Substance,rights, value,and abortion

Most serious contemporary opposition to abortion is grounded on the belief that human fetuses are members of the same moral category as beings like us, and that the loss of any such life is one of the worst possible losses. Substance view theorists oppose abortion for this reason: in their view beings like us are essentially rational substances with inherent moral worth, and those who perform induced abortion fail to recognize this moral worth. In a recent series of articles, Rob Lovering presents reductio‐style arguments against the substance view, in part arguing that it is inconsistent with our intuitions in rescue and spontaneous abortion cases. In a recent reply, Henrik Friberg‐Fernros argues that the substance view can evade these problematic implications because of a distinction between killing and letting die. According to this argument, the fetus’s right to life is a negative right not to be killed, not a positive right to be rescued, thus the anti‐abortion theorist who lets fetuses die acts acceptably. I argue this stance fails to recognize the inherent moral worth that the substance view contends fetuses possess. One who refrains from saving a person, or doesn’t care how many people she saves, cannot reasonably claim to value life. Furthermore, this stance is at odds with most contemporary anti‐abortion views that oppose induced abortions of both the killing and letting die variety.     

A Critique of Rob Lovering's Criticism of the Substance View

In his article, The Substance View: a critique, Rob Lovering argues that the substance view – according to which the human embryo is a person entitled to human rights – leads to such implausible implications that this view should be abandoned. In this article I respond to his criticism by arguing that either his arguments fail because the proponents of the substance view are not obligated to hold positions which may be considered absurd, or because the positions which they are assumed to be obligated to hold, are not absurd at all.     

Two puzzles for Marquis's conservative view on abortion

Don Marquis argues that abortion is morally wrong in most cases since it deprives the fetus of the value of its future. I criticize Marquis’s argument for the modified conservative view by adopting an argumentative strategy in which I work within his basic account: if it is granted that his fundamental idea is sound, what follows about the morality of abortion? I conclude that Marquis is faced with a dilemma: either his position must shift towards the extreme conservative view on which abortion is never morally permissible, or he must abandon any recognizably conservative view. This dilemma suggests that Marquis’s view is either deeply implausible or that he cannot use this argument to successfully support his preferred position.     

POST‐ABORTION SYNDROME: CREATING AN AFFLICTION

The contention that abortion harms women constitutes a new strategy employed by the pro‐life movement to supplement arguments about fetal rights. David C. Reardon is a prominent promoter of this strategy. Post‐abortion syndrome purports to establish that abortion psychologically harms women and, indeed, can harm persons associated with women who have abortions. Thus, harms that abortion is alleged to produce are multiplied. Claims of repression are employed to complicate efforts to disprove the existence of psychological harm and causal antecedents of trauma are only selectively investigated. We argue that there is no such thing as post‐abortion syndrome and that the psychological harms Reardon and others claim abortion inflicts on women can usually be ascribed to different causes. We question the evidence accumulated by Reardon and his analysis of data accumulated by others. Most importantly, we question whether the conclusions Reardon has drawn follow from the evidence he cites.     

Frozen embryos and the obligation to adopt

Rob Lovering has developed an interesting new critique of views that regard embryos as equally valuable as other human beings: the moral argument for frozen human embryo adoption. The argument is aimed at those who believe that the death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing, and Lovering concludes that some who hold this view ought to prevent one of these deaths by adopting and gestating a frozen embryo. Contra Lovering, we show that there are far more effective strategies for preserving the lives of frozen embryos than adoption. Moreover, we point out that those who regard the deaths of frozen embryos as a very bad thing will generally regard the deaths of all embryos as a very bad thing, whether they are discarded embryos, aborted embryos or embryos that spontaneously abort. This entails that these other embryos must be taken into account when considering moral obligations, as well as other human lives at risk from preventable causes.     

The Viable Violinist

In the aftermath of the Kermit Gosnell trial and Giubilini and Minerva's article ‘After‐birth abortion’, abortion‐rights advocates have been pressured to provide an account of the moral difference between abortion, particularly late‐term abortion, and infanticide. In response, some scholars have defended a moral distinction by appealing to an argument developed by Judith Jarvis Thomson in A defense of abortion. However, once Thomson's analogy is refined to account for the morally relevant features of late‐term pregnancy, rather than distinguishing between late‐term abortion and infanticide, it reinforces their moral similarity. This is because late‐term abortion requires more than detachment – it requires an act of feticide to ensure the death of the viable fetus. As such, a Thomsonian account cannot be deployed successfully as a response to Giubilini and Minerva. Those wishing to defend late‐term abortion while rejecting the permissibility of infanticide will need to provide an alternative account of the difference, or else accept Giubilini and Minerva's conclusion.     

Reduced expression of selected FASCICLIN‐LIKE ARABINOGALACTAN PROTEIN genes associates with the abortion of kernels in field crops of Zea mays (maize) and of Arabidopsis seeds

Abortion of fertilized ovaries at the tip of the ear can generate significant yield losses in maize crops. To investigate the mechanisms involved in this process, 2 maize hybrids were grown in field crops at 2 sowing densities and under 3 irrigation regimes (well‐watered control, drought before pollination, and drought during pollination), in all possible combinations. Samples of ear tips were taken 2–6 days after synchronous hand pollination and used for the analysis of gene expression and sugars. Glucose and fructose levels increased in kernels with high abortion risk. Several FASCICLIN‐LIKE ARABINOGALACTAN PROTEIN (FLA) genes showed negative correlation with abortion. The expression of ZmFLA7 responded to drought only at the tip of the ear. The abundance of arabinogalactan protein (AGP) glycan epitopes decreased with drought and pharmacological treatments that reduce AGP activity enhanced the abortion of fertilized ovaries. Drought also reduced the expression of AthFLA9 in the siliques of Arabidopsis thaliana. Gain‐ and loss‐of‐function mutants of Arabidopsis showed a negative correlation between AthFLA9 and seed abortion. On the basis of gene expression patterns, pharmacological, and genetic evidence, we propose that stress‐induced reductions in the expression of selected FLA genes enhance abortion of fertilized ovaries in maize and Arabidopsis.     

The impairment argument for the immorality of abortion: A reply

In his recent article Perry Hendricks presents what he calls the impairment argument to show that abortion is immoral. To do so, he argues that to give a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral. Because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome, Hendricks concludes that killing the fetus must also be immoral. Here, I claim that killing a fetus does not impair it in the way that giving it fetal alcohol syndrome does. By examining the reason why giving a fetus this condition is wrong, I conclude that the same reasoning, on common pro‐choice accounts, does not apply to killing the fetus. Accordingly, Hendricks's argument does not succeed in showing abortion is immoral.     

药械联合终止早孕的临床研究

目的：探讨药物联合负压吸宫术对哺乳期妊娠流产的有效性及安全性。方法：选择200例哺乳期早期妊娠妇女随即分为药械联合终止早孕组（药械联合组）和负压吸宫术终止早孕组（负压吸宫组）,比较两组间各临床指标。结果：药械联合组I级、II级、III级疼痛评价均较负压吸宫组明显降低（P〈0．05）。两组在完全流产率和不全流产率上差异均无统计学意义（P〉0．05）。药械联合组宫腔吸出组织量（2．48＋0．77）mL明显高于（12．11±4．23）mL（P〈0．05）。两组术后均无感染、闭经、器械性损伤和宫腔或宫颈粘连等并发症发生。结论：药械联合终止早孕有效、安全,疼痛及刮宫程度较轻。     

The Identity Objection to the future‐like‐ours argument

Some critics of Don Marquis's ‘future‐like‐ours’ anti‐abortion argument launch what has been called the Identity Objection. The upshot of this objection is that under a psychological theory of personal identity, a non‐sentient fetus lacks precisely what Marquis believes gives it a right to life – a future like ours. However, Eric Vogelstein, in a recent article, has argued that under this theory of personal identity a non‐sentient fetus, in fact, has a future like ours, which he believes dissolves the Identity Objection. But Vogelstein is mistaken. Even if he is correct that there is a sense in which a non‐sentient fetus has a future of value under a psychological theory of personal identity, the sense in which it has one is importantly different from the sense in which we have one, meaning that, under such a theory, a non‐sentient fetus does not have a future like ours.     

ABORTION COUNSELLING AND THE INFORMED CONSENT DILEMMA

An obstacle to abortion exists in the form of abortion ‘counselling’ that discourages women from terminating their pregnancies. This counselling involves providing information about the procedure that tends to create feelings of guilt, anxiety and strong emotional reactions to the recognizable form of a human fetus. Instances of such counselling that involve false or misleading information are clearly unethical and do not prompt much philosophical reflection, but the prospect of truthful abortion counselling draws attention to a delicate issue for healthcare professionals seeking to respect patient autonomy. This is the fact that even accurate information about abortion procedures can have intimidating effects on women seeking to terminate a pregnancy. Consequently, a dilemma arises regarding the information that one ought to provide to patients considering an abortion: on the one hand, the mere offering of certain types of information can lead to intimidation; on the other hand, withholding information that some patients would consider relevant to their decision‐making is objectionably paternalistic on any standard account of the physician‐patient relationship. This is an unsettling conclusion for the possibility of setting fixed professional guidelines regarding the counselling offered to women who are considering abortion. Thus, abortion ought to be viewed as an illuminating example of a procedure for which the process of securing informed consent ought to be highly context‐sensitive and responsive to the needs of each individual patient. This result underscores the need for health care professionals to cultivate trusting relationships with patients and to develop finely tuned powers of practical judgment.     

A Defence of Conscientious Objection in Medicine: A Reply to Schuklenk and Savulescu

In a recent (2015) Bioethics editorial, Udo Schuklenk argues against allowing Canadian doctors to conscientiously object to any new euthanasia procedures approved by Parliament. In this he follows Julian Savulescu's 2006 BMJ paper which argued for the removal of the conscientious objection clause in the 1967 UK Abortion Act. Both authors advance powerful arguments based on the need for uniformity of service and on analogies with reprehensible kinds of personal exemption. In this article I want to defend the practice of conscientious objection in publicly‐funded healthcare systems (such as those of Canada and the UK), at least in the area of abortion and end‐of‐life care, without entering either of the substantive moral debates about the permissibility of either. My main claim is that Schuklenk and Savulescu have misunderstood the special nature of medicine, and have misunderstood the motivations of the conscientious objectors. However, I acknowledge Schuklenk's point about differential access to lawful services in remote rural areas, and I argue that the health service should expend more to protect conscientious objection while ensuring universal access.     

产复康冲剂治疗药物流产后阴道出血的临床观察

目的：观察产复康冲剂在药物流产后服用,阴道出血时间及出血量的变化,方法与结果：实验组（产复康组）及对照组各120名,结果两组流产率无差异（P＞0．05）。完全流产组二者周内出血停止者实验组多于对照组P＜0．01。三周出血不止者实验组少于对照组,P＜0．01。尽管大于月经量出血的平均天数实验组略长,但点滴出血时间较对照组短P＜0．01。结论：产复康冲剂补气养血,排淤生新,加快恶露排净达到尽快止血目的,是治疗药物流后异常阴道出血的方法之一。     

Even if the fetus is not a person,abortion is immoral: The impairment argument

Much of the debate about the ethics of abortion has centered on whether the fetus is a person. In an attempt to sidestep this complex issue, I argue that, even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral. To arrive at this conclusion, I argue that giving a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral, and that if this is so, then killing the fetus is immoral. Roughly, this is because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome. Since abortion (in most cases) amounts to killing the fetus, this means that abortion (in most cases) is immoral. I defend the premises of this argument against a plethora of objections, concluding that they either do not work, or commit their proponent to a controversial position.     

The Substance View: A Critique (Part 2)

In my initial critique of the substance view, I raised reductio‐style objections to the substance view's conclusion that the standard human fetus has the same intrinsic value and moral standing as the standard adult human being, among others. In this follow‐up critique, I raise objections to some of the premises invoked in support of this conclusion. I begin by briefly presenting the substance view as well as its defense. (For a more thorough presentation, see the first part of my critique.) I then raise objections to three claims involved in the substance view's defense: the claim that the standard human fetus's intrinsic value and moral standing is a function of its potentiality; the claim that the standard human fetus's intrinsic value and moral standing is a function of its essential properties; and the claim that it is the possession of the basic potential for rational moral agency that best accounts for the wrongness of killing the standard human fetus, among others.     

Abortion is incommensurable with fetal alcohol syndrome

A recent article argued for the immorality of abortion regardless of personhood status by comparing the impairment caused by fetal alcohol syndrome to the impairment caused by abortion. I argue that two of the premises in this argument fail and that, as such, one cannot reasonably attribute moral harms to abortion on the basis of the moral harms caused by fetal alcohol syndrome. The impairment argument relies on an inconsistent instantiation, which undermines the claim that personhood is irrelevant, and it does not fulfill its own ceteris paribus clause, which demands that no additional benefit be gained from abortion that would not be gained from causing fetal alcohol syndrome.     

Selective abortion in Brazil: the anencephaly case

This paper discusses the Brazilian Supreme Court ruling on the case of anencephaly. In Brazil, abortion is a crime against the life of a fetus, and selective abortion of non-viable fetuses is prohibited. Following a paradigmatic case discussed by the Brazilian Supreme Court in 2004, the use of abortion was authorized in the case of a fetus with anencephaly. The objective of this paper is to analyze the ethical arguments of the case, in particular the strategy of avoiding the moral status of the fetus, the cornerstone thesis of the Catholic Church.     

Elevated viral antibody titres in spontaneous abortion

Abstract To assess the possible role of virus infections in spontaneous abortion we undertook a prospective study of three groups of patients: women who had a spontaneous abortion; women seen in the ante-natal booking clinic; and those undergoing therapeutic termination of pregnancy. Venous blood was taken for antibody detection, cervical swabs for virus isolation, and in the cases of spontaneous and therapeutic abortion products of conception were sent for virus culture. The infectious agents studied were influenza A and B, adenovirus, respiratory syncytial virus, measles, psittacosis, Varicella zoster , and mumps virus. Statistical analysis revealed that women in the spontaneous abortion group has a higher incidence of antibodies against respiratory syncytial virus ( P <0.01), and mumps virus ( P <0.01). Among women seropositive for each virus, higher titres were found only for respiratory syncytial virus ( P <0.05) in cases rather than controls. These results could be explained if viruses such as respiratory syncytial virus caused abortion or if women having a spontaneous abortion mount exaggerated immune responses to fetal adn viral infections, and the former altered immune response is associated with spontaneous abortion.     

The future‐like‐ours argument,animalism, and mereological universalism

Which metaphysical theories are involved—whether presupposed or implied—in Marquis’ future‐like‐ours (FLO) argument against abortion? Vogelstein has recently argued that the supporter of the FLO argument faces a problematic dilemma; in particular, Marquis, the main supporter of the argument, seems to have to either (a) abandon diachronic universalism (DU) or (b) acquiesce and declare that contraception is morally wrong. I argue that the premises of Marquis’ argument can be reasonably combined with a form of unrestricted composition and that the FLO argument is better viewed as including animalism, i.e., the thesis that we are animals.     

Potentiality and human embryos

Consideration of the potentiality of human embryos to develop characteristics of personhood, such as intellect and will, has figured prominently in arguments against abortion and the use of human embryos for research. In particular, such consideration was the basis for the call of the US President's Council on Bioethics for a moratorium on stem cell research on human embryos. In this paper, I critique the concept of potentiality invoked by the Council and offer an alternative account. In contrast to the Council's view that an embryo's potentiality is determined by definition and is not affected by external conditions that may prevent certain possibilities from ever being realized, I propose an empirically grounded account of potentiality that involves an assessment of the physical and decisional conditions that may restrict an embryo's possibilities. In my view, some human embryos lack the potentiality to become a person that other human embryos have. Assuming for the sake of argument that the potential to become a person gives a being special moral status, it follows that some human embryos lack this status. This argument is then used to support Gene Outka's suggestion that it is morally permissible to experiment on 'spare' frozen embryos that are destined to be destroyed.