Pro‐Life Arguments Against Infanticide and Why they are Not Convincing

Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva's controversial article ‘After‐Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?’ has received a lot of criticism since its publishing. Part of the recent criticism has been made by pro‐life philosopher Christopher Kaczor, who argues against infanticide in his updated book ‘Ethics of Abortion’. Kaczor makes four arguments to show where Giubilini and Minerva's argument for permitting infanticide goes wrong. In this article I argue that Kaczor's arguments, and some similar arguments presented by other philosophers, are mistaken and cannot show Giubilini and Minerva's view to be flawed. I claim that if one wants to reject the permissibility of infanticide, one must find better arguments for doing so.     

Against the impairment argument: A reply to Hendricks

In an article of this journal, Perry Hendricks makes a novel argument for the immorality of abortion. According to his impairment argument, abortion is immoral because: (a) it is wrong to impair a fetus to the nth degree, such as causing the fetus to have fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS); (b) it is wrong to impair a fetus to the n+1 degree (to cause the fetus to be more impaired than to have FAS); (c) killing the fetus impairs the fetus to the n+1 degree (causes it to be more impaired than to have FAS); (d) abortion kills the fetus; (e) therefore, abortion is immoral. The impairment argument is a promising account for the wrongness of abortion because it does not rely on the controversial metaphysical premise that a fetus is a person. This article aims to show, that despite some immediate advantages over the rival theories of the immorality of abortion there is a reason to believe that the impairment argument is untenable. That is because there are goods that can be achieved by abortion but that cannot be achieved by impairing the fetus.     

Protecting Future Children from In‐Utero Harm

The actions of pregnant women can cause harm to their future children. However, even if the possible harm is serious and likely to occur, the law will generally not intervene. A pregnant woman is an autonomous person who is entitled to make her own decisions. A fetus in‐utero has no legal right to protection. In striking contrast, the child, if born alive, may sue for injury in‐utero; and the child is entitled to be protected by being removed from her parents if necessary for her protection. Indeed, there is a legal obligation for health professionals to report suspected harm, and for authorities to protect the child's wellbeing. We ask whether such contradictory responses are justified. Should the law intervene where a pregnant woman's actions risk serious and preventable fetal injury? The argument for legal intervention to protect a fetus is sometimes linked to the concept of ‘fetal personhood’ and the moral status of the fetus. In this article we will suggest that even if the fetus is not regarded as a separate person, and does not have the legal or moral status of a child, indeed, even if the fetus is regarded as having no legal or moral status, there is an ethical and legal case for intervening to prevent serious harm to a future child. We examine the arguments for and against intervention on behalf of the future child, drawing on the example of excessive maternal alcohol intake.     

Against Anonymity

In ‘New Threats to Academic Freedom’ 1 1 Minerva, F. . New Threats to Academic Freedom . Bioethics 2013 ; DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12066 .
Francesca Minerva argues that anonymity for the authors of controversial articles is a prerequisite for academic freedom in the Internet age. This argument draws its intellectual and emotional power from the author's account of the reaction to the on‐line publication of ‘ After‐birth abortion: why should the baby live?’ 2 2 Giubilini, A. & Minerva, F. . After‐birth Abortion. Why Should the Baby Live? J Med Ethics 2013 ; 39 : 261 – 263 .
– an article that provoked cascades of hostile postings and e‐mails. Reflecting on these events, Minerva proposes that publishers should offer the authors of controversial articles the option of publishing their articles anonymously. This response reviews the history of anonymous publication and concludes that its reintroduction in the Internet era would recreate problems similar to those that led print journals to abandon the practice: corruption of scholarly discourse by invective and hate speech, masked conflicts of interest, and a diminution of editorial accountability. It also contends that Minerva misreads the intent of the hostile e‐mails provoked by ‘After‐birth abortion,’ and that ethicists who publish controversial articles should take responsibility by dialoguing with their critics – even those whose critiques are emotionally charged and hostile.     

Why arguments against infanticide remain convincing: A reply to Räsänen

In ‘Pro‐life arguments against infanticide and why they are not convincing’ Joona Räsänen argues that Christopher Kaczor's objections to Giubilini and Minerva's position on infanticide are not persuasive. We argue that Räsänen's criticism is largely misplaced, and that he has not engaged with Kaczor's strongest arguments against infanticide. We reply to each of Räsänen's criticisms, drawing on the full range of Kaczor's arguments, as well as adding some of our own.     

The use of CD 34(+) mobilized peripheral blood as a donor cell source does not improve chimerism after in utero hematopoietic stem cell transplantation in non-human primates

In utero hematopoietic stem cell transplantation is a therapeutic procedure that could potentially cure many developmental diseases affecting the immune and hematopoietic systems. In most clinical and experimental settings of fetal hematopoietic transplantation the level of donor cell engraftment has been low, suggesting that even in the fetus there are significant barriers to donor cell engraftment. In postnatal hematopoietic transplantation donor cells obtained from mobilized peripheral blood engraft more rapidly than cells derived from marrow. We tested the hypothesis that use of donor hematopoietic/stem cells obtained from mobilized peripheral blood would improve engraftment and the level of chimerism after in utero transplantation in non-human primates. Despite the potential competitive advantage from the use of CD 34(+) from mobilized peripheral blood, the level of chimerism was not appreciably different from a group of animals receiving marrow-derived CD 34(+) donor cells. Based on these results, it is unlikely that this single change in cell source will influence the clinical outcome of fetal hematopoietic transplantation.     

Boonin on the future-like-ours argument against abortion

I argue that David Boonin has failed in his attempt to undermine Donald Marquis's future-like-ours argument against abortion. I show that the ethical principle advanced by Boonin in his critique to that argument is unable, contrary to what he claims, to account for the wrongness of infanticide. Then I argue that Boonin's critique misrepresents Marquis's argument. Although there is a way to restate his critique in order to avoid the misrepresentation, the success of such restatement is precluded by the wrongness of infanticide.     

Ectogenesis and the case against the right to the death of the foetus

Ectogenesis, or the use of an artificial womb to allow a foetus to develop, will likely become a reality within a few decades, and could significantly affect the abortion debate. We first examine the implications for Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy, which argues for a woman’s right to withdraw life support from the foetus and so terminate her pregnancy, even if the foetus is granted full moral status. We show that on Thomson’s reasoning, there is no right to the death of the foetus, and abortion is not permissible if ectogenesis is available, provided it is safe and inexpensive. This raises the question of whether there are persuasive reasons for the right to the death of the foetus that could be exercised in the context of ectogenesis. Eric Mathison and Jeremy Davis have examined several arguments for this right, doubting that it exists, while Joona Räsänen has recently criticized their reasoning. We respond to Räsänen’s analysis, concluding that his arguments are unsuccessful, and that there is no right to the death of the foetus in these circumstances.     

Long-term exposure of male and female mice to 50 Hz magnetic field: effects on fertility

The effect of an extremely low frequency (ELF) magnetic field on the fertility of adult male and female Swiss mice was investigated. Adult male and female mice were exposed to a 50 Hz sinusoidal magnetic field at approximately 25 microT (rms) for 90 days before they were mated with unexposed counterparts. There were no exposure related effects on the fertility of male or female mice. The number of implantation sites, viable fetuses, and the total number of resorptions were not significantly affected in females impregnated by males exposed to the 50 Hz magnetic field as compared with the control group. The number of implantation sites, viable fetuses and the total number of resorptions in exposed females were also not statistically different from the control group. There were no significant effects on the weights of the testes, seminal vesicles, preputial gland or body weights of males exposed to 50 Hz magnetic field. Furthermore, body and uterine weights were not affected in females exposed to 50 Hz field; however, ovarian weight was significantly increased in females exposed to the same field. These results suggest that exposure of male and female mice to low frequency magnetic field had no adverse effects on fertility and reproduction in mice.     

Ultrasonic fetal gender diagnoses during Months 5 to 11 in mares

The effect of fetal age on the ability to diagnose gender during the last half of pregnancy was evaluated in 85 mares using a 3.5 MHz linear-array transducer. Diagnosis of fetal gender was completed in 19 of 21 attempts (90%) during Months 5–6 and was independent of fetal presentation; the percentage of cranial, caudal, and transverse presentations was 52, 29 and 19%, respectively. Fetal gender was diagnosed in only 4 of 64 (6%) attempts during Months 7 to 11; fetal presentation was predominantly cranial (95%). Attempts at gender diagnoses were always successful when the fetus was in caudal or transverse presentation. Overall accuracy for fetal gender diagnoses was 89%. Absolute accuracy verified after birth of the foal was 100% when expected accuracy, estimated at the time of the examination, was ≥80%. During Month 5, the penis was a hyperechogenic trilobulated structure located near the fetal umbilical attachment. During Months 6 to 11, the penis was pendulous; it appeared circular in cross section and rectangular in longitudinal section. The anogenital raphe was a narrow hyperechogenic structure between the hind limbs and along the perineum. During Months 5 to 11, the clitoris was hyperechogenic, trilobulated, and located in the perineal region. The labia could be delineated when the entire perineum was imaged. The mammary gland was a triangular hyperechogenic structure between the hind limbs in frontal and cross-sectional planes. In both genders the anus was identified as a hyperechogenic structure located immediately below the tail. Ultrasonic fetal gender diagnosis was readily accomplished and most accurate during Months 5 to 6, but thereafter the diagnostic areas were usually inaccessible.     

When "personhood" begins in the embryo: avoiding a syllabus of errors

The following essay was delivered at the conference "Ontogeny and Human Life" at the Ponifical Athenaeum "Regina Apostolorum," November, 2007. Sponsored by the Legion of Christ, the Pontifical Academy for Life, and the John Templeton Foundation, the sessions focused on when the conceptus became a "person." My essay focused on the scientific conclusions that could aid such discussions. Moreover, after listening to the philosophical, legal, and theological discussions that ensued, I responded theologically as well. New concepts in modern embryology have made scientists revise their views concerning the autonomy of embryos and the mechanisms that generate such embryos. There are interactions between the sperm and the female reproductive tract and egg which had never been known until recently. There are also interactions between the developing organism and its environment that had been unsuspected a decade ago. Gut bacteria induce the development of the mammalian digestive system and immune system by changing the gene expression patterns in the mammalian intestine. Conversely, chemicals in our technological society can adversely affect the embryo, rendering it sterile or prone to tumors later in life. While there is no consensus among scientists as to when human life begins, both Church and science can become allies in persuading governments to regulate or ban the production and use of these fetotoxic chemicals. These new views of embryonic development change many of the stories told about human embryos and fetuses, and they have implications concerning the use of science as evidence for theological positions.     

The impairment argument for the immorality of abortion: A reply

In his recent article Perry Hendricks presents what he calls the impairment argument to show that abortion is immoral. To do so, he argues that to give a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral. Because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome, Hendricks concludes that killing the fetus must also be immoral. Here, I claim that killing a fetus does not impair it in the way that giving it fetal alcohol syndrome does. By examining the reason why giving a fetus this condition is wrong, I conclude that the same reasoning, on common pro‐choice accounts, does not apply to killing the fetus. Accordingly, Hendricks's argument does not succeed in showing abortion is immoral.     

Even if the fetus is not a person,abortion is immoral: The impairment argument

Much of the debate about the ethics of abortion has centered on whether the fetus is a person. In an attempt to sidestep this complex issue, I argue that, even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral. To arrive at this conclusion, I argue that giving a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral, and that if this is so, then killing the fetus is immoral. Roughly, this is because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome. Since abortion (in most cases) amounts to killing the fetus, this means that abortion (in most cases) is immoral. I defend the premises of this argument against a plethora of objections, concluding that they either do not work, or commit their proponent to a controversial position.     

A Simple Hydroponic Culture Method for the Development of a Highly Viable Root System in Arabidopsis thaliana

In the studies of nutritional absorption and metal toxicity in the root, it is important to grow plants without technical damage. We established a simple hydroponic culture system for Arabidopsis thaliana to obtain a healthy plant having a well-developed root system with many lateral roots. The phytotoxic effects of Cr, Cu, and Al ions were examined by FDA-PI staining using this culture system. The pattern of root inhibition varied with the ion, suggesting the usefulness of this culture system.     

Why a right to life rules out infanticide: A final reply to Räsänen

Joona Räsänen has argued that pro‐life arguments against the permissibility of infanticide are not persuasive, and fail to show it to be immoral. We responded to Räsänen’s arguments, concluding that his critique of pro‐life arguments was misplaced. Räsänen has recently replied in ‘Why pro‐life arguments still are not convincing: A reply to my critics’, providing some additional arguments as to why he does not find pro‐life arguments against infanticide convincing. Here, we respond briefly to Räsänen’s critique of the substance view, and also to his most important claim: that possession of a right to life by an infant does not rule out the permissibility of infanticide. We demonstrate that this claim is unfounded, and conclude that Räsänen has not refuted pro‐life arguments against infanticide.     

A dubious defense of ‘after‐birth abortion’: A reply to Räsänen

Scholars have offered various critiques of Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva's controversial article, ‘After‐birth abortion: Why should the baby live?’ My book The Ethics of Abortion: Women's Rights, Human Life, and the Question of Justice presents four such critiques. First, Giubilini and Minerva argue from the deeply controversial to the even more controversial. Second, they presuppose a false view of personal identity called body‐self dualism. Third, their view cannot secure human equality. And fourth, their account of harm cannot account for harm found in some cases of murder. In the article, ‘Pro‐life arguments against infanticide and why they are not convincing’, J. Räsänen examines and finds wanting these four critiques. This essay responds to Räsänen's defense of infanticide and argues that his responses to the four objections fail.     

Substance,rights, value,and abortion

Most serious contemporary opposition to abortion is grounded on the belief that human fetuses are members of the same moral category as beings like us, and that the loss of any such life is one of the worst possible losses. Substance view theorists oppose abortion for this reason: in their view beings like us are essentially rational substances with inherent moral worth, and those who perform induced abortion fail to recognize this moral worth. In a recent series of articles, Rob Lovering presents reductio‐style arguments against the substance view, in part arguing that it is inconsistent with our intuitions in rescue and spontaneous abortion cases. In a recent reply, Henrik Friberg‐Fernros argues that the substance view can evade these problematic implications because of a distinction between killing and letting die. According to this argument, the fetus’s right to life is a negative right not to be killed, not a positive right to be rescued, thus the anti‐abortion theorist who lets fetuses die acts acceptably. I argue this stance fails to recognize the inherent moral worth that the substance view contends fetuses possess. One who refrains from saving a person, or doesn’t care how many people she saves, cannot reasonably claim to value life. Furthermore, this stance is at odds with most contemporary anti‐abortion views that oppose induced abortions of both the killing and letting die variety.     

Female eviction, abortion, and infanticide in banded mongooses (Mungos mungo): implications for social control of reproduction and synchronized parturition

Most cooperatively breeding species exhibit high reproductiveskew, where reproduction within the social group is monopolizedby a dominant pair. In many of these species, social controlof reproduction is the mechanism driving reproductive skew:individuals within the social group actively reduce the reproductivesuccess of others. In species where females do not suppressconception in other females, alternative routes to skewing thesocial group's reproductive output include inducing abortionin rivals, evicting them, or killing their young. This studyexamines instances of female eviction, abortion, and infanticidein a cooperatively breeding species with low preparturitionreproductive skew, the banded mongoose (Mungos mungo). Althoughinstances of these behaviors are rare in this species, aspectsof their occurrence have implications for social control ofreproduction. Abortion can be induced by the stress of beingevicted. The readmittance of females that abort suggests thatreducing communal litter size is a possible selective pressurefor eviction. This is supported by the occurrence of evictionevents in groups with relatively high numbers of reproductivefemales and by the eviction of young reproductive females. Thetiming of abortion events suggests that synchronization of parturitionwith other females in the group is a major selective pressure.Infanticide could represent the selective pressure for synchronizedparturition. Alternatively, synchronization may minimize competitiveasymmetry between pups born to different females. This paperalso describes incidences where a female aborts or gives birthto her litter over different days in order to synchronize parturition:behavior previously unrecorded in mammals.     

Between “Science” and “Superstition”: Moral Perceptions of Induced Abortion Among Young Adults in Vietnam

Despite the increasing use ofreproductive technologies the world over,anthropological studies have paid remarkablylimited attention to the ethical dilemmasinvolved in people's choices of suchtechnologies. Against this background, theauthor analyzes moral perceptions of inducedabortion among unmarried young adults in urbanNorth Vietnam. While the ethical aspects ofabortion are shrouded in silence in public lifein Vietnam, the young people participating inthe study expressed strong moral scepticismtowards the practice of abortion, even whileundergoing it themselves. Through the analysisof young people's experiences and perceptions,the paper demonstrates how moral ideas are tiedto particular social situations and structuredby larger socio-political circumstances. It isargued that moral notions which are dominant ina society's public sphere may not berepresentative of the moral sentiments that arelived in practice and felt in private.