A hospital-based strategy for setting priorities for antiviral prophylaxis during an influenza pandemic

An influenza pandemic would place an unprecedented strain on the nation's healthcare system-a compelling reason to carefully plan how priorities would be set for distributing antiviral medications. While antiviral medications have been added to the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), these supplies are not designated as frontline resources and remain far from sufficient to provide mass prophylaxis for the entire population of the country. In the healthcare setting, providing general chemoprophylaxis may not be feasible because of high costs or inadequate supply. We propose a hospital-based strategy for setting priorities for antiviral prophylaxis that may offer a rational starting point for discussion and guide allocation decisions in the event of a shortage during a pandemic influenza outbreak.     

Emergence of drug resistance: implications for antiviral control of pandemic influenza

Given the danger of an unprecedented spread of the highly pathogenic avian influenza strain H5N1 in humans, and great challenges to the development of an effective influenza vaccine, antiviral drugs will probably play a pivotal role in combating a novel pandemic strain. A critical limitation to the use of these drugs is the evolution of highly transmissible drug-resistant viral mutants. Here, we develop a mathematical model to evaluate the potential impact of an antiviral treatment strategy on the emergence of drug resistance and containment of a pandemic. The results show that elimination of the wild-type strain depends crucially on both the early onset of treatment in indexed cases and population-level treatment. Given the probable delay of 0.5-1 day in seeking healthcare and therefore initiating therapy, the findings indicate that a single strategy of antiviral treatment will be unsuccessful at controlling the spread of disease if the reproduction number of the wild-type strain (R0s) exceeds 1.4. We demonstrate the possible occurrence of a self-sustaining epidemic of resistant strain, in terms of its transmission fitness relative to the wild-type, and the reproduction number R0s. Considering reproduction numbers estimated for the past three pandemics, the findings suggest that an uncontrollable pandemic is likely to occur if resistant viruses with relative transmission fitness above 0.4 emerge. While an antiviral strategy is crucial for containing a pandemic, its effectiveness depends critically on timely and strategic use of drugs.     

21世纪的首次大流行：2009甲型（H1N1）流感

2009年4月初,在墨西哥和美国出现一种新型甲型（H1N1）流感病毒。该病毒通过人-人传播迅速在全球范围蔓延。该病毒拥有来自人流感病毒、禽流感病毒和猪流感病毒的基因片段,其HA基因与引发1918年大流行的流感病毒株的HA基因同源性很高。该病毒倾向于感染儿童、青少年、孕妇,以及具有心肺疾病的人。据观察,它在人群中的传播能力高于季节性流感。部分感染患者具有在季节性流感中罕见的呕吐和腹泻症状。先前的流感病毒大流行和2009年爆发的甲型H1N1流感病毒大流行表明,由于流感病毒变异速度快、容易发生基因重排,新产生的变异毒株很可能造成新的大流行,威胁人类健康。由于禽流感病毒和人流感病毒都能感染猪,猪被认为是通过基因重排生成新的大流行病毒的＂混合容器＂。     

Molecular character of influenza A/H1N1 2009: Implications for spread and control

The world is experiencing a pandemic of influenza that emerged in March 2009, due to a novel strain designated influenza A/H1N1 2009. This strain is closest in molecular sequence to swine influenza viruses, but differs from all previously known influenza by a minimum of 6.1%, and from prior “seasonal” H1N1 by 27.2%, giving it great potential for widespread human infection. While spread into India was delayed for two months by an aggressive interdiction program, since 1 August 2009 most cases in India have been indigenous. H1N1 2009 has differentially struck younger patients who are naïve susceptibles to its antigenic subtype, while sparing those >60 who have crossreactive antibody from prior experience with influenza decades ago and the 1977 “swine flu” vaccine distributed in the United States. It also appears to more severely affect pregnant women. It emanated from a single source in central Mexico, but its precise geographical and circumstantial origins, from either Eurasia or the Americas, remain uncertain. While currently a mild pandemic by the standard of past pandemics, the seriousness of H1N1 2009 especially among children should not be underestimated. There is potential for the virus, which continues to adapt to humans, to change over time into a more severe etiologic agent by any of several foreseeable mutations. Mass acceptance of the novel H1N1 2009 vaccine worldwide will be essential to its control. Having spread globally in a few months, affecting millions of people, it is likely to remain circulating in the human population for a decade or more.     

The Cost Effectiveness of Pandemic Influenza Interventions: A Pandemic Severity Based Analysis

Background

The impact of a newly emerged influenza pandemic will depend on its transmissibility and severity. Understanding how these pandemic features impact on the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of alternative intervention strategies is important for pandemic planning.

Methods

A cost effectiveness analysis of a comprehensive range of social distancing and antiviral drug strategies intended to mitigate a future pandemic was conducted using a simulation model of a community of ∼30,000 in Australia. Six pandemic severity categories were defined based on case fatality ratio (CFR), using data from the 2009/2010 pandemic to relate hospitalisation rates to CFR.

Results

Intervention strategies combining school closure with antiviral treatment and prophylaxis are the most cost effective strategies in terms of cost per life year saved (LYS) for all severity categories. The cost component in the cost per LYS ratio varies depending on pandemic severity: for a severe pandemic (CFR of 2.5%) the cost is ∼$9 k per LYS; for a low severity pandemic (CFR of 0.1%) this strategy costs ∼$58 k per LYS; for a pandemic with very low severity similar to the 2009 pandemic (CFR of 0.03%) the cost is ∼$155 per LYS. With high severity pandemics (CFR >0.75%) the most effective attack rate reduction strategies are also the most cost effective. During low severity pandemics costs are dominated by productivity losses due to illness and social distancing interventions, while for high severity pandemics costs are dominated by hospitalisation costs and productivity losses due to death.

Conclusions

The most cost effective strategies for mitigating an influenza pandemic involve combining sustained social distancing with the use of antiviral agents. For low severity pandemics the most cost effective strategies involve antiviral treatment, prophylaxis and short durations of school closure; while these are cost effective they are less effective than other strategies in reducing the infection rate.     

Diagnosis of influenza viruses with special reference to novel H1N1 2009 influenza virus

On 15 April and 17 April 2009, novel swineorigin influenza A (H1N1) virus was identifi ed in specimens obtained from two epidemiologically unlinked patients in the United States. The ongoing outbreak of novel H1N1 2009 influenza (swine influenza) has caused more than 3,99,232 laboratory confi rmed cases of pandemic influenza H1N1 and over 4735 deaths globally. This novel 2009 influenza virus designated as H1N1 A/swine/California/04/2009 virus is not zoonotic swine flu and is transmitted from person to person and has higher transmissibility then that of seasonal influenza viruses. In India the novel H1N1 virus infection has been reported from all over the country. A total of 68,919 samples from clinically suspected persons have been tested for influenza A H1N1 across the country and 13,330 (18.9%) of them have been found positive with 427 deaths. At the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi India, we tested 1096 clinical samples for the presence of novel H1N1 influenza virus and seasonal influenza viruses. Of these 1096 samples, 194 samples (17.7%) were positive for novel H1N1 influenza virus and 197 samples (18%) were positive for seasonal influenza viruses. During outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases accurate and rapid diagnosis is critical for minimizing further spread through timely implementation of appropriate vaccines and antiviral treatment. Since the symptoms of novel H1N1 influenza infection are not specifi c, laboratory confi rmation of suspected cases is of prime importance.     

Supply of Neuraminidase Inhibitors Related to Reduced Influenza A (H1N1) Mortality during the 2009–2010 H1N1 Pandemic: An Ecological Study

Background

The influenza A (H1N1) pandemic swept across the globe from April 2009 to August 2010 affecting millions. Many WHO Member States relied on antiviral drugs, specifically neuraminidase inhibitors (NAIs) oseltamivir and zanamivir, to treat influenza patients in critical condition. Such drugs have been found to be effective in reducing severity and duration of influenza illness, and likely reduced morbidity during the pandemic. However, it is less clear whether NAIs used during the pandemic reduced H1N1 mortality.

Methods

Country-level data on supply of oseltamivir and zanamivir were used to predict H1N1 mortality (per 100,000 people) from July 2009 to August 2010 in forty-two WHO Member States. Poisson regression was used to model the association between NAI supply and H1N1 mortality, with adjustment for economic, demographic, and health-related confounders.

Results

After adjustment for potential confounders, each 10% increase in kilograms of oseltamivir, per 100,000 people, was associated with a 1.6% reduction in H1N1 mortality over the pandemic period (relative rate (RR) = 0.84 per log increase in oseltamivir supply). While the supply of zanamivir was considerably less than that of oseltamivir in each Member State, each 10% increase in kilogram of active zanamivir, per 100,000, was associated with a 0.3% reduction in H1N1 mortality (RR = 0.97 per log increase).

Conclusion

While there are limitations to the ecologic nature of these data, this analysis offers evidence of a protective relationship between antiviral drug supply and influenza mortality and supports a role for influenza antiviral use in future pandemics.     

Protection from the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Influenza by an Antibody from Combinatorial Survivor-Based Libraries

Influenza viruses elude immune responses and antiviral chemotherapeutics through genetic drift and reassortment. As a result, the development of new strategies that attack a highly conserved viral function to prevent and/or treat influenza infection is being pursued. Such novel broadly acting antiviral therapies would be less susceptible to virus escape and provide a long lasting solution to the evolving virus challenge. Here we report the in vitro and in vivo activity of a human monoclonal antibody (A06) against two isolates of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza virus. This antibody, which was obtained from a combinatorial library derived from a survivor of highly pathogenic H5N1 infection, neutralizes H5N1, seasonal H1N1 and 2009 “Swine” H1N1 pandemic influenza in vitro with similar potency and is capable of preventing and treating 2009 H1N1 influenza infection in murine models of disease. These results demonstrate broad activity of the A06 antibody and its utility as an anti-influenza treatment option, even against newly evolved influenza strains to which there is limited immunity in the general population.     

Triple Combination of Amantadine,Ribavirin, and Oseltamivir Is Highly Active and Synergistic against Drug Resistant Influenza Virus Strains In Vitro

The rapid emergence and subsequent spread of the novel 2009 Influenza A/H1N1 virus (2009 H1N1) has prompted the World Health Organization to declare the first pandemic of the 21^st century, highlighting the threat of influenza to public health and healthcare systems. Widespread resistance to both classes of influenza antivirals (adamantanes and neuraminidase inhibitors) occurs in both pandemic and seasonal viruses, rendering these drugs to be of marginal utility in the treatment modality. Worldwide, virtually all 2009 H1N1 and seasonal H3N2 strains are resistant to the adamantanes (rimantadine and amantadine), and the majority of seasonal H1N1 strains are resistant to oseltamivir, the most widely prescribed neuraminidase inhibitor (NAI). To address the need for more effective therapy, we evaluated the in vitro activity of a triple combination antiviral drug (TCAD) regimen composed of drugs with different mechanisms of action against drug-resistant seasonal and 2009 H1N1 influenza viruses. Amantadine, ribavirin, and oseltamivir, alone and in combination, were tested against amantadine- and oseltamivir-resistant influenza A viruses using an in vitro infection model in MDCK cells. Our data show that the triple combination was highly synergistic against drug-resistant viruses, and the synergy of the triple combination was significantly greater than the synergy of any double combination tested (P<0.05), including the combination of two NAIs. Surprisingly, amantadine and oseltamivir contributed to the antiviral activity of the TCAD regimen against amantadine- and oseltamivir-resistant viruses, respectively, at concentrations where they had no activity as single agents, and at concentrations that were clinically achievable. Our data demonstrate that the TCAD regimen composed of amantadine, ribavirin, and oseltamivir is highly synergistic against resistant viruses, including 2009 H1N1. The TCAD regimen overcomes baseline drug resistance to both classes of approved influenza antivirals, and thus may represent a highly active antiviral therapy for seasonal and pandemic influenza.     

Using a Dynamic Model to Consider Optimal Antiviral Stockpile Size in the Face of Pandemic Influenza Uncertainty

Background

The Canadian National Antiviral Stockpile (NAS) contains treatment for 17.5% of Canadians. This assumes no concurrent intervention strategies and no wastage due to non-influenza respiratory infections. A dynamic model can provide a mechanism to consider complex scenarios to support decisions regarding the optimal NAS size under uncertainty.

Methods

We developed a dynamic model for pandemic influenza in Canada that is structured by age and risk to calculate the demand for antivirals to treat persons with pandemic influenza under a wide-range of scenarios that incorporated transmission dynamics, disease severity, and intervention strategies. The anticipated per capita number of acute respiratory infections due to viruses other than influenza was estimated for the full pandemic period from surveys based on criteria to identify potential respiratory infections.

Results

Our results demonstrate that up to two thirds of the population could develop respiratory symptoms as a result of infection with a pandemic strain. In the case of perfect antiviral allocation, up to 39.8% of the population could request antiviral treatment. As transmission dynamics, severity and timing of the emergence of a novel influenza strain are unknown, the sensitivity analysis produced considerable variation in potential demand (median: 11%, IQR: 2–21%). If the next pandemic strain emerges in late spring or summer and a vaccine is available before the anticipated fall wave, the median prediction was reduced to 6% and IQR to 0.7–14%. Under the strategy of offering empirical treatment to all patients with influenza like symptoms who present for care, demand could increase to between 65 and 144%.

Conclusions

The demand for antivirals during a pandemic is uncertain. Unless an accurate, timely and cost-effective test is available to identify influenza cases, demand for antivirals from persons infected with other respiratory viruses will be substantial and have a significant impact on the NAS.     

Killer-cell immunoglobulin-like receptors (KIR) in severe A (H1N1) 2009 influenza infections

Introduction of a novel influenza virus into the human population leads to the occurrence of pandemic events, such as the one caused by pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus. The severity of infections caused by this virus in young adults was greater than that observed in patients with seasonal influenza. Fatal cases have been associated with an abnormal innate, proinflammatory immune response. A critical role for natural killer cells during the initial responses to influenza infections has been suggested. In this study, we assessed the association of killer-cell immunoglobulin-like receptors (KIRs) with disease severity by comparing KIR gene content in patients with mild and severe pandemic influenza virus infections to a control group. We found that activator (KIR3DS1 and KIR2DS5) and inhibitory (KIR2DL5) genes, encoded in group B haplotypes containing the cB01, cB03 and tB01 motifs, are associated with severe pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 infections. Better understanding of how genetic variability contributes to influenza virus pathogenesis may help to the development of immune intervention strategies aiming at controlling the severity of disease.     

The global transmission and control of influenza

New strains of influenza spread around the globe via the movement of infected individuals. The global dynamics of influenza are complicated by different patterns of influenza seasonality in different regions of the world. We have released an open-source stochastic mathematical model of the spread of influenza across 321 major, strategically located cities of the world. Influenza is transmitted between cities via infected airline passengers. Seasonality is simulated by increasing the transmissibility in each city at the times of the year when influenza has been observed to be most prevalent. The spatiotemporal spread of pandemic influenza can be understood through clusters of global transmission and links between them, which we identify using the epidemic percolation network (EPN) of the model. We use the model to explain the observed global pattern of spread for pandemic influenza A(H1N1) 2009-2010 (pandemic H1N1 2009) and to examine possible global patterns of spread for future pandemics depending on the origin of pandemic spread, time of year of emergence, and basic reproductive number (). We also use the model to investigate the effectiveness of a plausible global distribution of vaccine for various pandemic scenarios. For pandemic H1N1 2009, we show that the biggest impact of vaccination was in the temperate northern hemisphere. For pandemics starting in the temperate northern hemisphere in May or April, vaccination would have little effect in the temperate southern hemisphere and a small effect in the tropics. With the increasing interconnectedness of the world's population, we must take a global view of infectious disease transmission. Our open-source, computationally simple model can help public health officials plan for the next pandemic as well as deal with interpandemic influenza.     

Susceptibility of pandemic influenza virus A 2009 H1N1 and highly pathogenic avian influenza virus A H5N1 to antiinfluenza agents in cell culture

The data on cytotoxicity and antiviral activity of commercial antivirals, such as Remantadine, Oseltamivir, Arbidol and Ribavirin in the MDCK cell culture infected with highly pathogenic (H5N1) and pandemic 2009 (H1N1) influenza A viruses are presented. The study of the antiviral activity of antivirals in the MDCK cells culture demonstrated that Arbidol, Rimantadine and Ribavirin efficiently inhibited reproduction of the highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses isolated from sick birds. Arbidol and Oseltamivir carboxylate selectively inhibited reproduction of the pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza A viruses with changed specificity to the cell receptors, causing severe influenza in men, while remantadine had no effect on their reproduction.     

Epidemiological update on swine influenza (H1N1) in pigs

The 2009 H1N1 pandemic has slowed down its spread after initial speed of transmission. The conventional swine influenza H1N1 virus (SIV) in pig populations worldwide needs to be differentiated from pandemic H1N1 influenza virus, however it is also essential to know about the exact role of pigs in the spread and mutations taking place in pig-to-pig transmission. The present paper reviews epidemiological features of classical SIV and its differentiation with pandemic influenza.     

A single amino acid in the HA of pH1N1 2009 influenza virus affects cell tropism in human airway epithelium, but not transmission in ferrets

The first pandemic of the 21(st) century, pandemic H1N1 2009 (pH1N1 2009), emerged from a swine-origin source. Although human infections with swine-origin influenza have been reported previously, none went on to cause a pandemic or indeed any sustained human transmission. In previous pandemics, specific residues in the receptor binding site of the haemagglutinin (HA) protein of influenza have been associated with the ability of the virus to transmit between humans. In the present study we investigated the effect of residue 227 in HA on cell tropism and transmission of pH1N1 2009. In pH1N1 2009 and recent seasonal H1N1 viruses this residue is glutamic acid, whereas in swine influenza it is alanine. Using human airway epithelium, we show a differential cell tropism of pH1N1 2009 compared to pH1N1 2009 E227A and swine influenza suggesting this residue may alter the sialic acid conformer binding preference of the HA. Furthermore, both pH1N1 2009 E227A and swine influenza multi-cycle viral growth was found to be attenuated in comparison to pH1N1 2009 in human airway epithelium. However this altered tropism and viral growth in human airway epithelium did not abrogate respiratory droplet transmission of pH1N1 2009 E227A in ferrets. Thus, acquisition of E at residue 227 was not solely responsible for the ability of pH1N1 2009 to transmit between humans.     

Comparison of Temporal and Spatial Dynamics of Seasonal H3N2, Pandemic H1N1 and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Virus Infections in Ferrets

Humans may be infected by different influenza A viruses-seasonal, pandemic, and zoonotic-which differ in presentation from mild upper respiratory tract disease to severe and sometimes fatal pneumonia with extra-respiratory spread. Differences in spatial and temporal dynamics of these infections are poorly understood. Therefore, we inoculated ferrets with seasonal H3N2, pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1), and highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza virus and performed detailed virological and pathological analyses at time points from 0.5 to 14 days post inoculation (dpi), as well as describing clinical signs and hematological parameters. H3N2 infection was restricted to the nose and peaked at 1 dpi. pH1N1 infection also peaked at 1 dpi, but occurred at similar levels throughout the respiratory tract. H5N1 infection occurred predominantly in the alveoli, where it peaked for a longer period, from 1 to 3 dpi. The associated lesions followed the same spatial distribution as virus infection, but their severity peaked between 1 and 6 days later. Neutrophil and monocyte counts in peripheral blood correlated with inflammatory cell influx in the alveoli. Of the different parameters used to measure lower respiratory tract disease, relative lung weight and affected lung tissue allowed the best quantitative distinction between the virus groups. There was extra-respiratory spread to more tissues-including the central nervous system-for H5N1 infection than for pH1N1 infection, and to none for H3N2 infection. This study shows that seasonal, pandemic, and zoonotic influenza viruses differ strongly in the spatial and temporal dynamics of infection in the respiratory tract and extra-respiratory tissues of ferrets.     

Pandemic Influenza (H1N1) 2009 Pneumonia: CURB-65 Score for Predicting Severity and Nasopharyngeal Sampling for Diagnosis Are Unreliable

Background

From the first case reports of pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009 it was clear that a significant proportion of infected individuals suffered a primary viral pneumonia. The objective of this study was twofold; to assess the utility of the CURB-65 community acquired pneumonia (CAP) severity index in predicting pneumonia severity and ICU admission, and to assess the relative sensitivity of nasopharyngeal versus lower respiratory tract sampling for the detection of pandemic influenza (H1N1) CAP.

Methods

A retrospective cohort study of 70 patients hospitalised for pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009 in an adult tertiary referral hospital. Characteristics evaluated included age, pregnancy status, sex, respiratory signs and symptoms, smoking and alcohol history, CURB-65 score, co-morbidities, disabling sequelae, length of stay and in-hospital mortality outcomes. Laboratory features evaluated included lymphocyte count, C-reactive protein (CRP), nasopharyngeal and lower respiratory tract pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009 PCR results.

Results

Patients with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza CAP differed significantly from those without pneumonia regarding length of stay, need for ICU admission, CRP and the likelihood of disabling sequelae. The CURB-65 score did not predict CAP severity or the need for ICU admission (only 2/11 patients admitted to ICU had CURB-65 scores of 2 or 3). Nasopharyngeal specimens for PCR were only 62.9% sensitive in CAP patients compared to 97.8% sensitivity for lower respiratory tract specimens.

Conclusions

The CURB-65 score does not predict severe pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009 CAP or need for ICU admission. Lower respiratory tract specimens should be collected when pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza CAP is suspected.     

Lessons from pandemic H1N1 2009 to improve prevention, detection, and response to influenza pandemics from a One Health perspective

In April 2009, a novel influenza A subtype H1N1 triple reassortant virus (novel H1N1 2009), composed of genes from swine, avian, and human influenza A viruses, emerged in humans in the United States and Mexico and spread person-to-person around the world to become the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century. The virus is believed to have emerged from a reassortment event involving a swine virus some time in the past 10 to 20 years, but pigs, pork, and pork products have not been involved with infection or spread of the virus to or among people. Because countries quickly implemented recently developed pandemic influenza plans, the disease was detected and reported and public health authorities instituted control measures in a timely fashion. But the news media's unfortunate and inappropriate naming of the disease as the "swine flu" led to a drop in the demand for pork and several countries banned pork imports from affected countries, resulting in serious negative economic impacts on the pork industry. With the continual circulation and interspecies transmission of human, swine, and avian influenza viruses in countries around the world, there are calls for strengthening influenza surveillance in pigs, birds, and other animals to aid in monitoring and assessing the risk of future pandemic virus emergence involving different species. We identify and discuss several lessons to be learned from pandemic H1N1 2009 from a One Health perspective, as stronger collaboration among human, animal, and environmental health sectors is necessary to more effectively prevent or detect and respond to influenza pandemics and thus improve human, animal, and environmental health and well-being.     

The impact of sex, gender and pregnancy on 2009 H1N1 disease

Children and young adults of reproductive age have emerged as groups that are highly vulnerable to the current 2009 H1N1 pandemic. The sex of an individual is a fundamental factor that can influence exposure, susceptibility and immune responses to influenza. Worldwide, the incidence, disease burden, morbidity and mortality rates following exposure to the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus differ between males and females and are often age-dependent. Pregnancy and differences in the presentation of various risk factors contribute to the worse outcome of infection in women. Vaccination and antiviral treatment efficacy also vary in a sex-dependent manner. Finally, sex-specific genetic and hormonal differences may contribute to the severity of influenza and the clearance of viral infection. The contribution of sex and gender to influenza can only be determined by a greater consideration of these factors in clinical and epidemiological studies and increased research into the biological basis underlying these differences.