How-possibly explanations as genuine explanations and helpful heuristics: A comment on Forber

Recently, Forber introduced a distinction between two kinds of how-possibly explanation, global and local how-possibly explanation, and argued that both play genuinely explanatory roles in evolutionary biology. In this paper I examine the nature of these two kinds of how-possibly explanations, focusing on the question whether they indeed constitute genuine explanations. I will conclude that one of Forber's kinds of how-possibly explanation may be thought of as a kind of genuine explanation but not as a kind of how-possibly explanation, while the other kind plays a heuristic role and should not be conceived of as a kind of explanation at all.     

The functions of fossils: inference and explanation in functional morphology

This paper offers an account of the relationship between inference and explanation in functional morphology which combines Robert Brandon's theory of adaptation explanation with standard accounts of inference to the best explanation. Inferences of function from structure, it is argued, are inferences to the best adaptation explanation. There are, however, three different approaches to the problem of determining which adaptation explanation is the best. The theory of inference to the best adaptation explanation is then applied to a case study from the history of functional morphology: the case of the crested duckbilled dinosaurs.     

Calanoid copepod biogeography in New Zealand

The distribution of four calanoid copepod species of Boeckella in New Zealand are mapped and described. An explanation of their distribution patterns based on panbiogeographic methods is compared to an explanation based on dispersalist concepts. The panbiogeographic explanation is simpler, and is consistent with explanation of distribution patterns among other genera of plants, invertebrates, amphibians and birds. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Editorial policy and Notes for authors

Modern accounts of evolutionary mechanism pay little attention to the pattern and logic of Darwin's explanation, but recognition of the logic of Darwin's explanation has significance for our understanding of evolution and for our appreciation of the extent to which Darwin's concept of evolutionary mechanism accords with modern evolutionary thought. Also, Darwin's explanation exemplifies the concept of a scientific ‘law’ and thus is of considerable value in helping learners to understand the nature of scientific explanation.     

Carl F. Craver, Explaining what? Review of explaining the brain: mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience

Carl Craver’s recent book offers an account of the explanatory and theoretical structure of neuroscience. It depicts it as centered around the idea of achieving mechanistic understanding, i.e., obtaining knowledge of how a set of underlying components interacts to produce a given function of the brain. Its core account of mechanistic explanation and relevance is causal-manipulationist in spirit, and offers substantial insight into casual explanation in brain science and the associated notion of levels of explanation. However, the focus on mechanistic explanation leaves some open questions regarding the role of computation and cognition.     

Qualitative and quantitative explanation of the forms of heat sensitive organs in snakes

Heat sensitive pit organs in different species of snakes show various shapes. The relation between form characters and functions were analysed by means of two different research programs. This paper presents the methodological steps involved in these research programs. The first approach is called a qualitative explanation because it connects experimental data by means of qualitative statements in order to give a functional morphological explanation for the construction of the pits in respect to the behaviour of the snake. The second approach is called a quantitative explanation because the core of the explanation is a mathematical model which in its consequences explaines the construction of the pits in respect to image formation.     

使用多因素易患性阈值模型评估双相情感障碍的遗传度缺失

为了评估双向情感障碍的遗传度缺失,文章通过查询美国国家人类基因组研究所(National Human Genome Research Institute,NHGRI)的gwascatalog目录,检索出所有已发现的双相情感障碍易感变异,使用多因素易患性阈值模型计算每个易感变异对双相情感障碍遗传度的解释度。将所有易感变异遗传度解释度求和得到双相情感障碍已知易感变异对遗传度的总解释度,使用此总解释度评估双相情感障碍的遗传度缺失。结果显示,已知双相情感障碍易感变异对双相情感障碍遗传度的合计解释度为38.34%,尚有61.66%的遗传度无法被已有易感变异解释,属于遗传度缺失。双相情感障碍38.34%的遗传度解释度较早前国外同类研究大幅度提高,表明随着新的双相情感障碍易感变异被不断发现,双相情感障碍遗传度缺失得到大幅度减小。但双相情感障碍遗传度缺失依然存在且数目较大的事实也表明双相情感障碍尚存在许多未知的分子遗传学机制有待进一步阐明。     

The method of synthesis in ecology

Synthesis of results from different investigations is an important activity for ecologists but when compared with analysis the method of synthesis has received little attention. Ecologists usually proceed intuitively and this can lead to a problem in defining differences between the syntheses made by different scientists. It also leads to criticism from scientists favoring analytical approaches that the construction of general theory is an activity that does not follow the scientific method. We outline a methodology for scientific inference about integrative concepts and the syntheses made in constructing them and illustrate how this can be applied in the development of general theory from investigations into particular ecological systems. The objective is to construct a causal scientific explanation. This has four characteristics. (1) It defines causal and/or organizational processes that describe how systems function. (2) These processes are consistent – under the same conditions they will produce the same effect. (3) A causal scientific explanation provides general information about events of a similar kind. (4) When experiments are possible then a designed manipulation will produce a predictable response. The essential characteristic of making synthesis to construct a causal scientific explanation is that it is progressive and we judge progress made by assessing the coherence of the explanation using six criteria: acceptability of individual propositions including that they have been tested with data, consistency of concept definitions, consistency in the type of concepts used in making the explanation, that ad hoc propositions are not used, that there is economy in the number of propositions used, that the explanation applies to broad questions. We illustrate development of a causal scientific explanation for the concept of long-lived pioneer tree species, show how the coherence of this explanation can be assessed, and how it could be improved.     

The causal structure of mechanisms

Recently, a number of philosophers of science have claimed that much explanation in the sciences, especially in the biomedical and social sciences, is mechanistic explanation. I argue the account of mechanistic explanation provided in this tradition has not been entirely satisfactory, as it has neglected to describe in complete detail the crucial causal structure of mechanistic explanation. I show how the interventionist approach to causation, especially within a structural equations framework, provides a simple and elegant account of the causal structure of mechanisms. This account explains the many useful insights of traditional accounts of mechanism, such as Carl Craver’s account in his book Explaining the Brain (2007), but also helps to correct the omissions of such accounts. One of these omissions is the failure to provide an explicit formulation of a modularity constraint that plays a significant role in mechanistic explanation. One virtue of the interventionist/structural equations framework is that it allows for a simple formulation of a modularity constraint on mechanistic explanation. I illustrate the role of this constraint in the last section of the paper, which describes the form that mechanistic explanation takes in the computational, information-processing paradigm of cognitive psychology.     

Brief report: Newborn adoption in a confined group of Japanese macaques

In a group of Japanese macaques, a multiparous high-ranking female gave birth to an infant and, two days later, adopted a neonate abandoned right after birth by a primiparous low-ranking female. Both infants were reared successfully. Whereas the “selfish” explanation does not accord with the evidence from the present case, the “altruistic” explanation cannot be discarded definitively. However, the context and the consequences of the adoption suggest reproductive error on the part of the adoptive mother as the most likely explanation.     

Function and organization: comparing the mechanisms of protein synthesis and natural selection

In this paper, we compare the mechanisms of protein synthesis and natural selection. We identify three core elements of mechanistic explanation: functional individuation, hierarchical nestedness or decomposition, and organization. These are now well understood elements of mechanistic explanation in fields such as protein synthesis, and widely accepted in the mechanisms literature. But Skipper and Millstein have argued (2005) that natural selection is neither decomposable nor organized. This would mean that much of the current mechanisms literature does not apply to the mechanism of natural selection. We take each element of mechanistic explanation in turn. Having appreciated the importance of functional individuation, we show how decomposition and organization should be better understood in these terms. We thereby show that mechanistic explanation by protein synthesis and natural selection are more closely analogous than they appear--both possess all three of these core elements of a mechanism widely recognized in the mechanisms literature.     

Why one model is never enough: a defense of explanatory holism

Traditionally, a scientific model is thought to provide a good scientific explanation to the extent that it satisfies certain scientific goals that are thought to be constitutive of explanation (e.g. generating understanding, identifying mechanisms, making predictions, identifying high-level patterns, allowing us to control and manipulate phenomena). Problems arise when we realize that individual scientific models cannot simultaneously satisfy all the scientific goals typically associated with explanation. A given model’s ability to satisfy some goals must always come at the expense of satisfying others. This has resulted in philosophical disputes regarding which of these goals are in fact necessary for explanation, and as such which types of models can and cannot provide explanations (e.g. dynamical models, optimality models, topological models, etc.). Explanatory monists argue that one goal will be explanatory in all contexts, while explanatory pluralists argue that the goal will vary based on pragmatic considerations. In this paper, I argue that such debates are misguided, and that both monists and pluralists are incorrect. Instead of any goal being given explanatory priority over others in a given context, the different goals are all deeply dependent on one another for their explanatory power. Any model that sacrifices some explanatory goals to attain others will always necessarily undermine its own explanatory power in the process. And so when forced to choose between individual scientific models, there can be no explanatory victors. Given that no model can satisfy all the goals typically associated with explanation, no one model in isolation can provide a good scientific explanation. Instead we must appeal to collections of models. Collections of models provide an explanation when they satisfy the web of interconnected goals that justify the explanatory power of one another.     

The Hydraulic Principle

SYNOPSIS. AS theory rules method, the methodological proceduresapplied to morphological explanation have to be derived fromthe law-like properties of the objects under investigation.The explanation of organismic constructions has to be basedon the hydraulic principle which describes organisms as systemscomposed of fluid contained within flexiblemembranes. This insightestablishes a supra-molecular causal principle which, in itsgenerality for morphological explanation, parallels the biochemicalprinciples of molecular biology on the molecular level. Everyform and architectural arrangement has to be conceived as theresult of the form-enforcing influence of mechanical elementsthat operatewithin an integrated mechanically coherent system.An adequate explanation of morphological configuration has toelaborate the organization of the constructional whole and explainits properties as the result of a gradual transformation processthat is constrained by internal mechanical principles. The theoriesdeveloped by such a procedure are open to criticism and canbe tested and corroborated by reference to experiments conductedby nature.     

On bacterial dissociation

A possible explanation for bacterial dissociation is presented. Alternation of haploidy to diploidy to haploidy is offered as an explanation for dissociation. By studying dissociation with such an approach, the real sexual mechanism of bacteria may be discovered.     

植被生态信息的典范相关分析技术理论

植被生态信息分析中对两（多）组取样集间的相关分析的需求导致了典范相关分析技术的应用和发展。本文对典范相关分析技术的原理、典范参数的生态学意义进行了提示,比较了典范相关分析与ＰＣＡ之间的差异,产在典范相关分析技术的应用过程中,原始数据的预处理提出了建议。     

Natural selection and the conditions for existence: representational vs. conditional teleology in biological explanation

Human intentional action, including the design and use of artifacts, involves the prior mental representation of the goal (end) and the means to achieve that goal. This representation is part of the efficient cause of the action, and thus can be used to explain both the action and the achievement of the end. This is intentional teleological explanation. More generally, teleological explanation that depends on the real existence of a representation of the goal (and the means to achieve it) can be called representational teleological explanation. Such explanations in biology can involve both external representations (e.g., ideas in the mind of God) and internal representations (souls, vital powers, entelechies, developmental programs, etc.). However, another type of explanation of intentional action (or any other process) is possible. Given that an action achieving a result occurs, the action can be explained as fulfilling the necessary conditions (means) for that result (end), and, reciprocally, the result explained by the occurrence of those necessary conditions. This is conditional teleological explanation. For organisms, natural selection is often understood metaphorically as the designer, intentionally constructing them for certain ends. Unfortunately, this metaphor is often taken rather too literally, because it has been difficult to conceive of another way to relate natural selection to the process of evolution. I argue that combining a conditional teleological explanation of organisms and of evolution provides such an alternative. This conditional teleology can be grounded in existence or survival. Given that an organism exists, we can explain its existence by the occurrence of the necessary conditions for that existence. This principle of the 'conditions for existence' was introduced by Georges Cuvier in 1800, and provides a valid, conditional teleological method for explaining organismal structure and behavior. From an evolutionary perspective, the conditions for existence are the range of boundary conditions within which the evolutionary process must occur. Moreover, evolutionary change itself can be subjected to conditional teleological explanation, because natural selection theory is primarily a theory about the relation between the conditions for the existence of organisms and the conditions for the existence of traits in populations. I show that failure to distinguish representational from conditional teleological explanation has confused previous attempts to clarify the relation of teleology to biology.     

Alternative Models of Scientific Explanation

In response to archaeologists' interests in models of scientific explanation, this paper surveys several "covering-law" models. Primary emphasis is on a critical comparison of Hempel's deductive-nomological and inductive-statistical models, and Meehan's systems model, with the more recent statistical-relevance model. The crucial difference hinges on certain relevance conditions. Two advantages of the latter model—of possible interest to anthropologists and of especial interest to archaeologists—are its ability to incorporate explanations of low-probability events and its potential for furnishing an account of functional explanation. Advanced toward the end are suggestions for supplementing the statistical-relevance model with causal relevance factors. [scientific explanation, systems theory, covering-law, statistical relevance]     

Families of stationary patterns producing illusory movement: insights into the visual system.

A computational explanation of the illusory movement experienced upon extended viewing of Enigma, a static figure painted by Leviant, is presented. The explanation relies on a model for the interpretation of three-dimensional motion information contained in retinal motion measurements. This model shows that the Enigma figure is a special case of a larger class of figures exhibiting the same illusory movement and these figures are introduced here. Our explanation suggests that eye movements and/or accommodation changes cause weak retinal motion signals, which are interpreted by higher-level processes in a way that gives rise to these illusions, and proposes a number of new experiments to unravel the functional structure of the motion pathway.     

Constraining the adaptationism debate

This contribution to the adaptationism debate elaborates the nature of constraints and their importance in evolutionary explanation and argues that the adaptationism debate should be limited to the issue of how to privilege causes in evolutionary explanation. I argue that adaptationist explanations are deeply conceptually dependent on developmental constraints, and explanations that appeal to constraints are dependant on the results of natural selection. I suggest these explanations should be integrated into the framework of historical causal explanation. Each strategy explicitly appeals to some aspect of the evolutionary process, while implicitly appealing to others. Thus, adaptationists and anti-adaptationists can offer complementary causal explanations of the same explanandum. This eliminates much of the adaptationism debate and explains why its adversaries regularly agree with each other more than they would like. The adaptationism issue that remains is a species of the general issue of how to privilege causes in explanation. I show how a proposed solution to this general problem might be brought to bear on evolutionary explanations, and investigate some difficulties that might arise due to the nature of the evolutionary process.