Really taking Darwin seriously: An alternative to Michael Ruse's Darwinian metaethics

Michael Ruse has proposed in his recent book Taking Darwin Seriously and elsewhere a new Darwinian ethics distinct from traditional evolutionary ethics, one that avoids the latter's inadequate accounts of the nature of morality and its failed attempts to provide a naturalistic justification of morality. Ruse argues for a sociobiologically based account of moral sentiments, and an evolutionary based casual explanation of their function, rejecting the possibility of ultimate ethical justification. We find that Ruse's proposal distorts, overextends and weakens both Darwinism and naturalism. So we propose an alternative Darwinian metaethics that both remedies the problems in Ruse's proposal and shows how a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness avoids the naturalistic fallacy and can provide genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive ethical claims. Thus, we propose to really take Darwin seriously.The authors are equally responsible for the writing of this paper.     

Evolutionary ethics,Darwinian ethics and ethical naturalism

The relevance of evolutionary theory to ethics goes back to Darwin but until recently discussion employed evolutionary theory to justify ethical, social and political positions. Recently, evolutionary theory has been used to explain the existence of moral systems and moral propensities and, thereby, to provide a naturalistic basis for ethics. I argue that this approach has advanced our understanding of the basis of moral systems and moral propensities but does not as yet adequately incorporate the role of cognition in its account. Cognition has the effect of decoupling to some extent — though, of course, far from fully — human moral systems from their evolutionary origins. In an adequate account, evolutionary theory will play a crucial role but so also will our evolved cognitive abilities.     

The insufficience of supervenient explanations of moral actions: Really taking Darwin and the naturalistic fallacy seriously

In a recent paper in this journal (Rottschaefer and Martinsen 1990) we have proposed a view of Darwinian evolutionary metaethics that we believe improves upon Michael Ruse's (e.g., Ruse 1986) proposals by claiming that there are evolutionary based objective moral values and that a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness can be given that avoids the naturalistic fallacy in both its definitional and derivational forms while providing genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive ethical claims. Jonathan Barrett (this issue) has objected to our proposal contending that we cannot hold for the reality of supervenient moral properties without either falling foul of the naturalistic fallacy or suffering the consequences of postulating inexplicable moral properties. In reply, we show that Barrett's explicit arguments that we commit either the definitional or derivational form of the naturalistic fallacy fail and that his naturalistic intuitions that supervenience explanations of moral properties by nonmoral properties force us into what we call the explanatory form of the naturalistic fallacy also fail. Positively, his objections help us to clarify the nature of the naturalistic fallacy within an evolutionary based naturalistic ethics and to point out the proper role of both supervenience explanations and moral explanations in such an ethics.     

From applied ethics to empirical ethics to contextual ethics

Bioethics became applied ethics when it was assimilated to moral philosophy. Because deduction is the rationality of moral philosophy, subsuming facts under moral principles to deduce conclusions about what ought to be done became the prescribed reasoning of bioethics, and bioethics became a theory comprised of moral principles. Bioethicists now realize that applied ethics is too abstract and spare to apprehend the specificity, particularity, complexity and contingency of real moral issues. Empirical ethics and contextual ethics are needed to incorporate these features into morality, not just bioethics. The relevant facts and features of problems have to be identified, investigated and framed coherently, and potential resolutions have to be constructed and assessed. Moreover, these tasks are pursued and melded within manifold contexts, for example, families, work and health care systems, as well as societal, economic, legal and political backgrounds and encompassing worldviews. This naturalist orientation and both empirical ethics and contextual ethics require judgment, but how can judgment be rational? Rationality, fortunately, is more expansive than deductive reasoning. Judgment is rational when it emanates from a rational process of deliberation, and a process of deliberation is rational when it uses the resources of non‐formal reason: observation, creative construction, formal and informal reasoning methods and systematic critical assessment. Empirical ethics and contextual ethics recognize that finite, fallible human beings live in complex, dynamic, contingent worlds, and they foster creative, critical deliberation and employ non‐formal reason to make rational moral judgments.     

The biological roots of morality

The question whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer either to thecapacity for ethics (e.i., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong), or to the moralnorms accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. My theses are: (1) that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature; and (2) that moral norms are products of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution.Humans exhibits ethical behavior by nature because their biological makeup determines the presence of the three necessary, and jointly sufficient, conditions for ethical behavior: (i) the ability to anticipate the consequences of one's own actions; (ii) the ability to make value judgements; and (iii) the ability to choose between alternative courses of action. Ethical behavior came about in evolution not because it is adaptive in itself, but as a necessary consequece of man's eminent intellectual abilities, which are an attribute directly promoted by natural selection.Since Darwin's time there have been evolutionists proposing that the norms of morality are derived from biological evolution. Sociobiologists represent the most recent and most subtle version of that proposal. The sociobiologists' argument is that human ethical norms are sociocultural correlates of behaviors fostered by biological evolution. I argue that such proposals are misguided and do not escape the naturalistic fallacy. The isomorphism between the behaviors promoted by natural selection and those sanctioned by moral norms exist only with respect to the consequences of the behaviors; the underlying causations are completely disparate.This article is based on a paper presented at the International Symposium onBiological Models of Human Action, Palma de Mallorca, Spain, 16–18 December 1985.     

医学研究伦理学的发展现状与前景

创新技术的开展和转化医学的注重给医学的发展注入了新的活力,但同时,也带来了一系列社会伦理问题和法律问题。生命医学伦理学的兴起和发展催生了医学研究伦理学分支学科形成,目的在于推进解决涉及人体的医学研究的伦理问题。当前,面临的最突出的伦理问题在于,对医学研究合法性、先进性及伦理性的把握,对医学研究伦理审查必要性的认知,对医学研究方案设计与伦理道德的匹配,对医学研究知情同意的告知,对医学研究风险与受益的平衡。逐步与国际接轨,加强伦理委员会制度建设;提高伦理审查能力建设,形成高水平的伦理审查队伍;学术组织和团体共同努力,推进医学研究伦理学的发展,这将助推医学研究伦理学的发展。     

Evolutionary Ethics: An Irresistible Temptation: Some Reflections on Paul Farber‘s The Temptation of Evolutionary Ethics

In his recent The Temptation of Evolutionary Ethics, Paul Farber has given a negative assessment of the last one hundred years of attempts in Anglo-American philosophy, beginning with Darwin, to develop an evolutionary ethics. Farber identifies some version of the naturalistic fallacy as one of the central sources for the failures of evolutionary ethics. For this reason, and others, Farber urges that though it has its attraction, evolutionary ethics is a temptation to be resisted. In this discussion I identify three major, historically relevant forms of the naturalistic fallacy, the (1) the deductive, (2) genetic, and (3) open question forms and argue that none of them pose an intrinsic problem for evolutionary ethics. I conclude that on this score at least there is no reason to resist temptation.     

Between the individual and the community: the impact of genetics on ethical models

This paper discusses how genetics is influencing ethical frameworks with particular focus on the effectiveness and appropriateness of individual and communal models. It suggests that genetics supports a relational understanding of the person and therefore that genetic ethics requires ethical models which respect both individuals and groups. First, the inadequacy of individualistic frameworks – at conceptual, ethical and practical levels – is outlined. Second, the “communal turn” in genetic ethics in both clinical and population ethics is considered. Third, it is claimed that this communal turn is applicable to genetic ethics in general and to illustrate this two further examples are explored: those of UK Biobank and personalized medicine. The paper concludes that ethical frameworks in genetic ethics must accommodate both group and individual concerns.     

EMPIRICAL ETHICS AS DIALOGICAL PRACTICE

In this article, we present a dialogical approach to empirical ethics, based upon hermeneutic ethics and responsive evaluation. Hermeneutic ethics regards experience as the concrete source of moral wisdom. In order to gain a good understanding of moral issues, concrete detailed experiences and perspectives need to be exchanged. Within hermeneutic ethics dialogue is seen as a vehicle for moral learning and developing normative conclusions. Dialogue stands for a specific view on moral epistemology and methodological criteria for moral inquiry. Responsive evaluation involves a structured way of setting up dialogical learning processes, by eliciting stories of participants, exchanging experiences in (homogeneous and heterogeneous) groups and drawing normative conclusions for practice. By combining these traditions we develop both a theoretical and a practical approach to empirical ethics, in which ethical issues are addressed and shaped together with stakeholders in practice. Stakeholders' experiences are not only used as a source for reflection by the ethicist; stakeholders are involved in the process of reflection and analysis, which takes place in a dialogue between participants in practice, facilitated by the ethicist. This dialogical approach to empirical ethics may give rise to questions such as: What contribution does the ethicist make? What role does ethical theory play? What is the relationship between empirical research and ethical theory in the dialogical process? In this article, these questions will be addressed by reflecting upon a project in empirical ethics that was set up in a dialogical way. The aim of this project was to develop and implement normative guidelines with and within practice, in order to improve the practice concerning coercion and compulsion in psychiatry.     

The application of environmental ethics in biological conservation: a case study from the southernmost tip of the Americas

Biological conservation is not only about facts and technical measures concerning ecology, rather it must also consider values. This pertains to both the balancing of various human interests and also to the ethical evaluation of human actions towards nature. Here we discuss how environmental ethics can be incorporated into conservation decisions, and what implications the inclusion of ethical valuation has for the practice of conservation biology. While this is done mostly on a rather abstract level, we illustrate this here by applying ethical theory to a case study: the options for management of the introduced North American beaver (Castor canadensis) in the very south of Chile (Navarino Island). The beaver is an exotic species to the area and has substantially altered the ecological systems of the region. We discuss different options for dealing with the beaver (eradicate, control, tolerate, promote) from the viewpoint of anthropocentric environmental ethics and biocentric ethics. The results of our analysis demonstrate the value of ethical discussions in clarifying and underpinning arguments for and against specific actions. At the same time, they also show that ethical arguments do not decrease the need for sound scientific data but, on the contrary, may even increase this demand. We also highlight that the conclusions regarding adequate actions to be taken vary depending on the specific ethical theory embraced.

Assessment of the ethical review process in Sudan

The ethical review process is an important component of contemporary health research worldwide. Sudan started an ethical review process rather late in comparison with other countries. In this study, we evaluate the structure and functions of existing ethics review committees. We also explore the knowledge and attitudes of Sudanese researchers toward the ethical review process and their experience with existing ethics review committees. There are four ethics review committees in the country; these committees have no institutional regulations to govern their functions. Furthermore, Sudan also lacks national guidelines. Ethical reviews are carried out primarily for studies seeking international funding and are almost always governed by the funding agencies' requirements. Nearly half of respondents (46.3%) knew about the existence of research ethics committees in Sudan. Researchers reported a variety of experiences with the ethical review process; most of them were unable to define 'ethics committee'.     

Guidelines for Community-based Ethics Review of Children’s Science Fair Projects

Low-level community based ethics committees staffed by teachers, parents and community representatives can readily review children’s science fair projects subject to the revision of two core assumptions currently governing children’s Science Fairs. The first part of the paper recasts the New Zealand Royal Society guidelines from its primary emphasis on risk to a new assumption, without benefit there can be no risk. Equally, this revision gives more prominence to the participant information sheet, allowing it to act as a quasi application form which provides ethical transparency between student researchers, participants and a community based ethics committee. A second core assumption, more accurately labeled a cult of originality, produces a random, open-ended array of student topics taking ethics review beyond the confidence level of most community based ethics review committees. This paper reins in Science Fair coordinators recommending they make community level ethics review more manageable by providing a list of preapproved topics for those students wanting to conduct research involving human participants. These revised assumptions create a workable division of labour. Teachers’ preapproved topics involving human participants are more likely to be low risk, permitting community level ethics review to focus primarily on two aspects of the minimization of harm: first, for all participants, especially those with diminished autonomy, and second, for the child researchers themselves, as some participants may be unknown to the student. These revised assumptions make science and ethics more accessible to public education thus demonstrating how Science Fairs can lead students and the community into better understanding the role and function that ethics has in all scientific research human participants. Martin Tolich chaired New Zealand’s National Health Ethics committee, the multi-region ethics committee.     

Enhancing Research Ethics Review Systems in Egypt: The Focus of an International Training Program Informed by an Ecological Developmental Approach to Enhancing Research Ethics Capacity

Recently, training programs in research ethics have been established to enhance individual and institutional capacity in research ethics in the developing world. However, commentators have expressed concern that the efforts of these training programs have placed ‘too great an emphasis on guidelines and research ethics review’, which will have limited effect on ensuring ethical conduct in research. What is needed instead is a culture of ethical conduct supported by national and institutional commitment to ethical practices that are reinforced by upstream enabling conditions (strong civil society, public accountability, and trust in basic transactional processes), which are in turn influenced by developmental conditions (basic freedoms of political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security). Examining this more inclusive understanding of the determinants of ethical conduct enhances at once both an appreciation of the limitations of current efforts of training programs in research ethics and an understanding of what additional training elements are needed to enable trainees to facilitate national and institutional policy changes that enhance research practices. We apply this developmental model to a training program focused in Egypt to describe examples of such additional training activities.     

Evolution,explanation, and the fact/value distinction

Though modern non-cognitivists in ethics characteristically believe that values are irreducible to facts, they nevertheless believe that values are determined by facts, viz., those specified in functionalist, explanatory theories of the evolutionary origin of morality. The present paper probes the consistency of this position. The conventionalist theories of Hume and Harman are examined, and are seen not to establish a tight determinative reduction of values to facts. This result is illustrated by reference to recent theories of the sociobiological mechanisms involved in moral evolution. Though explanatory theories have linguistic implications,exaggerated in Harman's linguistic form of social relativism, there is also failure to establish the semantic reductionism which non-cognitivists reject under the rubric of ethical naturalism. It is concluded that explanatory forms of naturalism, the best of which is a functionalist-utilitarian account, are compatible with the fact/value distinction.     

Research versus practice: The dilemmas of research ethics in the era of learning health‐care systems

In this article we attempt to answer the question of how the ethical and conceptual framework (ECF) for a learning health‐care system (LHS) affects some of the main controversies in research ethics by addressing five key problems of research ethics: (a) What is the difference between practice and research? (b) What is the relationship between research ethics and clinical ethics? (c) What is the ethical relevance of the principle of clinical equipoise? (d) Does participation in research require a higher standard of informed consent than the practice of medicine? and (e) What ethical principle should take precedence in medicine? These questions allow us to construct two opposite idealized positions on the distinction between research and practice: the integration model and the segregation model of research and practice. We then compare the ECF for an LHS with these two idealized positions. We argue that the ECF for a LHS does not, in fact, solve these problems, but that it is a third, separate position in the relationship between research ethics and clinical ethics. Moreover, we suggest that the ECF for a LHS raises new ethical problems that require additional ethical analysis and justification. Our article contributes to the discussion on the relationship between research ethics and clinical ethics, revealing that although a learning health‐care system may significantly change the landscape of health care, some ethical dilemmas still require resolving on both theoretical and policy‐making levels.     

神山森林文化传统的生态伦理学意义

在云南山地民族的传统文化里 ,对绿的图腾和对树的崇拜无处不在 ,神山森林传统已经成为一种生态文化传统 ,几乎所有的民族都会在自己居住的村寨附近选一片葱绿茂密的山林作为自己的风水林或水源林 ,有的甚至作为神山森林顶礼膜拜 ,严禁任何人砍伐和破坏。村寨和神山上的参天古树也往往成为神树和村寨的标记加以崇拜和保护。我们把山地民族这种文化传统称为神山森林文化传统。这是一种朴素的生态伦理观 ,体现一种敬畏生命的生态伦理学 ,有着深刻的自然保护意义。1　神山森林文化的生态学内涵及生态学意义文化 ,是人类对环境的一种社会生态适…     

Ethical problems in conducting research in acute epidemics: the Pfizer meningitis study in Nigeria as an illustration

The ethics of conducting research in epidemic situations have yet to account fully for differences in the proportion and acuteness of epidemics, among other factors. While epidemics most often arise from infectious diseases, not all infectious diseases are of epidemic proportions, and not all epidemics occur acutely. These and other variations constrain the generalization of ethical decision-making and impose ethical demands on the individual researcher in a way not previously highlighted. This paper discusses a number of such constraints and impositions. It applies the ethical principles enunciated by Emmanuel et al. ¹ to the controversial Pfizer study in Nigeria in order to highlight the particular ethical concerns of acute epidemic research, and suggest ways of meeting such challenges.
The paper recommends that research during epidemics should be partly evaluated on its own merits in order to determine its ethical appropriateness to the specific situation. Snap decisions to conduct research during acute epidemics should be resisted. Community engagement, public notification and good information management are needed to promote the ethics of conducting research during acute epidemics. Individual consent is most at risk of being compromised, and every effort should be made to ensure that it is maintained and valid. Use of data safety management boards should be routine. Acute epidemics also present opportunities to enhance the social value of research and maximize its benefits to communities.
Ethical research is possible in acute epidemics, if the potential challenges are thought of ahead of time and appropriate precautions taken.     

A Brief History of Biomedical Research Ethics in Iran: Conflict of Paradigms

During the past two decades, Iran has experienced a noteworthy growth in its biomedical research sector. At the same time, ethical concerns and debates resulting from this burgeoning enterprise has led to increasing attention paid to biomedical ethics. In Iran, Biomedical research ethics and research oversight passed through major periods during the past decades, separated by a paradigm shift. Period 1, starting from the early 1970s, is characterized by research paternalism and complete reliance on researchers as virtuous and caring physicians. This approach was in concordance with the paternalistic clinical practice of physicians outside of research settings during the same period. Period 2, starting from the late 1990s, was partly due to revealing of ethical flaws that occurred in biomedical research in Iran. The regulatory and funding bodies concluded that it was not sufficient to rely solely on the personal and professional virtues of researchers to safeguard human subjects' rights and welfare. The necessity for independent oversight, emphasized by international declarations, became obvious and undeniable. This paradigm shift led to the establishment of research ethics committees throughout the country, the establishment of academic research centers focusing on medical ethics (MEHR) and the compilation of the first set of national ethical guidelines on biomedical research–one of the first and most important projects conducted by and in the MEHR. Although not yet arrived, ‘period 3’ is on its way. It is predictable from the obvious trends toward performance of high‐quality clinical research and the appearance of a highly educated new generation, especially among women.