On Cognitive and Moral Enhancement: A Reply to Savulescu and Persson

In a series of recent works, Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson insist that, given the ease by which irreversible destruction is achievable by a morally wicked minority, (i) strictly cognitive bio‐enhancement is currently too risky, while (ii) moral bio‐enhancement is plausibly morally mandatory (and urgently so). This article aims to show that the proposal Savulescu and Persson advance relies on several problematic assumptions about the separability of cognitive and moral enhancement as distinct aims. Specifically, we propose that the underpinnings of Savulescu's and Persson's normative argument unravel once it is suitably clear how aiming to cognitively enhance an individual will in part require that one aim to bring about certain moral goods we show to be essential to cognitive flourishing; conversely, aiming to bring about moral enhancement in an individual must involve aiming to improve certain cognitive capacities we show to be essential to moral flourishing. After developing these points in some detail, and their implication for Savulescu's & Persson's proposal, we conclude by outlining some positive suggestions.     

ENHANCING EVOLUTION AND ENHANCING EVOLUTION

It has been claimed in several places that the new genetic technologies allow humanity to achieve in a generation or two what might take natural selection hundreds of millennia in respect of the elimination of certain diseases and an increase in traits such as intelligence. More radically, it has been suggested that those same technologies could be used to instil characteristics that we might reasonably expect never to appear due to natural selection alone. John Harris, a proponent of this genomic optimism, claims in his book Enhancing Evolution that we not only have it in our power to enhance evolution, but that we also have a duty to do so. In this paper, I claim that Harris' hand is strong but that he overplays it nevertheless. He is correct to dismiss the arguments of the anti‐enhancement lobby and correct to say that enhancement is permissible; but ‘good’ is different from ‘permissible’ and his argument for the goodness of enhancement is less convincing. Moreover, he is simply wrong to claim that it generates a duty to enhance.     

Approval policies for modifications to machine learning‐based software as a medical device: A study of bio‐creep

Successful deployment of machine learning algorithms in healthcare requires careful assessments of their performance and safety. To date, the FDA approves locked algorithms prior to marketing and requires future updates to undergo separate premarket reviews. However, this negates a key feature of machine learning—the ability to learn from a growing dataset and improve over time. This paper frames the design of an approval policy, which we refer to as an automatic algorithmic change protocol (aACP), as an online hypothesis testing problem. As this process has obvious analogy with noninferiority testing of new drugs, we investigate how repeated testing and adoption of modifications might lead to gradual deterioration in prediction accuracy, also known as “biocreep” in the drug development literature. We consider simple policies that one might consider but do not necessarily offer any error‐rate guarantees, as well as policies that do provide error‐rate control. For the latter, we define two online error‐rates appropriate for this context: bad approval count (BAC) and bad approval and benchmark ratios (BABR). We control these rates in the simple setting of a constant population and data source using policies aACP‐BAC and aACP‐BABR, which combine alpha‐investing, group‐sequential, and gate‐keeping methods. In simulation studies, bio‐creep regularly occurred when using policies with no error‐rate guarantees, whereas aACP‐BAC and aACP‐BABR controlled the rate of bio‐creep without substantially impacting our ability to approve beneficial modifications.     

The evolution of moral progress and biomedical moral enhancement

In The Evolution of Moral Progress Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell advance an evolutionary explanation of moral progress by morality becoming more ‘inclusivist’. We are prepared to accept this explanation as far as it goes, but argue that it fails to explain how morality can become inclusivist in the fuller sense they intend. In fact, it even rules out inclusivism in their intended sense of moral progress, since they believe that human altruism and prosocial attitudes are essentially parochial. We also respond to their charge that the possibility of moral enhancement by biomedical means that we have defended in numerous publications assumes that moral attitudes are biologically hard‐wired to an extent that implies that they are resilient to the influence of cognitive or cultural factors. Quite the contrary, we think they are more open to such influence than they seem to do.     

Conceptual and Practical Problems of Moral Enhancement

Recently, the debate on human enhancement has shifted from familiar topics like cognitive enhancement and mood enhancement to a new and – to no one's surprise – controversial subject, namely moral enhancement. Some proponents from the transhumanist camp allude to the ‘urgent need’ of improving the moral conduct of humankind in the face of ever growing technological progress and the substantial dangers entailed in this enterprise. Other thinkers express more sceptical views about this proposal. As the debate has revealed so far, there is no shared opinion among philosophers (or scientists) about the meaning, prospects, and ethical evaluation of moral enhancement. In this article I will address several conceptual and practical problems of this issue, in order to encourage discussion about the prospects of (thinking about) moral enhancement in the future. My assumption is that (i) for the short term, there is little chance of arriving at an agreement on the proper understanding of morality and the appropriateness of one single (meta‐)ethical theory; (ii) apart from this, there are further philosophical puzzles loosely referred to in the debate which add to theoretical confusion; and (iii) even if these conceptual problems could be solved, there are still practical problems to be smoothed out if moral enhancement is ever to gain relevance apart from merely theoretical interest. My tentative conclusion, therefore, will be that moral enhancement is not very likely to be made sense of – let alone realized – in the medium‐term future.     

Can a Welfarist Approach be Used to Justify a Moral Duty to Cognitively Enhance Children?

The desire to self‐improve is probably as old as humanity: most of us want to be smarter, more athletic, more beautiful, or more talented. However, in the light of an ever increasing array of possibilities to enhance our capacities, clarity about the purpose and goal of such efforts becomes crucial. This is especially true when decisions are made for children, who are exposed to their parents’ plans and desires for them under a notion of increasing wellbeing. In recent years, cognitive enhancement has become a popular candidate for the promotion of wellbeing; welfarists even impose a moral duty on parents to cognitively enhance their children for the sake of their wellbeing. In this article, I aim to show that welfarists are mistaken in inferring such a moral obligation from the potential benefit of cognitive enhancement. In support of this, I offer three arguments: (a) the vagueness of wellbeing as a theoretical concept means it becomes impossible to apply in practice; (b) the link between cognition and wellbeing is far from unequivocal; and (c) quantification issues with regard to cognition make a duty impossible to discharge. In conclusion, I reject the welfarist approach as a justification for a parental moral obligation to cognitively enhance children.     

MORAL ENHANCEMENT VIA DIRECT EMOTION MODULATION: A REPLY TO JOHN HARRIS

Some argue that humans should enhance their moral capacities by adopting institutions that facilitate morally good motives and behaviour. I have defended a parallel claim: that we could permissibly use biomedical technologies to enhance our moral capacities, for example by attenuating certain counter‐moral emotions. John Harris has recently responded to my argument by raising three concerns about the direct modulation of emotions as a means to moral enhancement. He argues (1) that such means will be relatively ineffective in bringing about moral improvements, (2) that direct modulation of emotions would invariably come at an unacceptable cost to our freedom, and (3) that we might end up modulating emotions in ways that actually lead to moral decline. In this article I outline some counter‐intuitive potential implications of Harris' claims. I then respond individually to his three concerns, arguing that they license only the very weak conclusion that moral enhancement via direct emotion modulation is sometimes impermissible. However I acknowledge that his third concern might, with further argument, be developed into a more troubling objection to such enhancements.     

Should we use Commitment Contracts to Regulate Student use of Cognitive Enhancing Drugs?

Are universities justified in trying to regulate student use of cognitive enhancing drugs? In this article I argue that they can be, but that the most appropriate kind of regulatory intervention is likely to be voluntary in nature. To be precise, I argue that universities could justifiably adopt a commitment contract system of regulation wherein students are encouraged to voluntarily commit to not using cognitive enhancing drugs (or to using them in a specific way). If they are found to breach that commitment, they should be penalized by, for example, forfeiting a number of marks on their assessments. To defend this model of regulation, I adopt a recently‐proposed evaluative framework for determining the appropriateness of enhancement in specific domains of activity, and I focus on particular existing types of cognitive enhancement drugs, not hypothetical or potential forms. In this way, my argument is tailored to the specific features of university education, and common patterns of usage among students. It is not concerned with the general ethical propriety of using cognitive enhancing drugs.     

Pyrogenic carbon capture and storage

The growth of biomass is considered the most efficient method currently available to extract carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. However, biomass carbon is easily degraded by microorganisms releasing it in the form of greenhouse gases back to the atmosphere. If biomass is pyrolyzed, the organic carbon is converted into solid (biochar), liquid (bio‐oil), and gaseous (permanent pyrogas) carbonaceous products. During the last decade, biochar has been discussed as a promising option to improve soil fertility and sequester carbon, although the carbon efficiency of the thermal conversion of biomass into biochar is in the range of 30%–50% only. So far, the liquid and gaseous pyrolysis products were mainly considered for combustion, though they can equally be processed into recalcitrant forms suitable for carbon sequestration. In this review, we show that pyrolytic carbon capture and storage (PyCCS) can aspire for carbon sequestration efficiencies of >70%, which is shown to be an important threshold to allow PyCCS to become a relevant negative emission technology. Prolonged residence times of pyrogenic carbon can be generated (a) within the terrestrial biosphere including the agricultural use of biochar; (b) within advanced bio‐based materials as long as they are not oxidized (biochar, bio‐oil); and (c) within suitable geological deposits (bio‐oil and CO₂ from permanent pyrogas oxidation). While pathway (c) would need major carbon taxes or similar governmental incentives to become a realistic option, pathways (a) and (b) create added economic value and could at least partly be implemented without other financial incentives. Pyrolysis technology is already well established, biochar sequestration and bio‐oil sequestration in soils, respectively biomaterials, do not present ecological hazards, and global scale‐up appears feasible within a time frame of 10–30 years. Thus, PyCCS could evolve into a decisive tool for global carbon governance, serving climate change mitigation and the sustainable development goals simultaneously.     

Growth enhancement due to global atmospheric change as predicted by terrestrial ecosystem models: consistent with US forest inventory data

Small reported growth enhancement factors based on analyses of forest inventory data from the eastern USA ( Caspersen et al. 2000 , Science, 290, 1148–1151) have been interpreted as evidence against CO₂ fertilization in natural forests. We show to the contrary that growth enhancement in response to rising CO₂, as found in ecosystems with experimental CO₂ enrichment and implemented in terrestrial ecosystem models, is consistent with the data that have been presented within their uncertainties. Comparing forest inventory data with results of an empirical model of age‐dependent biomass accumulation, we find that growth enhancement of plausible magnitude could not be detected in these data, even if it were present. Although forest regrowth due to land‐use change is recognized as an important cause of carbon uptake by eastern US forests, forest inventory data do not provide a basis for eliminating environmentally induced growth enhancement as a substantial contribution to the global terrestrial carbon sink.     

HUMAN NATURE AND ENHANCEMENT

Appeals to the idea of human nature are frequent in the voluminous literature on the ethics of enhancing human beings through biotechnology. Two chief concerns about the impact of enhancements on human nature have been voiced. The first is that enhancement may alter or destroy human nature. The second is that if enhancement alters or destroys human nature, this will undercut our ability to ascertain the good because, for us, the good is determined by our nature. The first concern assumes that altering or destroying human nature is in itself a bad thing. The second concern assumes that human nature provides a standard without which we cannot make coherent, defensible judgments about what is good.
I will argue (1) that there is nothing wrong, per se, with altering or destroying human nature, because, on a plausible understanding of what human nature is, it contains bad as well as good characteristics and there is no reason to believe that eliminating some of the bad would so imperil the good as to make the elimination of the bad impermissible, and (2) that altering or destroying human nature need not result in the loss of our ability to make judgments about the good, because we possess a conception of the good by which we can and do evaluate human nature. I will argue that appeals to human nature tend to obscure rather than illuminate the debate over the ethics of enhancement and can be eliminated in favor of more cogent considerations.     

Microbial alkane production for jet fuel industry: motivation,state of the art and perspectives

Bio‐jet fuel has attracted a lot of interest in recent years and has become a focus for aircraft and engine manufacturers, oil companies, governments and researchers. Given the global concern about environmental issues and the instability of oil market, bio‐jet fuel has been identified as a promising way to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions from the aviation industry, while also promoting energy security. Although a number of bio‐jet fuel sources have been approved for manufacture, their commercialization and entry into the market is still a far way away. In this review, we provide an overview of the drivers for intensified research into bio‐jet fuel technologies, the type of chemical compounds found in bio‐jet fuel preparations and the current state of related pre‐commercial technologies. The biosynthesis of hydrocarbons is one of the most promising approaches for bio‐jet fuel production, and thus we provide a detailed analysis of recent advances in the microbial biosynthesis of hydrocarbons (with a focus on alkanes). Finally, we explore the latest developments and their implications for the future of research into bio‐jet fuel technologies.     

SUCROSE TRANSPORTER 5 supplies Arabidopsis embryos with biotin and affects triacylglycerol accumulation

The Arabidopsis SUC5 protein represents a classical sucrose/H⁺ symporter. Functional analyses previously revealed that SUC5 also transports biotin, an essential co‐factor for fatty acid synthesis. However, evidence for a dual role in transport of the structurally unrelated compounds sucrose and biotin in plants was lacking. Here we show that SUC5 localizes to the plasma membrane, and that the SUC5 gene is expressed in developing embryos, confirming the role of the SUC5 protein as substrate carrier across apoplastic barriers in seeds. We show that transport of biotin but not of sucrose across these barriers is impaired in suc5 mutant embryos. In addition, we show that SUC5 is essential for the delivery of biotin into the embryo of biotin biosynthesis‐defective mutants (bio1 and bio2). We compared embryo and seedling development as well as triacylglycerol accumulation and fatty acid composition in seeds of single mutants (suc5, bio1 or bio2), double mutants (suc5 bio1 and suc5 bio2) and wild‐type plants. Although suc5 mutants were like the wild‐type, bio1 and bio2 mutants showed developmental defects and reduced triacylglycerol contents. In suc5 bio1 and suc5 bio2 double mutants, developmental defects were severely increased and the triacylglycerol content was reduced to a greater extent in comparison to the single mutants. Supplementation with externally applied biotin helped to reduce symptoms in both single and double mutants, but the efficacy of supplementation was significantly lower in double than in single mutants, showing that transport of biotin into the embryo is lower in the absence of SUC5.     

Will cognitive enhancement create post‐persons? The use(lessness) of induction in determining the likelihood of moral status enhancement

The prospect of cognitive enhancement well beyond current human capacities raises worries that the fundamental equality in moral status of human beings could be undermined. Cognitive enhancement might create beings with moral status higher than persons. Yet, there is an expressibility problem of spelling out what the higher threshold in cognitive capacity would be like. Nicholas Agar has put forward the bold claim that we can show by means of inductive reasoning that indefinite cognitive enhancement will probably mark a difference in moral status. The hope is that induction can determine the plausibility of post‐personhood existence in the absence of an account of what the higher status would be like. In this article, we argue that Agar's argument fails and, more generally, that inductive reasoning has little bearing on assessing the likelihood of post‐personhood in the absence of an account of higher status. We conclude that induction cannot bypass the expressibility problem about post‐persons.     

Autonomy and the limits of cognitive enhancement

In the debates regarding the ethics of human enhancement, proponents have found it difficult to refute the concern, voiced by certain bioconservatives, that cognitive enhancement violates the autonomy of the enhanced. However, G. Owen Schaefer, Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu have attempted not only to avoid autonomy‐based bioconservative objections, but to argue that cognition‐enhancing biomedical interventions can actually enhance autonomy. In response, this paper has two aims: firstly, to explore the limits of their argument; secondly, and more importantly, to develop a more complete understanding of autonomy and its relation to cognitive enhancement. By drawing a distinction between the capacity for autonomy and the exercise and achievement of autonomy, and by exploring the possible effects of cognitive enhancement on both competence and authenticity conditions for autonomy, the paper identifies and explains which dimensions of autonomy can and cannot, in principle, be enhanced via direct cognitive interventions. This allows us to draw conclusions regarding the limits of cognitive enhancement as a means for enhancing autonomy.     

OUGHT WE TO ENHANCE OUR COGNITIVE CAPACITIES?1

Ought we to improve our cognitive capacities beyond the normal human range? It might be a good idea to level out differences between peoples cognitive capacities; and some people's reaching beyond normal capacities may have some good side‐effects on society at large (but also bad side‐effects, of course). But is there any direct gain to be made from having ones cognitive capacities enhanced? Would this as such make our lives go better? No, I argue; or at least there doesn't seem to be any evidence suggesting that it would. And it doesn't matter whether we consider the question from a narrow hedonistic perspective, from a more refined hedonistic perspective, from a desire‐satisfaction view, or from some reasonable objective list view of what makes a life go well. Only an extremely perfectionist – and implausible – view of what makes our lives go well could support any direct value in cognitive enhancement. Finally, our sense of identity gives us no good reasons to enhance even our capacity to remember. So, cognitive enhancement as such would not improve our lives.     

Characterizing standard genetic parts and establishing common principles for engineering legume and cereal roots

Plant synthetic biology and cereal engineering depend on the controlled expression of transgenes of interest. Most engineering in plant species to date has relied heavily on the use of a few, well‐established constitutive promoters to achieve high levels of expression; however, the levels of transgene expression can also be influenced by the use of codon optimization, intron‐mediated enhancement and varying terminator sequences. Most of these alternative approaches for regulating transgene expression have only been tested in small‐scale experiments, typically testing a single gene of interest. It is therefore difficult to interpret the relative importance of these approaches and to design engineering strategies that are likely to succeed in different plant species, particularly if engineering multigenic traits where the expression of each transgene needs to be precisely regulated. Here, we present data on the characterization of 46 promoters and 10 terminators in Medicago truncatula, Lotus japonicus, Nicotiana benthamiana and Hordeum vulgare, as well as the effects of codon optimization and intron‐mediated enhancement on the expression of two transgenes in H. vulgare. We have identified a core set of promoters and terminators of relevance to researchers engineering novel traits in plant roots. In addition, we have shown that combining codon optimization and intron‐mediated enhancement increases transgene expression and protein levels in barley. Based on our study, we recommend a core set of promoters and terminators for broad use and also propose a general set of principles and guidelines for those engineering cereal species.     

Autonomy,Natality and Freedom: A Liberal Re‐examination of Habermas in the Enhancement Debate

Jurgen Habermas has argued that carrying out pre‐natal germline enhancements would be inimical to the future child's autonomy. In this article, I suggest that many of the objections that have been made against Habermas' arguments by liberals in the enhancement debate misconstrue his claims. To explain why, I begin by explaining how Habermas' view of personal autonomy confers particular importance to the agent's embodiment and social environment. In view of this, I explain that it is possible to draw two arguments against germline enhancements from Habermas' thought. I call these arguments ‘the argument from negative freedom’ and ‘the argument from natality’. Although I argue that many of the common liberal objections to Habermas are not applicable when his arguments are properly understood, I go on to suggest ways in which supporters of enhancement might appropriately respond to Habermas' arguments.     

Moral Enhancement and Those Left Behind

Opponents to genetic or biomedical human enhancement often claim that the availability of these technologies would have negative consequences for those who either choose not to utilize these resources or lack access to them. However, Thomas Douglas has argued that this objection has no force against the use of technologies that aim to bring about morally desirable character traits, as the unenhanced would benefit from being surrounded by such people. I will argue that things are not as straightforward as Douglas makes out. The widespread use of moral enhancement would raise the standards for praise and blame worthiness, making it much harder for the unenhanced to perform praiseworthy actions or avoid performing blameworthy actions. This shows that supporters of moral enhancement cannot avoid this challenge in the way that Douglas suggests.