A concept of value during experimental exchange in brown capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella

We evaluated the response of brown capuchin monkeys to two differentially valued tokens in an experimental exchange situation akin to a simple barter. Monkeys were given a series of three tests to evaluate their ability to associate tokens with food, then their responses were examined in a barter situation in which tokens were either limited or unlimited. Capuchins did not perform barter in the typical sense, returning the tokens which were associated with the reward. However, females, but not males, showed a different response, preferring the higher-value token. This may indicate that they learned to prefer one token over the other rather than to associate the tokens with their specific rewards. This sex difference parallels previous findings of greater reciprocity in female brown capuchins than in males.     

Macaque Monkeys Can Learn Token Values from Human Models through Vicarious Reward

Monkeys can learn the symbolic meaning of tokens, and exchange them to get a reward. Monkeys can also learn the symbolic value of a token by observing conspecifics but it is not clear if they can learn passively by observing other actors, e.g., humans. To answer this question, we tested two monkeys in a token exchange paradigm in three experiments. Monkeys learned token values through observation of human models exchanging them. We used, after a phase of object familiarization, different sets of tokens. One token of each set was rewarded with a bit of apple. Other tokens had zero value (neutral tokens). Each token was presented only in one set. During the observation phase, monkeys watched the human model exchange tokens and watched them consume rewards (vicarious rewards). In the test phase, the monkeys were asked to exchange one of the tokens for food reward. Sets of three tokens were used in the first experiment and sets of two tokens were used in the second and third experiments. The valuable token was presented with different probabilities in the observation phase during the first and second experiments in which the monkeys exchanged the valuable token more frequently than any of the neutral tokens. The third experiments examined the effect of unequal probabilities. Our results support the view that monkeys can learn from non-conspecific actors through vicarious reward, even a symbolic task like the token-exchange task.     

Crows and common ravens do not reciprocally exchange tokens with a conspecific to gain food rewards

Human economic transactions are based on complex forms of reciprocity, which involve the capacities to share and to keep track of what was given and received over time. Animals too engage in reciprocal interactions, but mechanisms such as calculated reciprocity have only been shown experimentally in few species. Various forms of cooperation, for example food and information sharing, are frequently observed in corvids, and they can engage in exchange interactions with human experimenters and accept delayed rewards. Here, we tested whether crows and common ravens would reciprocally exchange tokens with a conspecific in an exchange task. Birds received a set of three different types of tokens, some valuable for themselves, that is, they could exchange them for a food reward with a human experimenter, some valuable for their partner and some without value. The valuable tokens differed between the birds, which means that each bird could obtain more self-value tokens from their partner's compartment. We did not observe any active transfers, that is one individual giving a token to the experimental partner by placing it in its beak. We only observed 6 indirect transfers, that is one individual transferring a token into the compartment of the partner (3 no-value, 1 partner-value and 2 self-value tokens) and 67 “passive” transfers, that is one subject taking the token lying in reach in the compartment of the partner. Individuals took significantly more self-value tokens compared with no-value and partner-value tokens. This indicates a preference for tokens valuable to focal individuals. Significantly more no-value tokens compared with partner-value tokens were taken, likely to be caused by experimental partners exchanging self-value tokens with the human experimenter, and therefore, more no-value tokens being available in the compartment. Our results presently do not provide empirical support for reciprocity in crows and ravens, most likely caused by them not understanding the potential roles of receiver and donor. We therefore suggest further empirical tests of calculated reciprocity to be necessary in corvids.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Cebus apella</Emphasis> Tolerate Intermittent Unreliability in Human Experimenters

Monkeys form expectations for outcomes based on interactions with human experimenters. Capuchins, a cooperative New World monkey species, not only anticipate receiving rewards that the experimenter indicates, but also apparently anticipate rewards based on what the experimenter has given to their partners. However, this could be due to subjects responding to either outcomes or experimenters. Here we examine whether capuchins will continue to interact with human experimenters who are occasionally unreliable. We tested 10 monkeys with a series of familiar human experimenters using an exchange task. The experimenters had never before participated in exchange studies with these monkeys, hence the monkeys learned about their behavior during the course of testing. Occasionally experimenters were unreliable, failing to give a reward after the monkey returned the token. The monkeys did recognize these interactions as different, responding much more quickly in trials following those that were nonrewarded than in other situations with the same experimenter. However, subjects did not change their preference for experimenters when given the opportunity to choose between the unreliable exchanger and another exchanger, nor did subjects learn to prefer reliable experimenters from watching other monkeys’ interactions. Instead, subjects returned the tokens to the same location from which they received it. These results indicate that capuchins may not be sensitive to isolated instances in which experimenters are unreliable, possibly because of a strong bias to returning the token to the location from which it was donated.     

Do capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) use tokens as symbols?

In the absence of language, the comprehension of symbols is difficult to demonstrate. Tokens can be considered symbols since they arbitrarily stand for something else without having any iconic relation to their referent. We assessed whether capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) can use tokens as symbols to represent and combine quantities. Our paradigm involved choices between various combinations of tokens A and B, worth one and three rewards, respectively. Pay-off maximization required the assessment of the value of each offer by (i) estimating token numerousness, (ii) representing what each token stands for and (iii) making simple computations. When one token B was presented against one to five tokens A (experiment 1), four out of ten capuchins relied on a flexible strategy that allowed to maximize their pay-off, i.e. they preferred one token B against one and two tokens A, and they preferred four or five tokens A against one token B. Moreover, when two tokens B were presented against three to six tokens A (experiment 2), two out of six capuchins performed summation over representation of quantities. These findings suggest that capuchins can use tokens as symbols to flexibly combine quantities.     

Language-trained chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) delay gratification by choosing token exchange over immediate reward consumption

Token exchange inherently introduces an element of delay between behavior and reward and so token studies may help us better understand delay of gratification and self-control. To examine this possibility, we presented three language-trained chimpanzees with repeated choices involving different foods that could be eaten immediately or lexigram (graphic symbol) tokens that represented (and could be traded for) foods later. When both options were foods, chimpanzees always chose more preferred foods over less preferred foods. When both options were lexigram tokens representing those same foods, performance remained the same as chimpanzees selected the higher value token and then traded it for food. Then, when faced with choosing a token that could be traded later or choosing a food item that could be eaten immediately, most chimpanzees learned to make whatever response led to the more preferred food. They did this even when that meant selecting a high value lexigram token that could be traded only 2 to 3 min later instead of a medium value, but immediately available, food item. Thus, chimpanzees flexibly selected tokens even though such selections necessarily delayed gratification and required forgoing immediately available food. This finding illustrates the utility of symbolic token exchange for assessing self-control in nonhuman animals.     

Non-human primate token use shows possibilities but also limitations for establishing a form of currency

Non-human primates evaluate choices based on quantitative information and subjective valuation of options. Non-human primates can learn to value tokens as placeholders for primary rewards (such as food). With those tokens established as a potential form of ‘currency’, it is then possible to examine how they respond to opportunities to earn and use tokens in ways such as accumulating tokens or exchanging tokens with each other or with human experimenters to gain primary rewards. Sometimes, individuals make efficient and beneficial choices to obtain tokens and then exchange them at the right moments to gain optimal reward. Sometimes, they even accumulate such rewards through extended delay of gratification, or through other exchange-based interactions. Thus, non-human primates are capable of associating value to arbitrary tokens that may function as currency-like stimuli, but there also are strong limitations on how non-human primates can integrate such tokens into choice situations or use such tokens to fully ‘symbolize’ economic decision-making. These limitations are important to acknowledge when considering the evolutionary emergence of currency use in our species.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates’.     

How Social Context,Token Value,and Time Course Affect Token Exchange in Capuchin Monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Cebus apella</Emphasis>)

Although numerous studies have examined token-directed behaviors in primates, few have done so in a social context despite the fact that most primate species live in complex groups. Here, we provided capuchin monkeys with a relatively limited budget of tokens, likely to elicit intragroup competition, and, after an overnight delay, we allowed them to exchange tokens while in a group setting. We aimed to 1) evaluate whether social context affects token-directed behaviors of knowledgeable subjects, i.e., subjects already proficient in token exchange before the present study, as well as of naïve subjects, i.e., subjects that never showed exchange behavior before this study; 2) appraise whether capuchins indeed value tokens; and 3) assess whether capuchins can refrain from throwing tokens outside their enclosure when the experimenter is not present. Overall, the social context positively affected high-ranking individuals and negatively affected low-ranking ones. All 6 high-ranking naïve subjects, but none of the 4 low-ranking ones, quickly acquired token exchange behavior, whereas 9 of 12 low-ranking knowledgeable subjects, but only 1 high-ranking knowledgeable subject, never displayed token exchange in social contexts. Thus, competition constrained token exchange in low-ranking subjects and prompted exchange behavior in high-ranking naïve subjects. Capuchins were unable to inhibit the exchange of valueless items when the experimenter was soliciting them and, at the group level, knowledgeable subjects did not exchange more valuable tokens than less valuable (or valueless) ones. However, the 3 high-ranking knowledgeable subjects that exchanged most of the tokens first preferentially exchanged more valuable tokens over less valuable or valueless ones. Finally, capuchins inhibited exchange behavior in the absence of the experimenter, thus recognizing the appropriate conditions in which a successful exchange could occur.     

Response-cost punishment via token loss with pigeons

Two experiments were conducted to investigate punishment via response-contingent removal of conditioned token reinforcers (response cost) with pigeons. In Experiment 1, key pecking was maintained on a two-component multiple second-order schedule of token delivery, with light emitting diodes (LEDs) serving as token reinforcers. In both components, responding produced tokens according to a random-interval 20-s schedule and exchange periods according to a variable-ratio schedule. During exchange periods, each token was exchangeable for 2.5-s access to grain. In one component, responses were conjointly punished according to fixed-ratio schedules of token removal. Response rates in this punishment component decreased to low levels while response rates in the alternate (no-punishment) component were unaffected. Responding was eliminated when it produced neither tokens nor exchange periods (Extinction), but was maintained at moderate levels when it produced tokens in the signaled absence of food reinforcement, suggesting that tokens served as effective conditioned reinforcers. In Experiment 2, the effect of the response-cost punishment contingency was separated from changes in the density of food reinforcement. This was accomplished by yoking either the number of food deliveries per component (Yoked Food) or the temporal placement of all stimulus events (tokens, exchanges, food deliveries) (Yoked Complete), from the punishment to the no-punishment component. Response rates decreased in both components, but decreased more rapidly and were generally maintained at lower levels in the punishment component than in the yoked component. In showing that the response-cost contingency had a suppressive effect on responding in addition to that produced by reductions in reinforcement density, the present results suggest that response-cost punishment shares important features with other forms of punishment.     

Acquisition of object-robbing and object/food-bartering behaviours: a culturally maintained token economy in free-ranging long-tailed macaques

The token exchange paradigm shows that monkeys and great apes are able to use objects as symbolic tools to request specific food rewards. Such studies provide insights into the cognitive underpinnings of economic behaviour in non-human primates. However, the ecological validity of these laboratory-based experimental situations tends to be limited. Our field research aims to address the need for a more ecologically valid primate model of trading systems in humans. Around the Uluwatu Temple in Bali, Indonesia, a large free-ranging population of long-tailed macaques spontaneously and routinely engage in token-mediated bartering interactions with humans. These interactions occur in two phases: after stealing inedible and more or less valuable objects from humans, the macaques appear to use them as tokens, by returning them to humans in exchange for food. Our field observational and experimental data showed (i) age differences in robbing/bartering success, indicative of experiential learning, and (ii) clear behavioural associations between value-based token possession and quantity or quality of food rewards rejected and accepted by subadult and adult monkeys, suggestive of robbing/bartering payoff maximization and economic decision-making. This population-specific, prevalent, cross-generational, learned and socially influenced practice may be the first example of a culturally maintained token economy in free-ranging animals.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates''.     

Influence of Supraliminal Reward Information on Unconsciously Triggered Response Inhibition

Although executive functions (e.g., response inhibition) are often thought to interact consciously with reward, recent studies have demonstrated that they can also be triggered by unconscious stimuli. Further research has suggested a close relationship between consciously and unconsciously triggered response inhibition. To date, however, the effect of reward on unconsciously triggered response inhibition has not been explored. To address this issue, participants in this study performed runs of a modified Go/No-Go task during which they were exposed to both high and low value monetary rewards presented both supraliminally and subliminally. Participants were informed that they would earn the reward displayed if they responded correctly to each trial of the run. According to the results, when rewards were presented supraliminally, a greater unconsciously triggered response inhibition was observed for high-value rewards than for low-value rewards. In contrast, when rewards were presented subliminally, no enhanced unconsciously triggered response inhibition was observed. Results revealed that supraliminal and subliminal rewards have distinct effects on unconsciously triggered response inhibition. These findings have important implications for extending our understanding of the relationship between reward and response inhibition.     

Tentative evidence for inequity aversion to unequal work-effort but not to unequal reward distribution in Goffin's cockatoos

One hallmark in the evolution of cooperation is the ability to evaluate one's own payoff for a task against that of another person. To trace its evolutionary history, there has recently been a surge in comparative studies across different species. In non-human animals, evidence of inequity aversion has so far been identified in several primate species, dogs, and rats. Research in birds revealed mixed findings so far: among corvids, crows and ravens did react sensitively to unequal payoffs and work-effort, while New Caledonian crows did not. Among psittacids, kea were studied so far: Yet, despite the fact that they live in large, hierarchically organized social groups that show complex interactions, they did not show a significant reaction to inequitable payoffs. Here we tested for the first time a Cacatua, the Goffin's cockatoo, using a standardized token exchange paradigm in which first the partner and then the subject could exchange a token for a food reward. Our results show that subjects did not react to unequal reward distributions. However, in comparison to the Equity Condition, the likelihood to exchange was lower in the condition in which the partner received the same reward as a gift (without having to work for it) whereas the subject had to perform a task involving substantial work-effort, suggesting that the Goffin's cockatoos do react aversively to work-effort inequity. In a follow-up experiment, subjects never received a reward but observed a conspecific receive a high-quality reward depending on condition. We found again no evidence for an aversion for the unequal reward distribution, but only that, independent of condition, subjects quickly lost their motivation to participate due to not receiving a reward. In summary, Goffins showed some sensitivity to increased unequal work-effort, but did not react to unequal reward distribution.     

Behavioral Responses to Inequity in Reward Distribution and Working Effort in Crows and Ravens

Sensitivity to inequity is considered to be a crucial cognitive tool in the evolution of human cooperation. The ability has recently been shown also in primates and dogs, raising the question of an evolutionary basis of inequity aversion. We present first evidence that two bird species are sensitive to other individuals'' efforts and payoffs. In a token exchange task we tested both behavioral responses to inequity in the quality of reward (preferred versus non-preferred food) and to the absence of reward in the presence of a rewarded partner, in 5 pairs of corvids (6 crows, 4 ravens). Birds decreased their exchange performance when the experimental partner received the reward as a gift, which indicates that they are sensitive to other individuals'' working effort. They also decreased their exchange performance in the inequity compared with the equity condition. Notably, corvids refused to take the reward after a successful exchange more often in the inequity compared with the other conditions. Our findings indicate that awareness to other individuals'' efforts and payoffs may evolve independently of phylogeny in systems with a given degree of social complexity.     

Chimpanzees use self-distraction to cope with impulsivity

It is unknown whether animals, like humans, can employ behavioural strategies to cope with impulsivity. To examine this question, we tested whether chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) would use self-distraction as a coping strategy in a situation in which they had to continually inhibit responses to accumulating candies in order to earn a greater amount of those rewards. We tested animals in three conditions in which they were sometimes given a set of toys and were sometimes allowed physical access to the accumulating candies. Chimpanzees allowed the rewards to accumulate longer before responding when they could divert their attention to the toys, and they manipulated the toys more when the candies were physically accessible. Thus, chimpanzees engaged in self-distraction with the toys when such behaviour was most beneficial as a coping mechanism.     

Biological auctions with multiple rewards

The competition for resources among cells, individuals or species is a fundamental characteristic of evolution. Biological all-pay auctions have been used to model situations where multiple individuals compete for a single resource. However, in many situations multiple resources with various values exist and single reward auctions are not applicable. We generalize the model to multiple rewards and study the evolution of strategies. In biological all-pay auctions the bid of an individual corresponds to its strategy and is equivalent to its payment in the auction. The decreasingly ordered rewards are distributed according to the decreasingly ordered bids of the participating individuals. The reproductive success of an individual is proportional to its fitness given by the sum of the rewards won minus its payments. Hence, successful bidding strategies spread in the population. We find that the results for the multiple reward case are very different from the single reward case. While the mixed strategy equilibrium in the single reward case with more than two players consists of mostly low-bidding individuals, we show that the equilibrium can convert to many high-bidding individuals and a few low-bidding individuals in the multiple reward case. Some reward values lead to a specialization among the individuals where one subpopulation competes for the rewards and the other subpopulation largely avoids costly competitions. Whether the mixed strategy equilibrium is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) depends on the specific values of the rewards.     

By Coin or By Kine? Barter and Pastoral Production in Kazakhstan

This article argues against scholarship that views barter and monetized transactions as fundamentally similar practices of exchange. Drawing on an ethnography of small-holder mobile pastoralism in south Kazakhstan, I compare instances in which flock owners chose to sell sheep with examples of barter and explain the calculations behind each choice. In barter exchange, sheep replaced money as both medium of exchange and store of value and the material qualities of sheep meant this shift had profound consequences for the kinds of social relations associated with the transaction. In a context of chronic money shortages, barter of sheep freed participants from future obligations, while monetized exchange locked them into the most prolonged and risky of relations.     

Squirrel monkeys' response to inequitable outcomes indicates a behavioural convergence within the primates

Although several primates respond negatively to inequity, it is unknown whether this results from homology or convergent processes. Behaviours shared within a taxonomic group are often assumed to be homologous, yet this distinction is important for a better understanding of the function of the behaviour. Previous hypotheses have linked cooperation and inequity responses. Supporting this, all species in which inequity responses have been documented are cooperative. In this study, we tested this hypothesis by investigating the response to inequity in squirrel monkeys, which share a phylogenetic family with capuchin monkeys, but do not cooperate extensively. Subjects exchanged tokens to receive food rewards in conditions in which the level of effort required and reward received varied. Squirrel monkeys did not respond negatively to inequity. However, the monkeys were sensitive to the variation present in the task; male subjects showed a contrast effect and, as in previous studies, subjects were more sensitive to differences in reward in the context of a task than when rewards were given for free. Taken with other results, these results support the hypothesis that a negative response to inequity evolved convergently in primates, probably as a mechanism for evaluating outcomes relative to one's partners in cooperative species.     

The present values of delayed rewards are approximately additive

In two experiments, human subjects were asked to estimate their present values of single delayed rewards and their present values of temporal sequences of three rewards. Present values were solicited by asking subjects to indicate an amount of money v for which they would be indifferent between receiving v at the end of the session and receiving the delayed reward(s). A procedure was used for which responding the true value of v was the optimal strategy, and the actual payoff that each subject received was determined by one randomly selected trial. In Experiment 1 (n=29) each delayed reward was 9.90 dollars in cash. In Experiment 2 (n=19) the delayed rewards were dated 15 dollars gift certificates to a local restaurant. In both experiments, the present values of the sequences were approximately equal to the sums of the present values of their component rewards. The presence of outliers suggests that a few subjects may have valued sequences less than the sums of their single rewards. Effects of a preference for uniform sequences, if any, were too small to be detected. Discounting of sequences was well fit by a parallel hyperbolic discounting equation, consistent with Mazur's [Mazur, J.E., 1986. Choice between single and multiple delayed reinforcers. J. Exp. Anal. Behav. 46 (1), 67-77] results using multiple reinforcers.     

Partner's behavior, not reward distribution, determines success in an unequal cooperative task in capuchin monkeys

It was recently demonstrated that capuchin monkeys notice and respond to distributional inequity, a trait that has been proposed to support the evolution of cooperation in the human species. However, it is unknown how capuchins react to inequitable rewards in an unrestricted cooperative paradigm in which they may freely choose both whether to participate and, within the bounds of their partner's behavior, which reward they will receive for their participation. We tested capuchin monkeys with such a design, using a cooperative barpull, which has been used with great success in the past. Contrary to our expectations, the equity of the reward distribution did not affect success or pulling behavior. However, the behavior of the partner in an unequal situation did affect overall success rates: pairs that had a tendency to alternate which individual received the higher-value food in unequal reward situations were more than twice as successful in obtaining rewards than pairs in which one individual dominated the higher-value food. This ability to equitably distribute rewards in inherently biased cooperative situations has profound implications for activities such as group hunts, in which multiple individuals work together for a single, monopolizable reward.     

Food-exchange with humans in brown capuchin monkeys

To assess how brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) delay gratification and maximize payoff, we carried out four experiments in which six subjects could exchange food pieces with a human experimenter. The pieces differed either in quality or quantity. In qualitative exchanges, all subjects gave a piece of food to receive another of higher value. When the difference of value between the rewards to be returned and those expected was higher, subjects performed better. Only two subjects refrained from nibbling the piece of food before returning it. All subjects performed two or three qualitative exchanges in succession to obtain a given reward. In quantitative exchanges, three subjects returned a food item to obtain a bigger one, but two of them nibbled the item before returning it. Individual differences were marked. Subjects had some difficulties when the food to be returned was similar or equal in quality to that expected.