game and the Maasai concept of osotua. Maasai use the term osotua to refer to gift-giving relationships based on obligation, need, respect, and restraint. In the trust game, the first player is given money and an opportunity to give any portion of it to the second player. The amount given is then multiplied by the experimenter, and the second player has an opportunity to give any amount back to the first player. Fifty trust games were played by Maasai men at a field site in north central Kenya. Half of the games were played without deliberate framing, and half were framed with the statement, “This is an osotua game.” Compared to games with no deliberate framing, those played within the osotua rhetorical frame were associated with lower transfers by both players and with lower expected returns on the part of the first players. Osotua rhetorical framing is also associated with a negative correlation between amounts given by the first player and amounts returned by the second. These results have implications both for the experimental game method and for our understanding of the relationship between culture and behavior.     

A theory for the evolutionary game

We present an evolutionary game theory. This theory differs in several respects from current theories related to Maynard Smith's pioneering work on evolutionary stable strategies (ESS). Most current work deals with two person matrix games. For these games the strategy set is finite. We consider evolutionary games which are defined over a continuous strategy set and which permit any number of players. Matrix games are included as a bilinear continuous game. However, under our definition, such games will not posses an ESS on the interior of the strategy set. We extend previous work on continuous games by developing an ESS definition which permits the ESS to be composed of a coalition of several strategies. This definition requires that the coalition must not only be stable with respect to perturbations in strategy frequencies which comprise the coalition, but the coalition must also satisfy the requirement that no mutant strategies can invade. Ecological processes are included in the model by explicitly considering population size and density dependent selection.     

Trust and Reciprocity: Are Effort and Money Equivalent?

Trust and reciprocity facilitate cooperation and are relevant to virtually all human interactions. They are typically studied using trust games: one subject gives (entrusts) money to another subject, which may return some of the proceeds (reciprocate). Currently, however, it is unclear whether trust and reciprocity in monetary transactions are similar in other settings, such as physical effort. Trust and reciprocity of physical effort are important as many everyday decisions imply an exchange of physical effort, and such exchange is central to labor relations. Here we studied a trust game based on physical effort and compared the results with those of a computationally equivalent monetary trust game. We found no significant difference between effort and money conditions in both the amount trusted and the quantity reciprocated. Moreover, there is a high positive correlation in subjects' behavior across conditions. This suggests that trust and reciprocity may be character traits: subjects that are trustful/trustworthy in monetary settings behave similarly during exchanges of physical effort. Our results validate the use of trust games to study exchanges in physical effort and to characterize inter-subject differences in trust and reciprocity, and also suggest a new behavioral paradigm to study these differences.     

Individual differences in plasticity and sampling when playing behavioural games

When engaged in behavioural games, animals can adjust their use of alternative tactics until groups reach stable equilibria. Recent theory on behavioural plasticity in games predicts that individuals should differ in their plasticity or responsiveness and hence in their degree of behavioural adjustment. Moreover, individuals are predicted to be consistent in their plasticity within and across biological contexts. These predictions have yet to be tested empirically and so we examine the behavioural adjustment of individual nutmeg mannikins (Lonchura punctulata), gregarious ground-feeding passerines, when playing two different social foraging games: producer-scrounger (PS) and patch-choice (PC) games. We found: (i) significant individual differences in plasticity and sampling behaviour in each of the two games, (ii) individual differences in sampling behaviour were consistent over different test conditions within a game (PC) and over a six month period (PS), (iii) but neither individual plasticity nor sampling behaviour was correlated from one social foraging game to another. The rate at which birds sampled alternative tactics was positively associated with seed intake in PS trials but negatively associated in PC trials. These results suggest that games with frequency dependence of pay-offs can maintain differences in behavioural plasticity but that an important component of this plasticity is group- and/or context-specific.     

Comparison of the physiological responses to different small-sided games in elite young soccer players

The purpose of this study was to compare the blood lactate (La-), heart rate (HR) and percentage of maximum HR (%HRmax) responses among the small-sided games (SSGs) in elite young soccer players. Sixteen players (average age 15.7 6 0.4 years; height 176.8 6 4.6 cm; body mass 65.5 6 5.6 kg; VO2max 53.1 6 5.9 ml · kg(-1) · min(-1); HRmax 195.9 6 7.4 b · min(-1)) volunteered to perform the YoYo intermittent recovery test and 6 bouts of soccer drills including 1-a-side, 2-a-side, 3-a-side, and 4-a-side games without a goalkeeper in random order at 2-day intervals. The differences in La-, HR and%HRmax either among the SSGs or among the bouts were identified using 4 x 6 (games x exercise bouts) 2-way analysis of variance with repeated measures. Significant differences were found on La-, HR, and %HRmax among the bouts (p ≤ 0.05). The 3-a-side and 4-a-side games were significantly higher than 1-a-side and 2-a-side games on HR and %HRmax (p ≤ 0.05), whereas the 1-a-side game significantly resulted in higher La- responses compared to other SSGs. This study demonstrated that physiological responses during the 1-a-side and 2-a-side games were different compared to 3-a-side and 4-a-side games. Therefore, it can be concluded that a decreased number of players results in increased intensity during SSGs including 6 bouts. These results suggest that coaches should pay attention on choosing the SSG type and the number of bouts to improve desired physical conditioning of elite young soccer players in soccer training.     

Extrapolating Weak Selection in Evolutionary Games

In evolutionary games, reproductive success is determined by payoffs. Weak selection means that even large differences in game outcomes translate into small fitness differences. Many results have been derived using weak selection approximations, in which perturbation analysis facilitates the derivation of analytical results. Here, we ask whether results derived under weak selection are also qualitatively valid for intermediate and strong selection. By “qualitatively valid” we mean that the ranking of strategies induced by an evolutionary process does not change when the intensity of selection increases. For two-strategy games, we show that the ranking obtained under weak selection cannot be carried over to higher selection intensity if the number of players exceeds two. For games with three (or more) strategies, previous examples for multiplayer games have shown that the ranking of strategies can change with the intensity of selection. In particular, rank changes imply that the most abundant strategy at one intensity of selection can become the least abundant for another. We show that this applies already to pairwise interactions for a broad class of evolutionary processes. Even when both weak and strong selection limits lead to consistent predictions, rank changes can occur for intermediate intensities of selection. To analyze how common such games are, we show numerically that for randomly drawn two-player games with three or more strategies, rank changes frequently occur and their likelihood increases rapidly with the number of strategies . In particular, rank changes are almost certain for , which jeopardizes the predictive power of results derived for weak selection.     

Evolution of cooperation with shared costs and benefits

The quest to determine how cooperation evolves can be based on evolutionary game theory, in spite of the fact that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) for most non-zero-sum games are not cooperative. We analyse the evolution of cooperation for a family of evolutionary games involving shared costs and benefits with a continuum of strategies from non-cooperation to total cooperation. This cost-benefit game allows the cooperator to share in the benefit of a cooperative act, and the recipient to be burdened with a share of the cooperator's cost. The cost-benefit game encompasses the Prisoner's Dilemma, Snowdrift game and Partial Altruism. The models produce ESS solutions of total cooperation, partial cooperation, non-cooperation and coexistence between cooperation and non-cooperation. Cooperation emerges from an interplay between the nonlinearities in the cost and benefit functions. If benefits increase at a decelerating rate and costs increase at an accelerating rate with the degree of cooperation, then the ESS has an intermediate level of cooperation. The game also exhibits non-ESS points such as unstable minima, convergent-stable minima and unstable maxima. The emergence of cooperative behaviour in this game represents enlightened self-interest, whereas non-cooperative solutions illustrate the Tragedy of the Commons. Games having either a stable maximum or a stable minimum have the property that small changes in the incentive structure (model parameter values) or culture (starting frequencies of strategies) result in correspondingly small changes in the degree of cooperation. Conversely, with unstable maxima or unstable minima, small changes in the incentive structure or culture can result in a switch from non-cooperation to total cooperation (and vice versa). These solutions identify when human or animal societies have the potential for cooperation and whether cooperation is robust or fragile.     

Emerging factors affecting the continuance of online gaming: the roles of bridging and bonding social factors

The forecasted growth of the online gaming industry in Korea is expected to reach over 11.8 trillion Korean won (KRW) by 2014. Nearly 60 % of domestic residents play online games. Online games are becoming an integral part of life and we need different perspectives to look into this subject rather than focus on the negatives such as online gaming addiction. In addition, although achievement motivation for online games has been emphasized in earlier research, communicating and socializing with other players is commonplace in today’s online gaming world and socialization motivation is emerging as an important factor influencing online gamers. With stress on the communication and socialization aspects of online gaming, we need different perspectives from those of the past to investigate online gaming and draw on social capital theory. By socially interacting with other gamers, the online gamer not only builds new relationships (bridging social capital), but he/she also strengthens existing relationships (bonding social capital). However, previous research has concentrated only on one of these types of user interactions, and has not analyzed interactions for both bridging and bonding social capital at the same time. Therefore, this study explores both bridging and bonding social capital in online gaming with a neutral dependent construct, the continuance of online gaming, and provides new insights and implications for future research and the industry.     

On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem

In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the fundamental theory for non-cooperative games, defines all Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games. Here, we prove that Nash equilibria that are not characterised by the folk theorem do exist. By adopting specific reactive strategies, a group of players can be better off by coordinating their actions in repeated games. We call it a type-k equilibrium when a group of k players coordinate their actions and they have no incentive to deviate from their strategies simultaneously. The existence and stability of the type-k equilibrium in general games is discussed. This study shows that the sets of Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable states have greater cardinality than classic game theory has predicted in many repeated games.     

Physiological and skill demands of 'on-side' and 'off-side' games

This study investigated the physiological and skill demands of 'on-side' and 'off-side' games in elite rugby league players. Sixteen male rugby league players participated in 'on-side' and 'off-side' games. Both small-sided games were played in a 40- × 40-m playing area. The 'off-side' game permitted players to have 3 'plays' while in possession of the ball. Players were permitted to pass backward or forward (to an 'off-side' player). The 'on-side' game also permitted players to have 3 'plays' while in possession of the ball. However, players were only permitted to pass backward to players in an 'on-side' position. Heart rate and movement patterns (via global positioning system) were recorded continuously throughout both games. Data were collected on the distance covered, number of high-acceleration and velocity efforts, and recovery between efforts. Video footage was also taken to track the performance of the players. Post hoc inspection of the footage was undertaken to count the number of possessions and the number and quality of disposals. In comparison to 'on-side' games, 'off-side' games had a greater number of involvements ("touches"), passes, and effective passes. However, the cognitive demands of 'on-side' games were greater than 'off-side' games. 'Off-side' games resulted in a greater total distance covered, greater distance covered in mild and moderate accelerations, and greater distance covered in low, moderate, and high-velocity efforts. There were also a greater number of short duration recovery periods between efforts in 'off-side' games. The results of this study demonstrate that 'off-side' games provide greater physiological and skill demands than 'on-side' games. 'Off-side' games may provide a practical alternative to 'on-side' games for the development of skill and fitness in elite rugby league players.     

Natural selection and social preferences

A large number of individuals are randomly matched into groups, where each group plays a finite symmetric game. Individuals breed true. The expected number of surviving offspring depends on own material payoff, but may also, due to cooperative breeding and/or reproductive competition, depend on the material payoffs to other group members. The induced population dynamic is equivalent with the replicator dynamic for a game with payoffs derived from those in the original game. We apply this selection dynamic to a number of examples, including prisoners' dilemma games with and without a punishment option, coordination games, and hawk-dove games. For each of these, we compare the outcomes with those obtained under the standard replicator dynamic. By way of a revealed-preference argument, our selection dynamic can explain certain "altruistic" and "spiteful" behaviors that are consistent with individuals having social preferences.     

A logical circuit for the regulation of fission yeast growth modes

Growth of fission yeast at the ends of its cylindrical cells switches from a monopolar to a bipolar mode, before it ceases during mitosis and cell division. Here we assume that these growth modes correspond to three stable states of an underlying regulatory circuit, which is a relatively simple and to a large degree autonomous subsystem of an otherwise complex cellular control system. We develop a switch-like logical circuit based on three elements defined as binary variables. Effects of circuit variables on each other are expressed in terms of logical operations. We analyse this circuit for its behavior ("phenotypes") after removing single or multiple operations ("mutants"). Known fission yeast polarity mutants such as those defective in the switch to bipolar growth can be classified based on these predicted 'phenotypes'. Differences in growth patterns between daughter cells in different bipolar growth mutants are also predicted by the circuit model. The model presented here should provide a useful framework to guide future experiments into mechanisms of cellular polarity. This paper illustrates the usefulness of simple logical circuits to describe and dissect features of complex regulatory processes such as the fission yeast growth patterns in both wild type and mutant cells.     

The Shapley value of phylogenetic trees

Every weighted tree corresponds naturally to a cooperative game that we call a tree game; it assigns to each subset of leaves the sum of the weights of the minimal subtree spanned by those leaves. In the context of phylogenetic trees, the leaves are species and this assignment captures the diversity present in the coalition of species considered. We consider the Shapley value of tree games and suggest a biological interpretation. We determine the linear transformation M that shows the dependence of the Shapley value on the edge weights of the tree, and we also compute a null space basis of M. Both depend on the split counts of the tree. Finally, we characterize the Shapley value on tree games by four axioms, a counterpart to Shapley’s original theorem on the larger class of cooperative games. We also include a brief discussion of the core of tree games. Research of Francis Edward Su was partially supported by NSF Grants DMS-0301129 and DMS-0701308.     

Geographical and technological differences in Life Cycle Inventories shown by the use of process models for waste incinerators

Goal and Background  Geographical and technological differences in Life Cycle Inventory data are an important source for uncertainty in the result of Life Cycle Assessments. Knowledge on their impact on the result of an LCA is scarce, and also knowledge on how to manage them in an LCA case study. Objective  Goal of this paper is to explore these differences for municipal solid waste incinerator plants, and to develop recommendations for managing technological and geographical differences. Methodology  The paper provides a definition of technological and geographical differences, and analyses their possible impacts. In a case study, the differences are caused intentionally in ‘games’, by virtually transplanting incineration plants to a different location and by changing parameters such as the composition of the waste input incinerated. The games are performed by using a modular model for municipal solid waste incinerator plants. In each case, an LCA including an Impact Assessment is calculated to trace the impact of these changes, and the results are compared. Conclusions  The conclusions of the paper are two-fold: (1) reduce the differences in inventory data where their impact on the result is high; where it is possible reducing them to a great extent, and the effort for performing the change acceptable; in the case of incineration plants: Adapt the flue gas treatment, especially a possible DeNOx step, to the real conditions; (2) make use of modular process models that allow adapting plant parameters to better meet real conditions, but be aware of possible modelling errors. We invite the scientific community to validate the model used for a waste incinerator plant, and suggest putting up similar models for other processes, preferably those of similar relevance for Life Cycle Inventories.     

Geographical and technological differences in life cycle inventories shown by the use of process models for waste incinerators part I. technological and geographical differences

Goal and Background  Geographical and technological differences in Life Cycle Inventory data are an important source for uncertainty in the result of Life Cycle Assessments. Knowledge on their impact on the result of an LCA is scarce, and also knowledge on how to manage them in an LCA case study. Objective  Goal of this paper is to explore these differences for municipal solid waste incinerator plants, and to develop recommendations for managing technological and geographical differences. Methodology  The paper provides a definition of technological and geographical differences, and analyses their possible impacts. In a case study, the differences are caused intentionally in ‘games’, by virtually transplanting incineration plants to a different location and by changing parameters such as the composition of the waste input incinerated. The games are performed by using a modular model for municipal solid waste incinerator plants. In each case, an LCA including an Impact Assessment is calculated to trace the impact of these changes, and the results are compared. Conclusions  The conclusions of the paper are two-fold: (1) reduce the differences in inventory data where their impact on the result is high; where it is possible reducing them to a great extent, and the effort for performing the change acceptable; in the case of incineration plants: Adapt the flue gas treatment, especially a possible DeNOx step, to the real conditions; (2) make use of modular process models that allow adapting plant parameters to better meet real conditions, but be aware of possible modelling errors. The paper invites the scientific community to validate the model used for a waste incinerator plant, and suggest putting up similar models for other processes, preferably those of similar relevance for Life Cycle Inventories.     

Monitoring the Early Signs of Cognitive Decline in Elderly by Computer Games: An MRI Study

BackgroundIt is anticipated that current and future preventive therapies will likely be more effective in the early stages of dementia, when everyday functioning is not affected. Accordingly the early identification of people at risk is particularly important. In most cases, when subjects visit an expert and are examined using neuropsychological tests, the disease has already been developed. Contrary to this cognitive games are played by healthy, well functioning elderly people, subjects who should be monitored for early signs. Further advantages of cognitive games are their accessibility and their cost-effectiveness.PurposeThe aim of the investigation was to show that computer games can help to identify those who are at risk. In order to validate games analysis was completed which measured the correlations between results of the ''Find the Pairs'' memory game and the volumes of the temporal brain regions previously found to be good predictors of later cognitive decline.ResultsThere was a correlation between the number of attempts and the time required to complete the memory game and the volume of the entorhinal cortex, the temporal pole, and the hippocampus. There was also a correlation between the results of the Paired Associates Learning (PAL) test and the memory game.ConclusionsThe results gathered support the initial hypothesis that healthy elderly subjects achieving lower scores in the memory game have increased level of atrophy in the temporal brain structures and showed a decreased performance in the PAL test. Based on these results it can be concluded that memory games may be useful in early screening for cognitive decline.