Anthropomorphism and 'mental welfare' of fishes

Anthropomorphism, the use of human characteristics as a foundation for interpreting behavior and mental capacities of animals, is a bias undermining our understanding of other species, especially species as evolutionarily distant from humans as fishes. Anthropomorphism is not justified by allusions to evolutionary continuity among vertebrates, because no living vertebrate was ever a descendant of humans, so none could have inherited human traits. Nonetheless, it has recently been claimed that fishes are capable of conscious experiences of pain and emotional feelings and that mental welfare is an important issue for fishes. This paper shows that the evidence supporting claims for experiences of pain or conscious emotions by fishes is conceptually and methodologically flawed. In addition, the paper shows that the natural history and behavior of diverse fish species is inconsistent with a presumption of human-like awareness. This behavioral evidence is in accord with neurobiological observations showing that fishes are very different from us and are unlikely to have a capacity for awareness of pain or emotional feelings that meaningfully resemble our own. The factors that are detrimental to fish welfare have been well delineated by valid, objective indicators of physiological and behavioral well-being. This knowledge should guide welfare decisions. An empirical and non-anthropomorphic examination of diverse fishes and their adaptations should be the foundation for welfare decisions that would be truly beneficial to fishes and humans alike.     

Anthropomorphism,anthropectomy, and the null hypothesis

We examine the claim that the methodology of psychology leads to a bias in animal cognition research against attributing “anthropomorphic” properties to animals (Sober in Thinking with animals: new perspectives on anthropomorphism. Columbia University Press, New York, pp 85–99, 2005; de Waal in Philos Top 27:225–280, 1999). This charge is examined in light of a debate on the role of folk psychology between primatologists who emphasize similarities between humans and other apes, and those who emphasize differences. We argue that while in practice there is sometimes bias, either in the formulation of the null hypothesis or in the preference of Type-II errors over Type-I errors, the bias is not the result of proper use of the Neyman and Pearson hypothesis testing method. Psychologists’ preference for false negatives over false positives cannot justify a preference for avoiding anthropomorphic errors over anthropectic (Gk. anthropos—human; ektomia—to cut out) errors.     

Thinking with Animals: New Perspectives on Anthropomorphism

Thinking with Animals: New Perspectives on Anthropomorphism. Lorraine Daston and Gregg Mitman, eds. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. 230 pp.     

Anthropomorphism,primatomorphism, mammalomorphism: understanding cross-species comparisons

The charge that anthropomorphizing nonhuman animals is a fallacy is itself largely misguided and mythic. Anthropomorphism in the study of animal behavior is placed in its original, theological context. Having set the historical stage, I then discuss its relationship to a number of other, related issues: the role of anecdotal evidence, the taxonomy of related anthropomorphic claims, its relationship to the attribution of psychological states in general, and the nature of the charge of anthropomorphism as a categorical claim. I then argue that the categorical reading of anthropomorphism cannot work and that it misrepresents what is being claimed when one claims that traits are shared between humans and nonhumans. We should think of such claims not as anthropomorphic per se– because that implies the trait is intrinsically human and only derivatively nonhuman. Instead, traits shared with mammals are mammalomorphic, for example, or primatomorphic when shared by primates.     

Anthropomorphism in Japanese Women's Status Terms used in Talk to Potential Guide Dogs

Abstract

We surveyed residents' attitudes toward common urban animals and their participation in animal-oriented activities in the city of Trondheim, Norway. The results show that people most like small birds, squirrels, butterflies, hedgehogs, ducks, geese and dogs, and dislike bats, snails, invertebrate species, mice and rats. Birds of prey, foxes, cats, bumblebees, magpies, pigeons, badgers, gulls, grasshoppers and crows received a neutral ranking. Generally, females more than males liked the popular and neutral species, while males more than females liked the less-preferred animals. A negative association was found between age of respondents and preferences for birds of prey, dogs, cats, badgers, bats, mice and rats. This relation was positive for some invertebrate species, and small and medium-sized birds. A positive correlation was found between educational level of the respondents and preference scores for most of the species listed. Watching television programs about nature (59% often/very often) and watching/feeding birds (41%) were the most frequently reported animal-related activities. When walking in the neighborhood, important animal-related motives for doing this were to observe birds (42%) and to observe mammals (34%). Interest in bird observation and television programs about nature increased with increasing age. Few respondents reported experiencing problems with wildlife, but dogs and cats were more often (36%) considered to create problems. These results indicate that wildlife plays an important role in shaping urban residents' daily experiences, and that both animals and their habitats should have a higher priority in urban planning and management.     

Anthropomorphism or sub-anthropomorphism? An anthropological approach to gods and robots

Since the 1980s, a new area of research entitled HRI (Human-Robot Interaction) has been emerging in the field of robotic studies. It focuses on the empirical study of the relationship between robots and human beings. This article aims to contrast the findings of roboticists concerning the interaction between humans and robots with anthropological studies which focus on the ritual interaction between gods and humans in specific religious contexts. This idea may seem provocative, but it is argued here that such a comparison can yield valuable insights both at a theoretical level and at an empirical one. This will be demonstrated with reference to ritual interactions between humans and gods in the Western Himalayas.  

Résumé

Depuis les années 1980, un nouveau domaine d'étude appelé HRI (Human-Robot Interaction) est apparu dans la recherche en robotique. Il s'agit d'une étude empirique des relations entre robots et êtres humains. Le présent article met en regard les observations de roboticiens sur les interactions entre humains et robots et les études anthropologiques consacrées à l'interaction entre dieux et humains dans des contextes religieux spécifiques. Pour provocatrice qu'elle puisse paraître, cette comparaison peut constituer une approche intéressante, du point de vue théorique aussi bien qu'empirique. L'auteur le démontre en référence à des interactions rituelles entre hommes et dieux dans les massifs occidentaux de l'Himalaya.     

Analogies in science and science teaching

Analogies are often used in science, but students may not appreciate their significance, and so the analogies can be misunderstood or discounted. For this reason, educationalists often express concern about the use of analogies in teaching. Given the important place of analogies in the discourse of science, it is necessary that students are explicitly shown how they work, perhaps based on the structure-mapping theory we outline here. When using an analogy, the teacher should very clearly specify both its components and its limitations. Great care is required in developing an analogy to ensure that it is understood as intended and that misconceptions are minimized. This approach models the behavior of a scientist, which helps to develop student understanding of the practice of science.     

Chauvinism in science

Is Science chauvinistic? It is not, but scientists often are. How does chauvinism in Science manifest itself? Could it be that we are genetically programmed to reject those we see as “foreign”?