Complete Genome Sequence of an Avian-Like H4N8 Swine Influenza Virus Discovered in Southern China

We report here the complete genomic sequence of an avian-like H4N8 swine influenza virus containing an H5N1 avian influenza virus segment from swine in southern China. Phylogenetic analyses of the sequences of all eight viral RNA segments demonstrated that these are wholly avian influenza viruses of the Asia lineage. To our knowledge, this is the first report of interspecies transmission of an avian H4N8 influenza virus to domestic pigs under natural conditions.     

Emergence of avian H1N1 influenza viruses in pigs in China.

Avian influenza A viruses from Asia are recognized as the source of genes that reassorted with human viral genes to generate the Asian/57 (H2N2) and Hong Kong/68 (H3N2) pandemic strains earlier in this century. Here we report the genetic analysis of avian influenza A H1N1 viruses recently isolated from pigs in southern China, a host suspected to generate new pandemic strains through gene reassortment events. Each of the eight gene segments was of avian origin. Phylogenetic analysis indicates that these genes form an Asian sublineage of the Eurasian avian lineage, suggesting that these viruses are an independent introduction into pigs in Asia. The presence of avian influenza viruses in pigs in China places them in an optimal position for transmission to humans and may serve as an early warning of the emergence of the next human influenza virus pandemic.     

Isolation and genetic characterization of avian-like H1N1 and novel ressortant H1N2 influenza viruses from pigs in China

As pigs are susceptible to both human and avian influenza viruses, they have been proposed to be intermediate hosts or mixing vessels for the generation of pandemic influenza viruses through reassortment or adaptation to the mammalian host. In this study, we reported avian-like H1N1 and novel ressortant H1N2 influenza viruses from pigs in China. Homology and phylogenetic analyses showed that the H1N1 virus (A/swine/Zhejiang/1/07) was closely to avian-like H1N1 viruses and seemed to be derived from the European swine H1N1 viruses, which was for the first time reported in China; and the two H1N2 viruses (A/swine/Shanghai/1/07 and A/swine/Guangxi/13/06) were novel ressortant H1N2 influenza viruses containing genes from the classical swine (HA, NP, M and NS), human (NA and PB1) and avian (PB2 and PA) lineages, which indicted that the reassortment among human, avian, and swine influenza viruses had taken place in pigs in China and resulted in the generation of new viruses. The isolation of avian-like H1N1 influenza virus originated from the European swine H1N1 viruses, especially the emergence of two novel ressortant H1N2 influenza viruses provides further evidence that pigs serve as intermediate hosts or “mixing vessels”, and swine influenza virus surveillance in China should be given a high priority.     

Studies of H5N1 influenza virus infection of pigs by using viruses isolated in Vietnam and Thailand in 2004

To determine whether avian H5N1 influenza viruses associated with human infections in Vietnam had transmitted to pigs, we investigated serologic evidence of exposure to H5N1 influenza virus in Vietnamese pigs in 2004. Of the 3,175 pig sera tested, 8 (0.25%) were positive for avian H5N1 influenza viruses isolated in 2004 by virus neutralization assay and Western blot analysis. Experimental studies of replication and transmissibility of the 2004 Asian H5N1 viruses in pigs revealed that all viruses tested replicated in the swine respiratory tract but none were transmitted to contact pigs. Virus titers from nasal swabs peaked on day 2, and low titers were detected in the liver of two of the four pigs tested. Our findings indicate that pigs can be infected with highly lethal Asian H5N1 viruses but that these viruses are not readily transmitted between pigs under experimental conditions.     

Reassortant between Human-Like H3N2 and Avian H5 Subtype Influenza A Viruses in Pigs: A Potential Public Health Risk

Background

Human-like H3N2 influenza viruses have repeatedly been transmitted to domestic pigs in different regions of the world, but it is still uncertain whether any of these variants could become established in pig populations. The fact that different subtypes of influenza viruses have been detected in pigs makes them an ideal candidate for the genesis of a possible reassortant virus with both human and avian origins. However, the determination of whether pigs can act as a “mixing vessel” for a possible future pandemic virus is still pending an answer. This prompted us to gather the epidemiological information and investigate the genetic evolution of swine influenza viruses in Jilin, China.

Methods

Nasopharyngeal swabs were collected from pigs with respiratory illness in Jilin province, China from July 2007 to October 2008. All samples were screened for influenza A viruses. Three H3N2 swine influenza virus isolates were analyzed genetically and phylogenetically.

Results

Influenza surveillance of pigs in Jilin province, China revealed that H3N2 influenza viruses were regularly detected from domestic pigs during 2007 to 2008. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that two distinguishable groups of H3N2 influenza viruses were present in pigs: the wholly contemporary human-like H3N2 viruses (represented by the Moscow/10/99-like sublineage) and double-reassortant viruses containing genes from contemporary human H3N2 viruses and avian H5 viruses, both co-circulating in pig populations.

Conclusions

The present study reports for the first time the coexistence of wholly human-like H3N2 viruses and double-reassortant viruses that have emerged in pigs in Jilin, China. It provides updated information on the role of pigs in interspecies transmission and genetic reassortment of influenza viruses.     

Cocirculation of Avian H9N2 and Contemporary “Human” H3N2 Influenza A Viruses in Pigs in Southeastern China: Potential for Genetic Reassortment?

Pigs are permissive to both human and avian influenza viruses and have been proposed to be an intermediate host for the genesis of pandemic influenza viruses through reassortment or adaptation of avian viruses. Prospective virological surveillance carried out between March 1998 and June 2000 in Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region, People's Republic of China, on pigs imported from southeastern China, provides the first evidence of interspecies transmission of avian H9N2 viruses to pigs and documents their cocirculation with contemporary human H3N2 (A/Sydney/5/97-like, Sydney97-like) viruses. All gene segments of the porcine H9N2 viruses were closely related to viruses similar to chicken/Beijing/1/94 (H9N2), duck/Hong Kong/Y280/97 (H9N2), and the descendants of the latter virus lineage. Phylogenetic analysis suggested that repeated interspecies transmission events had occurred from the avian host to pigs. The Sydney97-like (H3N2) viruses isolated from pigs were related closely to contemporary human H3N2 viruses in all gene segments and had not undergone genetic reassortment. Cocirculation of avian H9N2 and human H3N2 viruses in pigs provides an opportunity for genetic reassortment leading to the emergence of viruses with pandemic potential.     

Guinea pig model for evaluating the potential public health risk of swine and avian influenza viruses

Background

The influenza viruses circulating in animals sporadically transmit to humans and pose pandemic threats. Animal models to evaluate the potential public health risk potential of these viruses are needed.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We investigated the guinea pig as a mammalian model for the study of the replication and transmission characteristics of selected swine H1N1, H1N2, H3N2 and avian H9N2 influenza viruses, compared to those of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and seasonal human H1N1, H3N2 influenza viruses. The swine and avian influenza viruses investigated were restricted to the respiratory system of guinea pigs and shed at high titers in nasal tracts without prior adaptation, similar to human strains. None of the swine and avian influenza viruses showed transmissibility among guinea pigs; in contrast, pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus transmitted from infected guinea pigs to all animals and seasonal human influenza viruses could also horizontally transmit in guinea pigs. The analysis of the receptor distribution in the guinea pig respiratory tissues by lectin histochemistry indicated that both SAα2,3-Gal and SAα2,6-Gal receptors widely presented in the nasal tract and the trachea, while SAα2,3-Gal receptor was the main receptor in the lung.

Conclusions/Significance

We propose that the guinea pig could serve as a useful mammalian model to evaluate the potential public health threat of swine and avian influenza viruses.     

禽流感与猪流感病毒：跨越物种传播的新认识

今年在墨西哥暴发的流感疫情来源于一种新的流感病毒：甲型H1N1病毒．这种病毒包括人源,禽源和猪源等甲型流感病毒基因片段,为混合毒株．比较了禽、猪和人的流感病毒在其天然宿主中的致病机理,主要目的是评估猪和禽的流感病毒成为人兽共患病的可能性,同时还评估猪在禽流感病毒传入人的过程中可能起到的作用．禽流感和猪流感作为人畜共患疾病,在流感病毒从动物到人的传播过程中起到关键的作用．猪作为流感病毒的中间宿主,具有混合器作用,人、猪、禽流感病毒可在其体内进行基因重排产生新病毒,并可能跨越种间屏障感染人类．但是流感病毒本身的跨越种间障碍传播不足以引起人流感的大暴发,动物流感病毒必须经过显著的遗传变异后才能使其在人群中长期存在．     

Close relationship between the 2009 H1N1 virus and South Dakota AIV strains

Although previous publications suggest the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus was reassorted from swine viruses of North America and Eurasia, the immediate ancestry still remains elusive due to the big evolutionary distance between the 2009 H1N1 virus and the previously isolated strains. Since the unveiling of the 2009 H1N1 influenza, great deal of interest has been drawn to influenza, consequently a large number of influenza virus sequences have been deposited into the public sequence databases. Blast analysis demonstrated that the recently submitted 2007 South Dakota avian influenza virus strains and other North American avian strains contained genetic segments very closely related to the 2009 H1N1 virus, which suggests these avian influenza viruses are very close relatives of the 2009 H1N1 virus. Phylogenetic analyses also indicate that the 2009 H1N1 viruses are associated with both avian and swine influenza viruses circulating in North America. Since the migrating wild birds are preferable to pigs as the carrier to spread the influenza viruses across vast distances, it is very likely that birds played an important role in the inter-continental evolution of the 2009 H1N1 virus. It is essential to understand the evolutionary route of the emerging influenza virus in order to find a way to prevent further emerging cases. This study suggests the close relationship between 2009 pandemic virus and the North America avian viruses and underscores enhanced surveillance of influenza in birds for understanding the evolution of the 2009 pandemic influenza.     

Replication and Immunogenicity of Swine,Equine, and Avian H3 Subtype Influenza Viruses in Mice and Ferrets

Since it is difficult to predict which influenza virus subtype will cause an influenza pandemic, it is important to prepare influenza virus vaccines against different subtypes and evaluate the safety and immunogenicity of candidate vaccines in preclinical and clinical studies prior to a pandemic. In addition to infecting humans, H3 influenza viruses commonly infect pigs, horses, and avian species. We selected 11 swine, equine, and avian H3 influenza viruses and evaluated their kinetics of replication and ability to induce a broadly cross-reactive antibody response in mice and ferrets. The swine and equine viruses replicated well in the upper respiratory tract of mice. With the exception of one avian virus that replicated poorly in the lower respiratory tract, all of the viruses replicated in mouse lungs. In ferrets, all of the viruses replicated well in the upper respiratory tract, but the equine viruses replicated poorly in the lungs. Extrapulmonary spread was not observed in either mice or ferrets. No single virus elicited antibodies that cross-reacted with viruses from all three animal sources. Avian and equine H3 viruses elicited broadly cross-reactive antibodies against heterologous viruses isolated from the same or other species, but the swine viruses did not. We selected an equine and an avian H3 influenza virus for further development as vaccines.     

Complete Genome Sequence of a Novel H4N1 Influenza Virus Isolated from a Pig in Central China

Pigs are proposed to be “mixing vessel” hosts that can produce genetically novel reassortant viruses with pandemic potential. The appearance of any novel influenza viruses among pigs should pose concerns for human health. Here, we report the complete genome sequence of a novel H4N1 influenza virus [A/Swine/HuBei/06/2009(H4N1)] isolated from a pig in Central China in 2009. The genomic sequence analysis indicates that this virus is a wholly avian-original influenza virus. Each gene may come from different avian influenza viruses outside mainland China, suggesting the role of migratory birds in the dispersal of influenza virus.     

Domestic pigs have low susceptibility to H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses

Genetic reassortment of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAI) with currently circulating human influenza A strains is one possibility that could lead to efficient human-to-human transmissibility. Domestic pigs which are susceptible to infection with both human and avian influenza A viruses are one of the natural hosts where such reassortment events could occur. Virological, histological and serological features of H5N1 virus infection in pigs were characterized in this study. Two- to three-week-old domestic piglets were intranasally inoculated with 10(6) EID(50) of A/Vietnam/1203/04 (VN/04), A/chicken/Indonesia/7/03 (Ck/Indo/03), A/Whooper swan/Mongolia/244/05 (WS/Mong/05), and A/Muscovy duck/Vietnam/ 209/05 (MDk/VN/05) viruses. Swine H3N2 and H1N1 viruses were studied as a positive control for swine influenza virus infection. The pathogenicity of the H5N1 HPAI viruses was also characterized in mouse and ferret animal models. Intranasal inoculation of pigs with H5N1 viruses or consumption of infected chicken meat did not result in severe disease. Mild weight loss was seen in pigs inoculated with WS/Mong/05, Ck/Indo/03 H5N1 and H1N1 swine influenza viruses. WS/Mong/05, Ck/Indo/03 and VN/04 viruses were detected in nasal swabs of inoculated pigs mainly on days 1 and 3. Titers of H5N1 viruses in nasal swabs were remarkably lower compared with those of swine influenza viruses. Replication of all four H5N1 viruses in pigs was restricted to the respiratory tract, mainly to the lungs. Titers of H5N1 viruses in the lungs were lower than those of swine viruses. WS/Mong/05 virus was isolated from trachea and tonsils, and MDk/VN/05 virus was isolated from nasal turbinate of infected pigs. Histological examination revealed mild to moderate bronchiolitis and multifocal alveolitis in the lungs of pigs infected with H5N1 viruses, while infection with swine influenza viruses resulted in severe tracheobronchitis and bronchointerstitial pneumonia. Pigs had low susceptibility to infection with H5N1 HPAI viruses. Inoculation of pigs with H5N1 viruses resulted in asymptomatic to mild symptomatic infection restricted to the respiratory tract and tonsils in contrast to mouse and ferrets animal models, where some of the viruses studied were highly pathogenic and replicated systemically.     

Emergence of mammalian species-infectious and -pathogenic avian influenza H6N5 virus with no evidence of adaptation

The migratory waterfowl of the world are considered to be the natural reservoir of influenza A viruses. Of the 16 hemagglutinin subtypes of avian influenza viruses, the H6 subtype is commonly perpetuated in its natural hosts and is of concern due to its potential to be a precursor of highly pathogenic influenza viruses by reassortment. During routine influenza surveillance, we isolated an unconventional H6N5 subtype of avian influenza virus. Experimental infection of mice revealed that this isolate replicated efficiently in the lungs, subsequently spread systemically, and caused lethality. The isolate also productively infected ferrets, with direct evidence of contact transmission, but no disease or transmission was seen in pigs. Although the isolate possessed the conserved receptor-binding site sequences of avian influenza viruses, it exhibited relatively low replication efficiencies in ducks and chickens. Our genetic and molecular analyses of the isolate revealed that its PB1 sequence showed the highest evolutionary relationship to those of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza viruses and that its PA protein had an isoleucine residue at position 97 (a representative virulence marker). Further studies will be required to examine why our isolate has the virologic characteristics of mammalian influenza viruses but the archetypal receptor binding profiles of avian influenza viruses, as well as to determine whether its potential virulence markers (PB1 analogous to those of H5N1 viruses or isoleucine residue at position 97 within PA) could render it highly pathogenic in mice.     

Emergence of influenza A viruses.

Pandemic influenza in humans is a zoonotic disease caused by the transfer of influenza A viruses or virus gene segments from animal reservoirs. Influenza A viruses have been isolated from avian and mammalian hosts, although the primary reservoirs are the aquatic bird populations of the world. In the aquatic birds, influenza is asymptomatic, and the viruses are in evolutionary stasis. The aquatic bird viruses do not replicate well in humans, and these viruses need to reassort or adapt in an intermediate host before they emerge in human populations. Pigs can serve as a host for avian and human viruses and are logical candidates for the role of intermediate host. The transmission of avian H5N1 and H9N2 viruses directly to humans during the late 1990s showed that land-based poultry also can serve between aquatic birds and humans as intermediate hosts of influenza viruses. That these transmission events took place in Hong Kong and China adds further support to the hypothesis that Asia is an epicentre for influenza and stresses the importance of surveillance of pigs and live-bird markets in this area.     

Evidence of infection with H4 and H11 avian influenza viruses among Lebanese chicken growers

Human infections with H5, H7, and H9 avian influenza viruses are well documented. Exposure to poultry is the most important risk factor for humans becoming infected with these viruses. Data on human infection with other low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses is sparse but suggests that such infections may occur. Lebanon is a Mediterranean country lying under two major migratory birds flyways and is home to many wild and domestic bird species. Previous reports from this country demonstrated that low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses are in circulation but highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses were not reported. In order to study the extent of human infection with avian influenza viruses in Lebanon, we carried out a seroprevalence cross-sectional study into which 200 poultry-exposed individuals and 50 non-exposed controls were enrolled. We obtained their sera and tested it for the presence of antibodies against avian influenza viruses types H4 through H16 and used a questionnaire to collect exposure data. Our microneutralization assay results suggested that backyard poultry growers may have been previously infected with H4 and H11 avian influenza viruses. We confirmed these results by using a horse red blood cells hemagglutination inhibition assay. Our data also showed that farmers with antibodies against each virus type clustered in a small geographic area suggesting that unrecognized outbreaks among birds may have led to these human infections. In conclusion, this study suggests that occupational exposure to chicken is a risk factor for infection with avian influenza especially among backyard growers and that H4 and H11 influenza viruses may possess the ability to cross the species barrier to infect humans.     

Adaptation of Pandemic H2N2 Influenza A Viruses in Humans

The 1957 A/H2N2 influenza virus caused an estimated 2 million fatalities during the pandemic. Since viruses of the H2 subtype continue to infect avian species and pigs, the threat of reintroduction into humans remains. To determine factors involved in the zoonotic origin of the 1957 pandemic, we performed analyses on genetic sequences of 175 newly sequenced human and avian H2N2 virus isolates and all publicly available influenza virus genomes.     

近年来华东地区家鸭中禽流感病毒的亚型分布

[目的]为了研究近年来华东地区家鸭中禽流感病毒的亚型分布情况.[方法]对2002-2006年分离自华东地区家鸭的180株禽流感病毒的HA亚型和其中88株禽流感病毒的NA亚型分别进行了测定.[结果]近年来华东地区家鸭中至少存在9种HA亚型和6种NA亚型组成的H1N1,H3N1,H3N2,H3N8,H4N6,H5N1,H5N2,H6N2,H6N8,H8N4,H9N2,H10N3,H11N2共13种亚型的禽流感病毒.[结论]华东地区家鸭中有多种亚型的禽流感病毒分布,应加强家鸭禽流感的监测和防制工作.     

Lethal H5N1 influenza viruses escape host anti-viral cytokine responses

The H5N1 influenza viruses transmitted to humans in 1997 were highly virulent, but the mechanism of their virulence in humans is largely unknown. Here we show that lethal H5N1 influenza viruses, unlike other human, avian and swine influenza viruses, are resistant to the antiviral effects of interferons and tumor necrosis factor alpha. The nonstructural (NS) gene of H5N1 viruses is associated with this resistance. Pigs infected with recombinant human H1N1 influenza virus that carried the H5N1 NS gene experienced significantly greater and more prolonged viremia, fever and weight loss than did pigs infected with wild-type human H1N1 influenza virus. These effects required the presence of glutamic acid at position 92 of the NS1 molecule. These findings may explain the mechanism of the high virulence of H5N1 influenza viruses in humans.     

Evaluation of the ESPLINE INFLUENZA A&B-N Kit for the diagnosis of avian and swine influenza

The ESPLINE INFLUENZA A&B-N kit was evaluated for its applicability to the rapid diagnosis of influenza in chickens and pigs. The kit specifically detected viral antigens in tracheal swabs and tissue homogenates of the trachea, liver, spleen, and colon of chickens inoculated with a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus strain, A/chicken/Yamaguchi/7/04 (H5N1), at 48 hr post-inoculation (p.i.) as well as in the tracheal and cloacal swabs and tissue homogenates of dead chickens. For those infected with a low pathogenic strain, A/chicken/aq-Y-55/01 (H9N2), antigens were detected only in the samples from tracheal swabs and organs 1-4 days p.i. The kit also detected viral antigens in the nasal swabs of miniature pigs infected with swine and avian influenza viruses. The kit was found to be sensitive and specific enough for the rapid diagnosis of infections of influenza A virus in chickens and pigs.