Why arguments against infanticide remain convincing: A reply to Räsänen

In ‘Pro‐life arguments against infanticide and why they are not convincing’ Joona Räsänen argues that Christopher Kaczor's objections to Giubilini and Minerva's position on infanticide are not persuasive. We argue that Räsänen's criticism is largely misplaced, and that he has not engaged with Kaczor's strongest arguments against infanticide. We reply to each of Räsänen's criticisms, drawing on the full range of Kaczor's arguments, as well as adding some of our own.     

A dubious defense of ‘after‐birth abortion’: A reply to Räsänen

Scholars have offered various critiques of Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva's controversial article, ‘After‐birth abortion: Why should the baby live?’ My book The Ethics of Abortion: Women's Rights, Human Life, and the Question of Justice presents four such critiques. First, Giubilini and Minerva argue from the deeply controversial to the even more controversial. Second, they presuppose a false view of personal identity called body‐self dualism. Third, their view cannot secure human equality. And fourth, their account of harm cannot account for harm found in some cases of murder. In the article, ‘Pro‐life arguments against infanticide and why they are not convincing’, J. Räsänen examines and finds wanting these four critiques. This essay responds to Räsänen's defense of infanticide and argues that his responses to the four objections fail.     

The Viable Violinist

In the aftermath of the Kermit Gosnell trial and Giubilini and Minerva's article ‘After‐birth abortion’, abortion‐rights advocates have been pressured to provide an account of the moral difference between abortion, particularly late‐term abortion, and infanticide. In response, some scholars have defended a moral distinction by appealing to an argument developed by Judith Jarvis Thomson in A defense of abortion. However, once Thomson's analogy is refined to account for the morally relevant features of late‐term pregnancy, rather than distinguishing between late‐term abortion and infanticide, it reinforces their moral similarity. This is because late‐term abortion requires more than detachment – it requires an act of feticide to ensure the death of the viable fetus. As such, a Thomsonian account cannot be deployed successfully as a response to Giubilini and Minerva. Those wishing to defend late‐term abortion while rejecting the permissibility of infanticide will need to provide an alternative account of the difference, or else accept Giubilini and Minerva's conclusion.     

Why a right to life rules out infanticide: A final reply to Räsänen

Joona Räsänen has argued that pro‐life arguments against the permissibility of infanticide are not persuasive, and fail to show it to be immoral. We responded to Räsänen’s arguments, concluding that his critique of pro‐life arguments was misplaced. Räsänen has recently replied in ‘Why pro‐life arguments still are not convincing: A reply to my critics’, providing some additional arguments as to why he does not find pro‐life arguments against infanticide convincing. Here, we respond briefly to Räsänen’s critique of the substance view, and also to his most important claim: that possession of a right to life by an infant does not rule out the permissibility of infanticide. We demonstrate that this claim is unfounded, and conclude that Räsänen has not refuted pro‐life arguments against infanticide.     

Autonomy,Natality and Freedom: A Liberal Re‐examination of Habermas in the Enhancement Debate

Jurgen Habermas has argued that carrying out pre‐natal germline enhancements would be inimical to the future child's autonomy. In this article, I suggest that many of the objections that have been made against Habermas' arguments by liberals in the enhancement debate misconstrue his claims. To explain why, I begin by explaining how Habermas' view of personal autonomy confers particular importance to the agent's embodiment and social environment. In view of this, I explain that it is possible to draw two arguments against germline enhancements from Habermas' thought. I call these arguments ‘the argument from negative freedom’ and ‘the argument from natality’. Although I argue that many of the common liberal objections to Habermas are not applicable when his arguments are properly understood, I go on to suggest ways in which supporters of enhancement might appropriately respond to Habermas' arguments.     

Fair Innings and Time‐Relative Claims

Greg Bognar has recently offered a prioritarian justification for ‘fair innings’ distributive principles that would ration access to healthcare on the basis of patients' age. In this article, I agree that Bognar's principle is among the strongest arguments for age‐based rationing. However, I argue that this position is incomplete because of the possibility of ‘time‐relative' egalitarian principles that could complement the kind of lifetime egalitarianism that Bognar adopts. After outlining Bognar's position, and explaining the attraction of time‐relative egalitarianism, I suggest various ways in which these two kinds of principle could interact. Since various options have very different implications for age‐based rationing, proponents of such a rationing scheme must take a position on time‐relative egalitarianism to complement a lifetime prioritarian view like Bognar's.     

Against Anonymity

In ‘New Threats to Academic Freedom’ 1 1 Minerva, F. . New Threats to Academic Freedom . Bioethics 2013 ; DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12066 .
Francesca Minerva argues that anonymity for the authors of controversial articles is a prerequisite for academic freedom in the Internet age. This argument draws its intellectual and emotional power from the author's account of the reaction to the on‐line publication of ‘ After‐birth abortion: why should the baby live?’ 2 2 Giubilini, A. & Minerva, F. . After‐birth Abortion. Why Should the Baby Live? J Med Ethics 2013 ; 39 : 261 – 263 .
– an article that provoked cascades of hostile postings and e‐mails. Reflecting on these events, Minerva proposes that publishers should offer the authors of controversial articles the option of publishing their articles anonymously. This response reviews the history of anonymous publication and concludes that its reintroduction in the Internet era would recreate problems similar to those that led print journals to abandon the practice: corruption of scholarly discourse by invective and hate speech, masked conflicts of interest, and a diminution of editorial accountability. It also contends that Minerva misreads the intent of the hostile e‐mails provoked by ‘After‐birth abortion,’ and that ethicists who publish controversial articles should take responsibility by dialoguing with their critics – even those whose critiques are emotionally charged and hostile.     

Evolution,reproduction and definition of life

Synthetic theory of evolution is a superior integrative biological theory. Therefore, there is nothing surprising about the fact that multiple attempts of defining life are based on this theory. One of them even has a status of NASA’s working definition. According to this definition, ‘life is a self-sustained chemical system capable of undergoing Darwinian evolution’ Luisi (Orig Life Evol Bios 28:613–622, 1998); Cleland, Chyba (Orig Life Evol Bios 32:387–393, 2002). This definition is often considered as one of the more theoretically mature definitions of life. This Darwinian definition has nonetheless provoked a lot of criticism. One of the major arguments claims that this definition is wrong due to ‘mule’s problem’. Mules (and other infertile hybrids), despite being obviously living organisms, in the light of this definition are considered inanimate objects. It is strongly counterintuitive. The aim of this article was to demonstrate that this reasoning is false. In the later part of the text, I also discuss some other arguments against the Darwinian approach to defining life.     

Academic Freedom and the Professional Responsibilities of Applied Ethicists: A comment on Minerva

Academic freedom is an important good, but it comes with several responsibilities. In this commentary we seek to do two things. First, we argue against Francesca Minerva's view of academic freedom as presented in her article ‘New threats to academic freedom’ on a number of grounds. We reject the nature of the absolutist moral claim to free speech for academics implicit in the article; we reject the elitist role for academics as truth‐seekers explicit in her view; and we reject a possible more moderate re‐construction of her view based on the harm/offence distinction. Second, we identify some of the responsibilities of applied ethicists, and illustrate how they recommend against allowing for anonymous publication of research. Such a proposal points to the wider perils of a public discourse which eschews the calm and careful discussion of ideas.     

ONTOLOGY OR PHENOMENOLOGY? HOW THE LVAD CHALLENGES THE EUTHANASIA DEBATE

This article deals with the euthanasia debate in light of new life‐sustaining technologies such as the left ventricular assist device (LVAD). The question arises: does the switching off of a LVAD by a doctor upon the request of a patient amount to active or passive euthanasia, i.e. to ‘killing’ or to ‘letting die’? The answer hinges on whether the device is to be regarded as a proper part of the patient's body or as something external. We usually regard the switching off of an internal device as killing, whereas the deactivation of an external device is seen as ‘letting die’. The case is notoriously difficult to decide for hybrid devices such as LVADs, which are partly inside and partly outside the patient's body. Additionally, on a methodological level, I will argue that the ‘ontological’ arguments from analogy given for both sides are problematic. Given the impasse facing the ontological arguments, complementary phenomenological arguments deserve closer inspection. In particular, we should consider whether phenomenologically the LVAD is perceived as a body part or as an external device. I will support the thesis that the deactivation of a LVAD is to be regarded as passive euthanasia if the device is not perceived by the patient as a part of the body proper.     

Solutions to the New Threats to Academic Freedom?

In my commentary on Francesca Minerva's article ‘New Threats to Academic Freedom’, I agree with her contention that the existence of the Internet has given rise to new and very serious threats to academic freedom. I think that it is crucial that we confront those threats, and find ways to eliminate them, which I believe can be done. The threats in question involve both authors and editors. In the case of authors, I argue that the best solution is not anonymous publication, but publication using pseudonyms, and I describe how that would work. In the case of editors, my proposal is a website that a number of journals would have access to, where papers that editors judge to be clearly worthy of publication, but whose publication seems likely to set off a firestorm of public and media protest, could be published without any indication of the journal that had accepted the paper for publication.     

More on the genetical theory of multilevel selection

In my article The genetical theory of multilevel selection, I provided a synthesis of the theory of multilevel selection (MLS) and the theory of natural selection in class‐structured populations. I framed this synthesis within Fisher's genetical paradigm, taking a strictly genetical approach to traits and fitness. I showed that this resolves a number of long‐standing conceptual problems that have plagued the MLS literature, including the issues of ‘aggregate’ vs. ‘emergent’ group traits, ‘collective fitness₁’ vs. ‘collective fitness₂’ and ‘MLS1’ vs. ‘MLS2 ‘. In his commentary, Goodnight suggests this theoretical and conceptual synthesis is flawed in several respects. Here, I show this is incorrect, by: reiterating the theoretical and conceptual goals of my synthesis; clarifying that my genetical approach to traits is necessary for a proper analysis of the action of MLS independently of non‐Darwinian factors; emphasizing that the Price–Hamilton approach to MLS provides a consistent, useful and conceptually superior theoretical framework; and explaining the role of reproductive value in the study of natural selection in class‐structured populations. I also show that Goodnight's contextual analysis treatment of MLS in a class‐structured population is mathematically, biologically and conceptually inadequate.     

Troubled landscapes,troubling anthropology: co‐presence,necessity, and the making of ethnographic knowledge

If ‘co‐presence is a condition of [anthropological] inquiry’ (Fabian), what sort of knowledge does it produce? I explore this question through an ethnography of a ‘troubled landscape’ in Malaysian Borneo: a lush, hilly region that has been the site of a dam construction and resettlement project since the late 2000s. My article uses the notion of co‐presence as both a lens through which to explore the predicaments of the four small communities affected by the scheme and a reflexive device that underscores the embeddedness of the ethnographic encounter in a larger relational field – one characterized as much by chance and necessity as it is by anthropologists’ intellectual agendas. In the process, I seek to trouble some of the methodological and ethical issues posed by anthropology's recent ‘ontological turn’, notably the long‐standing questions of what it means to ‘take seriously’ and how ethnography and the ethnographer are implicated in this project.     

Does benefit justify research with children?

The inclusion of children in research gives rise to a difficult ethical question: What justifies children's research participation and exposure to research risks when they cannot provide informed consent? This question arises out of the tension between the moral requirement to obtain a subject's informed consent for research participation, on the one hand, and the limited capacity of most children to provide informed consent, on the other. Most agree that children's participation in clinical research can be justified. But the ethical justification for exposing children to research risks in the absence of consent remains unclear. One prevalent group of arguments aims to justify children's risk exposure by appealing to the concept of benefit. I call these ‘benefit arguments’. Prominent versions of this argument defend the idea that broadening our understanding of the notion of benefit to include non‐medical benefits (such as the benefit of a moral education) helps to justify children's research participation. I argue that existing benefit arguments are not persuasive and raise problems with the strategy of appealing to broader notions of benefit to justify children's exposure to research risk.     

Statistical consistency and phylogenetic inference: a brief review

The claim that parsimony can be statistically inconsistent remains the chief criticism of the cladistic approach, and also the main justification for alternative model‐based approaches such as maximum likelihood and Bayesian inference. Despite its refutation in the 1980s, this persistent myth of parsimony's Achilles’ heel is entrenched in the primary literature, and has metastasized into textbooks, as well. Here, I review historical controversies, and offer three short arguments as to why statistical consistency is not only irrelevant to systematics, but to empirical science in general.     

A Defence of Conscientious Objection in Medicine: A Reply to Schuklenk and Savulescu

In a recent (2015) Bioethics editorial, Udo Schuklenk argues against allowing Canadian doctors to conscientiously object to any new euthanasia procedures approved by Parliament. In this he follows Julian Savulescu's 2006 BMJ paper which argued for the removal of the conscientious objection clause in the 1967 UK Abortion Act. Both authors advance powerful arguments based on the need for uniformity of service and on analogies with reprehensible kinds of personal exemption. In this article I want to defend the practice of conscientious objection in publicly‐funded healthcare systems (such as those of Canada and the UK), at least in the area of abortion and end‐of‐life care, without entering either of the substantive moral debates about the permissibility of either. My main claim is that Schuklenk and Savulescu have misunderstood the special nature of medicine, and have misunderstood the motivations of the conscientious objectors. However, I acknowledge Schuklenk's point about differential access to lawful services in remote rural areas, and I argue that the health service should expend more to protect conscientious objection while ensuring universal access.     

Third‐way neoliberalism and conditional cash transfers: The paradoxes of empowerment,participation and self‐help among poor Uruguayan women

The Latin American literature on Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) welfare programs has typically involved the quantitative evaluation of social and economic impact, with fewer studies addressing the qualitative and gendered impacts of CCTs. Drawing from ethnographic fieldwork in poor squatter settlement communities in Uruguay, this article explores the everyday social realities of poor single mothers who have been disconnected from their kinship networks and must rely on CCT payments for survival. I locate these women's experiences within the third‐way neoliberal discourses of ‘empowerment’, ‘participation’ and ‘self‐help’ espoused by the state, and the various structural conditions, including crime, violence and unequal gender relations, that impact negatively on women's abilities to comply with their social and civic duties. I argue that rather than producing responsible and empowered subjects, Uruguay's recent CCT welfare program has paradoxically limited some women's participation in civic and public life and reproduced their dependent relations with men.     

Why Procreative Preferences May be Moral – And Why it May not Matter if They Aren't

There has been much argument over whether procreative selection is obligatory or wrong. Rebecca Bennett has recently challenged the assumption that procreative choices are properly moral choices, arguing that these views express mere preferences. This article challenges Bennett's view on two fronts. First, I argue that the Non‐Identity Problem does not show that there cannot be harmless wrongs – though this would require us to abandon the intuitively attractive ‘person‐affecting principle’, that may be a lesser cost than abandoning some more firmly‐held intuition. But, even if we accept Bennett's claim that these choices are not moral, that does not show them to be mere personal preferences. I argue that there is a class of non‐moral ‘categorical preferences’ that have much the same implications as moral preferences. If a moral preference for able‐bodied children is problematic (as Bennett claims), then so is a non‐moral categorical preference. Thus, showing that these preferences are not moral does not show that they are not problematic, since they may still be categorical.     

DEEPER PROBLEMS FOR NOONAN'S PROBABILITY ARGUMENT AGAINST ABORTION: ON A CHARITABLE READING OF NOONAN'S CONCEPTION CRITERION OF HUMANITY

In ‘An Almost Absolute Value in History’ John T. Noonan criticizes several attempts to provide a criterion for when an entity deserves rights. These criteria, he argues are either arbitrary or lead to absurd consequence. Noonan proposes human conception as the criterion of rights, and justifies it by appeal to the sharp shift in probability, at conception, of becoming a being possessed of human reason. Conception, then, is when abortion becomes immoral. The article has an historical and a philosophical goal. The historical goal is to carefully present the probability argument in a charitable manner. The philosophical goal is to offer a unique criticism of Noonan's probability argument against abortion. I argue that, even on a very charitable reading of Noonan's argument for the conception criterion, this criterion is also susceptible to charges of arbitrariness and absurdity. Noonan's claim that probability shifts have anything to do with the moral rights of fetuses cannot be made coherent. I also show that there are problems with Noonan's assumptions about moral rights and the potential to become a being possessed of human reason.     

A pluralist challenge to “integrative medicine”: Feyerabend and Popper on the cognitive value of alternative medicine

This paper is a critique of ‘integrative medicine’ as an ideal of medical progress on the grounds that it fails to realise the cognitive value of alternative medicine. After a brief account of the cognitive value of alternative medicine, I outline the form of ‘integrative medicine’ defended by the late Stephen Straus, former director of the US National Centre for Complementary and Alternative Medicine. Straus’ account is then considered in the light of Zuzana Parusnikova’s recent criticism of ‘integrative medicine’ and her distinction between ‘cognitive’ and ‘opportunistic’ engagement with alternative medicine. Parusnikova warns that the medical establishment is guilty of ‘dogmatism’ and proposes that one can usefully invoke Karl Popper’s ‘critical rationalism’ as an antidote. Using the example of Straus, I argue that an appeal to Popper is insufficient, on the grounds that ‘integrative medicine’ can class as a form of cognitively-productive, critical engagement. I suggest that Parusnikova’s appeal to Popper should be augmented with Paul Feyerabend’s emphasis upon the role of ‘radical alternatives’ in maximising criticism. ‘Integrative medicine’ fails to maximise criticism because it ‘translates’ alternative medicine into the theories and terminology of allopathic medicine and so erodes its capacity to provide cognitively-valuable ‘radical alternatives’. These claims are then illustrated with a discussion of ‘traditional’ and ‘medical’ acupuncture. I conclude that ‘integrative medicine’ fails to exploit the cognitive value of alternative medicine and so should be rejected as an ideal of medical progress.