The argument from intrinsic value: a critique

In his recent book Abortion and Unborn Human Life , Patrick Lee develops an argument for foetal personhood based on intrinsic value. Lee argues that since the foetus is identical with the rational, self-conscious being who will exist a few years later, and since this rational, self-conscious being indisputably is intrinsically valuable, therefore the foetus must already be intrinsically valuable; for nothing can come to be at one time but become intrinsically valuable at another. I show that this argument fails on two counts. First, the crucial premise that a thing's intrinsic value must derive from its essential properties is question-begging and devoid of support. Second, that premise is inconsistent with the pro-life position.     

The pro-life argument from substantial identity: a defence

This article defends the following argument: what makes you and I valuable so that it is wrong to kill us now is what we are (essentially). But we are essentially physical organisms, who, embryology reveals, came to be at conception/fertilisation. I reply to the objection to this argument (as found in Dean Stretton, Judith Thomson, and Jeffrey Reiman), which holds that we came to be at one time, but became valuable as a subject of rights only some time later, in virtue of an acquired characteristic. I argue against this position that the difference between a basic, natural capacity and some degree of development of such a capacity is a mere difference in degree, that this position logically implies the denial of equal personal dignity, and that the selection of the required degree of development of a capacity is necessarily arbitrary.     

The argument from transfer

Utilitarian arguments on bioethical issues regarding human reproduction typically start with the view that it is wrong, other things being equal, not to procreate when this would have resulted in an additional being with a life worth living. The paper takes this view for granted and examines the common utilitarian claim that overpopulation and destitution in the world mean that, in practice, this obligation to procreate, other things being equal, often turn into a (categorical) obligation not to procreate. A version of this argument is defended— a version called the argument from transfer — according to which, rather than having additional children and care for them in order to make them happy, many people in the West ought to abstain from procreation and take care of destitute children already existing. The reasoning leading up to this conclusion raises some philosophical questions, seldom discussed in connection with bioethics, which indicate that the argument from transfer, although supporting the claim above, cannot neutralise the obligation to create mare happy people as easib as assumed by utilitarians. It is argued that the argument from transfer may place many people facing the choice of procreation in a peculiar moral dilemma.     

The argument from biogenesis: Probabilities against a natural origin of life

No evidence exists that the accidental origin of life is too improbable to have occurred naturally, but there are numerous attempts to argue so. Dizzying statistics are cited to show that a god had to be responsible. This paper identifies the Argument from Biogenesis, then explains why all these arguments so far fail, and what would actually have to be done to make such an argument succeed. Describes seven general types of error, with examples. Includes a table of forty-seven statistics used by over twenty authors to date.     

The origin of eukaryotes: a reappraisal

Ever since the elucidation of the main structural and functional features of eukaryotic cells and subsequent discovery of the endosymbiotic origin of mitochondria and plastids, two opposing hypotheses have been proposed to account for the origin of eukaryotic cells. One hypothesis postulates that the main features of these cells, including their ability to capture food by endocytosis and to digest it intracellularly, were developed first, and later had a key role in the adoption of endosymbionts; the other proposes that the transformation was triggered by an interaction between two typical prokaryotic cells, one of which became the host and the other the endosymbiont. Re-examination of this question in the light of cell-biological and phylogenetic data leads to the conclusion that the first model is more likely to be the correct one.     

The human adaptations to meat eating: a reappraisal

In this paper we discuss the hypothesis, proposed by some authors, that man is a habitual meat-eater. Gut measurements of primate species do not support the contention that human digestive tract is specialized for meat-eating, especially when taking into account allometric factors and their variations between folivores, frugivores and meat-eaters. The dietary status of the human species is that of an unspecialised frugivore, having a flexible diet that includes seeds and meat (omnivorous diet). Throughout the various time periods, our human ancestors could have mostly consumed either vegetable, or large amounts of animal matter (with fat and/or carbohydrates as a supplement), depending on the availability and nutrient content of food resources. Some formerly adaptive traits (e.g. the “thrifty genotype”) could have resulted from selective pressure during transitory variations of feeding behaviour linked to environmental constraints existing in the past.     

The moral status of the foetus: a reappraisal

Fleming reappraises the school of thought that attributes a limited moral standing to the fetus at a certain stage of development. She examines this "minimal rights position" (MRP) in detail, drawing primarily on the writings of Michael Tooley concerning rights, desires, and interests. The MRP consists of claims that, while the fetus does not have a right to life, it does acquire some minimal rights when it develops the capacity for consciousness and desires. Fleming argues that, because these claims are inconsistent and cannot be held conjointly, the framework upon which the MRP is based, while sound, does not in fact support the MRP. She proposes an alternative position on the moral status of the fetus that is consistent with the framework that she believes has been used erroneously to support the minimal rights position.     

The amyloid hypothesis for Alzheimer's disease: a critical reappraisal

The amyloid hypothesis has been the basis for most work on the pathogenesis of Alzheimer's disease. Recent clinical trials based on this hypothesis have been inconclusive. In this article I review the current status of the hypothesis and suggest that a major scientific need is to understand the normal function of amyloid-β precursor protein (APP) and think how this may relate to the cell death in the disease process.     

The handicap principle and the argument of subversion from within

This paper examines the very disparate positions that various actors have taken towards the argument of subversion from within (a classical argument against the evolution of altruism by group selection) in a set of related debates on group selection, altruism and the handicap principle. Using this set of debates as a case study, this paper argues that different applications of epistemic values were one of the factors behind the disagreements between John Maynard Smith and Amotz Zahavi over a number of important evolutionary issues. The paper also argues that these different applications were connected to important epistemological differences related in part (but not solely) to their disciplinary background. Apart from conflicting evolutionary views concerning the theoretical feasibility of the handicap effect, these antagonists both differed in the confidence they ascribed to mathematical modeling and over the hereditary basis for altruistic behavior.     

The vertical mammaplasty: a reappraisal of the technique and its complications

Since 1989, superior pedicle vertical scar mammaplasty as described by Lejour has been used in the authors' department as the only technique for breast reduction. From 1991 through 1994, a series of 170 consecutive patients (330 breasts) underwent an operation. In these patients, minor complications were observed in 30 percent of the patients and major complications in 15 percent. Surgical revision for scar or volume corrections was necessary in 28 percent of the breasts, which seemed unacceptable. Therefore, the original technique was modified by decreasing the skin undermining and avoiding liposuction in the breast. Primary skin excision was performed in the submammary fold at the end of the operation if the skin could not be puckered adequately. This modified technique was used from 1996 through 1999 in 138 consecutive patients (227 breasts). In the second series, minor complications were observed in 15 percent of the patients and major complications in 5 percent. However, the technical modifications did not significantly change the rate of secondary scar and volume corrections, which were still necessary in 22 percent of the breasts. In large breasts, the addition of a horizontal scar at the end of the operation did not change the rate of secondary revision, which however compares favorably with the figures obtained with the inverted T, superior pedicle mammaplasty.     

The role of climate in human mitochondrial DNA evolution: a reappraisal

Previous studies have proposed that selection has been involved in the differentiation of human mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) and climate was the main driving force. This viewpoint, however, gets no support from the subsequent studies and remains controversial thus far. To clarify this issue, a total of 237 complete mtDNA sequences belonging to autochthonous lineages from South Asia, Oceania, and East Asia were collected to seek for the imprint of selection. Based on nonsynonymous (N) and synonymous (S) substitutions analysis, our results confirmed that purifying selection was the predominant force during the evolution of human mtDNA. However, no significant and extensive difference was detected among these three regions, which did not support the climate adaptation hypothesis but preferred random genetic drift to be the main factor in shaping the current landscape of human mtDNA, at least those from Asian and Oceanian regions.     

Paternalism and the argument from illiteracy

Throughout this essay, I will consider an argument frequently used to justify paternalistic behavior toward a specific class of persons: illiterate people. The argument states that illiterate people are uneducated, lack information and understanding, and are thus unable to make decisions. Therefore, it is argued, paternalism in their case is justified. The conclusion is that illiterate persons cannot be autonomous. The justification for this view is based on an a priori attitude: since it is impossible to communicate, physicians should decide which kind of treatment the illiterate patient should receive. This argument is frequently used even though its proponents may not be aware of its implications. Given the importance and uncritical acceptance this argument has in Argentina, and also in other Latin American countries, I think it is relevant to analyze carefully what it means. I propose a thorough analysis of this argument, of its implications and an evaluation of whether it is acceptable.