Theorizing human impacts into ecological restoration is not a slippery slope,but a toehold for reaching social‐ecological resilience: a counter‐response to McDonald et al. (2019)

In their reply, McDonald et al. have misconstrued several crucial points from our article. In this counter‐response, we clarify our concerns with the Standards as a document with global implications. We highlight our concern with framing preindustrial indigenous peoples' impacts as natural and the colonial connotations of such an assumption. We also discuss practical issues that arise from the Standards' conceptualization of natural variation and suggest avenues for developing frameworks that do not rely on a nature‐culture dichotomy or naturalization of indigenous landscapes.     

The nature of psychiatric disorders

A foundational question for the discipline of psychiatry is the nature of psychiatric disorders. What kinds of things are they? In this paper, I review and critique three major relevant theories: realism, pragmatism and constructivism. Realism assumes that the content of science is real and independent of human activities. I distinguish two “flavors” of realism: chemistry‐based, for which the paradigmatic example is elements of the periodic table, and biology‐based, for which the paradigm is species. The latter is a much better fit for psychiatry. Pragmatism articulates a sensible approach to psychiatric disorders just seeking categories that perform well in the world. But it makes no claim about the reality of those disorders. This is problematic, because we have a duty to advocate for our profession and our patients against other physicians who never doubt the reality of the disorders they treat. Constructivism has been associated with anti‐psychiatry activists, but we should admit that social forces play a role in the creation of our diagnoses, as they do in many sciences. However, truly socially constructed psychiatric disorders are rare. I then describe powerful arguments against a realist theory of psychiatric disorders. Because so many prior psychiatric diagnoses have been proposed and then abandoned, can we really claim that our current nosologies have it right? Much of our current nosology arose from a series of historical figures and events which could have gone differently. If we re‐run the tape of history over and over again, the DSM and ICD would not likely have the same categories on every iteration. Therefore, we should argue more confidently for the reality of broader constructs of psychiatric illness rather than our current diagnostic categories, which remain tentative. Finally, instead of thinking that our disorders are true because they correspond to clear entities in the world, we should consider a coherence theory of truth by which disorders become more true when they fit better into what else we know about the world. In our ongoing project to study and justify the nature of psychiatric disorders, we ought to be broadly pragmatic but not lose sight of an underlying commitment, despite the associated difficulties, to the reality of psychiatric illness.     

Encountering nature through fieldwork: expert knowledge,modes of reasoning,and local creativity

The concept of ‘relation’ has been central to the anthropological reworking of the nature/culture and nature/society dichotomies. However, ecology is relational in a way that has often been ignored or dismissed in contemporary socio‐cultural anthropology. This article shows that there is more to ethnoecology than an ethnocentric form of analysis representing other people's understandings of the natural world through the prejudiced lens of Western scientific classifications. Three ‘fieldwork on fieldwork’ experiments involving encounters between natural scientists and indigenous communities in Amazonian Ecuador and Southern Guyana are discussed to illustrate the heterogeneity of human knowledge, the role of expert knowledge in intercultural communication, and the need to differentiate ecological reasoning from moral reasoning.     

Autonomy and Why You Can “Never Let Me Go”

Kazuo Ishiguro’s book Never Let Me Go is a thoughtful and provocative exploration of what it means to be human. Drawing on insights from the hermeneutic-phenomenology of Martin Heidegger, I argue that the movement of Ishiguro’s story can be understood in terms of actualising the human potential for autonomous action. Liberal theories take autonomy to be concerned with analytically and ethically isolatable social units directing their lives in accordance with self-interested preferences, arrived at by means of rational calculation. However, I argue that such theories are simplistic abstractions from our human-life world, distorting the fundamental embodied, embedded, and relational nature of autonomy. When we attend closely to our concrete, lived existence we see instead that autonomy is about responding appropriately to others with whom we share a world. As we follow the path of Ishiguro’s central character Kathy H., we are shown how an awareness and acceptance of our existential finitude as precarious and fallible creatures is necessary for guiding such appropriate interactions. As Kathy grows and is affirmed into her life-world, which grounds and supports her Being, she moves from heteronomy to autonomy; from being moved by external laws to embodying those laws, thereby becoming autonomous. This is exemplified by her appropriation of the carer role, through which she responds in a fitting way to those with whom she shares her world, bearing the weight of and dwelling responsibly within our human condition.     

Negotiating belonging: plants,people, and indigeneity in northern Australia

This article focuses on human‐plant relations, drawing on ethnographic research from northern Australia's Gulf Country to address the concept of indigeneity. Just as the identities of ‘Indigenous’ and ‘non‐Indigenous’ people in this region are contextual and at times contested according to the vernacular categories of ‘Blackfellas’, ‘Whitefellas’, and ‘Yellafellas’, so too the issue of what ‘belongs’ in the natural world is negotiated through ambiguities about whether species are useful, productive, and aesthetically pleasing to humans, as well as local understandings about how plants and animals came to be located in the Gulf region. At the same time, plants’ distinctive characteristics as plants shape their relations with humans in ways which affect their categorization as ‘native’ and ‘alien’ or ‘introduced’. Focusing our analysis on three specific trees, we argue that attention to the ‘plantiness’ of flora contributes significantly to debates about indigeneity in society and nature. At the same time, our focus on human‐plant relations contributes important context and nuance to current debates about human and other‐than‐human relations in a more‐than‐human world.     

Bad Hair Days in the Paleolithic: Modern (Re)Constructions of the Cave Man

Although we have never seen Paleolithic humans in the flesh, we recognize them immediately in illustrations, art, cartoons, and museum displays. The familiar iconography of the "Cave Man" often depicts our early human ancestors with longish, unkempt hair. However, this conventionalized image is not congruent with available archaeological data on the appearance of Upper Paleolithic humans. The lengthy iconographic history of representations of our prehistoric humans is rather a palimpsest of beliefs about the origins of humans, "natural man," human nature, primitive humans, and the savage "Other": a history of discourses about human evolution, human language, and the place of humans in the natural world. These images are traced in their anthropological, evolutionary, and philosophical contexts from medieval art through recent scientific illustrations, art, cartoons, and murals, and their influence on the scientific interpretation of our ancestors is assessed. [Cave Man, Paleolithic, evolution, primitive, illustration]     

Life Sciences and Globalization – Two Modern Marketing Slogans or a Challenge for the Future?

The historical development of the industrialization in the past 200 years may be best illustrated by the Kondratiew‐cycles. The world’s population is increasing both rapidly and continuously. According to the latest statistics, there are currently around 6 billion people on our planet. In the next two–three decades it will be increasing to 8 billion people. Approximate 1 billion people in the world have not enough to eat, they are undernourished. How mankind will behave in smaller and smaller living‐spaces is besides the basic needs of nutrition, health, and housing. This problem we must solve in the near future. In favored areas of settlement the population density is increasing all the time. Areas of the resources for raw materials, energy, and nutrition are not identical with the locations for production and housing. Life sciences comprise an interdisciplinary science of nature, about nature, of mankind and its behavior, that means psychology and sociology. Life sciences and globalization depend on one another and force us to adapt production methods to shortage of natural resources and the regeneration of the environment and the sources for water, energy, and materials. Life science will be a modern vision in future, independent from the organizational structure of individual companies. The ability to regenerate means more than environmental protection; it means “health” in the widest sense. Nature may be changed, it is not static. But nature must be allowed to be regenerated. Globalization means the construction of a network of storage, production‐, transportation‐, and communication systems so that we can exchange and use supplies of water, energy, raw‐materials, products, and information without disruption and according to need. Presently, the globalization is interpreted by the western industrialized nations according to their own advantage and profit. At the latest in one decade the countries within Asia and Latin‐America or the CIS will be serious competitors on the world market in the fields of basic and high technology. If the globalization will continue to be interpreted in a profitable euphoria, we can expect a new economic disaster. These problems should be discussed openly and without ideological baggage or narrow‐mindedness.     

Understanding how nature works: Five pathways towards a more ecologically literate world – A perspective

The sustainability of human life on Earth depends upon the integrity of the relationship between humanity and nature. Natural systems support humanity, and knowledge and understanding of how nature works form the foundation of ecological literacy. It is ecological literacy, and science literacy in general, that underpins our capacity as humans to make well‐informed decisions about how to live in sustainable ways. It is of concern that levels of ecological knowledge and understanding within many contemporary human communities may be too low to enable effective decision‐making in support of sustainable human settlements. Our concern led to an exploration of the concept of ecological literacy and the assessment of a sample of South Australian adults. We found that while ecological literacy can vary significantly in correlation with a range of socio‐demographic and psychographic characteristics, no one factor is necessarily more critical than another. Based on this work, we have identified five pathways for growing eco‐literate communities. While the patterns and drivers of ecological knowledge and understanding naturally vary between cultures and communities, our findings certainly invite serious consideration for a society, and indeed a world, that aspires to cultivate informed citizenry, leadership and governance with capacity for building sustainable human settlements.     

Cryoconservation of South African plant genetic diversity

South Africa has a rich flora which exhibits among the highest species density in the world, distributed across nine biomes that support an impressive diversity of animal life. However, a variety of human actions, invasion by alien species, natural disturbances and climate change collectively impact negatively on the great diversity of both plant and animal species. In situ conservation has long been practised, primarily in nature reserves, complemented by ex situ conservation in national botanic gardens, but in vitro plant conservation is not common. In the context of animal biodiversity conservation, the Wildlife Biological Resource Centre of the National Zoological Gardens utilises cryobanking as one of its major focuses and is now poised to expand as the repository for the cryoconservation of plant germplasm, particularly for indigenous recalcitrant-seeded and poor-seeding species. However, there are particular problems associated with successful germplasm cryostorage of such tropical and subtropical plants. As we see the science and application of cryobiology and cryoconservation as cross-cutting and transdisciplinary, we have entrained formal networking among scientists offering a range of specialisations aimed at a deeper understanding of common problems and practical outcomes to facilitate both plant and animal biobanking. The endeavours are aimed at elucidating the basis of both successes and failures in our efforts to attain optimal outcomes. With focus on best practices, standard operating procedures, validation and risk management for cryopreserved and cold-stored plant and animal material, our ultimate aim is to facilitate restoration by the safe reintroduction of indigenous species.     

The Law of the Land: A Review Article

This is a review article of the book Native Title Corporations: A Legal and Anthropological Analysis from the point of view of anthropology. I begin by highlighting the development of Anglo‐Australian social anthropology from such figures as Radcliffe‐Brown and Fortes, who were heavily influenced by regulatory and normative models from the domain of legal and judicial scholarship and speculate on the contemporary conditions by which this original social anthropological metaphor has apparently achieved a new literalisation. I criticise the legalistic appropriation of anthropological and ethnographic methodology that this book makes explicit, and finally, I express scepticism for the future success of the prescribed body corporate, as described in the Native Title Act (1993), as a model for the possession, transmission and elaboration of indigenous rights to country.     

The Anthropocene narrative and Amerindian lifeworlds: anthropos,agency, and personhood

Based on the observation that the Anthropocene narrative signifies a departure from the Cartesian nature/culture division dominant within modernist science, this article explores notions of personhood and agency among Amerindian peoples in the Amazon, the Andes, and Mesoamerica in comparison to the corresponding notions in modernist discourses. We discuss the differences in conceptualizations in relation to diverging understandings of climate change and the Anthropocene, focusing on perspectives on agentivity both within our respective ethnographical fields and in modernist social sciences. This leads us to stress the significance of new materialists’ disregard for intentionality in relation to agency and the consequences this neglect has for understanding animist perspectives. We examine the different views in relation to their effects on morality and to perceived forms of accountability. In accordance, the modernist ‘global we’, prominent in the Anthropocene debate stressing the role of humanity as a species, is contrasted with what we call a ‘universal we’, which includes both human and other-than-human persons, in conformance with Amerindian animist perspectives on the world. This approach to the issue does not only mean that we challenge the obvious iniquity in blaming all of humanity for climate change but also that we point to the coloniality of reality implicit in the Anthropocene narrative.     

The Biodiversity Discourse: Categorisation of Indigenous People in a Mexican Bio-prospecting Case

Indigenous knowledge is often portrayed as static and traditional, while indigenous people are considered victims of exploitation. In the name of development and empowerment NGOs as well as scientists may run the risk of representing indigenous communities that fit their definition of the “correct” way to be indigenous. However, for indigenous people knowledge is not necessarily a static condition in a binary position to science or the ‘modern’ world. Rather, it is a dynamic condition that draws from experience and adapts to a changing environment. The perspective advanced in this paper is that all forms of knowledge, including indigenous knowledge(s), are situated and hybrid. Our argument draws from research carried out in Chiapas, Mexico, regarding the ICBG-Maya bio-prospecting project that was initiated in the 1990s and later terminated due to accusations of bio-piracy.     

Peripheral vision: science and creole patriotism in eighteenth-century Spanish America

This article examines the study of natural history on the imperial periphery in late colonial Spanish America. It considers the problems that afflicted peripheral naturalists—lack of books, instruments, scholarly companionship, and skilled technicians. It discusses how these deprivations impacted upon their self-confidence and credibility as men of science and it examines the strategies adopted by peripheral naturalists to boost their scientific credibility. The article argues that Spanish American savants, deprived of the most up-to-date books and sophisticated instruments, emphasised instead their sustained experience of local nature and their familiarity with indigenous knowledge. It details how some creole naturalists, such as the Mexican José Antonio Alzate, questioned the applicability of European classificatory systems to American fauna and flora, and it analyses the complex relationship between natural science and creole patriotism.     

Anatomy--analysis and synthesis

Scientific knowledge is a continuum, and anatomy is a part of this subject to the same methods, principles, and the need of synthesis, both within anatomy and with other syntheses. Western science is the spearhead of human progress in understanding the universe around us and the world of Earth, from which we cannot escape. Science may also, in its power of synthesis, bringing together not only those who practise it but also uniting the nations. Excellent as are the applications of science in technology, knowledge has its own value in producing a synthesis of human awareness,--and also it may prevent us from ruining the Earth, which is our only possible home.     

Blackawton bees

BACKGROUND: Real science has the potential to not only amaze, but also transform the way one thinks of the world and oneself. This is because the process of science is little different from the deeply resonant, natural processes of play. Play enables humans (and other mammals) to discover (and create) relationships and patterns. When one adds rules to play, a game is created. THIS IS SCIENCE: the process of playing with rules that enables one to reveal previously unseen patterns of relationships that extend our collective understanding of nature and human nature. When thought of in this way, science education becomes a more enlightened and intuitive process of asking questions and devising games to address those questions. But, because the outcome of all game-playing is unpredictable, supporting this 'messyness', which is the engine of science, is critical to good science education (and indeed creative education generally). Indeed, we have learned that doing 'real' science in public spaces can stimulate tremendous interest in children and adults in understanding the processes by which we make sense of the world. The present study (on the vision of bumble-bees) goes even further, since it was not only performed outside my laboratory (in a Norman church in the southwest of England), but the 'games' were themselves devised in collaboration with 25 8- to 10-year-old children. They asked the questions, hypothesized the answers, designed the games (in other words, the experiments) to test these hypotheses and analysed the data. They also drew the figures (in coloured pencil) and wrote the paper. Their headteacher (Dave Strudwick) and I devised the educational programme (we call 'i,scientist'), and I trained the bees and transcribed the childrens' words into text (which was done with smaller groups of children at the school's local village pub). So what follows is a novel study (scientifically and conceptually) in 'kids speak' without references to past literature, which is a challenge. Although the historical context of any study is of course important, including references in this instance would be disingenuous for two reasons. First, given the way scientific data are naturally reported, the relevant information is simply inaccessible to the literate ability of 8- to 10-year-old children, and second, the true motivation for any scientific study (at least one of integrity) is one's own curiousity, which for the children was not inspired by the scientific literature, but their own observations of the world. This lack of historical, scientific context does not diminish the resulting data, scientific methodology or merit of the discovery for the scientific and 'non-scientific' audience. On the contrary, it reveals science in its truest (most naive) form, and in this way makes explicit the commonality between science, art and indeed all creative activities. PRINCIPAL FINDING: 'We discovered that bumble-bees can use a combination of colour and spatial relationships in deciding which colour of flower to forage from. We also discovered that science is cool and fun because you get to do stuff that no one has ever done before. (Children from Blackawton)'.     

‘The Miserablest People in the World’: Race,Humanism and the Australian Aborigine

This paper considers how an idea of the Australian Aborigine impacted upon the development of racial thinking throughout the nineteenth century. We distinguish three phases of this development. Against the background of what was considered to be a distinctly human capacity to rise above nature, our central argument however is that the extreme and irremediable savagery attributed to the Aborigine led to the mid‐nineteenth shift to a polygenist, or an innatist, idea of race. The first part of our discussion, covering the early 1800s, elicits a specifically humanist puzzlement at the unimproved condition of the Aborigines. But, as we will show in the central part of our discussion, it was not only the Aborigines' inclination but their capacity for ‘improvement’ that came to be doubted. Challenging the very basis upon which ‘the human’ had been defined, and the unity of humankind assumed, the Aborigine could not be accommodated within a prevailing conception of racial difference as a mere variety of the human. The elaboration of polygenism may therefore be understood as arising out of this humanist incomprehension: as an attempt to account for the ontologically inexplicable difference of the Australian Aborigine. In the final part of our discussion, we trace the legacy of the Aborigine's place within polygenism through the evolutionary thought of the late nineteenth century. Despite an explicit return to monogenism, here the Aborigine is invoked to support the claim that race constitutes a more or less permanent difference and, for certain races, a more or less permanent deficiency. And as, in these terms, the anomalous Aborigine became an anachronism, so Australia's indigenous peoples came to embody the most devastating conclusion of evolutionary thought: that in the human struggle for existence certain races were destined not even to survive.     

Research integrity and rights of indigenous peoples: appropriating Foucault's critique of knowledge/power

In this paper I appropriate the philosophical critique of Michel Foucault as it applies to the engagement of Western science and indigenous peoples in the context of biomedical research. The science of population genetics, specifically as pursued in the Human Genome Diversity Project, is the obvious example to illustrate (a) the contraposition of modern science and 'indigenous science', (b) the tendency to depreciate and marginalize indigenous knowledge systems, and (c) the subsumption of indigenous moral preferences in the juridical armature of international human rights law. I suggest that international bioethicists may learn from Foucault's critique, specifically of the need for vigilance about the knowledge/power relation expressed by the contraposition of modern science and 'indigeneity'.     

Quandaries and complexities of ecological risk assessment: Viable options to reduce humanistic arrogance

Ecological risk assessment has been used to support decisions regarding human‐generated actions which affect natural “resources”; and indigenous ecosystems. Often, the logical and scientific input serve as rationalization to legitimize the process. Though widely accepted as the realistic and sole paradigm, Ecological Risk Assessments do not address the complexities of the natural world, are humanistically arrogant, and disregard or do not consider alternatives which offer imagination and realistic attempts to reduce human impact to the land.

Ecological Alternatives Assessment practices would place the highest priority on: (a) continued temporal and spatial evolution of existing complex ecological relationships, (b) acknowledgment of the inherent rights of all species, and (c) examination of alternatives to reduce effects of anthropogenic actions. These steps, as discussed, are not impossible to accomplish and are necessary for favorable short‐term (50–500 years) anthropocentric alternatives and maintenance of long‐term (+1,000 years) biodiversity of species and ecosystems.     

Anthropology in Disneyworld: Rapport,Gardner, and the ‘Discipline‘ of Social Anthropology

This article examines the response by Rapport to the critique made by Gardner of his book Transcendent Individual. Rapport eschews the idea of discipline in relation to anthropology. This is connected to his distaste for any hint of social determinism, and his eulogising of the essay format as the most suitable means of conveying human contrariety. His approach necessarily leads him to embellish his accounts of what the world is like with visions of what it should be like if only everyone adopted his literary and liberal stance. A contrary ‘manifesto’ is here presented: the job of social anthropology is to explain actual historical societies, and one cannot simply appropriate the subject so that it now becomes about a kind of never‐never land. Rapport's approach, far from leading to a glorification of individuality, leads only to a monochrome vision which paints all human beings as reductively ‘aesthetic’, ignoring, and rendering impossible the explanation of all institutionalised forms of belief and practice, not least those brutal forms which, says Rapport, inspire his work.