Cooperation Improves Success during Intergroup Competition: An Analysis Using Data from Professional Soccer Tournaments

The benefit mutually gained by cooperators is considered the ultimate explanation for why cooperation evolved among non-relatives. During intergroup competition, cooperative behaviours within groups that provide a competitive edge over their opposition should be favoured by selection, particularly in lethal human warfare. Aside from forming larger groups, three other ways that individuals within a group can cooperate to improve their chances of gaining a mutual benefit are: (i) greater networking, (ii) contributing more effort, and (iii) dividing labour. Greater cooperation is expected to increase the chances of gaining a group benefit by improving proficiency in the tasks critical to success—yet empirical tests of this prediction using real-world cases are absent. In this study, we used data derived from 12 international and professional soccer competitions to test the predictions that: 1) greater levels of cooperative behaviour are associated with winning group contests, 2) the three forms of cooperation differ in relative importance for winning matches, 3) competition and tournament-type affect the levels of cooperation and shooting proficiency in matches, and 4) greater levels of networking behaviour are associated with increased proficiency in the most critical task linked with winning success in soccer—shooting at goal. Winners were best predicted by higher shooting proficiency, followed by greater frequencies of networking interactions within a team but unexpectedly, fewer networking partners and less division of labour. Although significant variation was detected across competitions and tournament-types, greater levels of networking behaviour were consistently associated with increased proficiency in shooting at goal, which in turn was linked with winning success. This study empirically supports the idea that intergroup competition can favour cooperation among non-relatives.     

Altruistic Punishment and Between-Group Competition

Collective action, or the large-scale cooperation in the pursuit of public goods, has been suggested to have evolved through cultural group selection. Previous research suggests that the costly punishment of group members who do not contribute to public goods plays an important role in the resolution of collective action dilemmas. If large-scale cooperation sustained by the punishment of defectors has evolved through the mechanism of cultural group selection, two implications regarding costly punishment follow: (1) that people are more willing to punish defecting group members in a situation of intergroup competition than in a single-group social dilemma game and (2) that levels of "perverse" punishment of cooperators are not affected by intergroup competition. We find confirmation for these hypotheses. However, we find that the effect of intergroup competition on the punishment of defectors is fully explained by the stronger conditionality of punishment on expected punishment levels in the competition condition.     

Cooperation in humans: competition between groups and proximate emotions

Understanding the ultimate and proximate mechanisms that favour cooperation remains one of the greatest challenges in the biological and social sciences. A number of theoretical studies have suggested that competition between groups may have played a key role in the evolution of cooperation within human societies, and similar ideas have been discussed for other organisms, especially cooperative breeding vertebrates. However, there is a relative lack of empirical work testing these ideas. Our experiment found, in public goods games with humans, that when groups competed with other groups for financial rewards, individuals made larger contributions within their own groups. In such situations, participants were more likely to regard their group mates as collaborators rather than competitors. Variation in contribution among individuals, either with or without intergroup competition, was positively correlated with individuals' propensity to regard group mates as collaborators. We found that the levels of both guilt and anger individuals experienced were a function of their own contributions and those of their group mates. Overall, our results are consistent with the idea that the level of cooperation can be influenced by proximate emotions, which vary with the degree of intergroup competition.     

Conflict, sticks and carrots: war increases prosocial punishments and rewards

Unlike most species, humans cooperate extensively with group members who are not closely related to them, a pattern sustained in part by punishing non-cooperators and rewarding cooperators. Because internally cooperative groups prevail over less cooperative rival groups, it is thought that violent intergroup conflict played a key role in the evolution of human cooperation. Consequently, it is plausible that propensities to punish and reward will be elevated during intergroup conflict. Using experiments conducted before, during and after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, we show that, during wartime, people are more willing to pay costs to punish non-cooperative group members and reward cooperative group members. Rather than simply increasing within-group solidarity, violent intergroup conflict thus elicits behaviours that, writ large, enhance cooperation within the group, thereby making victory more likely.     

Does Competition Really Bring Out the Worst? Testosterone,Social Distance and Inter-Male Competition Shape Parochial Altruism in Human Males

Parochial altruism, defined as increased ingroup favoritism and heightened outgroup hostility, is a widespread feature of human societies that affects altruistic cooperation and punishment behavior, particularly in intergroup conflicts. Humans tend to protect fellow group members and fight against outsiders, even at substantial costs for themselves. Testosterone modulates responses to competition and social threat, but its exact role in the context of parochial altruism remains controversial. Here, we investigated how testosterone influences altruistic punishment tendencies in the presence of an intergroup competition. Fifty male soccer fans played an ultimatum game (UG), in which they faced anonymous proposers that could either be a fan of the same soccer team (ingroup) or were fans of other teams (outgroups) that differed in the degree of social distance and enmity to the ingroup. The UG was played in two contexts with varying degrees of intergroup rivalry. Our data show that unfair offers were rejected more frequently than fair proposals and the frequency of altruistic punishment increased with increasing social distance to the outgroups. Adding an intergroup competition led to a further escalation of outgroup hostility and reduced punishment of unfair ingroup members. High testosterone levels were associated with a relatively increased ingroup favoritism and also a change towards enhanced outgroup hostility in the intergroup competition. High testosterone concentrations further predicted increased proposer generosity in interactions with the ingroup. Altogether, a significant relation between testosterone and parochial altruism could be demonstrated, but only in the presence of an intergroup competition. In human males, testosterone may promote group coherence in the face of external threat, even against the urge to selfishly maximize personal reward. In that way, our observation refutes the view that testosterone generally promotes antisocial behaviors and aggressive responses, but underlines its rather specific role in the fine-tuning of male social cognition.     

Perspective: repression of competition and the evolution of cooperation

Abstract Repression of competition within groups joins kin selection as the second major force in the history of life shaping the evolution of cooperation. When opportunities for competition against neighbors are limited within groups, individuals can increase their own success only by enhancing the efficiency and productivity of their group. Thus, characters that repress competition within groups promote cooperation and enhance group success. Leigh first expressed this idea in the context of fair meiosis, in which each chromosome has an equal chance of transmission via gametes. Randomized success means that each part of the genome can increase its own success only by enhancing the total number of progeny and thus increasing the success of the group. Alexander used this insight about repression of competition in fair meiosis to develop his theories for the evolution of human sociality. Alexander argued that human social structures spread when they repress competition within groups and promote successful group-against-group competition. Buss introduced a new example with his suggestion that metazoan success depended on repression of competition between cellular lineages. Maynard Smith synthesized different lines of thought on repression of competition. In this paper, I develop simple mathematical models to illustrate the main processes by which repression of competition evolves. With the concepts made clear, I then explain the history of the idea. I finish by summarizing many new developments in this subject and the most promising lines for future study.     

Asymmetry within social groups: division of labour and intergroup competition

Social animals vary in their ability to compete with group members over shared resources and also vary in their cooperative efforts to produce these resources. Competition among groups can promote within‐group cooperation, but many existing models of intergroup cooperation do not explicitly account for observations that group members invest differentially in cooperation and that there are often within‐group competitive or power asymmetries. We present a game theoretic model of intergroup competition that investigates how such asymmetries affect within‐group cooperation. In this model, group members adopt one of two roles, with relative competitive efficiency and the number of individuals varying between roles. Players in each role make simultaneous, coevolving decisions. The model predicts that although intergroup competition increases cooperative contributions to group resources by both roles, contributions are predominantly from individuals in the less competitively efficient role, whereas individuals in the more competitively efficient role generally gain the larger share of these resources. When asymmetry in relative competitive efficiency is greater, a group's per capita cooperation (averaged across both roles) is higher, due to increased cooperation from the competitively inferior individuals. For extreme asymmetry in relative competitive efficiency, per capita cooperation is highest in groups with a single competitively superior individual and many competitively inferior individuals, because the latter acquiesce and invest in cooperation rather than within‐group competition. These predictions are consistent with observed features of many societies, such as monogynous Hymenoptera with many workers and caste dimorphism.     

Repression of competition favours cooperation: experimental evidence from bacteria

Repression of competition (RC) within social groups has been suggested as a key mechanism driving the evolution of cooperation, because it aligns the individual’s proximate interest with the interest of the group. Despite its enormous potential for explaining cooperation across all levels of biological organization, ranging from fair meiosis, to policing in insect societies, to sanctions in mutualistic interactions between species, there has been no direct experimental test of whether RC favours the spread of cooperators in a well‐mixed population with cheats. To address this, we carried out an experimental evolution study to test the effect of RC upon a cooperative trait – the production of iron‐scavenging siderophore molecules – in the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We found that cooperation was favoured when competition between siderophore producers and nonsiderophore‐producing cheats was repressed, but not in a treatment where competition between the two strains was permitted. We further show that RC altered the cost of cooperation, but did not affect the relatedness among interacting individuals. This confirms that RC per se, as opposed to increased relatedness, has driven the observed increase in bacterial cooperation.     

The cost of defeat: Capuchin groups travel further,faster and later after losing conflicts with neighbors

Although competition between social groups is central to hypotheses about the evolution of human social organization, competitive interactions among group‐mates are thought to play a more dominant role in shaping the behavior and ecology of other primate species. However, few studies have directly tested the impact of intergroup conflicts in non‐human primates. What is the cost of defeat? To address this question, the movements of six neighboring white‐faced capuchin (Cebus capucinus) social groups living on Barro Colorado Island, Panama were tracked simultaneously using an Automated Radio Telemetry System (ARTS), for a period of six months. Groups moved 13% (441 m) further on days they lost interactions compared with days they won interactions. To cover these larger distances, they traveled faster, stopped less frequently, and remained active later in the evening. Defeat also caused groups to alter their patterns of space use. Losing groups had straighter travel paths than winning groups, larger net displacements and were more likely to change their sleeping site. These results demonstrate that losing groups pay increased travel costs and suggest that they forage in low‐quality areas. They provide some of the first direct evidence that intergroup conflicts have important energetic consequences for members of competitively unsuccessful primate social groups. A better understanding of how intergroup competition impacts patterns of individual fitness is thus needed to clarify the role that this group‐level process plays in shaping the evolution of human‐ and non‐human primate behavior. Am J Phys Anthropol 152:79–85, 2013. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Between-group competition and human cooperation

A distinctive feature of human behaviour is the widespread occurrence of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Explaining the maintenance of costly within-group cooperation is a challenge because the incentive to free ride on the efforts of other group members is expected to lead to decay of cooperation. However, the costs of cooperation can be diminished or overcome when there is competition at a higher level of organizational hierarchy. Here we show that competition between groups resolves the paradigmatic 'public goods' social dilemma and increases within-group cooperation and overall productivity. Further, group competition intensifies the moral emotions of anger and guilt associated with violations of the cooperative norm. The results suggest an important role for group conflict in the evolution of human cooperation and moral emotions.     

Sexual Size Dimorphism,Canine Dimorphism,and Male-Male Competition in Primates

Sexual size dimorphism is generally associated with sexual selection via agonistic male competition in nonhuman primates. These primate models play an important role in understanding the origins and evolution of human behavior. Human size dimorphism is often hypothesized to be associated with high rates of male violence and polygyny. This raises the question of whether human dimorphism and patterns of male violence are inherited from a common ancestor with chimpanzees or are uniquely derived. Here I review patterns of, and causal models for, dimorphism in humans and other primates. While dimorphism in primates is associated with agonistic male mate competition, a variety of factors can affect male and female size, and thereby dimorphism. The causes of human sexual size dimorphism are uncertain, and could involve several non-mutually-exclusive mechanisms, such as mate competition, resource competition, intergroup violence, and female choice. A phylogenetic reconstruction of the evolution of dimorphism, including fossil hominins, indicates that the modern human condition is derived. This suggests that at least some behavioral similarities with Pan associated with dimorphism may have arisen independently, and not directly from a common ancestor.     

Costly punishment prevails in intergroup conflict

Understanding how societies resolve conflicts between individual and common interests remains one of the most fundamental issues across disciplines. The observation that humans readily incur costs to sanction uncooperative individuals without tangible individual benefits has attracted considerable attention as a proximate cause as to why cooperative behaviours might evolve. However, the proliferation of individually costly punishment has been difficult to explain. Several studies over the last decade employing experimental designs with isolated groups have found clear evidence that the costs of punishment often nullify the benefits of increased cooperation, rendering the strong human tendency to punish a thorny evolutionary puzzle. Here, we show that group competition enhances the effectiveness of punishment so that when groups are in direct competition, individuals belonging to a group with punishment opportunity prevail over individuals in a group without this opportunity. In addition to competitive superiority in between-group competition, punishment reduces within-group variation in success, creating circumstances that are highly favourable for the evolution of accompanying group-functional behaviours. We find that the individual willingness to engage in costly punishment increases with tightening competitive pressure between groups. Our results suggest the importance of intergroup conflict behind the emergence of costly punishment and human cooperation.     

Group‐level competition influences urinary steroid hormones among wild red–tailed monkeys,indicating energetic costs

Various theories emphasize that intergroup competition should affect intragroup cooperation and social relationships, especially if the cost of intergroup competition outweighs that of intragroup competition. This cost of intergroup competition may be quantified by changes in physiological status, such as in the steroid hormones cortisol (C) and testosterone (T), which rise or are depressed during periods of energetic stress, respectively. Here we tested for changes in urinary C and T after intergroup encounters (IGEs) among wild red‐tailed monkeys (Cercopithecus ascanius), a species that experiences frequent intergroup feeding competition, at the Ngogo station in Kibale National Park, Uganda. We assayed 108 urine samples, of which 36 were collected after IGEs, from 23 individuals in four social groups. Bayesian multilevel models controlling for various confounds revealed that IGEs increased C and decreased T relative to baseline, consistent with an energetic cost to IGEs. The C change was more apparent in samples collected early after IGEs, suggesting an anticipatory increase, whereas the T change was stronger in later samples, suggesting sustained energetic trade‐offs. Hormone responses were not affected by the IGE outcome. This cost to intergroup competition, together with little evidence for intragroup competition in redtails and other guenons, establishes an interesting test case for theories emphasizing the effect of intergroup competition on intragroup cooperation.     

Multilevel selection analysis of a microbial social trait

The study of microbial communities often leads to arguments for the evolution of cooperation due to group benefits. However, multilevel selection models caution against the uncritical assumption that group benefits will lead to the evolution of cooperation. We analyze a microbial social trait to precisely define the conditions favoring cooperation. We combine the multilevel partition of the Price equation with a laboratory model system: swarming in Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We parameterize a population dynamics model using competition experiments where we manipulate expression, and therefore the cost‐to‐benefit ratio of swarming cooperation. Our analysis shows that multilevel selection can favor costly swarming cooperation because it causes population expansion. However, due to high costs and diminishing returns constitutive cooperation can only be favored by natural selection when relatedness is high. Regulated expression of cooperative genes is a more robust strategy because it provides the benefits of swarming expansion without the high cost or the diminishing returns. Our analysis supports the key prediction that strong group selection does not necessarily mean that microbial cooperation will always emerge.     

Pathogen threat and intergroup prejudice using the minimal group paradigm: Evidence from a registered report

Infection by parasites, bacteria, and other microorganisms has been a powerful selection pressure faced by humans and other species. Consequently, avoiding pathogens has played an important role in human evolution and continues to play a role in contemporary social psychological processes. The current research tested the hypothesis that pathogen avoidance promotes intergroup prejudice. Whereas previous tests relied on existing cultural groups, which can conflate outgroup status with pre-existing group stereotypes about disease or geographic variability in pathogen prevalence, the current experiments assessed intergroup bias using a minimal group paradigm. Based on preliminary evidence (Study 1, N = 207, undergraduate students) that experimentally priming pathogen avoidance motivation promoted negativity toward a minimal outgroup, we conducted a Registered Report (Study 2, N = 1339 online participants) to replicate and extend those findings. Our primary hypothesis was that an experimental manipulation of pathogen threat (relative to two control conditions) would produce greater intergroup prejudice (negativity toward the nominal outgroup relative to the nominal ingroup). This hypothesis was not supported in the larger, registered second study. Exploratory analyses provided some evidence for interactions between experimental priming of pathogen threat and individual differences in pathogen disgust, but the interactive pattern differed across the two experiments. Findings call into question the hypothesis that, in the absence of cultural stereotypes, situationally activated pathogen avoidance promotes intergroup prejudice.     

Explaining the evolution of parochial punishment in humans

Humans usually favour members of their own group, ethnicity or culture (parochial cooperation), and punish out-group wrongdoers more harshly (parochial punishment). The evolution of parochial cooperation is mainly explained by intergroup conflict, as restricting cooperation to in-groups can provide a relative advantage during conflict. However, explanations for the evolution of parochial punishment are still lacking. It is unclear whether conflict can also explain parochial punishment, because conflict is expected to lead to full hostility towards out-groups, irrespective of their behaviour. Here, we use an agent-based simulation to explore which conditions favour the evolution of parochial third-party punishment. We show that when groups interact and then engage in conflict with each other, third-party punishment is not parochial but spiteful, and directed towards all out-groups. A parochial bias in punishment decisions evolves (i) without conflict, when groups compete against nature and enforcing cooperation requires many punitive actions, and (ii) with conflict, when groups come into conflict with a group other than one they previously interacted with. Our findings suggest that intergroup conflict does not always lead to parochial punishment, and that stable collaborative relations between groups is a key factor promoting third-party parochial punishment. Our findings also provide novel predictions on how punishment and intergroup conflict influence in-group bias in human societies.     

A chemically triggered transition from conflict to cooperation in burying beetles

Although interspecific competition has long been recognised as a major driver of trait divergence and adaptive evolution, relatively little effort has focused on how it influences the evolution of intraspecific cooperation. Here we identify the mechanism by which the perceived pressure of interspecific competition influences the transition from intraspecific conflict to cooperation in a facultative cooperatively breeding species, the Asian burying beetle Nicrophorus nepalensis. We not only found that beetles are more cooperative at carcasses when blowfly maggots have begun to digest the tissue, but that this social cooperation appears to be triggered by a single chemical cue – dimethyl disulfide (DMDS) – emitted from carcasses consumed by blowflies, but not from control carcasses lacking blowflies. Our results provide experimental evidence that interspecific competition promotes the transition from intraspecific conflict to cooperation in N. nepalensis via a surprisingly simple social chemical cue that is a reliable indicator of resource competition between species.     

Cultural evolution of cooperation: The interplay between forms of social learning and group selection

The role of cultural group selection in the evolution of human cooperation is hotly debated. It has been argued that group selection is more effective in cultural evolution than in genetic evolution, because some forms of cultural transmission (conformism and/or the tendency to follow a leader) reduce intra-group variation while creating stable cultural variation between groups. This view is supported by some models, while other models lead to contrasting and sometimes opposite conclusions. A consensus view has not yet been achieved, partly because the modelling studies differ in their assumptions on the dynamics of cultural transmission and the mode of group selection. To clarify matters, we created an individual-based model allowing for a systematic comparison of how different social learning rules governing cultural transmission affect the evolution of cooperation in a group-structured population. We consider two modes of group selection (selection by group replacement or by group contagion) and systematically vary the frequency and impact of group-level processes. From our simulations we conclude that the outcome of cultural evolution strongly reflects the interplay of social learning rules and the mode of group selection. For example, conformism hampers or even prevents the evolution of cooperation if group selection acts via contagion; it may facilitate the evolution of cooperation if group selection acts via replacement. In contrast, leader-imitation promotes the evolution of cooperation under a broader range of conditions.     

Using visual modelling to study the evolution of lizard coloration: sexual selection drives the evolution of sexual dichromatism in lacertids

Sexual selection has been invoked as a major force in the evolution of secondary sexual traits, including sexually dimorphic colourations. For example, previous studies have shown that display complexity and elaborate ornamentation in lizards are associated with variables that reflect the intensity of intrasexual selection. However, these studies have relied on techniques of colour analysis based on human – rather than lizard – visual perception. Here, we use reflectance spectrophotometry and visual modelling to quantify sexual dichromatism considering the overall colour patterns of lacertids, a lizard clade in which visual signalling has traditionally been underrated. These objective methods of colour analysis reveal a large, previously unreported, degree of sexual dichromatism in lacertids. Using a comparative phylogenetic approach, we further demonstrate that sexual dichromatism is positively associated with body size dimorphism (an index of intrasexual selection), suggesting that conspicuous coloration in male lacertids has evolved to improve opponent assessment under conditions of intense male–male competition. Our findings provide the first evidence for the covariation of sexual dichromatism and sexual size dimorphism in lacertids and suggest that the prevalent role of intrasexual selection in the evolution of ornamental coloration is not restricted to the iguanian lineage, but rather may be a general trend common to many diurnal lizards.     

The cancellation effect at the group level

Group selection models combine selection pressure at the individual level with selection pressure at the group level. Cooperation can be costly for individuals, but beneficial for the group, and therefore, if individuals are sufficiently much assorted, and cooperators find themselves in groups with disproportionately many other cooperators, cooperation can evolve. The existing literature on group selection generally assumes that competition between groups takes place in a well-mixed population of groups, where any group competes with any other group equally intensely. Competition between groups however might very well occur locally; groups may compete more intensely with nearby than with far-away groups. We show that if competition between groups is indeed local, then the evolution of cooperation can be hindered significantly by the fact that groups with many cooperators will mostly compete against neighboring groups that are also highly cooperative, and therefore harder to outcompete. The existing empirical method for determining how conducive a group structured population is to the evolution of cooperation also implicitly assumes global between-group competition, and therefore gives (possibly very) biased estimates.