Implications of Odera Oruka's ethics of consumerism for reducing globesity

In this paper, I advance Odera Oruka's insights on the ethics of consumerism in order to draw relevant implications of his thoughts on rethinking the problem of obesity. I argue that Oruka's ethics of consumerism and his right to human minimum theory entail some salient ideas that might serve as a better ethical model for reducing the global obesity prevalence. Though Oruka's African moral philosophy is yet to receive universal attention it arguably deserves, the interests of the international and ‘globesity’ community would be better served learning from the contributions of an African moral theory to contemporary bioethical discourse on obesity. Oruka's moral thoughts are by constitution, a deontological and cosmopolitan call for reducing hunger in globalized world, while also indirectly, addressing obesity of the poor. I show the limitations of his ethics of consumerism, and the shortcomings of such ethics in the context of obesity of the poor. Consequently, I develop a neo‐Orukan virtue based ethics that is worthy of attention in efforts towards addressing the obesity tide. No such perspective currently exists in the context of obesity; yet the exigent need for one is necessitated by the defects of the libertarian and harm principle approaches in Western bioethical discourse.     

Really taking Darwin seriously: An alternative to Michael Ruse's Darwinian metaethics

Michael Ruse has proposed in his recent book Taking Darwin Seriously and elsewhere a new Darwinian ethics distinct from traditional evolutionary ethics, one that avoids the latter's inadequate accounts of the nature of morality and its failed attempts to provide a naturalistic justification of morality. Ruse argues for a sociobiologically based account of moral sentiments, and an evolutionary based casual explanation of their function, rejecting the possibility of ultimate ethical justification. We find that Ruse's proposal distorts, overextends and weakens both Darwinism and naturalism. So we propose an alternative Darwinian metaethics that both remedies the problems in Ruse's proposal and shows how a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness avoids the naturalistic fallacy and can provide genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive ethical claims. Thus, we propose to really take Darwin seriously.The authors are equally responsible for the writing of this paper.     

Ethical implications of genetic analysis of individual susceptibility to diseases

Ethics can be regarded as a reflection or reconsideration of existing moral codes in the search of good and goes beyond moral conduct. This means that ethics is a never-ending process, which in science must develop with the development of science itself. Thus, the process of seeking better ethics is as integral within science as the development of new methods. Along these lines of thought it can be argued that (1) poor science cannot be ethically sound, (2) every scientist has a personal responsibility to develop ethics in his area of expertise, (3) the development of solid ethical background in science requires education in ethics as well as in methodology and scientific thinking and (4) research ethics cannot develop in solitude, but needs input from other scientists, other fields (including philosophy) and society. Several burning questions can be identified within genetic analysis for individual susceptibility. These ethical aspects can be viewed from three different perspectives: practice of research, patient/research subject personally and long-term implications in society. This paper tries more to awaken thoughts than give clear answers.     

Bioethics and law: a developmental perspective

In most Western countries, health law bioethics are strongly intertwined. This strong connection is the result of some specific factors that, in the early years of these disciplines, facilitated a rapid development of both. In this paper, I analyse these factors and construe a development theory existing of three phases, or ideal-typical models.
In the moralistic-paternalistic model, there is almost no health law of explicit medical ethics and the little law there is is usually based on traditional morality, combined with paternalist motives, the objections to this modal are that its paternalism and moralism are unacceptable, that it is too static and knows no external control mechanisms.
In the liberal model, which is now dominant on most Western countries, law and ethics closely cooperate and converge, both disciplines use the same framework for analysis: they are product-oriented rather than practice-oriented; they use the same conceptual categories, they focus on the minimally decent rather than the ideal, and they are committed to the same substantive normative theory in which patient autonomy and patient rights are central. However, each of these four characteristics also result in a certain one-sidedness.
In some countries, a third model is emerging. In this postliberal model, health law is more modest and acknowledges its inherent and normative limits, whereas ethics takes a richer and most ambitious self image. As a result health law and ethics will partly diverge again.     

The evolutionary ethics of Alfred C. Kinsey

It is commonplace to point out that Alfred Kinsey's taxonomic work on gall wasps provided a methodology for his studies of human sexual behavior. It is equally commonplace to point out that, when researching and presenting his sexual studies, Kinsey's professedly neutral scientific data were constrained by a social agenda. What I have done in this paper is to join these two claims and demonstrate, with particular reference to Kinsey's Sexual Behavior in the Human Male, how his zoology helped guide Kinsey to a naturalistic ethics that, despite contrasts to, shared certain parallel logical failures with the traditional ethics of his critics.     

Why Restrictions on the Immigration of Health Workers Are Unjust

Some bioethicists and political philosophers argue that rich states should restrict the immigration of health workers from poor countries in order to prevent harm to people in these countries. In this essay, I argue that restrictions on the immigration of health workers are unjust, even if this immigration results in bad health outcomes for people in poor countries. I contend that negative duties to refrain from interfering with the occupational liberties of health workers outweighs rich states' positive duties to prevent harm to people in sending countries. Furthermore, I defend this claim against the objection that health workers in poor countries acquire special duties to their compatriots that render them liable to coercive interference.     

Autonomy,Natality and Freedom: A Liberal Re‐examination of Habermas in the Enhancement Debate

Jurgen Habermas has argued that carrying out pre‐natal germline enhancements would be inimical to the future child's autonomy. In this article, I suggest that many of the objections that have been made against Habermas' arguments by liberals in the enhancement debate misconstrue his claims. To explain why, I begin by explaining how Habermas' view of personal autonomy confers particular importance to the agent's embodiment and social environment. In view of this, I explain that it is possible to draw two arguments against germline enhancements from Habermas' thought. I call these arguments ‘the argument from negative freedom’ and ‘the argument from natality’. Although I argue that many of the common liberal objections to Habermas are not applicable when his arguments are properly understood, I go on to suggest ways in which supporters of enhancement might appropriately respond to Habermas' arguments.     

Enrico Ferri’s Scientific Socialism: A Marxist Interpretation of Herbert Spencer’s Organic Analogy

Spencer’s evolutionary philosophy is usually identified with right-wing doctrines such as individualism, laissez-faire liberalism and even conservatism. Since he himself defended similar positions, it is perhaps not surprising that the study of the political interpretations of his ideas has drawn relatively little attention. In this article I propose to examine a rather atypical reading of Spencer’s organic analogy, though definitely not a marginal one: Enrico Ferri’s Marxist doctrine of Scientific Socialism. Ferri is not a figure unknown to scholars interested in the political aspects of the evolutionary debate. Nonetheless, the relation between his theory and Spencer’s bio-sociology – notably the complex dialectic of themes such as “the struggle for existence” versus “class struggle,” or “evolution” versus “revolution” – has not yet received full-length analysis. In my study I investigate the diffusion of Spencer’s ideas in Italy and their impact on the new “positivist” sciences of psychology and sociology inasmuch as these questions are essential to understanding Ferri’s position. Throughout, I stress the importance of the intellectual and political context in the process of appropriation of ideas that led to this unexpected shift in meaning.¹ Spencer, 1843, 1851, 1879–1893, 1884.     

Pentecostal peacefulness: virtue ethics and the reception of theology in Nepal

The anthropology of Christianity has struggled to theorize the place of theology in Christian social life. Drawing on Alasdair MacIntyre's account of virtue ethics, in particular his concepts of practice, narrative, and moral tradition, I explore the reception of Pentecostal theology in the Nepali city of Bhaktapur. I show how local Christians have drawn on Pentecostal eschatology to develop a pacifistic ethics, allowing them to negotiate local social and religious conflicts. The belief that Christ has decisively defeated evil spirits allows local Christians to detach themselves from cycles of aggression connected with witchcraft accusations, providing a space of security in which to cultivate distinctive practices of care. Connecting this local theology with a wider tradition in Pentecostal moral thought, I argue that MacIntyre's virtue ethics provides a powerful tool for interpreting the relationship between local circumstance and extra‐local theology, and for studying cross‐cultural patterns of theological reception.     

全球化背景下医学伦理学教学改革的探索

医学伦理学理论和实践根植于一定时期的社会经济、文化和教育,并随之发生改变和发展。随着全球经济一体化的进展完善,不同国家的文化和教育已在全球范围内互联互通并进而影响异乡本土医学文化。从目前我国医学伦理学教育和实践看,医学伦理学教学及评价体系已不能满足日新月异的全球化医学发展进程。本文从传统医学文化和医学伦理学的理论渊源入手,针对我国医学伦理学教学实践中存在的德性培育重视不足、临床决策能力培养缺失、标准化评价体系缺失等主要问题,探析教学改革的路径,以促进医学伦理学教学理论和实践的发展。     

Modification of excitation energy distribution to photosystem I by protein phosphorylation and cation depletion during thylakoid biogenesis in wheat

The effects of protein phosphorylation and cation depletion on the electron transport rate and fluorescence emission characteristics of photosystem I at two stages of chloroplast development in light-grown wheat leaves are examined. The light-harvesting chlorophyll a/b protein complex associated with photosystem I (LHC I) was absent from the thylakoids at the early stage of development, but that associated with photosystem II (LHC II) was present. Protein phosphorylation produced an increase in the light-limited rate of photosystem I electron transport at the early stage of development when chlorophyll b was preferentially excited, indicating that LHC I is not required for transfer of excitation energy from phosphorylated LHC II to the core complex of photosystem I. However, no enhancement of photosystem I fluorescence at 77 K was observed at this stage of development, demonstrating that a strict relationship between excitation energy density in photosystem I pigment matrices and the long-wavelength fluorescence emission from photosystem I at 77 K does not exist. Depletion of Mg²⁺ from the thylakoids produced a stimulation of photosystem I electron transport at both stages of development, but a large enhancement of the photosystem I fluorescence emission was observed only in the thylakoids containing LHC I. It is suggested that the enhancement of PS I electron transport by Mg²⁺-depletion and phosphorylation of LHC II is associated with an enhancement of fluorescence at 77 K from LHC I and not from the core complex of PS I.     

The international dimensions of neuroethics

Neuroethics, in its modern form, investigates the impact of brain science in four basic dimensions: the self, social policy, practice and discourse. In this study, we analyzed a set of 461 peer-reviewed articles with neuroethics content, published by authors from 32 countries. We analyzed the data for: (1) trends in the development of international neuroethics over time, and (2) how challenges at the intersection of ethics and neuroscience are viewed in countries that are considered developed by International Monetary Fund (IMF) standards, and in those that are developing. Our results demonstrate a steady increase in global participation in neuroethics from 1989 to 2005, characterized by an increase in numbers of articles published specifically on neuroethics, journals publishing these articles, and countries contributing to the literature. The focus from all countries was on the practice of brain science and the amelioration of neurological disease. Indicators of technology creation and diffusion in developing countries were specifically correlated with increases in publications concerning policy implications of brain science. Neuroethics is an international endeavor and, as such, should be sensitive to the impact that context has on acceptance and use of technological innovation.     

Evolutionary Ethics: An Irresistible Temptation: Some Reflections on Paul Farber‘s The Temptation of Evolutionary Ethics

In his recent The Temptation of Evolutionary Ethics, Paul Farber has given a negative assessment of the last one hundred years of attempts in Anglo-American philosophy, beginning with Darwin, to develop an evolutionary ethics. Farber identifies some version of the naturalistic fallacy as one of the central sources for the failures of evolutionary ethics. For this reason, and others, Farber urges that though it has its attraction, evolutionary ethics is a temptation to be resisted. In this discussion I identify three major, historically relevant forms of the naturalistic fallacy, the (1) the deductive, (2) genetic, and (3) open question forms and argue that none of them pose an intrinsic problem for evolutionary ethics. I conclude that on this score at least there is no reason to resist temptation.     

The Unabomber’s ethics

In this paper, I present and criticize Ted Kaczynski’s (“The Unabomber”) theory that industrialization has been terrible for humanity, and that we should use any means necessary, including violent means, to induce a return to pre‐industrial ways of living. Although Kaczynski’s manifesto, Industrial society and its future, has become widely known, his ideas have never before been subject to careful philosophical criticism. In this paper I show how Kaczynski’s arguments rely on a number of highly implausible philosophical premises. I further make the case that, although his theory as a whole should be rejected, Kaczynski raises a number of worries about technological development that ought to receive serious attention. Some of these worries have recently come to be shared by prominent defenders of human enhancement, including Nick Bostrom and Julian Savulescu. In the last section I indicate why I believe it is important that academic philosophers scrutinize ideas that motivate acts of violence.     

Great Apes Do Not Learn Novel Tool Use Easily: Conservatism,Functional Fixedness,or Cultural Influence?

Animal culture has been of interest for decades but the concept remains controversial. Many researchers feel that animal behavior should not be granted the label “culture” because the latter includes more than “simple” behavioral variation. In recent years, the study of animal culture has been concerned mainly with social learning mechanisms, often claimed to be human specific, which led to the uniqueness of human culture. In addition, failure to innovate novel cultural behavior as often as humans is usually explained by psychological mechanisms presented as more parsimonious, such as conservatism or functional fixedness. However, it is unclear how cognitively complex these mechanisms are in the first place. Here, I analyze recent data obtained with wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii) and wild-born orangutans (Pongo abelii) using the honey-trap experiment, in which individuals must devise a solution to reach inaccessible honey. I compare behavior of apes that developed a tool-based solution in the task with those that did not, and test whether conservatism and functional fixedness can explain individual variation in ape behavior. I find evidence of conservatism, with apes relying on their existing knowledge, and evidence of functional fixedness, with this knowledge potentially preventing them from innovating. However, the apes showed large intraspecific variability. I discuss the two mechanisms through a representational perspective to tackle their cognitive complexity. Understanding how conservatism and functional fixedness interact with ape cultural knowledge to limit innovation of novel tool use appears necessary to understand the full extent of ape cultures and how they compare to human cultures.     

Compulsory moral bioenhancement should be covert

Some theorists argue that moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory. I take this argument one step further, arguing that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, then its administration ought to be covert rather than overt. This is to say that it is morally preferable for compulsory moral bioenhancement to be administered without the recipients knowing that they are receiving the enhancement. My argument for this is that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, then its administration is a matter of public health, and for this reason should be governed by public health ethics. I argue that the covert administration of a compulsory moral bioenhancement program better conforms to public health ethics than does an overt compulsory program. In particular, a covert compulsory program promotes values such as liberty, utility, equality, and autonomy better than an overt program does. Thus, a covert compulsory moral bioenhancement program is morally preferable to an overt moral bioenhancement program.     

Epistemology, necessity, and evolution: a critical review of Michael Ruse��s Philosophy After Darwin

Michael Ruse??s new anthology Philosophy After Darwin provides great history and background in the major impacts Darwinism has had on philosophy, especially in ethics and epistemology. This review focuses on epistemology understood through the lens of evolution by natural selection. I focus on one of Ruse??s own articles in the collection, which responds to two classic articles by Konrad Lorenz and David Hull on the two major forms of evolutionary epistemology. I side with Ruse against Lorenz??s account of the necessity we think our principles of reasoning have, though I disagree with Ruse??s particular example. I also argue that Ruse??s alternative explanation is lacking. Against Hull, I side with Ruse in his doubts that a sociobiological approach to science will prove fruitful, though I point out that it has certain advantages other approaches do not have. Although I side with Ruse on the issue, I conclude that the two views do not really come into direct conflict and so one needs not reject either. Finally, I discuss Ruse??s positive view and raise questions for his conception of evolutionary epistemology. I conclude that his arguments are insufficient to overcome opposing views and his view has at least as many unintuitive conclusions as the alternatives.     

Michael Ruse and His Fifteen Years of Booknotes – For Better or for Worse

In this paper I trace Michael Ruse's Booknotes from the first volumeof Biology and Philosophy in 1986 to the present. I deal withboth the style and the content of these booknotes. Ruse paid specialattention to authors outside of the traditional English axis as wellas to feminist writers. He complained that too much attention wasbeing paid to certain topics (e.g., evolutionary ethics, evolutionaryepistemology, the species problem and reduction) while other, moreimportant topics were all but ignored (e.g., natural selection,population genetics, levels of selection and extraterrestrial life).He also dealt with the Darwin Industry. Creationism, his love-haterelationships with several authors and his undiluted love of CharlesDickens.     

How is it between us? Relational ethics and transcendence

In this article, I engage the recent debate on transcendence/the transcendental within the anthropology of ethics with the claim that ‘How is it between us?’ is the most fundamental of all ethical questions. In doing so, I contrast relational ethics with ordinary ethics to show that ethics begins with a demand that emerges from a situation within which one finds oneself with others; a demand that pulls one out of oneself to respond in a modality of concern and care for the between where we dwell together. This attuned response is both an ethical and a political one; a response that opens possibilities for being-together-otherwise. Such possibilities, I argue throughout, can only begin with a relational ethics. I illustrate this with an ethnographic example from harm reduction practice and anti-drug war political activity in both New York City and Vancouver, Canada.     

ENHANCING EVOLUTION AND ENHANCING EVOLUTION

It has been claimed in several places that the new genetic technologies allow humanity to achieve in a generation or two what might take natural selection hundreds of millennia in respect of the elimination of certain diseases and an increase in traits such as intelligence. More radically, it has been suggested that those same technologies could be used to instil characteristics that we might reasonably expect never to appear due to natural selection alone. John Harris, a proponent of this genomic optimism, claims in his book Enhancing Evolution that we not only have it in our power to enhance evolution, but that we also have a duty to do so. In this paper, I claim that Harris' hand is strong but that he overplays it nevertheless. He is correct to dismiss the arguments of the anti‐enhancement lobby and correct to say that enhancement is permissible; but ‘good’ is different from ‘permissible’ and his argument for the goodness of enhancement is less convincing. Moreover, he is simply wrong to claim that it generates a duty to enhance.