Local competition sparks concerns for fairness in the ultimatum game

Humans reject uneven divisions of resources, even at personal cost. This is observed in countless experiments using the ultimatum game, where a proposer offers to divide a resource with a responder who either accepts the division or rejects it (whereupon both earn zero). Researchers debate why humans evolved a psychology that is so averse to inequity within partnerships. We suggest that the scale of competition is crucial: under local competition with few competitors, individuals reject low offers, because they cannot afford to be disadvantaged relative to competitors. If one competes against the broader population (i.e. global competition), then it pays to accept low offers to increase one''s absolute pay-off. We support this intuition with an illustrative game-theoretical model. We also conducted ultimatum games where participants received prizes based on pay-offs relative to immediate partners (local competition) versus a larger group (global competition). Participants demanded higher offers under local competition, suggesting that local competition increases people''s demands for fairness and aversion to inequality.     

Cooperation and the common good

In this paper, we draw the attention of biologists to a result from the economic literature, which suggests that when individuals are engaged in a communal activity of benefit to all, selection may favour cooperative sharing of resources even among non-relatives. Provided that group members all invest some resources in the public good, they should refrain from conflict over the division of these resources. The reason is that, given diminishing returns on investment in public and private goods, claiming (or ceding) a greater share of total resources only leads to the actor (or its competitors) investing more in the public good, such that the marginal costs and benefits of investment remain in balance. This cancels out any individual benefits of resource competition. We illustrate how this idea may be applied in the context of biparental care, using a sequential game in which parents first compete with one another over resources, and then choose how to allocate the resources they each obtain to care of their joint young (public good) versus their own survival and future reproductive success (private good). We show that when the two parents both invest in care to some extent, they should refrain from any conflict over the division of resources. The same effect can also support asymmetric outcomes in which one parent competes for resources and invests in care, whereas the other does not invest but refrains from competition. The fact that the caring parent gains higher fitness pay-offs at these equilibria suggests that abandoning a partner is not always to the latter''s detriment, when the potential for resource competition is taken into account, but may instead be of benefit to the ‘abandoned’ mate.     

Human Wagering Behavior Depends on Opponents' Faces

Research in competitive games has exclusively focused on how opponent models are developed through previous outcomes and how peoples'' decisions relate to normative predictions. Little is known about how rapid impressions of opponents operate and influence behavior in competitive economic situations, although such subjective impressions have been shown to influence cooperative decision-making. This study investigates whether an opponent''s face influences players'' wagering decisions in a zero-sum game with hidden information. Participants made risky choices in a simplified poker task while being presented opponents whose faces differentially correlated with subjective impressions of trust. Surprisingly, we find that threatening face information has little influence on wagering behavior, but faces relaying positive emotional characteristics impact peoples'' decisions. Thus, people took significantly longer and made more mistakes against emotionally positive opponents. Differences in reaction times and percent correct were greatest around the optimal decision boundary, indicating that face information is predominantly used when making decisions during medium-value gambles. Mistakes against emotionally positive opponents resulted from increased folding rates, suggesting that participants may have believed that these opponents were betting with hands of greater value than other opponents. According to these results, the best “poker face” for bluffing may not be a neutral face, but rather a face that contains emotional correlates of trustworthiness. Moreover, it suggests that rapid impressions of an opponent play an important role in competitive games, especially when people have little or no experience with an opponent.     

Endogenous timing in competitive interactions among relatives

Most evolutionary game theory models solve for equilibrium levels of some behaviour on the restrictive assumptions that players choose their actions simultaneously, and that a player cannot change its action after observing that of its opponent. An alternative framework is provided by sequential or 'Stackelberg' games in which one player commits to a 'first move' and the other has an opportunity to observe this move before choosing its response. Recent interest in the economic literature has focused on Stackelberg games which exhibit 'endogenous timing', i.e. games in which a leader and a follower arise spontaneously as a consequence of each player attempting to maximize its reward. Here, we provide the first demonstration of endogenous timing in an evolutionary context using a simple model of resource competition (the 'tug-of-war' model). We show that whenever two related individuals compete for a share of communal resources, both do best to adopt distinct roles in a sequential game rather than engage in simultaneous competition. Somewhat counterintuitively, the stable solution is for the weaker individual to act as leader and commit to a first move, because this arrangement leads to a lower total effort invested in competition. Endogenous timing offers a new explanation for the spontaneous emergence of leaders and followers in social groups, and highlights the benefits of commitment in social interaction.     

Social Distance Evaluation in Human Parietal Cortex

Across cultures, social relationships are often thought of, described, and acted out in terms of physical space (e.g. “close friends” “high lord”). Does this cognitive mapping of social concepts arise from shared brain resources for processing social and physical relationships? Using fMRI, we found that the tasks of evaluating social compatibility and of evaluating physical distances engage a common brain substrate in the parietal cortex. The present study shows the possibility of an analytic brain mechanism to process and represent complex networks of social relationships. Given parietal cortex''s known role in constructing egocentric maps of physical space, our present findings may help to explain the linguistic, psychological and behavioural links between social and physical space.     

Interspecific Resource Competition Effects on Fisheries Revenue

In many fisheries multiple species are simultaneously caught while stock assessments and fishing quota are defined at species level. Yet species caught together often share habitat and resources, resulting in interspecific resource competition. The consequences of resource competition on population dynamics and revenue of simultaneously harvested species has received little attention due to the historical single stock approach in fisheries management. Here we present the results of a modelling study on the interaction between resource competition of sole (Solea solea) and slaice (Pleuronectus platessa) and simultaneous harvesting of these species, using a stage-structured population model. Three resources were included of which one is shared with a varied competition intensity. We find that plaice is the better competitor of the two species and adult plaice are more abundant than adult sole. When competition is high sole population biomass increases with increasing fishing effort prior to plaice extinction. As a result of this increase in the sole population, the revenue of the stocks combined as function of effort becomes bimodal with increasing resource competition. When considering a single stock quota for sole, its recovery with increasing effort may result in even more fishing effort that would drive the plaice population to extinction. When sole and plaice compete for resources the highest revenue is obtained at effort levels at which plaice is extinct. Ignoring resource competition promotes overfishing due to increasing stock of one species prior to extinction of the other species. Consequently, efforts to mitigate the decline in one species will not be effective if increased stock in the other species leads to increased quota. If a species is to be protected against extinction, management should not only be directed at this one species, but all species that compete with it for resource as well.     

Reciprocity on the Hardwood: Passing Patterns among Professional Basketball Players

Past theory and research view reciprocal resource sharing as a fundamental building block of human societies. Most studies of reciprocity dynamics have focused on trading among individuals in laboratory settings. But if motivations to engage in these patterns of resource sharing are powerful, then we should observe forms of reciprocity even in highly structured group environments in which reciprocity does not clearly serve individual or group interests. To this end, we investigated whether patterns of reciprocity might emerge among teammates in professional basketball games. Using data from logs of National Basketball Association (NBA) games of the 2008–9 season, we estimated a series of conditional logistic regression models to test the impact of different factors on the probability that a given player would assist another player in scoring a basket. Our analysis found evidence for a direct reciprocity effect in which players who had “received” assists in the past tended to subsequently reciprocate their benefactors. Further, this tendency was time-dependent, with the probability of repayment highest soon after receiving an assist and declining as game time passed. We found no evidence for generalized reciprocity – a tendency to “pay forward” assists – and only very limited evidence for indirect reciprocity – a tendency to reward players who had sent others many assists. These findings highlight the power of reciprocity to shape human behavior, even in a setting characterized by extensive planning, division of labor, quick decision-making, and a focus on inter-group competition.     

Task Design Influences Prosociality in Captive Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

Chimpanzees confer benefits on group members, both in the wild and in captive populations. Experimental studies of how animals allocate resources can provide useful insights about the motivations underlying prosocial behavior, and understanding the relationship between task design and prosocial behavior provides an important foundation for future research exploring these animals'' social preferences. A number of studies have been designed to assess chimpanzees'' preferences for outcomes that benefit others (prosocial preferences), but these studies vary greatly in both the results obtained and the methods used, and in most cases employ procedures that reduce critical features of naturalistic social interactions, such as partner choice. The focus of the current study is on understanding the link between experimental methodology and prosocial behavior in captive chimpanzees, rather than on describing these animals'' social motivations themselves. We introduce a task design that avoids isolating subjects and allows them to freely decide whether to participate in the experiment. We explore key elements of the methods utilized in previous experiments in an effort to evaluate two possibilities that have been offered to explain why different experimental designs produce different results: (a) chimpanzees are less likely to deliver food to others when they obtain food for themselves, and (b) evidence of prosociality may be obscured by more “complex” experimental apparatuses (e.g., those including more components or alternative choices). Our results suggest that the complexity of laboratory tasks may generate observed variation in prosocial behavior in laboratory experiments, and highlights the need for more naturalistic research designs while also providing one example of such a paradigm.     

Information use and resource competition: an integrative framework

Organisms may reduce uncertainty regarding how best to exploit their environment by collecting information about resource distribution. We develop a model to demonstrate how competition can facilitate or constrain an individual''s ability to use information when acquiring resources. As resource distribution underpins both selection on information use and the strength and nature of competition between individuals, we demonstrate interdependencies between the two that should be common in nature. Individuals in our model can search for resources either personally or by using social information. We explore selection on social information use across a comprehensive range of ecological conditions, generalizing the producer–scrounger framework to a wide diversity of taxa and resources. We show that resource ecology—defined by scarcity, depletion rate and monopolizability—determines patterns of individual differences in social information use. These differences suggest coevolutionary processes linking dominance systems and social information use, with implications for the evolutionary demography of populations.     

Decentralized Opportunistic Spectrum Resources Access Model and Algorithm toward Cooperative Ad-Hoc Networks

Limited communication resources have gradually become a critical factor toward efficiency of decentralized large scale multi-agent coordination when both system scales up and tasks become more complex. In current researches, due to the agent’s limited communication and observational capability, an agent in a decentralized setting can only choose a part of channels to access, but cannot perceive or share global information. Each agent’s cooperative decision is based on the partial observation of the system state, and as such, uncertainty in the communication network is unavoidable. In this situation, it is a major challenge working out cooperative decision-making under uncertainty with only a partial observation of the environment. In this paper, we propose a decentralized approach that allows agents cooperatively search and independently choose channels. The key to our design is to build an up-to-date observation for each agent’s view so that a local decision model is achievable in a large scale team coordination. We simplify the Dec-POMDP model problem, and each agent can jointly work out its communication policy in order to improve its local decision utilities for the choice of communication resources. Finally, we discuss an implicate resource competition game, and show that, there exists an approximate resources access tradeoff balance between agents. Based on this discovery, the tradeoff between real-time decision-making and the efficiency of cooperation using these channels can be well improved.     

Nash Equilibria in Multi-Agent Motor Interactions

Social interactions in classic cognitive games like the ultimatum game or the prisoner''s dilemma typically lead to Nash equilibria when multiple competitive decision makers with perfect knowledge select optimal strategies. However, in evolutionary game theory it has been shown that Nash equilibria can also arise as attractors in dynamical systems that can describe, for example, the population dynamics of microorganisms. Similar to such evolutionary dynamics, we find that Nash equilibria arise naturally in motor interactions in which players vie for control and try to minimize effort. When confronted with sensorimotor interaction tasks that correspond to the classical prisoner''s dilemma and the rope-pulling game, two-player motor interactions led predominantly to Nash solutions. In contrast, when a single player took both roles, playing the sensorimotor game bimanually, cooperative solutions were found. Our methodology opens up a new avenue for the study of human motor interactions within a game theoretic framework, suggesting that the coupling of motor systems can lead to game theoretic solutions.     

Evolutionary Stability in the Asymmetric Volunteer's Dilemma

It is often assumed that in public goods games, contributors are either strong or weak players and each individual has an equal probability of exhibiting cooperation. It is difficult to explain why the public good is produced by strong individuals in some cooperation systems, and by weak individuals in others. Viewing the asymmetric volunteer''s dilemma game as an evolutionary game, we find that whether the strong or the weak players produce the public good depends on the initial condition (i.e., phenotype or initial strategy of individuals). These different evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) associated with different initial conditions, can be interpreted as the production modes of public goods of different cooperation systems. A further analysis revealed that the strong player adopts a pure strategy but mixed strategies for the weak players to produce the public good, and that the probability of volunteering by weak players decreases with increasing group size or decreasing cost-benefit ratio. Our model shows that the defection probability of a “strong” player is greater than the “weak” players in the model of Diekmann (1993). This contradicts Selten''s (1980) model that public goods can only be produced by a strong player, is not an evolutionarily stable strategy, and will therefore disappear over evolutionary time. Our public good model with ESS has thus extended previous interpretations that the public good can only be produced by strong players in an asymmetric game.     

Evolutionary Establishment of Moral and Double Moral Standards through Spatial Interactions

Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success tends to create a tragedy of the commons (such as over-fishing or the destruction of our environment). This contribution addresses a number of related puzzles of human behavior with an evolutionary game theoretical approach as it has been successfully used to explain the behavior of other biological species many times, from bacteria to vertebrates. Our agent-based model distinguishes individuals applying four different behavioral strategies: non-cooperative individuals (“defectors”), cooperative individuals abstaining from punishment efforts (called “cooperators” or “second-order free-riders”), cooperators who punish non-cooperative behavior (“moralists”), and defectors, who punish other defectors despite being non-cooperative themselves (“immoralists”). By considering spatial interactions with neighboring individuals, our model reveals several interesting effects: First, moralists can fully eliminate cooperators. This spreading of punishing behavior requires a segregation of behavioral strategies and solves the “second-order free-rider problem”. Second, the system behavior changes its character significantly even after very long times (“who laughs last laughs best effect”). Third, the presence of a number of defectors can largely accelerate the victory of moralists over non-punishing cooperators. Fourth, in order to succeed, moralists may profit from immoralists in a way that appears like an “unholy collaboration”. Our findings suggest that the consideration of punishment strategies allows one to understand the establishment and spreading of “moral behavior” by means of game-theoretical concepts. This demonstrates that quantitative biological modeling approaches are powerful even in domains that have been addressed with non-mathematical concepts so far. The complex dynamics of certain social behaviors become understandable as the result of an evolutionary competition between different behavioral strategies.     

Why Do Women Not Use Antenatal Services in Low- and Middle-Income Countries? A Meta-Synthesis of Qualitative Studies

Background

Almost 50% of women in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) don''t receive adequate antenatal care. Women''s views can offer important insights into this problem. Qualitative studies exploring inadequate use of antenatal services have been undertaken in a range of countries, but the findings are not easily transferable. We aimed to inform the development of future antenatal care programmes through a synthesis of findings in all relevant qualitative studies.

Methods and Findings

Using a predetermined search strategy, we identified robust qualitative studies reporting on the views and experiences of women in LMICs who received inadequate antenatal care. We used meta-ethnographic techniques to generate themes and a line-of-argument synthesis. We derived policy-relevant hypotheses from the findings. We included 21 papers representing the views of more than 1,230 women from 15 countries. Three key themes were identified: “pregnancy as socially risky and physiologically healthy”, “resource use and survival in conditions of extreme poverty”, and “not getting it right the first time”. The line-of-argument synthesis describes a dissonance between programme design and cultural contexts that may restrict access and discourage return visits. We hypothesize that centralised, risk-focused antenatal care programmes may be at odds with the resources, beliefs, and experiences of pregnant women who underuse antenatal services.

Conclusions

Our findings suggest that there may be a misalignment between current antenatal care provision and the social and cultural context of some women in LMICs. Antenatal care provision that is theoretically and contextually at odds with local contextual beliefs and experiences is likely to be underused, especially when attendance generates increased personal risks of lost family resources or physical danger during travel, when the promised care is not delivered because of resource constraints, and when women experience covert or overt abuse in care settings. Please see later in the article for the Editors'' Summary     

THE RELEVANT USE OF THE TRADITIONAL TUNISIAN GAME ‘‘RAQASSA’’ FOR CARDIOVASCULAR STIMULATION IN SCHOOLCHILDREN

The aim of this study was to investigate the heart rate (HR) responses, the rate of perceived exertion (RPE), and the feeling during physical education schooling while performing traditional games activities compared to intermittent exercise. Nineteen pre-pubertal children randomly performed on different days two types of lessons (intermittent running mode vs. traditional Tunisian “Raqassa” game) lasting 12-min each. HR was continuously recorded during both lessons, while ratings of perceived exertion and Feeling values were recorded after the sessions. The mean HR value during the traditional game was significantly higher than during intermittent exercise (p<0.05). Conversely, the perceived exertion score was significantly higher after intermittent exercise than the traditional exercise game (p<0.05), showing that the higher cardiovascular strain of the game was perceived as “lighter” than the run. Simultaneously, the children''s Feeling was significantly higher after the traditional game than intermittent exercise (p<0.001), showing a higher satisfaction from playing with respect to running. Exercise based on the “Raqassa” traditional game could be used in pre-pubertal children as an alternative or as an additional method for suitable cardiovascular stimulation during physical education lessons with lower perceived exertion and better feeling compared to intermittent running.     

Religious Pro-Sociality? Experimental Evidence from a Sample of 766 Spaniards

This study explores the relationship between several personal religion-related variables and social behaviour, using three paradigmatic economic games: the dictator (DG), ultimatum (UG), and trust (TG) games. A large carefully designed sample of the urban adult population in Granada (Spain) is employed (N = 766). From participants'' decisions in these games we obtain measures of altruism, bargaining behaviour and sense of fairness/equality, trust, and positive reciprocity. Three dimensions of religiosity are examined: (i) religious denomination; (ii) intensity of religiosity, measured by active participation at church services; and (iii) conversion out into a different denomination than the one raised in. The major results are: (i) individuals with “no religion” made decisions closer to rational selfish behaviour in the DG and the UG compared to those who affiliate with a “standard” religious denomination; (ii) among Catholics, intensity of religiosity is the key variable that affects social behaviour insofar as religiously-active individuals are generally more pro-social than non-active ones; and (iii) the religion raised in seems to have no effect on pro-sociality, beyond the effect of the current measures of religiosity. Importantly, behaviour in the TG is not predicted by any of the religion-related variables we analyse. While the results partially support the notion of religious pro-sociality, on the other hand, they also highlight the importance of closely examining the multidimensional nature of both religiosity and pro-social behaviour.     

An Application of Evolutionary Game Theory to Social Dilemmas: The Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination Game

The Traveler''s Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler''s Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games.     

Doctor,you're in tobacco sales!

The director of British Columbia''s Doctors'' Stop-Smoking Project says that, whether they recognize it or not, doctors have the best and most competitive position within the tobacco industry because they have the best product line. Dr. Frederic Bass says physicians'' products—health and freedom from addiction—will win against the competition, which can offer only smoke, addiction to nicotine and ill health. “We offer the better deal,” he says, “but are we selling like we could? That''s the issue.”     

Free-Riding Behavior in Vaccination Decisions: An Experimental Study

Individual decision-making regarding vaccination may be affected by the vaccination choices of others. As vaccination produces externalities reducing transmission of a disease, it can provide an incentive for individuals to be free-riders who benefit from the vaccination of others while avoiding the cost of vaccination. This study examined an individual''s decision about vaccination in a group setting for a hypothetical disease that is called “influenza” using a computerized experimental game. In the game, interactions with others are allowed. We found that higher observed vaccination rate within the group during the previous round of the game decreased the likelihood of an individual''s vaccination acceptance, indicating the existence of free-riding behavior. The free-riding behavior was observed regardless of parameter conditions on the characteristics of the influenza and vaccine. We also found that other predictors of vaccination uptake included an individual''s own influenza exposure in previous rounds increasing the likelihood of vaccination acceptance, consistent with existing empirical studies. Influenza prevalence among other group members during the previous round did not have a statistically significant effect on vaccination acceptance in the current round once vaccination rate in the previous round was controlled for.     

Recruiters and Joiners: Using Optimal Skew Theory to Predict Group Size and the Division of Resources within Groups of Social Foragers

I apply skew theory to the division of resources within multimember social foraging and antipredator groups. Resource division is modeled as a game between an individual controlling resources (recruiter) and a potential joiner to the group. If a recruiter benefits from the presence of a joiner, it will allocate sufficient resources to the joiner so that the joiner gains as much from group foraging as it would from foraging alone. Joiners should receive a greater proportion of resources controlled by the recruiter when benefits to grouping are low. If group success is a concave-down function of group size, this framework can be used to predict the stable group size. The stable group size is larger than the optimal group size, given equal division of resources, and smaller than the stable group size, given equal division of resources. Furthermore, both current group members and potential joiners agree on the stable group size, so long as the recruiter is able to control resource division. If the recruiter cannot control resource division, there may be conflict over group size and the opportunity for group members to contribute less to group success than they are able.