Pattern Cladistics and the ‘Realism–Antirealism Debate’ in the Philosophy of Biology

Despite the amount of work that has been produced on the subject over the years, the ‘transformation of cladistics’ is still a misunderstood episode in the history of comparative biology. Here, I analyze two outstanding, highly contrasting historiographic accounts on the matter, under the perspective of an influential dichotomy in the philosophy of science: the opposition between Scientific Realism and Empiricism. Placing special emphasis on the notion of ‘causal grounding’ of morphological characters (sensu Olivier Rieppel) in modern developmental biology’s (mechanistic) theories, I arrive at the conclusion that a ‘new transformation of cladistics’ is philosophically plausible. This ‘reformed’ understanding of ‘pattern cladistics’ entails retaining the interpretation of cladograms as ‘schemes of synapomorphies’, but in association to construing cladogram nodes as ‘developmental-genetic taxic homologies’, instead of ‘standard Darwinian ancestors’. The reinterpretation of pattern cladistics presented here additionally proposes to take Bas Van Fraassen’s ‘constructive empiricism’ as a philosophical stance that could properly support such analysis of developmental-genetic data for systematic purposes. The latter suggestion is justified through a reappraisal of previous ideas developed by prominent pattern cladists (mainly, Colin Patterson), which concerned a scientifically efficient ‘observable/non-observable distinction’ linked to the conceptual pair ‘ontogeny and phylogeny’. Finally, I argue that a robust articulation of Antirealist alternatives in systematics may provide a rational basis for its disciplinary separation from evolutionary biology, as well as for a critical reconsideration of the proper role of certain Scientific Realist positions, currently popular in comparative biology.     

Emergent properties and the context objection to reduction

Reductionism is a central issue in the philosophy of biology. One common objection to reduction is that molecular explanation requires reference to higher-level properties, which I refer to as the context objection. I respond to this objection by arguing that a well-articulated notion of a mechanism and what I term mechanism extension enables one to accommodate the context-dependence of biological processes within a reductive explanation. The existence of emergent features in the context could be raised as an objection to the possibility of reduction via this strategy. I argue that this objection can be overcome by showing that there is no tenable argument for the existence of emergent properties that are not susceptible to a reductive explanation.     

Adaptability in protein structures: structural dynamics and implications in ligand design

The basic framework of understanding the mechanisms of protein functions is achieved from the knowledge of their structures which can model the molecular recognition. Recent advancement in the structural biology has revealed that in spite of the availability of the structural data, it is nontrivial to predict the mechanism of the molecular recognition which progresses via situation-dependent structural adaptation. The mutual selectivity of protein–protein and protein–ligand interactions often depends on the modulations of conformations empowered by their inherent flexibility, which in turn regulates the function. The mechanism of a protein’s function, which used to be explained by the ideas of ‘lock and key’ has evolved today as the concept of ‘induced fit’ as well as the ‘population shift’ models. It is felt that the ‘dynamics’ is an essential feature to take into account for understanding the mechanism of protein’s function. The design principles of therapeutic molecules suffer from the problems of plasticity of the receptors whose binding conformations are accurately not predictable from the prior knowledge of a template structure. On the other hand, flexibility of the receptors provides the opportunity to improve the binding affinity of a ligand by suitable substitution that will maximize the binding by modulating the receptors surface. In this paper, we discuss with example how the protein’s flexibility is correlated with its functions in various systems, revealing the importance of its understanding and for making applications. We also highlight the methodological challenges to investigate it computationally and to account for the flexible nature of the molecules in drug design.     

Scientific perspectivism: A philosopher of science's response to the challenge of big data biology

Big data biology—bioinformatics, computational biology, systems biology (including ‘omics’), and synthetic biology—raises a number of issues for the philosophy of science. This article deals with several such: Is data-intensive biology a new kind of science, presumably post-reductionistic? To what extent is big data biology data-driven? Can data ‘speak for themselves?’ I discuss these issues by way of a reflection on Carl Woese’s worry that “a society that permits biology to become an engineering discipline, that allows that science to slip into the role of changing the living world without trying to understand it, is a danger to itself.” And I argue that scientific perspectivism, a philosophical stance represented prominently by Giere, Van Fraassen, and Wimsatt, according to which science cannot as a matter of principle transcend our human perspective, provides the best resources currently at our disposal to tackle many of the philosophical issues implied in the modeling of complex, multilevel/multiscale phenomena.     

Synthetic biology and its alternatives. Descartes,Kant and the idea of engineering biological machines

The engineering-based approach of synthetic biology is characterized by an assumption that ‘engineering by design’ enables the construction of ‘living machines’. These ‘machines’, as biological machines, are expected to display certain properties of life, such as adapting to changing environments and acting in a situated way. This paper proposes that a tension exists between the expectations placed on biological artefacts and the notion of producing such systems by means of engineering; this tension makes it seem implausible that biological systems, especially those with properties characteristic of living beings, can in fact be produced using the specific methods of engineering. We do not claim that engineering techniques have nothing to contribute to the biotechnological construction of biological artefacts. However, drawing on Descartes’s and Kant’s thinking on the relationship between the organism and the machine, we show that it is considerably more plausible to assume that distinctively biological artefacts emerge within a paradigm different from the paradigm of the Cartesian machine that underlies the engineering approach. We close by calling for increased attention to be paid to approaches within molecular biology and chemistry that rest on conceptions different from those of synthetic biology’s engineering paradigm.     

Interview with Sydney Brenner

The following text is an edited version of a recent interview with Sydney Brenner who has been at the forefront of many developments in molecular biology since the 1950s. It provides a participant’s view on current issues in the history and epistemology of molecular biology. The main issue raised by Brenner regards the relation of molecular biology to the new field of systems biology. Brenner defends the original programme of molecular biology—the molecular explanation of living processes—that in his view has yet to be completed. The programme of systems biology in contrast he views as either trivial or as not achievable since it purports to deal with inverse problems that are impossible to solve in complex living systems. Other issues covered in the conversation concern the impact of the human genome sequencing project, the commercial turn in molecular biology and the contested disciplinary status of the science.     

Analysis of development and differentiation with tumour cell glycoproteins

The repertoire of acceptor glycoproteins for concanavalin A expressed by a cultured tumour cell reflects the normal developmental lineage from which it was derived, as well as the degree of maturation along that lineage. Antibodies to this particular set of glycoproteins show a considerable specificity towards normal differentiation antigens which are often preferentially associated with the less mature intermediates of the corresponding pathway. In addition, comparisons between ‘immature’ and ‘mature’ tumour cells can be used to identify glycoproteins associated with specific differentiated functions such as secretion. Thus tumour cell glycoproteins provide useful probes for analysis of the molecular biology of development and differentiation.     

Group behaviour in physical,chemical and biological systems

Groups exhibit properties that either are not perceived to exist, or perhaps cannot exist, at the individual level. Such ‘emergent’ properties depend on how individuals interact, both among themselves and with their surroundings. The world of everyday objects consists of material entities. These are, ultimately, groups of elementary particles that organize themselves into atoms and molecules, occupy space, and so on. It turns out that an explanation of even the most commonplace features of this world requires relativistic quantum field theory and the fact that Planck’s constant is discrete, not zero. Groups of molecules in solution, in particular polymers (‘sols’), can form viscous clusters that behave like elastic solids (‘gels’). Sol-gel transitions are examples of cooperative phenomena. Their occurrence is explained by modelling the statistics of inter-unit interactions: the likelihood of either state varies sharply as a critical parameter crosses a threshold value. Group behaviour among cells or organisms is often heritable and therefore can evolve. This permits an additional, typically biological, explanation for it in terms of reproductive advantage, whether of the individual or of the group. There is no general agreement on the appropriate explanatory framework for understanding group-level phenomena in biology.     

Wnt Signaling in Remyelination in Multiple Sclerosis: Friend or Foe?

Myelination is critical to normal functioning of the vertebrate nervous system. In demyelinating diseases such as multiple sclerosis, oligodendrocytes, the myelinating cells in the central nervous system, are targeted, resulting in myelin loss, axonal damage, and severe functional impairment. While spontaneous remyelination has been proven a failure in multiple sclerosis, understanding the molecular mechanism underlying oligodendrocyte biology, myelination, and remyelination becomes crucial. To date, a series of signaling pathways in regulating oligodendrocyte development and remyelination have been suggested and, among them, the Wnt/β-catenin/Tcf pathway has been considered a negative factor in the myelinating process. However, this notion has been challenged by recent studies, which showed a pro-myelinating effect of this pathway. This review summarizes the current contradictory concepts concerning the role of the Wnt pathway in the oligodendrocyte development and remyelination process, attempts to address the potential mechanism underlying this controversy, and recommends caution in targeting the Wnt pathway as a potential demyelinating therapy.     

Molecular ecology in Vienna: hot topics in a chilly place

The international VIPCA conference on ‘Molecular Ecology’ took place in Vienna, Austria, in early February 2012. The meeting showcased the diversity of molecular tools and conceptual approaches at the disposal of practitioners in this flourishing field, which lies at the interface of ecology, evolution and molecular biology.     

Applying ecological models to communities of genetic elements: the case of neutral theory

A promising recent development in molecular biology involves viewing the genome as a mini‐ecosystem, where genetic elements are compared to organisms and the surrounding cellular and genomic structures are regarded as the local environment. Here, we critically evaluate the prospects of ecological neutral theory (ENT), a popular model in ecology, as it applies at the genomic level. This assessment requires an overview of the controversy surrounding neutral models in community ecology. In particular, we discuss the limitations of using ENT both as an explanation of community dynamics and as a null hypothesis. We then analyse a case study in which ENT has been applied to genomic data. Our central finding is that genetic elements do not conform to the requirements of ENT once its assumptions and limitations are made explicit. We further compare this genome‐level application of ENT to two other, more familiar approaches in genomics that rely on neutral mechanisms: Kimura's molecular neutral theory and Lynch's mutational‐hazard model. Interestingly, this comparison reveals that there are two distinct concepts of neutrality associated with these models, which we dub ‘fitness neutrality’ and ‘competitive neutrality’. This distinction helps to clarify the various roles for neutral models in genomics, for example in explaining the evolution of genome size.     

The problem of teleology in biology as a problem of biology-teacher education

The paper sketches the ways ‘the problem of teleology’ appears in pupil-texts, teacher-guides, and college-level texts. Excerpts from the literature in the field of philosophy and history of science are then quoted, which illustrate that ‘the problem of teleology’ cannot be handled dogmatically, as if the issues were indisputable. It is pointed out, that teacher-education does not enable the prospective teacher to analyse the teacher and pupil texts objectively and critically as to their philosophical implications. Suggestions are made which might alter this situation.     

The missing link between neurobiology and behavior in Aplysia conditioning

Over the past decades, a wealth of findings has led to a substantial change in the assumed complexity of classical conditioning. The combined evidence indicates that temporal pairing is neither necessary nor sufficient for the formation of an associative connection. At the same time, studies of model invertebrate nervous systems have allowed us to ask a series of questions about the molecular basis of associative conditioning. The discovery of a pairing-sensitive mechanism in the gill-withdrawal circuitry of Aplysia is regarded as the hallmark of the reductionist approach. This review outlines the insights gathered from behavioral and neurobiological studies. Furthermore, the conceptual frameworks guiding research at the ‘what’ and ‘how’ levels of analysis are compared and contrasted. I argue that a rich cognitive view of conditioning has emerged at the ‘what’ level, whereas the traditional notion of temporal pairing still drives research at the ‘how’ level. A complete account of classical conditioning has to await the resolving of this discordance.     

Phosphorus-32 in the Phage Group: radioisotopes as historical tracers of molecular biology

The recent historiography of molecular biology features key technologies, instruments and materials, which offer a different view of the field and its turning points than preceding intellectual and institutional histories. Radioisotopes, in this vein, became essential tools in postwar life science research, including molecular biology, and are here analyzed through their use in experiments on bacteriophage. Isotopes were especially well suited for studying the dynamics of chemical transformation over time, through metabolic pathways or life cycles. Scientists labeled phage with phosphorus-32 in order to trace the transfer of genetic material between parent and progeny in virus reproduction. Initial studies of this type did not resolve the mechanism of generational transfer but unexpectedly gave rise to a new style of molecular radiobiology based on the inactivation of phage by the radioactive decay of incorporated phosphorus-32. These ‘suicide experiments’, a preoccupation of phage researchers in the mid-1950s, reveal how molecular biologists interacted with the traditions and practices of radiation geneticists as well as those of biochemists as they were seeking to demarcate a new field. The routine use of radiolabels to visualize nucleic acids emerged as an enduring feature of molecular biological experimentation.     

Policy on Synthetic Biology: Deliberation,Probability, and the Precautionary Paradox

Synthetic biology is a cutting‐edge area of research that holds the promise of unprecedented health benefits. However, in tandem with these large prospective benefits, synthetic biology projects entail a risk of catastrophic consequences whose severity may exceed that of most ordinary human undertakings. This is due to the peculiar nature of synthetic biology as a ‘threshold technology’ which opens doors to opportunities and applications that are essentially unpredictable. Fears about these potentially unstoppable consequences have led to declarations from civil society groups calling for the use of a precautionary principle to regulate the field. Moreover, the principle is prevalent in law and international agreements. Despite widespread political recognition of a need for caution, the precautionary principle has been extensively criticized as a guide for regulatory policy. We examine a central objection to the principle: that its application entails crippling inaction and incoherence, since whatever action one takes there is always a chance that some highly improbable cataclysm will occur. In response to this difficulty, which we call the ‘precautionary paradox,’ we outline a deliberative means for arriving at threshold of probability below which potential dangers can be disregarded. In addition, we describe a Bayesian mechanism with which to assign probabilities to harmful outcomes. We argue that these steps resolve the paradox. The rehabilitated PP can thus provide a viable policy option to confront the uncharted waters of synthetic biology research.     

Can't see the colony for the bees: behavioural perspectives of biological individuality

The question ‘what is an individual’ does not often arise in studies within the field of behavioural ecology. Generally behavioural ecologists do not think about what makes an individual because they tend to use intuitive working concepts of individuality. Rarely do they explicitly mention how individuality affects their experimental design and interpretation of results. By contrast, the concept of individuality continues to intrigue philosophers of biology. It is interesting that while philosophers of biology debate definitions of individuality, biologists generally use the concept of individuality every day without much thought. Here we review the philosophical approaches to defining biological individuality, and illustrate how the biological individuality concepts used by biologists are affected by their study question and choice of organism. We clarify the behavioural perspective of biological individuality by introducing the concept of the behavioural individual. The notion of the behavioural individual is particularly interesting when explored in less‐conventional study organisms. By including less‐conventional organisms, it becomes clear why the concept of biological individuality is usually intuitive in behavioural ecology.     

The emerging structure of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis: where does Evo-Devo fit in?

The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) debate is gaining ground in contemporary evolutionary biology. In parallel, a number of philosophical standpoints have emerged in an attempt to clarify what exactly is represented by the EES. For Massimo Pigliucci, we are in the wake of the newest instantiation of a persisting Kuhnian paradigm; in contrast, Telmo Pievani has contended that the transition to an EES could be best represented as a progressive reformation of a prior Lakatosian scientific research program, with the extension of its Neo-Darwinian core and the addition of a brand-new protective belt of assumptions and auxiliary hypotheses. Here, we argue that those philosophical vantage points are not the only ways to interpret what current proposals to ‘extend’ the Modern Synthesis-derived ‘standard evolutionary theory’ (SET) entail in terms of theoretical change in evolutionary biology. We specifically propose the image of the emergent EES as a vast network of models and interweaved representations that, instantiated in diverse practices, are connected and related in multiple ways. Under that assumption, the EES could be articulated around a paraconsistent network of evolutionary theories (including some elements of the SET), as well as models, practices and representation systems of contemporary evolutionary biology, with edges and nodes that change their position and centrality as a consequence of the co-construction and stabilization of facts and historical discussions revolving around the epistemic goals of this area of the life sciences. We then critically examine the purported structure of the EES—published by Laland and collaborators in 2015—in light of our own network-based proposal. Finally, we consider which epistemic units of Evo-Devo are present or still missing from the EES, in preparation for further analyses of the topic of explanatory integration in this conceptual framework.     

The Philosophical Dullness of Classical Ecology, and a Levinsian Alternative

Ecology has had a lower profile in Biology & Philosophy than one might expect on the basis of the attention ecology is given in public discussions in relation to environmental issues. Our tentative explanation is that ecology appears theoretically redundant within biology and, consequently, philosophically challenging problemsrelated to biology are commonly supposed to be somewhere else, particularly in the molecular sphere. Richard Levins has recognized the genuine challenges posed by ecology for theoretical and philosophical thinking in biology. This essay sets the stage for appreciating his work; it was preceded by four articles published in Biology & Philosophy 15(2),and is followed by a personal reminiscent.