Science and Sentiment: Grinnell’s Fact-Based Philosophy of Biodiversity Conservation

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the biologist Joseph Grinnell made a distinction between science and sentiment for producing fact-based generalizations on how to conserve biodiversity. We are inspired by Grinnellian science, which successfully produced a century-long impact on studying and conserving biodiversity that runs orthogonal to some familiar philosophical distinctions such as fact versus value, emotion versus reason and basic versus applied science. According to Grinnell, unlike sentiment-based generalizations, a fact-based generalization traces its diverse commitments and thus becomes tractable for its audience. We argue that foregrounding tractability better explains Grinnell’s practice in the context of his time as well as in the context of current discourse among scientists over the political “biases” of biodiversity research and its problem of “reproducibility.”     

Development of evolutionary biomedicine as a novel direction of biological science

This review analyzes the data obtained for the last decade on invertebrate animals (insects, round worms, molluscs) as models of various human diseases. As illustration, there are considered advances in studying of the invertebrate system of insulin-like peptides and signaling mechanisms of their action—evolutionary conservative homologues of the mammalian insulin/IGF-1 system. Results are presented of studies on the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans, Drosophila Drosophila melanogaster, and mollusks, which “model” individual aspects of some human diseases—diabetes, neurodegenerative dysfunction, carcinogenesis, as well as aging. A conclusion is made about the development of a new, synthetic direction combining evolutionary science and molecular biology and medicine, which we call evolutionary biomedicine. The roots of the appearance of this synthetic direction are to be searched for in L.A. Orbeli’s evolutionary ideas, methods, and scientific predictions.     

Social and ethical checkpoints for bottom-up synthetic biology, or protocells

An alternative to creating novel organisms through the traditional “top-down” approach to synthetic biology involves creating them from the “bottom up” by assembling them from non-living components; the products of this approach are called “protocells.” In this paper we describe how bottom-up and top-down synthetic biology differ, review the current state of protocell research and development, and examine the unique ethical, social, and regulatory issues raised by bottom-up synthetic biology. Protocells have not yet been developed, but many expect this to happen within the next five to ten years. Accordingly, we identify six key checkpoints in protocell development at which particular attention should be given to specific ethical, social and regulatory issues concerning bottom-up synthetic biology, and make ten recommendations for responsible protocell science that are tied to the achievement of these checkpoints.     

What is a species? Essences and generation

Arguments against essentialism in biology rely strongly on a claim that modern biology abandoned Aristotle’s notion of a species as a class of necessary and sufficient properties. However, neither his theory of essentialism, nor his logical definition of species and genus (eidos and genos) play much of a role in biological research and taxonomy, including his own. The objections to natural kinds thinking by early twentieth century biologists wrestling with the new genetics overlooked the fact that species have typical developmental cycles and most have a large shared genetic component. These are the “what-it-is-to-be” members of that species. An intrinsic biological essentialism does not commit us to Aristotelian notions, nor even modern notions, of essence. There is a long-standing definition of “species” and its precursor notions that goes back to the Greeks, and which Darwin and pretty well all biologists since him share, that I call the Generative Conception of Species. It relies on there being a shared generative power that makes progeny resemble parents. The “what-it-is-to-be” a member of that species is that developmental type, mistakes in development notwithstanding. Moreover, such “essences” have always been understood to include deviations from the type. Finally, I shall examine some implications of the collapse of the narrative about essences in biology.     

Differentiation,ageing, and terminal differentiation: A semantic analysis

The largely unsolved problems in the theoretical analysis of differentiation and ageing involve a substantial component of linguistic (semantic) difficulties. Some of these are simple traps of ambiguity, resulting from metaphorical or analogical employment of established terms—for example, “terminal differentiation” (loss of division potential in vitro) as a borrowing from “differentiation” as used by developmental biologists, or “commitment” by analogy with “determination”. Some difficulties represent a failure to adopt (at least provisionally) an operational (empirical) view—for example, failure to ask what is the nature of the evidence for the view that a fertilized ovum is totipotential, or to scrutinize the evidence for the view that cells “terminally differentiated” in vitro in a conventional medium are in fact moribund under all conditions, or to examine more closely the view that the differentiated state and the cycling state are mutually exclusive.With respect to the problem of ageing, we review some of the critical experiments on ”terminal differentiation” or “clonal senescence”. We then proceed to consider some of the models that have been proposed, including a molecular model proposed by the author which appears to overcome some of the objections to other models. Some of the models exemplify the results of what are ultimately semantic vices.The problems with which these remarks began should indeed yield to the immense and novel resources of molecular biology. But the development of complete analyses demands not only good luck and delicate technique but also critical semantic clarity and severity. Given the best tools, we shall solve major theoretical problems only if we understand quite fully what problem it is that we are trying to solve—and the history of science illustrates that this is not as elementary a matter as it sounds. For the working scientist semantics (and indeed all philosophy of science) is not an indulgence or a frill, but a basic technical resource.     

Diffusion of synthetic biology: a challenge to biosafety

One of the main aims of synthetic biology is to make biology easier to engineer. Major efforts in synthetic biology are made to develop a toolbox to design biological systems without having to go through a massive research and technology process. With this “de-skilling” agenda, synthetic biology might finally unleash the full potential of biotechnology and spark a wave of innovation, as more and more people have the necessary skills to engineer biology. But this ultimate domestication of biology could easily lead to unprecedented safety challenges that need to be addressed: more and more people outside the traditional biotechnology community will create self-replicating machines (life) for civil and defence applications, “biohackers” will engineer new life forms at their kitchen table; and illicit substances will be produced synthetically and much cheaper. Such a scenario is a messy and dangerous one, and we need to think about appropriate safety standards now.     

Logical fallacies and invasion biology

Leading invasion biologists sometimes dismiss critics and criticisms of their field by invoking “the straw man” fallacy. Critics of invasion biology are also labelled as a small group of “naysayers” or “contrarians”, who are sometimes engaging in “science denialism”. Such unfortunate labels can be seen as a way to possibly suppress legitimate debates and dismiss or minimize reasonable concerns about some aspects of invasion biology, including the uncertainties about the geographic origins and complex environmental impacts of species, and the control programs against species perceived as “invasive”. In assessing the quality of the debate in this area, we examine the validity of the use of various strategies, including the “straw man” concept, and explore a range of potential logical fallacies present in some recent prominent discussions about invasion biology and so-called “invasive” species. The goal is to add some clarity to the concepts involved, point out some problematic issues, and improve the quality of the debates as the discussions move forward.     

Heterogeneous assemblages of bioethics and science: the “pre-embryo” debate in America

This paper explores the “pre-embryo” debate in America to analyze the relationship between scientific uncertainty and moral decision-making. This paper explores how an ethical debate among bioethicists around the term “pre-embryo” has been transformed into a scientific “fact” debate between developmental biology and embryology. This transformation is driven by the scientism of ethical reasoning that stresses scientific claims to increase the credibility of ethical claims. This paper concludes that the “pre-embryo” debate is not an ethical controversy over a unified science but rather credibility struggles between two heterogeneous assemblages of science and bioethics.     

Synthetic biology, inspired by synthetic chemistry

The topic synthetic biology appears still as an 'empty basket to be filled'. However, there is already plenty of claims and visions, as well as convincing research strategies about the theme of synthetic biology. First of all, synthetic biology seems to be about the engineering of biology - about bottom-up and top-down approaches, compromising complexity versus stability of artificial architectures, relevant in biology. Synthetic biology accounts for heterogeneous approaches towards minimal and even artificial life, the engineering of biochemical pathways on the organismic level, the modelling of molecular processes and finally, the combination of synthetic with nature-derived materials and architectural concepts, such as a cellular membrane. Still, synthetic biology is a discipline, which embraces interdisciplinary attempts in order to have a profound, scientific base to enable the re-design of nature and to compose architectures and processes with man-made matter. We like to give an overview about the developments in the field of synthetic biology, regarding polymer-based analogs of cellular membranes and what questions can be answered by applying synthetic polymer science towards the smallest unit in life, namely a cell.     

A priority paper for the societal and ethical aspects of synthetic biology

As synthetic biology develops into a promising science and engineering field, we need to have clear ideas and priorities regarding its safety, security, ethical and public dialogue implications. Based on an extensive literature search, interviews with scientists, social scientists, a 4 week long public e-forum, and consultation with several stakeholders from science, industry and civil society organisations, we compiled a list of priority topics regarding societal issues of synthetic biology for the years ahead. The points presented here are intended to encourage all stakeholders to engage in the prioritisation of these issues and to participate in a continuous dialogue, with the ultimate goal of providing a basis for a multi-stakeholder governance in synthetic biology. Here we show possible ways to solve the challenges to synthetic biology in the field of safety, security, ethics and the science–public interface.     

Scientific perspectivism: A philosopher of science's response to the challenge of big data biology

Big data biology—bioinformatics, computational biology, systems biology (including ‘omics’), and synthetic biology—raises a number of issues for the philosophy of science. This article deals with several such: Is data-intensive biology a new kind of science, presumably post-reductionistic? To what extent is big data biology data-driven? Can data ‘speak for themselves?’ I discuss these issues by way of a reflection on Carl Woese’s worry that “a society that permits biology to become an engineering discipline, that allows that science to slip into the role of changing the living world without trying to understand it, is a danger to itself.” And I argue that scientific perspectivism, a philosophical stance represented prominently by Giere, Van Fraassen, and Wimsatt, according to which science cannot as a matter of principle transcend our human perspective, provides the best resources currently at our disposal to tackle many of the philosophical issues implied in the modeling of complex, multilevel/multiscale phenomena.     

“Participating means accepting”: debating and contesting synthetic biology

This article analyses opposition to public debates. In doing so, the article builds upon the tradition of analyzing controversies by symmetrically describing the advocates and the opponents of public debates. First, the public debates on synthetic biology will be placed in their wider political and institutional context. The call for a “serene” debate by the French public authorities will be retraced and its genealogy vis-à-vis previous controversies (i.e. on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and nanotechnology) will be elucidated. The article then describes how the group Pièces et main d’?uvre (PMO) obstructed a public debate on synthetic biology, an obstruction that will be analyzed by mobilizing and extending the notion of divisible versus indivisible conflicts. But the article will also move beyond the symmetrical analysis of a controversy by discussing one of the criticisms raised by PMO, that some researchers are “sociologists of acceptability.” The notions of divisibility, indivisibility and what I call “inversibility” will be used to reflect upon the positionality of social scientists and to offer a constructive view for a sociology of acceptability.     

Basic science through engineering? Synthetic modeling and the idea of biology-inspired engineering

Synthetic biology is often understood in terms of the pursuit for well-characterized biological parts to create synthetic wholes. Accordingly, it has typically been conceived of as an engineering dominated and application oriented field. We argue that the relationship of synthetic biology to engineering is far more nuanced than that and involves a sophisticated epistemic dimension, as shown by the recent practice of synthetic modeling. Synthetic models are engineered genetic networks that are implanted in a natural cell environment. Their construction is typically combined with experiments on model organisms as well as mathematical modeling and simulation. What is especially interesting about this combinational modeling practice is that, apart from greater integration between these different epistemic activities, it has also led to the questioning of some central assumptions and notions on which synthetic biology is based. As a result synthetic biology is in the process of becoming more “biology inspired.”     

Vygotsky's Crisis: Argument, context, relevance

Vygotsky’s The Historical Significance of the Crisis in Psychology (1926–1927) is an important text in the history and philosophy of psychology that has only become available to scholars in 1982 in Russian, and in 1997 in English. The goal of this paper is to introduce Vygotsky’s conception of psychology to a wider audience.I argue that Vygotsky’s argument about the “crisis” in psychology and its resolution can be fully understood only in the context of his social and political thinking. Vygotsky shared the enthusiasm, widespread among Russian leftist intelligentsia in the 1920s, that Soviet society had launched an unprecedented social experiment: The socialist revolution opened the way for establishing social conditions that would let the individual flourish. For Vygotsky, this meant that “a new man” of the future would become “the first and only species in biology that would create itself.” He envisioned psychology as a science that would serve this humanist teleology.I propose that The Crisis is relevant today insofar as it helps us define a fundamental problem: How can we systematically account for the development of knowledge in psychology? I evaluate how Vygotsky addresses this problem as a historian of the crisis.     

Synthetic biology as a source of global health innovation

Synthetic biology has the potential to contribute breakthrough innovations to the pursuit of new global health solutions. Wishing to harness the emerging tools of synthetic biology for the goals of global health, in 2011 the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation put out a call for grant applications to “Apply Synthetic Biology to Global Health Challenges” under its “Grand Challenges Explorations” program. A highly diverse pool of over 700 applications was received. Proposed applications of synthetic biology to global health needs included interventions such as therapeutics, vaccines, and diagnostics, as well as strategies for biomanufacturing, and the design of tools and platforms that could further global health research.     

The proximate/ultimate distinction in the multiple careers of Ernst Mayr

Ernst Mayr's distinction between “ultimate” and “proximate” causes is justly considered a major contribution to philosophy of biology. But how did Mayr come to this “philosophical” distinction, and what role did it play in his earlier “scientific” work? I address these issues by dividing Mayr's work into three careers or phases: 1) Mayr the naturalist/researcher, 2) Mayr the representative of and spokesman for evolutionary biology and systematics, and more recently 3) Mayr the historian and philosopher of biology. If we want to understand the role of the proximate/ultimate distinction in Mayr's more recent career as a philosopher and historian, then it helps to consider hisearlier use of the distinction, in the course of his research, and in his promotion of the professions of evolutionary biology and systematics. I believe that this approach would also shed light on some other important “philosophical” positions that Mayr has defended, including the distinction between “essentialism: and “population thinking.”     

So what is a species anyway? A primatological perspective

Since Darwin's time, the question “what a species” has provoked fierce disputes and a tremendous number of publications, from short opinion papers to thick volumes. 1 The debates covered fundamental philosophical questions, such as: Do species exist at all independently of a human observer or are they just a construct of the human mind to categorize nature's organismic diversity and serve as a semantic tool in human communication about biodiversity? 2 - 4 or: Are species natural kinds (classes) or individuals that are “born” by speciation, change in course of time, and finally “die” when they go extinct or diverge into new species? 5 - 8 Also included was the problem of species as taxa (taxonomic) versus species as products of the speciation process (evolutionary). 9 More pragmatic issues arose, such as: How can we reliably delineate and delimitate species? 10 , 11 The great interest in what a species is reflects the importance of “species” as fundamental units in most fields of biology, especially evolutionary biology, ecology, and conservation. 2 , 12 - 14     

Invasive species denialism: a reply to Ricciardi and Ryan

This paper offers a defense against ad hominem aspersions cast in this journal by Ricciardi and Ryan (Biol Invasions 20(3):549–553, 2018) who allege that several articles I wrote represent “invasive species denialism” and “science denialism.” I summarize the arguments found in those articles. They are (1) science cannot define ecological “harm” and thus cannot measure its risk; (2) invasion biologists rely on tautologies, i.e., definitions of concepts like “biodiversity” and “ecosystem intactness,” that exclude exotic species; (3) no empirical evidence shows that introduced plants have been significant causes of extinction; (4) biologists cannot tell by observing a species whether it is native or a naturalized alien; and (5) debates over the meanings and measurements of key concepts in invasion biology have passed the point of diminishing returns. These arguments may be wrong but none is “similar to the denialism that has affected climate science and medical science” as Ricciardi and Ryan aver.     

Beyond “beyond GDP indicators:” The need for reflexivity in science for governance

“Beyond GDP” initiatives flag the limits of the quantitative indicators of progress currently used for governance. Focusing on the quality assessment of quantitative information used for governance, we use some of the conceptual tools of theoretical ecology and evolutionary biology in order to identify the pre-analytical choices that determine the usefulness and pertinence of a model. Starting from the definition of a model as a formal representation of a specific and necessarily subjective observation, we show that the production of indicators is the final result of a series of decisions on what to observe and how. These choices, in turn, depend on the narrative, or set of narratives, adopted. Narratives provide causality and context to knowledge claims and are needed to select the indicators to be used for policy. Moving beyond the GDP debate requires reflexivity, that is, awareness of the key role that pre-analytical choices play in the definition of both the relevance of the chosen perceptions and narratives (determined by the normative stands of different actors – who defines wellbeing?), and the usefulness of the chosen models and data (determined by the pertinence of the resulting representation – how to measure wellbeing?). Reflexivity is essential in order to take into account the purposes for which different indicators were created and to define new purposes for the “beyond GDP” indicators.