An Increasing Danger of Zoonotic Orthopoxvirus Infections

On May 8, 1980, the World Health Assembly at its 33^rd session solemnly declared that the world and all its peoples had won freedom from smallpox and recommended ceasing the vaccination of the population against smallpox. Currently, a larger part of the world population has no immunity not only against smallpox but also against other zoonotic orthopoxvirus infections. Recently, recorded outbreaks of orthopoxvirus diseases not only of domestic animals but also of humans have become more frequent. All this indicates a new situation in the ecology and evolution of zoonotic orthopoxviruses. Analysis of state-of-the-art data on the phylogenetic relationships, ecology, and host range of orthopoxviruses—etiological agents of smallpox (variola virus, VARV), monkeypox (MPXV), cowpox (CPXV), vaccinia (VACV), and camelpox (CMLV)—as well as the patterns of their evolution suggests that a VARV-like virus could emerge in the course of natural evolution of modern zoonotic orthopoxviruses. Thus, there is an insistent need for organization of the international control over the outbreaks of zoonotic orthopoxvirus infections in various countries to provide a rapid response and prevent them from developing into epidemics.The genus Orthopoxvirus of the family Poxviridae comprises the species variola (smallpox) virus (VARV), with human as its only sensitive host; zoonotic species monkeypox virus (MPXV), cowpox virus (CPXV), vaccinia virus (VACV), and camelpox virus (CMLV); and several others. These orthopoxviruses are immunologically cross-reactive and cross-protective, so that infection with any member of this genus provides protection against infection with any other member of the genus [1], [2]. Traditionally, the species of the Orthopoxvirus genus have been named primarily according to the host animal from which they were isolated and identified based on a range of biological characteristics [1]. Most frequently, zoonotic orthopoxviruses have been initially isolated from animals immediately close to humans being incidental hosts for the virus, the natural carriers of which are, as a rule, wild animals. Correspondingly, the name of an orthopoxvirus species does not reflect the actual animal that is its natural reservoir.With accumulation of the data on complete genome nucleotide sequences for various strains of orthopoxvirus species, it has been found that an interesting feature of the orthopoxvirus genomes is the presence of genes that are intact in one species but fragmented or deleted in another [3]–[8]. These data confirm the concept of a reductive evolution of orthopoxviruses, according to which the gene loss plays an important role in the evolutionary adaptation of progenitor virus to a particular environmental niche (host) and emergence of new virus species [9]. CPXV has the largest genome of all the modern representatives of the genus Orthopoxvirus, and this genome contains all the genes found in the other species of this genus [2], [4], [10]–[12]. Therefore, Cowpox virus was proposed as the closest of all the modern species to the progenitor virus for the genus Orthopoxvirus, while the remaining species, Variola virus included, had appeared as a result of multistage reductive evolution [4], [9], [13].VARV, the most pathogenic species for humans, has the smallest genome of all the orthopoxviruses [2]–[7]. This suggests a potential possibility for emergence of a VARV-like variant from the currently existing zoonotic orthopoxviruses with longer genomes in the course of natural evolution. It is known that although mutational changes are rather a rare event for the poxvirus DNA [13], characteristic of these viruses is the possibility of intermolecular and intramolecular recombinations, as well as genomic insertions and deletions [14], [15]. It has been recently found that duplication/amplification of genomic segments is typical of poxviruses, and in the case of a certain selective pressure (for example, host antiviral defenses), certain genes are able to relatively rapidly accumulate mutations that would provide the virus adaptation to new conditions, including a new host [16].The conducted analysis of the available archive data on smallpox and the history of ancient civilizations as well as the newest data on the evolutionary relationships of orthopoxviruses has allowed me to suggest the hypothesis that smallpox could have repeatedly emerged in the past via evolutionary changes of a zoonotic progenitor virus [17].Because of the cessation of the vaccination against smallpox after its eradication 35 years ago, a tremendous part of the world human population currently has no immunity not only against smallpox, but also against any other zoonotic orthopoxvirus infections. This new situation allows orthopoxviruses to circulate in the human population and, as a consequence, should alter several established concepts on the ecology and range of sensitive hosts for various orthopoxvirus species.The most intricate case is the origin of VACV. For many decades, VACV has been used for vaccinating humans against smallpox, and it was considered that this virus, variolae vaccinae, originates from zoonotic CPXV, introduced to immunization practice by Jenner as early as 1796 [1]. Only in the 20^th century was it found out that the orthopoxvirus strains used for smallpox vaccination significantly differ in their properties from both the natural CPXV isolates recovered from cows and the other orthopoxvirus species examined by that time [18]. Correspondingly, they were regarded as a separate species, Vaccinia virus [19]. Moreover, it was inferred that the VACV natural reservoir was unknown and numerous hypotheses attempted to explain the origin of this virus while passaging progenitor viruses in animals in the process of vaccine production [1], [2], [20].The issue of VACV origin was somewhat clarified after sequencing the complete genome of horsepox virus (HSPV) [21], which appeared to be closely related to the sequenced VACV strains. Only after this was attention paid to the fact that Jenner specified the origin of his vaccine from an infection of the heels of horses (“grease”) and indicated that the vaccine became more suitable for human use after passage through the cow [20]. This suggests that VACV may originate from a zoonotic HSPV, which naturally persisted concurrently with CPXV. Some facts suggest that the infectious materials not only from cow lesions but also from horse lesions were used for smallpox vaccination in the 19^th century. The vaccine lymph from the horse gave the most satisfactory results in inducing an anti-smallpox immunity as well as less side reactions [1]. By all accounts, they gradually commenced using HSPV isolates for smallpox vaccination, the future generations of which recovered decades later were ascribed to the separate species Vaccinia virus [19], rather than CPXV for smallpox vaccination everywhere.Since the 1960s, VACVs have been repeatedly isolated in Brazil [22]. The first VACV isolates were recovered from wild rodents (sentinel mice and rice rat) [23]. Since 1999, an ever-increasing number of exanthematous outbreaks affecting dairy cows and their handlers have been recorded [24]–[27], supplemented recently with outbreaks among horses [28], [29]. Several VACV strains have been isolated during these outbreaks from cows, horses, humans, and rodents [22], [27], [28], [30], [31]. The questions that arise are when and how VACV entered Brazil and the wild nature of the American continent. The more widespread point of view is that VACV strains could be transmitted from vaccinated humans to domestic animals and further to wild ones with subsequent adaptation to the rural environment [22]. My standpoint implies that HSPV/VACV could have been repeatedly accidentally imported from Europe to South America with the infected horses or rodents to be further introduced into wildlife. Possibly, the latter hypothesis more adequately reflects the actual pathway of VACV transmission to the Brazilian environment, since recent phylogenetic studies have suggested an independent origin for South American VACV isolates, distinct from the vaccine strains used on this continent during the WHO smallpox eradication campaign [22], [32]. Presumably, genome-wide sequencing of the viruses will give a more precise answer to the origin of VACV variants isolated in Brazil.In the past, the outbreaks of buffalopox had occurred frequently in various states of India as well as in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Egypt, and other countries [33]. The causative agent, buffalopox virus (BPXV), is closely related to VACV and affiliated with the species Vaccinia virus, genus Orthopoxvirus [2], [34]. Recently, mass outbreaks of buffalopox in domestic buffaloes along with severe zoonotic infection in milk attendants were recorded at various places in India [35], [36]. In several buffalopox outbreaks, the BPXV-caused infections were recorded in cows in the same herds [37]. An increase in BPXV transmission to different species, including buffaloes, cows, and humans, suggests the reemergence of zoonotic buffalopox infection [35], [38]. The buffalopox outbreaks recorded in different distant regions of India are likely to suggest the presence of an abundant natural BPXV reservoir represented by wild animals, most probably rodents. Correspondingly, it is of the paramount importance to perform a large-scale study of the presence of orthopoxviruses in wild animals of India.Thus, yet incomplete data on the modern ecology of VACV and BPXV allow for speculation that the orthopoxviruses belonging to the species Vaccinia virus have a wide host range, are zoonotic, are currently spread over large areas in Eurasia and South America, and that their natural carriers are several rodents.CPXV has relatively low pathogenicity for humans but has a wide range of sensitive animal hosts [2], [39]. Human cowpox is a rare sporadic disease, which develops when CPXV is transmitted from an infected animal to human [2], [40]. This disease is mainly recorded in Europe. In wildlife, CPXV carriers are asymptomatically infected rodents [41], [42]. During the last two decades, reports on an increasing number of CPXV infections in cats, rats, exotic animals, and humans have been published [43]–[47]. Comparative studies of the properties of CPXV isolates recovered from various hosts at different times and in several geographic zones have shown sufficient intraspecific variations [2], [48], [49]. A recent phylogenetic analysis of the complete genomes of 12 CPXV strains recovered from humans and several animal species suggests that they be split into two major Cowpox virus–like and Vaccinia virus–like clades [50]. This means that the criteria of the separation of orthopoxviruses into these two species should be corrected.MPXV is a zoonotic virus causing a human infection similar to smallpox in its clinical manifestations with a lethality rate of 1–8% [51]. The natural reservoir of MPXV is various species of African rodents [8], [10]. The active surveillance data in the same health zone (Democratic Republic of Congo) from the 1980s to 2006–2007 suggest a 20-fold increase in human monkeypox incidence 30 years after the cessation of the smallpox vaccination campaign [52]. This poses the question of whether MPXV can acquire the possibility of a high human-to-human transmission rate, characteristic of VARV, under conditions of a long-term absence of vaccination and considerably higher incidence of human infection. If this occurs, humankind will face a problem considerably more complex than with the smallpox eradication. First and foremost, this is determined by the fact that MPXV, unlike VARV, has its natural reservoir represented by numerous African rodents [2], [53].In its biological properties and according to the data of phylogenetic analysis of the complete virus genomic sequence, CMLV is closest to VARV, the causative agent of smallpox, as compared with the other orthopoxvirus species [1], [8]. Camelpox is recognized as one of the most important viral diseases in camels. This infection was first described in India in 1909. Subsequently, camelpox outbreaks have been reported in many countries of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa [54], [55]. Until recently, it has been commonly accepted that the host range of CMLV is confined to one animal species, camels [1], [55]. However, the first human cases of camelpox have been recently confirmed in India [56]. This suggests that camelpox could be a zoonotic disease. Since camelpox outbreaks occur irregularly in distant regions of the world and the viruses isolated during these outbreaks display different degrees of virulence [55], it is possible to postulate the presence of a wildlife animal reservoir of CMLV other than camels. Since the camelpox outbreaks are usually associated with the rainy season of the year, when rodents are actively reproducing, it is likely that rodents could be the natural carriers of CMLV.It is known that most of the emerging human pathogens originate from zoonotic pathogens [57]–[59]. Many viruses do not cause the disease in their natural reservoir hosts but can be highly pathogenic when transmitted to a new host species. Emerging and reemerging human pathogens more often are those with broad host ranges. The viruses able to infect many animal species are evolutionarily adapted to utilizing different cell mechanisms for their reproduction and, thus, can extend/change their host range with a higher probability [58].There are no fundamental prohibitions for the possible reemergence of smallpox or a similar human disease in the future as a result of natural evolution of the currently existing zoonotic orthopoxviruses. An ever-increasing sensitivity of the human population to zoonotic orthopoxviruses, resulting from cessation of the mass smallpox vaccination, elevates the probability for new variants of these viruses, potentially dangerous for humans, to emerge. However, the current situation is radically different from the ancient one, since many outbreaks of orthopoxvirus infections among domestic animals and humans are recorded and studied.Recently, the efforts of scientists under WHO control are directed to the development of state-of-the-art methods for VARV rapid identification as well as design of new generation safe smallpox vaccines and drugs against VARV and other orthopoxviruses [60]. The designed promising anti-orthopoxvirus drugs display no pronounced virus species specificity. Therefore, they are applicable in the outbreaks caused by any orthopoxvirus species. International acceptance of the designed highly efficient anti-orthopoxvirus drugs ST-246 and CMX001 [60] is of paramount importance.In the areas of high incidence of zoonotic orthopoxviral infections, it would be purposeful to vaccinate domestic and zoo animals as well as the persons closely associated with them using state-of-the-art safe vaccines based on VACV, which has a wide range of sensitive hosts. This would considerably decrease the likelihood for such infections to spread from wildlife into the human environment.In the African region endemic for monkeypox, which also displays a high rate of HIV infection, the population could be vaccinated with the VACV strain MVA, which has been recently demonstrated to be safe even for HIV-infected persons [61].Taking into account the above mentioned increased incidence of outbreaks of animal and human orthopoxvirus infections and their potential danger, it is important to accelerate organization of the international Smallpox Laboratory Network, discussed by the WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research [62], [63], and orient this network to express diagnosing not only of VARV but also of other zoonotic orthopoxviruses. This will provide constant monitoring of these infections in all parts of the world and make it possible to prevent the development of small outbreaks into expanded epidemics, thereby decreasing the risk of evolutional changes and emergence of an orthopoxvirus highly pathogenic for humans.The international system for clinical sampling and identification of infectious agents has been worked out and optimized while implementing the global smallpox eradication program under the aegis of the WHO as well as anti-epidemic measures and methods for mass vaccination [1]. The accumulated experience is of paramount importance for the establishment of international control not only over currently existing orthopoxvirus infections but also other emerging and reemerging diseases.     

Viral OTU Deubiquitinases: A Structural and Functional Comparison

Recent studies have revealed that proteases encoded by three very diverse RNA virus groups share structural similarity with enzymes of the Ovarian Tumor (OTU) superfamily of deubiquitinases (DUBs). The publication of the latest of these reports in quick succession prevented proper recognition and discussion of the shared features of these viral enzymes. Here we provide a brief structural and functional comparison of these virus-encoded OTU DUBs. Interestingly, although their shared structural features and substrate specificity tentatively place them within the same protease superfamily, they also show interesting differences that trigger speculation as to their origins.The covalent attachment of ubiquitin (Ub) to protein substrates, i.e., ubiquitination, plays a pivotal regulatory role in numerous cellular processes [1]–[5]. Ubiquitination can be reversed by deubiquitinases (DUBs) [6] and, not surprisingly, various virus groups encode such DUBs to influence ubiquitin-mediated host cell processes [7]–[21]. Some of these viral DUBs resemble proteases belonging to the Ovarian Tumor (OTU) superfamily [22]–[28]. Makarova et al. previously identified OTU proteases as a novel superfamily of cysteine proteases from different organisms [29], and their bioinformatics-based analysis included several of the viral enzymes discussed here. Recently reported structures of these viral DUBs include the OTU domains of the nairoviruses Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV) [22]–[24] and Dugbe virus (DUGV) [25], the papain-like protease (PLP2) domain of the arterivirus equine arteritis virus (EAV) [26], and the protease (PRO) domain of the tymovirus turnip yellow mosaic virus (TYMV) (Figure 1A–1D) [27], [28]. These viruses are strikingly diverse, considering that nairoviruses are mammalian negative-strand RNA viruses, while the mammalian arteriviruses and plant tymoviruses belong to separate orders of positive-strand RNA viruses.Open in a separate windowFigure 1Viral and eukaryotic OTU domain structures and viral protein context.Crystal structures of (A) CCHFV OTU (3PT2) [23], (B) DUGV OTU (4HXD) [25], (C) EAV PLP2 (4IUM) [26], (D) TYMV PRO (4A5U) [27], [28], (E) yeast OTU1 (3BY4) [57], and (F) human OTUD3 (4BOU) [46]. The β-hairpin motifs of CCHFV OTU and DUGV OTU are indicated in boxes in panels A and B, respectively, and the zinc-finger motif of EAV PLP2 is boxed in panel C. Active sites are indicated with arrows. The CCHFV OTU, DUGV OTU, EAV PLP2, and yeast OTU1 domains were crystallized in complex with Ub, which has been removed for clarity. Structure images were generated using PyMol [60]. (G) Schematic representation of the CCHFV large (L) protein [61], [62]. A similar organization is found in the DUGV L protein, but is not depicted. The OTU domain resides in the N-terminal region of this protein and is not involved in autoproteolytic cleavage events [48]. (H) Schematic representation of the EAV polyprotein 1ab [63]. PLP2 resides in nonstructural protein 2 (nsp2) and is responsible for the cleavage between nsp2 and nsp3 [51]. (I) Schematic representation of the TYMV ORF1 polyprotein [50]. PRO resides in the N-terminal product of this polyprotein and is responsible for two internal cleavages [49], [50]. Key replicative enzymes are indicated in G, H, and I. Colored arrowheads denote cleavage sites for the indicated protease domains. HEL, helicase; PLP, papain-like protease; RdRp, RNA-dependent RNA polymerase; SP, serine protease.Ubiquitination often involves the formation of polyubiquitin chains [1], which can target the ubiquitinated substrate to the proteasome for degradation [2] or modulate its protein–protein interactions, as in the activation of innate immune signaling pathways [3], [4]. Interestingly, several cellular OTU DUBs were found to negatively regulate innate immunity [30]–[33]. Likewise, both nairovirus OTU and arterivirus PLP2 were recently shown to inhibit innate immune responses by targeting ubiquitinated signaling factors [7]–[9], [26], [34], [35]. In contrast to eukaryotic OTU DUBs, both of these viral proteases were found to also deconjugate the Ub-like protein interferon-stimulated gene 15 (ISG15) [7], [36], which inhibits viral replication via a mechanism that is currently poorly understood [37]. Interestingly, coronaviruses (which, together with the arteriviruses, belong to the nidovirus order) also encode papain-like proteases targeting both Ub and ISG15 that were shown to inhibit innate immunity [11]–[13], [38]–[42] but belong to the ubiquitin-specific protease (USP) class of DUBs [6], [43], [44]. The presence of functionally similar, yet structurally different proteases in distantly related virus families highlights the potential benefits to the virus of harboring such enzymes.The proteasomal degradation pathway is an important cellular route to dispose of viral proteins, as exemplified by the turnover of the TYMV polymerase [45]. Moreover, the degradation of this protein is specifically counteracted by the deubiquitinase activity of TYMV PRO, which thus promotes virus replication [10]. The functional characterization of viral OTU DUBs remains incomplete and future studies will likely reveal additional roles in replication and virus–host interplay.Polyubiquitin chains can adopt a number of different configurations, depending on the type of covalent linkage present within the polymer [1]. A distal Ub molecule can be linked via its C-terminus to one of seven internal lysine residues present in a proximal Ub molecule via an isopeptide bond. Alternatively, in the case of linear chains, the C-terminus of the distal Ub is covalently linked to the N-terminal methionine residue of the proximal Ub via a peptide bond. While human OTU proteases often show a distinct preference for one or two isopeptide linkage types [46], nairovirus OTUs and TYMV PRO appear to be more promiscuous in their substrate preference [22], [25]. However, like most human OTU proteases, they seem unable to cleave linear polyubiquitin chains in vitro [22], [25], [46]. Arterivirus PLP2 has not been extensively studied in this respect.It is important to note that many positive-strand RNA viruses, including arteriviruses and tymoviruses, encode polyproteins that are post-translationally cleaved by internal protease domains [47]. Thus, while CCHFV OTU is not involved in viral protein cleavage and its activity seems dispensable for replication (Figure 1G) [48], both arterivirus PLP2 and tymovirus PRO are critically required for viral replication due to their primary role in polyprotein maturation (Figure 1H, 1I) [49]–[53]. Interestingly, while both EAV PLP2 and TYMV PRO can process peptide bonds in cis and in trans [50], [51], PRO does not cleave peptide bonds in linear polyubiquitin chains in vitro [25]. To date, activity of EAV PLP2 towards linear polyubiquitin chains has not been reported.Based on mutagenesis of putative catalytic residues, arterivirus PLP2 and tymovirus PRO were initially generally classified as papain-like cysteine proteases [51], [54], [55]. Now that crystal structures of these proteases are available, it is possible to search the DALI server [56] in order to identify structurally similar domains. Using the 3-dimensional coordinates of TYMV PRO, the most recently solved structure of a viral OTU protease, such a query identifies structural similarity with eukaryotic OTU DUBs as well as the nairovirus OTU domains and EAV PLP2 ([57] further highlights their similarities (Figure 2A–2C), and these comparisons together clearly position them within the OTU DUB superfamily. Sequence comparisons alone were insufficient to demonstrate this conclusively, as the similarity of viral OTU domains to each other and to eukaryotic OTU proteases is very limited and mostly restricted to the areas surrounding the active site residues [29].Open in a separate windowFigure 2Superpositions of the viral OTU proteases with yeast OTU1 and one another.Superpositions of yeast OTU1 (3BY4) [57] with (A) CCHFV OTU (3PT2) [23], RMSD: 1.8 Å over 112 residues, (B) EAV PLP2 (4IUM) [26], RMSD: 2.8 Å over 69 residues, and (C) TYMV PRO (4A5U) [27], [28], RMSD: 1.4 Å over 76 residues. Superpositions of the yeast OTU1-Ub complex with (D) the CCHFV OTU-Ub complex and (E) the EAV PLP2-Ub complex, highlighting the difference in the orientation of Ub between the two viral OTU domains versus the eukaryotic yeast OTU1 domain. The Ub that is complexed with yeast OTU1 is depicted in yellow, while the Ub complexed with CCHFV OTU or EAV PLP2 is depicted in orange. (F) Superposition of EAV PLP2 and TYMV PRO, RMSD: 2.5 Å over 53 residues. (G) Close-up of the active site region (boxed) of the superposition depicted in F. Side chains of the catalytic cysteine (Cys270 and Cys783 for EAV PLP2 and TYMV PRO, respectively) and histidine (His332 and His869 for EAV PLP2 and TYMV PRO, respectively) residues are shown as sticks, as well as the active site Asn263 for EAV PLP2. The backbone amide group of Asp267 likely contributes to the formation of the oxyanion hole in the active site of EAV PLP2, yet a functionally equivalent residue is absent in TYMV PRO. The Gly266 and Gly268 residues flanking Asp267 in EAV PLP2 are depicted as sticks as well, for clarity. Note the alternative orientation of the active site cysteine residue of TYMV PRO which, unlike EAV PLP2, was not determined in covalent complex with an Ub suicide substrate. All alignments were generated using the PDBeFOLD server [64], and thus the reported RMSD values differ from those reported in [60]. RMSD, root-mean-square deviation.

Table 1

Three-dimensional structural alignment of viral OTU domains against selected structures in the Protein Data Bank using the DALI server [56].

A Neutralizing Anti-gH/gL Monoclonal Antibody Is Protective in the Guinea Pig Model of Congenital CMV Infection

Human cytomegalovirus (HCMV) is the most common cause of congenital virus infection. Congenital HCMV infection occurs in 0.2–1% of all births, and causes birth defects and developmental abnormalities, including sensorineural hearing loss and developmental delay. Several key studies have established the guinea pig as a tractable model for the study of congenital HCMV infection and have shown that polyclonal antibodies can be protective [1]–[3]. In this study, we demonstrate that an anti-guinea pig CMV (GPCMV) glycoprotein H/glycoprotein L neutralizing monoclonal antibody protects against fetal infection and loss in the guinea pig. Furthermore, we have delineated the kinetics of GPCMV congenital infection, from maternal infection (salivary glands, seroconversion, placenta) to fetal infection (fetus and amniotic fluid). Our studies support the hypothesis that a neutralizing monoclonal antibody targeting an envelope GPCMV glycoprotein can protect the fetus from infection and may shed light on the therapeutic intervention of HCMV congenital infection in humans.     

Introducing the Outbreak Threshold in Epidemiology

When a pathogen is rare in a host population, there is a chance that it will die out because of stochastic effects instead of causing a major epidemic. Yet no criteria exist to determine when the pathogen increases to a risky level, from which it has a large chance of dying out, to when a major outbreak is almost certain. We introduce such an outbreak threshold (T₀), and find that for large and homogeneous host populations, in which the pathogen has a reproductive ratio R₀, on the order of 1/Log(R₀) infected individuals are needed to prevent stochastic fade-out during the early stages of an epidemic. We also show how this threshold scales with higher heterogeneity and R₀ in the host population. These results have implications for controlling emerging and re-emerging pathogens.With the constant risk of pathogens emerging [1], such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) or avian influenza virus in humans, foot-and-mouth disease virus in cattle in the United Kingdom [2], or various plant pathogens [3], it is imperative to understand how novel strains gain their initial foothold at the onset of an epidemic. Despite this importance, it has seldom been addressed how many infected individuals are needed to declare that an outbreak is occurring: that is, when the pathogen can go extinct due to stochastic effects, to when it infects a high enough number of hosts such that the outbreak size increases in a deterministic manner (Figure 1A). Generally, the presence of a single infected individual is not sufficient to be classified as an outbreak, so how many infected individuals need to be present to cause this deterministic increase? Understanding at what point this change arises is key in preventing and controlling nascent outbreaks as they are detected, as well as determining the best course of action for prevention or treatment.Open in a separate windowFigure 1The outbreak threshold in homogeneous and heterogeneous populations.(A) A schematic of pathogen emergence. This graph shows the early stages of several strains of an epidemic, where R₀ = 1.25. The black line denotes the outbreak threshold (T ₀ = 1/Log(R₀) = 4.48). Blue thin lines show cases in which the pathogen goes extinct and does not exceed the threshold; the red thick line shows an epidemic that exceeds the threshold and persists for a long period of time. Simulations were based on the Gillespie algorithm [22]. (B) Outbreak threshold in a homogeneous (black thick line) or in a heterogeneous population, for increasing R₀. The threshold was calculated following the method described by Lloyd-Smith et al. [11] and is shown for different values of k, the dispersion parameter of the offspring distribution, as obtained from data on previous epidemics [11]. If the threshold lies below one, this means that around only one infected individual is needed to give a high outbreak probability.The classic prediction for pathogen outbreak is that the pathogen''s reproductive ratio (R₀), the number of secondary infections caused by an infected host in a susceptible population, has to exceed one [4], [5]. This criterion only strictly holds in deterministic (infinite population) models; in finite populations, there is still a chance that the infection will go extinct by chance rather than sustain itself [4]–[6]. Existing studies usually consider random drift affecting outbreaks in the context of estimating how large a host population needs to be to sustain an epidemic (the “Critical Community Size” [4], [7], [8]), calculating the outbreak probability in general [9]–[12], or ascertaining whether a sustained increase in cases over an area has occurred [13]. Here we discuss the fundamental question of how many infected individuals are needed to almost guarantee that a pathogen will cause an outbreak, as opposed to the population size needed to maintain an epidemic once it has appeared (Critical Community Size; see also Box 1). We find that only a small number of infected individuals are often needed to ensure that an epidemic will spread.

Box 1. Glossary of Key Terms

• The Basic Reproductive Ratio (R₀) is the number of secondary infections caused by a single infected individual, in a susceptible population. It is classically used to measure the rate of pathogen spread. In infinite-population models, a pathogen can emerge if R₀>1. In a finite population, the pathogen can emerge from a single infection with probability 1-1/R₀ if R₀>1, otherwise extinction is certain.
• The Critical Community Size (CCS) is defined as the total population size (of susceptible and infected individuals, or others) needed to sustain an outbreak once it has appeared. This idea was classically applied to determining what towns were most likely to maintain measles epidemics [7], so that there would always be some infected individuals present, unless intervention measures were taken.
• The Outbreak Threshold (T₀) has a similar definition to the CSS, but is instead for use at the onset of an outbreak, rather than once it has appeared. It measures how many infected individuals (not the total population size) are needed to ensure that an outbreak is very unlikely to go extinct by drift. Note that the outbreak can still go extinct in the long term, even if T₀ is exceeded, if there are not enough susceptible individuals present to carry the infection afterwards.

We introduce the concept of the outbreak threshold (denoted T₀), which we define as the number of infected individuals needed for the disease to spread in an approximately deterministic manner. T₀ can be given by simple equations. Indeed, if the host population is homogeneous (that is, where there is no individual variability in reproductive rates) and large enough so that depletion of the pool of susceptible hosts is negligible, then the probability of pathogen extinction if I infected hosts are present is (1/R₀)^I ([6], details in Material S.1 in Text S1). By solving this equation in the limit of extinction probability going to zero, we find that on the order of 1/Log(R₀) infected hosts are needed for an outbreak to be likely (black thick curve in Figure 1B), a result that reflects similar theory from population genetics [14]–[16]. Note that this result only holds in a finite population, as an outbreak in a fully susceptible infinite population is certain if R₀>1 ([4], see also Material S.1 in Text S1).This basic result can be modified to consider more realistic or precise cases, and T₀ can be scaled up if an exact outbreak risk is desired. For example, for the pathogen extinction probability to be less than 1%, there needs to be at least 5/Log(R₀) infected individuals. More generally, the pathogen extinction probability is lower than a given threshold c if there are at least −Log(c)/Log(R₀) infected individuals. Furthermore, if only a proportion p<1 of all infected individuals are detected, then the outbreak threshold order is p/Log(R₀). Also, if there exists a time-lag τ between an infection occurring and its report, then the order of T₀ is e^−τ(β-δ)/Log(R₀), where β is the infection transmission rate and 1/δ the mean duration of the infectious period (Material S.1 in Text S1). Finally, we can estimate how long it would take, on average, for the threshold to be reached and find that, if the depletion in susceptible hosts is negligible, this duration is on the order of 1/(β-δ) (Material S.1 in Text S1).So far we have only considered homogenous outbreaks, where on average each individual has the same pathogen transmission rate. In reality, there will be a large variance among individual transmission rates, especially if “super-spreaders” are present [17]. This population heterogeneity can either be deterministic, due to differences in immune history among hosts or differences in host behavior, or stochastic, due to sudden environmental or social changes. Spatial structure can also act as a form of heterogeneity, if each region or infected individual is subject to different transmission rates, or degree of contact with other individuals [18]. In such heterogeneous host populations, the number of secondary cases an infected individual engenders is jointly captured by R₀ and a dispersion parameter k (see Box 2). This dispersion parameter controls the degree of variation in individual transmission rates, while fixing the average R₀. The consequence of this model is that the majority of infected hosts tend to cause few secondary infections, while the minority behave as super-spreaders, causing many secondary infections. Host population heterogeneity (obtained with lower values of k) increases the probability that an outbreak will go extinct, as the pathogen can only really spread via one of the dwindling super-spreading individuals. In this heterogeneous case, we can find accurate values of T₀ numerically. As shown in Figure 1B, if R₀ is close to 1, host heterogeneity (k) does not really matter (T₀ tends to be high). However, if the pathogen has a high R₀ and thus spreads well, then host heterogeneity strongly affects T₀. Additionally, we find that the heterogeneous threshold simply scales as a function of k and R₀² (see Box 2). As an example, if k = 0.16, as estimated for SARS infections [11], the number of infected individuals needed to guarantee an outbreak increases 4-fold compared to a homogeneous population (Material S.3 in Text S1).

Box 2. Heterogeneous Outbreak Threshold

In a heterogeneous host population (see the main text for the bases of this heterogeneity), it has been shown that the number of secondary infections generated per infected individual can be well described by a negative binomial distribution with mean R₀ and dispersion parameter k [11]. The dispersion parameter determines the level of variation in the number of secondary infections: if k = 1, we have a homogeneous outbreak, but heterogeneity increases as k drops below 1; that is, it enlarges the proportion of infected individuals that are either “super-spreaders” or “dead-ends” (those that do not transmit the pathogen). Lloyd-Smith et al. [11] showed how to estimate R₀ and k from previous epidemics through applying a maximum-likelihood model to individual transmission data.Although in this case it is not possible to find a strict analytical form for the outbreak threshold, progress can be made if we measure the ratio of the heterogeneous and homogeneous thresholds. This function yields values that are independent of a strict cutoff probability (Material S.3 in Text S1). By investigating this ratio, we first found that for a fixed R₀, a function of order 1/k fitted the numerical solutions very well. By measuring these curves for different R₀ values, we further found that a function of order 1/R₀ ² provided a good fit to the coefficients. By fitting a function of order 1/kR₀ ² to the numerical data using least-squares regression in Mathematica 8.0 [19], we obtained the following adjusted form for the outbreak threshold T₀ in a heterogeneous population:(1)As in the homogeneous case, T₀ only provides us with an order of magnitude and it can be multiplied by −Log(c) to find the number of infected hosts required for there to be a probability of outbreak equal to 1-c. A sensitivity analysis shows that Equation 1 tends to be more strongly affected by changes in R₀ than in k (Material S.3 in Text S1).The outbreak threshold T₀ of an epidemic, which we define as the number of infected hosts above which there is very likely to be a major outbreak, can be estimated using simple formulae. Currently, to declare that an outbreak has occurred, studies choose an arbitrary low or high threshold depending, for instance, on whether they are monitoring disease outbreaks or modeling probabilities of emergence. We show that the outbreak threshold can be defined without resorting to an arbitrary cutoff. Of course, the generality of this definition has a cost, which is that the corresponding value of T₀ is only an order of magnitude. Modifications are needed to set a specific cutoff value or to capture host heterogeneity in transmission or incomplete sampling.These results are valid if there are enough susceptible individuals present to maintain an epidemic in the initial stages, as assumed in most studies on emergence [6], [11]–[13], otherwise the pathogen may die out before the outbreak threshold is reached (Box 3 and Material S.2 in Text S1). Yet the key message generally holds that while the number of infections lies below the threshold, there is a strong chance that the pathogen will vanish without causing a major outbreak. From a biological viewpoint, unless R₀ is close to one, these thresholds tend to be small (on the order of 5 to 20 individuals). This contrasts with estimates of the Critical Community Size, which tend to lie in the hundreds of thousands of susceptible individuals [3], [7], [8]. Therefore, while only a small infected population is needed to trigger a full-scale epidemic, a much larger pool of individuals are required to maintain an epidemic, once it appears, and prevent it from fading out. This makes sense, since there tends to be more susceptible hosts early on in the outbreak than late on.

Box 3. Effect of Limiting Host Population Size

The basic result for the homogeneous population, T₀∼1/Log(R₀), assumes that during the time to pathogen outbreak, there are always enough susceptible individuals available to transmit to, so R₀ remains approximately constant during emergence. This assumption can be violated if R₀ is close to 1, or if the population size is small. More precisely, if the maximum outbreak size in a Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) epidemic, which is given byis less than 1/Log(R₀), then the threshold cannot be reached. Since this maximum is dependent on the population size, outbreaks in smaller populations are less likely to reach the outbreak threshold. For example, if N = 10,000 then R₀ needs to exceed 1.06 for 1/Log(R₀) to be reached; this increases to 1.34 if N decreases to 100. Further details are in Material S.2 in Text S1.Estimates of R₀ and k from previous outbreaks can be used to infer the approximate size of this threshold, to determine whether a handful or hundreds of infected individuals are needed for an outbreak to establish itself. Box 4 outlines two case studies (smallpox in England and SARS in Singapore), estimates of T₀ for these, and how knowledge of the threshold could have aided their control. These examples highlight how the simplicity and rigorousness of the definition of T₀ opens a wide range of applications, as it can be readily applied to specific situations in order to determine the most adequate policies to prevent pathogen outbreaks.

Box 4. Two Case Studies: Smallpox in England and SARS in Singapore

A smallpox outbreak (Variola minor) was initiated in Birmingham, United Kingdom in 1966 due to laboratory release. We calculate a threshold such that the chance of extinction is less than 0.1%, which means that T₀ is equal to 7 times Equation 1. With an estimated R₀ of 1.6 and dispersion parameter k = 0.65 [11], T₀ is approximately equal to 9 infections. The transmission chain for this outbreak is now well-known [20]. Due to prior eradication of smallpox in the United Kingdom, the pathogen was not recognised until around the 45^th case was detected, by which point a full-scale epidemic was underway. A second laboratory outbreak arose in 1978, but the initial case (as well as a single secondary case) was quickly isolated, preventing a larger spread of the pathogen. Given the fairly low T₀ for the previous epidemic, early containment was probably essential in preventing a larger outbreak.The SARS outbreak in Singapore in 2003 is an example of an outbreak with known super-spreaders [21], with an estimated initial R₀ of 1.63 and a low k of 0.16 [11]. T₀ is estimated to be around 27 infections. The first cases were observed in late February, with patients being admitted for pneumonia. Strict control measures were invoked from March 22^nd onwards, including home quarantining of those exposed to SARS patients and closing down of a market where a SARS outbreak was observed. By this date, 57 cases were detected, although it is unclear how many of those cases were still ongoing on the date. This point is important, as it is the infected population size that determines T₀.Overall, very early measures were necessary to successfully prevent a smallpox outbreak due to its rapid spread. In theory, it should have been “easier” to contain the SARS outbreak, as its threshold is three times greater than that for smallpox due to higher host heterogeneity (k). However, the first reported infected individual was a super-spreader, who infected at least 21 others. This reflects that in heterogeneous outbreaks, although the emergence probability is lower, the disease spread is faster (compared to homogeneous infections) once it does appear [11]. Quick containment of the outbreak was difficult to achieve since SARS was not immediately recognised, as well as the fact that the incubation period is around 5 days, by which point it had easily caused more secondary cases. However, in subsequent outbreaks super-spreaders might not be infected early on, allowing more time to contain the spread.For newly-arising outbreaks, T₀ can be applied in several ways. If the epidemic initially spreads slowly, then R₀ and T₀ can be measured directly. Alternatively, estimates of T₀ can be calculated from previous outbreaks, as outlined above. In both cases, knowing what infected population size is needed to guarantee emergence can help to assess how critical a situation is. More generally, due to the difficulty in detecting real-world outbreaks that go extinct very quickly, experimental methods might be useful in determining to what extent different levels of T₀ capture the likelihood of full epidemic emergence.     

Helicobacter pylori's Unconventional Role in Health and Disease

The discovery of a bacterium, Helicobacter pylori, that is resident in the human stomach and causes chronic disease (peptic ulcer and gastric cancer) was radical on many levels. Whereas the mouth and the colon were both known to host a large number of microorganisms, collectively referred to as the microbiome, the stomach was thought to be a virtual Sahara desert for microbes because of its high acidity. We now know that H. pylori is one of many species of bacteria that live in the stomach, although H. pylori seems to dominate this community. H. pylori does not behave as a classical bacterial pathogen: disease is not solely mediated by production of toxins, although certain H. pylori genes, including those that encode exotoxins, increase the risk of disease development. Instead, disease seems to result from a complex interaction between the bacterium, the host, and the environment. Furthermore, H. pylori was the first bacterium observed to behave as a carcinogen. The innate and adaptive immune defenses of the host, combined with factors in the environment of the stomach, apparently drive a continuously high rate of genomic variation in H. pylori. Studies of this genetic diversity in strains isolated from various locations across the globe show that H. pylori has coevolved with humans throughout our history. This long association has given rise not only to disease, but also to possible protective effects, particularly with respect to diseases of the esophagus. Given this complex relationship with human health, eradication of H. pylori in nonsymptomatic individuals may not be the best course of action. The story of H. pylori teaches us to look more deeply at our resident microbiome and the complexity of its interactions, both in this complex population and within our own tissues, to gain a better understanding of health and disease.Common wisdom circa 1980 suggested that the stomach, with its low pH, was a sterile environment. Then, endoscopy of the stomach became common and, in 1984, pathologist Robin Warren and gastroenterologist Barry Marshall saw an extracellular, curved bacillus, often in dense sheets, lining the stomach epithelium of patients with gastritis (inflammation of the stomach) and ulcer disease [1]. Soon, the medical community understood that the gram-negative bacterium Helicobacter pylori, not stress, is the major cause of stomach inflammation, which, in some infected individuals, precedes peptic ulcer disease (10%–20%), distal gastric adenocarcinoma (1%–2%), and gastric mucosal-associated lymphoid tissue (MALT) lymphoma (<1%) [2]–[5]. Thus, H. pylori gained distinction as the only known bacterial carcinogen [6]. It is believed that half of the world''s population is infected with H. pylori; however, the burden of disease falls disproportionately on less-developed countries. The incidence of infection in developed countries has fallen dramatically, for unknown reasons, with a corresponding decrease in gastric cancer [7]. This public health success is tempered by the recent demonstration of an inverse relationship between H. pylori infection and esophageal adenocarcinoma, Barrett''s esophagus, and reflux esophagitis [8]. H. pylori has been with humans since our earliest days, thus it is not surprising that its relationship is that of both a commensal bacterium and a pathogen, causing some diseases and possibly protecting against others. In addition, it is genetically diverse, likely as a result of constant exposure to both environmental and immunological selection, suggesting that genetic diversification is a strategy for long-term colonization.     

Archaeological Support for the Three-Stage Expansion of Modern Humans across Northeastern Eurasia and into the Americas

Background

Understanding the dynamics of the human range expansion across northeastern Eurasia during the late Pleistocene is central to establishing empirical temporal constraints on the colonization of the Americas [1]. Opinions vary widely on how and when the Americas were colonized, with advocates supporting either a pre-[2] or post-[1], [3], [4], [5], [6] last glacial maximum (LGM) colonization, via either a land bridge across Beringia [3], [4], [5], a sea-faring Pacific Rim coastal route [1], [3], a trans-Arctic route [4], or a trans-Atlantic oceanic route [5]. Here we analyze a large sample of radiocarbon dates from the northeast Eurasian Upper Paleolithic to identify the origin of this expansion, and estimate the velocity of colonization wave as it moved across northern Eurasia and into the Americas.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We use diffusion models [6], [7] to quantify these dynamics. Our results show the expansion originated in the Altai region of southern Siberia ∼46kBP , and from there expanded across northern Eurasia at an average velocity of 0.16 km per year. However, the movement of the colonizing wave was not continuous but underwent three distinct phases: 1) an initial expansion from 47-32k calBP; 2) a hiatus from ∼32-16k calBP, and 3) a second expansion after the LGM ∼16k calBP. These results provide archaeological support for the recently proposed three-stage model of the colonization of the Americas [8], [9]. Our results falsify the hypothesis of a pre-LGM terrestrial colonization of the Americas and we discuss the importance of these empirical results in the light of alternative models.

Conclusions/Significance

Our results demonstrate that the radiocarbon record of Upper Paleolithic northeastern Eurasia supports a post-LGM terrestrial colonization of the Americas falsifying the proposed pre-LGM terrestrial colonization of the Americas. We show that this expansion was not a simple process, but proceeded in three phases, consistent with genetic data, largely in response to the variable climatic conditions of late Pleistocene northeast Eurasia. Further, the constraints imposed by the spatiotemporal gradient in the empirical radiocarbon record across this entire region suggests that North America cannot have been colonized much before the existing Clovis radiocarbon record suggests.     

A Novel Genotype H9N2 Influenza Virus Possessing Human H5N1 Internal Genomes Has Been Circulating in Poultry in Eastern China since 1998

Many novel reassortant influenza viruses of the H9N2 genotype have emerged in aquatic birds in southern China since their initial isolation in this region in 1994. However, the genesis and evolution of H9N2 viruses in poultry in eastern China have not been investigated systematically. In the current study, H9N2 influenza viruses isolated from poultry in eastern China during the past 10 years were characterized genetically and antigenically. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that these H9N2 viruses have undergone extensive reassortment to generate multiple novel genotypes, including four genotypes (J, F, K, and L) that have never been recognized before. The major H9N2 influenza viruses represented by A/Chicken/Beijing/1/1994 (Ck/BJ/1/94)-like viruses circulating in poultry in eastern China before 1998 have been gradually replaced by A/Chicken/Shanghai/F/1998 (Ck/SH/F/98)-like viruses, which have a genotype different from that of viruses isolated in southern China. The similarity of the internal genes of these H9N2 viruses to those of the H5N1 influenza viruses isolated from 2001 onwards suggests that the Ck/SH/F/98-like virus may have been the donor of internal genes of human and poultry H5N1 influenza viruses circulating in Eurasia. Experimental studies showed that some of these H9N2 viruses could be efficiently transmitted by the respiratory tract in chicken flocks. Our study provides new insight into the genesis and evolution of H9N2 influenza viruses and supports the notion that some of these viruses may have been the donors of internal genes found in H5N1 viruses.Wild birds, including wild waterfowls, gulls, and shorebirds, are the natural reservoirs for influenza A viruses, in which they are thought to be in evolutionary stasis (2, 33). However, when avian influenza viruses are transmitted to new hosts such as terrestrial poultry or mammals, they evolve rapidly and may cause occasional severe systemic infection with high morbidity (20, 29). Despite the fact that avian influenza virus infection occurs commonly in chickens, it is unable to persist for a long period of time due to control efforts and/or a failure of the virus to adapt to new hosts (29). In the past 20 years, greater numbers of outbreaks in poultry have occurred, suggesting that the avian influenza virus can infect and spread in aberrant hosts for an extended period of time (5, 14-16, 18, 32).During the past 10 years, H9N2 influenza viruses have become panzootic in Eurasia and have been isolated from outbreaks in poultry worldwide (3, 5, 11, 14-16, 18, 24). A great deal of previous studies demonstrated that H9N2 influenza viruses have become established in terrestrial poultry in different Asian countries (5, 11, 13, 14, 18, 21, 24, 35). In 1994, H9N2 viruses were isolated from diseased chickens in Guangdong province, China, for the first time (4), and later in domestic poultry in other provinces in China (11, 16, 18, 35). Two distinct H9N2 virus lineages represented by A/Chicken/Beijing/1/94 (H9N2) and A/Quail/Hong Kong/G1/98 (H9N2), respectively, have been circulating in terrestrial poultry of southern China (9). Occasionally these viruses expand their host range to other mammals, including pigs and humans (6, 17, 22, 34). Increasing epidemiological and laboratory findings suggest that chickens may play an important role in expanding the host range for avian influenza virus. Our systematic surveillance of influenza viruses in chickens in China showed that H9N2 subtype influenza viruses continued to be prevalent in chickens in mainland China from 1994 to 2008 (18, 19, 36).Eastern China contains one metropolitan city (Shanghai) and five provinces (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Shandong, and Jiangxi), where domestic poultry account for approximately 50% of the total poultry population in China. Since 1996, H9N2 influenza viruses have been isolated regularly from both chickens and other minor poultry species in our surveillance program in the eastern China region, but their genetic diversity and the interrelationships between H9N2 influenza viruses and different types of poultry have not been determined. Therefore, it is imperative to explore the evolution and properties of these viruses. The current report provides insight into the genesis and evolution of H9N2 influenza viruses in eastern China and presents new evidence for the potential crossover between H9N2 and H5N1 influenza viruses in this region.     

Evaluation of Replication and Cross-Reactive Antibody Responses of H2 Subtype Influenza Viruses in Mice and Ferrets

H2 influenza viruses have not circulated in humans since 1968, and therefore a large segment of the population would likely be susceptible to infection should H2 influenza viruses reemerge. The development of an H2 pandemic influenza virus vaccine candidate should therefore be considered a priority in pandemic influenza preparedness planning. We selected a group of geographically and temporally diverse wild-type H2 influenza viruses and evaluated the kinetics of replication and compared the ability of these viruses to induce a broadly cross-reactive antibody response in mice and ferrets. In both mice and ferrets, A/Japan/305/1957 (H2N2), A/mallard/NY/1978 (H2N2), and A/swine/MO/2006 (H2N3) elicited the broadest cross-reactive antibody responses against heterologous H2 influenza viruses as measured by hemagglutination inhibition and microneutralization assays. These data suggested that these three viruses may be suitable candidates for development as live attenuated H2 pandemic influenza virus vaccines.Influenza pandemics occur when a novel influenza virus enters a population with little preexisting immunity (36). During the pandemics of the last century, novel influenza viruses were introduced either directly from an avian reservoir (34) or were the result of reassortment between contemporaneously circulating human, avian, and swine influenza viruses (5, 29, 36). Due to the lack of preexisting immunity to the novel virus, morbidity and mortality rates are typically higher than in epidemics caused by seasonal influenza viruses (4).Although pandemic preparedness planning has largely focused on the highly pathogenic H5 and H7 avian influenza virus subtypes, the recent emergence of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 viruses underscores the need to consider other influenza virus subtypes as well. Of the 16 hemagglutinin (HA) influenza A virus subtypes that have been identified to date, H1, H2, and H3 have been known to cause influenza pandemics (7, 27), suggesting that these viruses are capable of sustained transmission and can cause disease in humans. While the H1 and H3 subtypes have cocirculated in humans since 1977, H2 influenza viruses have not circulated in humans since 1968 (36) and therefore a large segment of the population would likely be susceptible to infection should H2 influenza viruses reemerge. The 1957 H2 pandemic virus was a reassortant that derived the HA, neuraminidase (NA), and PB1 genes from an avian virus and the remaining gene segments from the circulating H1N1 virus (15, 30). As H2 subtype viruses continue to circulate in avian reservoirs worldwide (12, 17, 18, 22, 33), they remain a potential pandemic threat. The development of an H2 influenza virus vaccine candidate should therefore be considered a priority in future pandemic influenza preparedness planning.Given the low likelihood that a previously selected vaccine virus will exactly match the pandemic virus, the ability to elicit a broadly cross-reactive antibody response to antigenically distinct viruses within a subtype is an important consideration in the selection of a pandemic influenza vaccine candidate. Previous studies have examined the ability of inactivated H2 influenza viruses to provide cross-protection against mouse-adapted variants of reassortant human viruses and an avian H2 influenza virus from 1978 (9, 14). Given the potential for live attenuated influenza virus vaccines to confer a great breadth of heterologous cross-protection (1, 2, 6, 35), we recently conducted a study evaluating cold-adapted A/Ann Arbor/6/1960 (AA CA), an H2 influenza virus used as the backbone of the seasonal live attenuated influenza A virus vaccine currently licensed in the United States (3). However, as H2 influenza virus continues to circulate widely and appear in migratory birds (10, 24, 26), in poultry markets (20), and in swine (21), with evidence of interregional gene transmission (19, 22), a more extensive evaluation of recent isolates may be warranted in the selection of a potential H2 pandemic vaccine candidate.H2 influenza viruses fall into three main lineages: a human lineage, a North American avian lineage, and a Eurasian avian lineage (29). In addition to viruses whose replicative ability in mammals has previously been established (11, 21, 23, 25), we selected a group of geographically and temporally diverse H2 influenza viruses from each lineage. We evaluated the kinetics of replication of each of these viruses in mice and ferrets and compared the abilities of these viruses to induce a broadly cross-reactive antibody response to determine which of these viruses would be suitable for further development as an H2 pandemic influenza vaccine candidate.     

Characterization of the H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Derived from Wild Pikas in China

The highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus emerged from China in 1996 and has spread across Eurasia and Africa, with a continuous stream of new cases of human infection appearing since the first large-scale outbreak among migratory birds at Qinghai Lake. The role of wild birds, which are the natural reservoirs for the virus, in the epidemiology of the H5N1 virus has raised great public health concern, but their role in the spread of the virus within the natural ecosystem of free-ranging terrestrial wild mammals remains unclear. In this study, we investigated H5N1 virus infection in wild pikas in an attempt to trace the circulation of the virus. Seroepidemiological surveys confirmed a natural H5N1 virus infection of wild pikas in their native environment. The hemagglutination gene of the H5N1 virus isolated from pikas reveals two distinct evolutionary clades, a mixed/Vietnam H5N1 virus sublineage (MV-like pika virus) and a wild bird Qinghai (QH)-like H5N1 virus sublineage (QH-like pika virus). The amino acid residue (glutamic acid) at position 627 encoded by the PB2 gene of the MV-like pika virus was different from that of the QH-like pika virus; the residue of the MV-like pika virus was the same as that of the goose H5N1 virus (A/GS/Guangdong [GD]/1/96). Further, we discovered that in contrast to the MV-like pika virus, which is nonpathogenic to mice, the QH-like pika virus is highly pathogenic. To mimic the virus infection of pikas, we intranasally inoculated rabbits, a species closely related to pikas, with the H5N1 virus of pika origin. Our findings first demonstrate that wild pikas are mammalian hosts exposed to H5N1 subtype avian influenza viruses in the natural ecosystem and also imply a potential transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus from wild mammals into domestic mammalian hosts and humans.Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is an extremely infectious, systemic viral disease that causes a high rate of mortality in birds. HPAI H5N1 viruses are now endemic in avian populations in Southeast Asia and have repeatedly been transmitted to humans (9, 14, 27). Since 2003, the H5N1 subtype has been reported in 391 human cases of influenza and has caused 247 human deaths in 15 countries, leading to greater than 60% mortality among infected individuals (38). Although currently incapable of sustained human-to-human transmission, H5N1 viruses undoubtedly pose a serious threat to public health, as well as to the global economy. Hence, preparedness for such a threat is a global priority (36).Wild birds are considered to be natural reservoirs for influenza A viruses (6, 18, 21, 35, 37). Of the 144 type A influenza virus hemagglutinin-neuraminidase (HA-NA) combinations, 103 have been found in wild birds (5, 7, 17, 37). Since the first HPAI outbreak among migratory wild birds appeared at Qinghai Lake in western China in May 2005 (3, 16, 25, 34, 41), HPAI viruses of the H5N1 subtype have been isolated from poultry throughout Eurasia and Africa. The continued occurrence of human cases has created a situation that could facilitate a pandemic emergence. There is heightened concern that wild birds are a reservoir for influenza A viruses that switch hosts and stably adapt to mammals, including horses, swine, and humans (11, 19, 22, 37).Despite the recent expansion of avian influenza virus (AIV) surveillance and genomic data (5, 17, 20, 21, 33, 40), fundamental questions remain concerning the ecology and evolution of these viruses. Little is known about how terrestrial wild mammals within their natural ecological systems affect HPAI H5N1 epidemiology or about the virus''s effects on public health, though there are many reports of natural and experimental H5N1 virus infection in animals belonging to the taxonomic orders Carnivora (12, 13, 15, 28, 29) and Artiodactyla (15). Herein, we provide the results of our investigation into H5N1 virus infection in wild pikas (Ochotona curzoniae of the order Lagomorpha) within their natural ecological setting. We describe our attempt to trace the circulation of H5N1 viruses and to characterize pika H5N1 influenza virus (PK virus).     

Immunological Mechanisms Mediating Hantavirus Persistence in Rodent Reservoirs

Hantaviruses, similar to several emerging zoonotic viruses, persistently infect their natural reservoir hosts, without causing overt signs of disease. Spillover to incidental human hosts results in morbidity and mortality mediated by excessive proinflammatory and cellular immune responses. The mechanisms mediating the persistence of hantaviruses and the absence of clinical symptoms in rodent reservoirs are only starting to be uncovered. Recent studies indicate that during hantavirus infection, proinflammatory and antiviral responses are reduced and regulatory responses are elevated at sites of increased virus replication in rodents. The recent discovery of structural and non-structural proteins that suppress type I interferon responses in humans suggests that immune responses in rodent hosts could be mediated directly by the virus. Alternatively, several host factors, including sex steroids, glucocorticoids, and genetic factors, are reported to alter host susceptibility and may contribute to persistence of hantaviruses in rodents. Humans and reservoir hosts differ in infection outcomes and in immune responses to hantavirus infection; thus, understanding the mechanisms mediating viral persistence and the absence of disease in rodents may provide insight into the prevention and treatment of disease in humans. Consideration of the coevolutionary mechanisms mediating hantaviral persistence and rodent host survival is providing insight into the mechanisms by which zoonotic viruses have remained in the environment for millions of years and continue to be transmitted to humans.Hantaviruses are negative sense, enveloped RNA viruses (family: Bunyaviridae) that are comprised of three RNA segments, designated small (S), medium (M), and large (L), which encode the viral nucleocapsid (N), envelope glycoproteins (G_N and G_C), and an RNA polymerase (Pol), respectively. More than 50 hantaviruses have been found worldwide [1]. Each hantavirus appears to have coevolved with a specific rodent or insectivore host as similar phylogenetic trees are produced from virus and host mitochondrial gene sequences [2]. Spillover to humans causes hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome (HFRS) or hantavirus cardiopulmonary syndrome (HCPS), depending on the virus [3]–[5]. Although symptoms vary, a common feature of both HFRS and HCPS is increased permeability of the vasculature and mononuclear infiltration [4]. Pathogenesis of HRFS and HCPS in humans is hypothesized to be mediated by excessive proinflammatory and CD8+ T cell responses (​).

Table 1

Summary of Immune Responses in Humans during Hantavirus Infection.

Lack of Bax Prevents Influenza A Virus-Induced Apoptosis and Causes Diminished Viral Replication

The ectopic overexpression of Bcl-2 restricts both influenza A virus-induced apoptosis and influenza A virus replication in MDCK cells, thus suggesting a role for Bcl-2 family members during infection. Here we report that influenza A virus cannot establish an apoptotic response without functional Bax, a downstream target of Bcl-2, and that both Bax and Bak are directly involved in influenza A virus replication and virus-induced cell death. Bak is substantially downregulated during influenza A virus infection in MDCK cells, and the knockout of Bak in mouse embryonic fibroblasts yields a dramatic rise in the rate of apoptotic death and a corresponding increase in levels of virus replication, suggesting that Bak suppresses both apoptosis and the replication of virus and that the virus suppresses Bak. Bax, however, is activated and translocates from the cytosol to the mitochondria; this activation is required for the efficient induction of apoptosis and virus replication. The knockout of Bax in mouse embryonic fibroblasts blocks the induction of apoptosis, restricts the infection-mediated activation of executioner caspases, and inhibits virus propagation. Bax knockout cells still die but by an alternative death pathway displaying characteristics of autophagy, similarly to our previous observation that influenza A virus infection in the presence of a pancaspase inhibitor leads to an increase in levels of autophagy. The knockout of Bax causes a retention of influenza A virus NP within the nucleus. We conclude that the cell and virus struggle to control apoptosis and autophagy, as appropriately timed apoptosis is important for the replication of influenza A virus.The pathology of influenza A virus infection usually arises from acute lymphopenia and inflammation of the lungs and airway columnar epithelial cells (23, 38). Influenza A virus induces apoptotic death in infected epithelial, lymphocyte, and phagocytic cells, and apoptosis is a source of tissue damage during infection (3, 22, 33) and increased susceptibility to bacterial pathogens postinfection (31). While the induction of apoptosis by influenza A virus has been well documented (4, 19-21, 28, 33, 37), the mechanisms of this interaction are not well understood. Two viral proteins, NS1 and PB1-F2, have been associated with viral killing of cells. NS1, originally characterized as being proapoptotic (34), was later identified as being an interferon antagonist, inhibiting the activation of several key antiviral responses and restricting the apoptotic response to infection (1, 10, 15, 18, 35, 39, 46). In contrast, PB1-F2 induces apoptosis primarily by localizing to the outer mitochondrial membrane, promoting cytochrome c release, and triggering the apoptotic cascade (43). This effect, however, is typically restricted to infected monocytes, leading to the hypothesis that PB1-F2 induces apoptosis specifically to clear the landscape of immune responders (5, 44). Although PB1-F2 activity does not directly manipulate virus replication or virus-induced apoptosis, PB1-F2 localization to the mitochondrial membrane during infection potentiates the apoptotic response in epithelial and fibroblastic cells through tBID signaling with proapoptotic Bcl-2 family protein members Bax and Bak (22, 43, 44).The Bcl-2 protein family consists of both pro- and antiapoptotic members that regulate cytochrome c release during mitochondrion-mediated apoptosis through the formation of pore-like channels in the outer mitochondrial membrane (12, 16). During the initiation of mitochondrion-mediated apoptosis, cytoplasmic Bid is cleaved to form tBID. This, in turn, activates proapoptotic Bax and Bak (40), which drive cytochrome c release and subsequent caspase activation. Bak is constitutively associated with the mitochondrial membrane, whereas inactive Bax is primarily cytosolic, translocating to the outer mitochondrial membrane only after activation (6). The activation of Bax and Bak results in homo- and heterodimer formation at the outer mitochondrial membrane, generating pores that facilitate mitochondrial membrane permeabilization and cytochrome c release (14, 17), leading to caspase activation and the apoptotic cascade (8). Antiapoptotic members of the Bcl-2 protein family, including Bcl-2, inhibit the activation of proapoptotic Bax and Bak primarily by sequestering inactive Bax and Bak monomers via interactions between their BH3 homology domains (7).Bcl-2 expression has been linked to decreased viral replication rates (26). Bcl-2 overexpression inhibits influenza A virus-induced cell death and reduces the titer and spread of newly formed virions (29). The activation of caspase-3 in the absence of sufficient Bcl-2 is critical to the influenza A virus life cycle. Both Bcl-2 expression and the lack of caspase activation during infection lead to the nuclear accumulation of influenza virus ribonucleoprotein (RNP) complexes, thereby leading to the improper assembly of progeny virions and a marked reduction in titers of infectious virus (26, 41, 42, 45).Here we show that influenza A virus induces mitochondrion-mediated (intrinsic-pathway) apoptosis signaled specifically through Bax and that this Bax signaling is essential for the maximum efficiency of virus propagation. In contrast, Bak expression is strongly downregulated during infection. Cells lacking Bak (while expressing Bax) display a much more severe apoptotic phenotype in response to infection and produce infectious virions at a higher rate than the wild type (WT), suggesting that Bak, which can suppress viral replication, is potentially downregulated by the virus. Our results indicate essential and opposing roles for Bax and Bak in both the response of cells to influenza A virus infection and the ability of the virus to maximize its own replicative potential.