A Novel Genotype H9N2 Influenza Virus Possessing Human H5N1 Internal Genomes Has Been Circulating in Poultry in Eastern China since 1998

Many novel reassortant influenza viruses of the H9N2 genotype have emerged in aquatic birds in southern China since their initial isolation in this region in 1994. However, the genesis and evolution of H9N2 viruses in poultry in eastern China have not been investigated systematically. In the current study, H9N2 influenza viruses isolated from poultry in eastern China during the past 10 years were characterized genetically and antigenically. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that these H9N2 viruses have undergone extensive reassortment to generate multiple novel genotypes, including four genotypes (J, F, K, and L) that have never been recognized before. The major H9N2 influenza viruses represented by A/Chicken/Beijing/1/1994 (Ck/BJ/1/94)-like viruses circulating in poultry in eastern China before 1998 have been gradually replaced by A/Chicken/Shanghai/F/1998 (Ck/SH/F/98)-like viruses, which have a genotype different from that of viruses isolated in southern China. The similarity of the internal genes of these H9N2 viruses to those of the H5N1 influenza viruses isolated from 2001 onwards suggests that the Ck/SH/F/98-like virus may have been the donor of internal genes of human and poultry H5N1 influenza viruses circulating in Eurasia. Experimental studies showed that some of these H9N2 viruses could be efficiently transmitted by the respiratory tract in chicken flocks. Our study provides new insight into the genesis and evolution of H9N2 influenza viruses and supports the notion that some of these viruses may have been the donors of internal genes found in H5N1 viruses.Wild birds, including wild waterfowls, gulls, and shorebirds, are the natural reservoirs for influenza A viruses, in which they are thought to be in evolutionary stasis (2, 33). However, when avian influenza viruses are transmitted to new hosts such as terrestrial poultry or mammals, they evolve rapidly and may cause occasional severe systemic infection with high morbidity (20, 29). Despite the fact that avian influenza virus infection occurs commonly in chickens, it is unable to persist for a long period of time due to control efforts and/or a failure of the virus to adapt to new hosts (29). In the past 20 years, greater numbers of outbreaks in poultry have occurred, suggesting that the avian influenza virus can infect and spread in aberrant hosts for an extended period of time (5, 14-16, 18, 32).During the past 10 years, H9N2 influenza viruses have become panzootic in Eurasia and have been isolated from outbreaks in poultry worldwide (3, 5, 11, 14-16, 18, 24). A great deal of previous studies demonstrated that H9N2 influenza viruses have become established in terrestrial poultry in different Asian countries (5, 11, 13, 14, 18, 21, 24, 35). In 1994, H9N2 viruses were isolated from diseased chickens in Guangdong province, China, for the first time (4), and later in domestic poultry in other provinces in China (11, 16, 18, 35). Two distinct H9N2 virus lineages represented by A/Chicken/Beijing/1/94 (H9N2) and A/Quail/Hong Kong/G1/98 (H9N2), respectively, have been circulating in terrestrial poultry of southern China (9). Occasionally these viruses expand their host range to other mammals, including pigs and humans (6, 17, 22, 34). Increasing epidemiological and laboratory findings suggest that chickens may play an important role in expanding the host range for avian influenza virus. Our systematic surveillance of influenza viruses in chickens in China showed that H9N2 subtype influenza viruses continued to be prevalent in chickens in mainland China from 1994 to 2008 (18, 19, 36).Eastern China contains one metropolitan city (Shanghai) and five provinces (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Shandong, and Jiangxi), where domestic poultry account for approximately 50% of the total poultry population in China. Since 1996, H9N2 influenza viruses have been isolated regularly from both chickens and other minor poultry species in our surveillance program in the eastern China region, but their genetic diversity and the interrelationships between H9N2 influenza viruses and different types of poultry have not been determined. Therefore, it is imperative to explore the evolution and properties of these viruses. The current report provides insight into the genesis and evolution of H9N2 influenza viruses in eastern China and presents new evidence for the potential crossover between H9N2 and H5N1 influenza viruses in this region.     

Characterization of the H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Derived from Wild Pikas in China

The highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus emerged from China in 1996 and has spread across Eurasia and Africa, with a continuous stream of new cases of human infection appearing since the first large-scale outbreak among migratory birds at Qinghai Lake. The role of wild birds, which are the natural reservoirs for the virus, in the epidemiology of the H5N1 virus has raised great public health concern, but their role in the spread of the virus within the natural ecosystem of free-ranging terrestrial wild mammals remains unclear. In this study, we investigated H5N1 virus infection in wild pikas in an attempt to trace the circulation of the virus. Seroepidemiological surveys confirmed a natural H5N1 virus infection of wild pikas in their native environment. The hemagglutination gene of the H5N1 virus isolated from pikas reveals two distinct evolutionary clades, a mixed/Vietnam H5N1 virus sublineage (MV-like pika virus) and a wild bird Qinghai (QH)-like H5N1 virus sublineage (QH-like pika virus). The amino acid residue (glutamic acid) at position 627 encoded by the PB2 gene of the MV-like pika virus was different from that of the QH-like pika virus; the residue of the MV-like pika virus was the same as that of the goose H5N1 virus (A/GS/Guangdong [GD]/1/96). Further, we discovered that in contrast to the MV-like pika virus, which is nonpathogenic to mice, the QH-like pika virus is highly pathogenic. To mimic the virus infection of pikas, we intranasally inoculated rabbits, a species closely related to pikas, with the H5N1 virus of pika origin. Our findings first demonstrate that wild pikas are mammalian hosts exposed to H5N1 subtype avian influenza viruses in the natural ecosystem and also imply a potential transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus from wild mammals into domestic mammalian hosts and humans.Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is an extremely infectious, systemic viral disease that causes a high rate of mortality in birds. HPAI H5N1 viruses are now endemic in avian populations in Southeast Asia and have repeatedly been transmitted to humans (9, 14, 27). Since 2003, the H5N1 subtype has been reported in 391 human cases of influenza and has caused 247 human deaths in 15 countries, leading to greater than 60% mortality among infected individuals (38). Although currently incapable of sustained human-to-human transmission, H5N1 viruses undoubtedly pose a serious threat to public health, as well as to the global economy. Hence, preparedness for such a threat is a global priority (36).Wild birds are considered to be natural reservoirs for influenza A viruses (6, 18, 21, 35, 37). Of the 144 type A influenza virus hemagglutinin-neuraminidase (HA-NA) combinations, 103 have been found in wild birds (5, 7, 17, 37). Since the first HPAI outbreak among migratory wild birds appeared at Qinghai Lake in western China in May 2005 (3, 16, 25, 34, 41), HPAI viruses of the H5N1 subtype have been isolated from poultry throughout Eurasia and Africa. The continued occurrence of human cases has created a situation that could facilitate a pandemic emergence. There is heightened concern that wild birds are a reservoir for influenza A viruses that switch hosts and stably adapt to mammals, including horses, swine, and humans (11, 19, 22, 37).Despite the recent expansion of avian influenza virus (AIV) surveillance and genomic data (5, 17, 20, 21, 33, 40), fundamental questions remain concerning the ecology and evolution of these viruses. Little is known about how terrestrial wild mammals within their natural ecological systems affect HPAI H5N1 epidemiology or about the virus''s effects on public health, though there are many reports of natural and experimental H5N1 virus infection in animals belonging to the taxonomic orders Carnivora (12, 13, 15, 28, 29) and Artiodactyla (15). Herein, we provide the results of our investigation into H5N1 virus infection in wild pikas (Ochotona curzoniae of the order Lagomorpha) within their natural ecological setting. We describe our attempt to trace the circulation of H5N1 viruses and to characterize pika H5N1 influenza virus (PK virus).     

Reassortment between Avian H5N1 and Human H3N2 Influenza Viruses in Ferrets: a Public Health Risk Assessment

This study investigated whether transmissible H5 subtype human-avian reassortant viruses could be generated in vivo. To this end, ferrets were coinfected with recent avian H5N1 (A/Thailand/16/04) and human H3N2 (A/Wyoming/3/03) viruses. Genotype analyses of plaque-purified viruses from nasal secretions of coinfected ferrets revealed that approximately 9% of recovered viruses contained genes from both progenitor viruses. H5 and H3 subtype viruses, including reassortants, were found in airways extending toward and in the upper respiratory tract of ferrets. However, only parental H5N1 genotype viruses were found in lung tissue. Approximately 34% of the recovered reassortant viruses possessed the H5 hemagglutinin (HA) gene, with five unique H5 subtypes recovered. These H5 reassortants were selected for further studies to examine their growth and transmissibility characteristics. Five H5 viruses with representative reassortant genotypes showed reduced titers in nasal secretions of infected ferrets compared to the parental H5N1 virus. No transmission by direct contact between infected and naïve ferrets was observed. These studies indicate that reassortment between H5N1 avian influenza and H3N2 human viruses occurred readily in vivo and furthermore that reassortment between these two viral subtypes is likely to occur in ferret upper airways. Given the relatively high incidence of reassortant viruses from tissues of the ferret upper airway, it is reasonable to conclude that continued exposure of humans and animals to H5N1 alongside seasonal influenza viruses increases the risk of generating H5 subtype reassortant viruses that may be shed from upper airway secretions.Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the H5N1 subtype have caused devastating outbreaks in avian species during the past decade. After emerging in the Guangdong province of China in 1996, H5N1 viruses have extended their geographic distribution from Asia into Europe and Africa (45, 51). Sporadic transmission of H5N1 viruses from infected birds to humans has resulted in over 380 laboratory-confirmed infections and a case fatality rate of ∼60% since 2003 (48). Currently circulating H5N1 viruses lack the ability to undergo efficient and sustained transmission among humans although instances of limited human-to-human transmission have been reported (13, 41). If H5N1 viruses were to acquire genetic changes that confer efficient transmissibility among humans, then another pandemic would likely occur.The pandemics of 1957 and 1968 highlight the importance of genetic reassortment between avian and human influenza viruses as a mechanism for the generation of human pandemic strains (15, 46, 47). The structural separation of the influenza virus genome into eight independent genes allows formation of hybrid progeny viruses during coinfections. The 1957 H2N2 and 1968 H3N2 pandemic viruses acquired the hemagglutinin (HA) and PB1 genes, with or without the neuraminidase (NA) gene, respectively, from an avian virus progenitor (14, 33). The remaining genes of these pandemic reassortants were derived from a contemporary human virus (14, 33). The host species in which such human pandemic strains were generated by reassortment between human and avian viruses is not known. However, coinfection of the same cell with both human and avian viruses must have occurred, even though human and avian influenza viruses have preferences for different sialic acid receptor structures present on cell surface glycoproteins and glycolipids (20, 30). The HA of human viruses preferentially binds α(2,6)-linked sialic acids while that of avian viruses preferentially bind α(2,3)-linked sialic acids (3, 12). Cells possessing both of these receptors could support coinfection of avian and human viruses, leading to reassortment.Human respiratory tract epithelial cells can possess surface glycans with α(2,3)- and α(2,6)-linked sialic acids and as such represent a potential host for the generation of avian-human reassortant viruses (24, 35). The general distribution of surface α(2,3)- and α(2,6)-linked sialic acids varies among cells of the human upper and lower respiratory tracts, which are anatomically separated by the larynx. Recent studies have shown that α(2,3)-linked sialic acids are present in tissues of the human lower respiratory tract (i.e., lung alveolar cells) (24, 35) as well as tissues of the human upper respiratory tract (24). Consistent with these findings, HPAI H5N1 viruses have been shown to attach to and infect tissues belonging to the lower respiratory tract (i.e., trachea, bronchi, and lung) (5, 25, 35, 40, 42, 43) as well as tissues belonging to the upper respiratory tract (i.e., nasopharyngeal, adenoid, and tonsillar) (25). Glycans with α(2,6)-linked sialic acids are more widespread on epithelial cells of the upper airways than lung alveoli (24, 35). In accordance, human seasonal influenza viruses preferentially attach to and infect cells of the upper respiratory tract (6, 25, 35, 43). If cells with both types of receptors are present in the human respiratory tract, simultaneous infection of a person with both human and avian viruses could generate reassortant viruses.Although viruses derived by reassortment between avian H5N1 and human H3N2 progenitors have been generated in vitro (17), reassortment between these avian and human strains in a coinfected mammalian host has not been shown. Furthermore, our knowledge of the genetic and phenotypic repertoire of such reassortants generated in vivo and their potential for transmission to uninfected hosts is limited (2, 17). In the present study, we used the ferret model to better understand the generation of reassortant viruses in a host coinfected with contemporary avian (H5N1) and human (H3N2) viruses and the extent to which such reassortants replicate and transmit from animal to animal. The domestic ferret (Mustela putoris) serves as an ideal small-animal model for influenza because ferrets are susceptible to human and avian influenza viruses, including HPAI H5N1 viruses, and reflect the relative transmissibility of human and avian influenza viruses in humans (9, 17, 18, 31, 36, 39, 53). Our study revealed that coinfection of ferrets reproducibly generated reassortant viruses that could be recovered from tissues within and extending toward the upper respiratory tract. Although H5 reassortant viruses were recovered from the upper airways, they displayed no transmissibility to contact ferrets, suggesting that additional functional changes are required for these viral subtypes to become pandemic within human populations.     

Association of Increased Pathogenicity of Asian H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses in Chickens with Highly Efficient Viral Replication Accompanied by Early Destruction of Innate Immune Responses

The Asian H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses have been increasing in pathogenicity in diverse avian species since 1996 and are now widespread in Asian, European, and African countries. To better understand the basis of the increased pathogenicity of recent Asian H5N1 HPAI viruses in chickens, we compared the fevers and mean death times (MDTs) of chickens infected with the Asian H5N1 A/chicken/Yamaguchi/7/04 (CkYM7) strain with those infected with the H5N1 Duck/Yokohama/aq10/03 (DkYK10) strain, using a wireless thermosensor. Asian H5N1 CkYM7 caused peracute death in chickens before fever could be induced, whereas DkYK10 virus induced high fevers and had a long MDT. Real-time PCR analyses of cytokine mRNA expressions showed that CkYM7 quickly induced antiviral and proinflammatory cytokine mRNA expressions at 24 h postinfection (hpi) that suddenly decreased at 32 hpi. In contrast, these cytokine mRNA expressions increased at 24 hpi in the DkYK10 group, but decreased from 48 hpi onward to levels similar to those resulting from infection with the low-pathogenicity H5N2 A/chicken/Ibaraki/1/2004 strain. Sequential titrations of viruses in lungs, spleens, and kidneys demonstrated that CkYM7 replicated rapidly and efficiently in infected chickens and that the viral titers were more than twofold higher than those of DkYK10. CkYM7 preferentially and efficiently replicated in macrophages and vascular endothelial cells, while DkYK10 grew moderately in macrophages. These results indicate that the increased pathogenicity in chickens of the recent Asian H5N1 HPAI viruses may be associated with extremely rapid and high replication of the virus in macrophages and vascular endothelial cells, which resulted in disruption of the thermoregulation system and innate immune responses.Since the first detection of the Asian lineage of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus (H5N1) in southern China in 1996, H5N1 virus infection in birds has continued for 13 years in Asia, acquiring pathogenicity not only in birds but also in mammals. In 1997, the H5N1 Hong Kong isolates caused illness and death in a variety of terrestrial birds and even in humans (9, 37, 48, 49). In 2001, emerging H5N1 Hong Kong isolates were more pathogenic to chickens and the mean death time (MDT) was 2 days without any prior clinical signs (12). In 2003 to 2004, the H5N1 epizootic occurred simultaneously in East Asian countries (22, 30). The 2003/2004 H5N1 isolates caused death in taxonomically diverse avian species, including domestic ducks (46, 47, 51), and humans (7, 55). Furthermore, the first indication of wild aquatic bird involvement occurred at recreational parks in Hong Kong in late 2002 to 2003 (46), and then migratory aquatic bird die-off occurred in 2005 at Qinghai Lake in China (6, 24). The broad host spectrum and increased pathogenicity of H5N1 viruses to diverse bird species raise serious concerns about the worldwide spread of the virus by migratory birds.According to the international criteria, HPAI viruses are defined by over 75% mortality in 4- to 8-week-old chickens following an intravenous pathogenicity test or an intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) of more than 1.2 in 6-week-old chickens (34); however, there are some variations in pathogenicity intensity among the HPAI viruses in chickens (1, 3, 5, 12, 15, 28, 31, 48, 50-52, 57). Most of the HPAI viruses that were isolated before 1996 cause severe clinical signs (e.g., ruffled feathers, depression, labored breathing, and neurological signs) and severe gross lesions (e.g., head and face edema, cyanosis, subcutaneous hemorrhages in combs and leg shanks, and necrosis of combs and wattles) in chickens (1, 3, 15, 31, 50, 52, 57). These viruses usually kill chickens 3 to 6 days after intranasal inoculation. On the other hand, the recently emerged Asian H5N1 HPAI viruses are more virulent and kill chickens within 1 to 2 days without causing typical clinical signs and gross lesions (5, 12, 27, 33, 48, 51), although some Asian H5N1 viruses, such as A/Goose/Guangdong/2/96 (23), A/goose/Hong Kong/437-10/99 (17), and A/chicken/Indonesia/7/03 (58), were less virulent. To successfully control HPAI in poultry, it is important to better understand the mechanisms of increased pathogenicity of recent H5N1 HPAI viruses in chickens.The Asian H5N1 HPAI virus has another important characteristic, which is its capability of crossing host-species barriers. It was reported that the H5N1 virus can infect and cause death in mammals such as mice (5, 9, 12, 14, 29), cats (21), tigers (2), ferrets (11, 26), monkeys (40), and humans (7, 49, 55). High-level inductions of proinflammatory cytokines in mammals infected with the H5N1 viruses, referred to as “cytokine storms,” have been hypothesized to contribute to the severity of pathological changes and ultimate death (4, 7, 13, 45, 55). Cytokine and chemokine dysregulation was detected in clinical cases of H5N1-infected humans (8, 13, 36) and also in monkeys experimentally infected with the H1N1 Spanish flu strain (20). In a mouse model, lymphocyte apoptosis and cytokine dysregulation have been proposed to contribute to the severity of the disease caused by H5N1 (56). Investigations with transgenic mice deficient in each cytokine gene suggest that tumor necrosis factor alpha (TNF-α) may contribute to morbidity and interleukin-1 (IL-1) may be important for virus clearance (53). However, mice deficient in TNF-α or IL-6 succumb to infection with H5N1, and cytokine inhibition treatment does not prevent death (42), suggesting that therapies targeting the virus rather than cytokines may be preferable. Thus, the significance of elevated proinflammatory cytokine responses in the pathogenesis of H5N1-infected mammals requires further studies.In contrast, little is known about proinflammatory cytokine responses and their roles in pathogenicity in chickens infected with HPAI viruses, including the recent Asian H5N1 viruses. It was reported that infection with an HPAI virus results in upregulation of gene expression of gamma interferon (IFN-γ) and inducible nitric oxide synthase (58). However, the roles of proinflammatory cytokines in disease severity and outcomes in chickens infected systemically with HPAI viruses are largely unknown. The less-virulent Asian H5N1 virus, which causes severe clinical signs and gross lesions in chickens (17, 23, 27, 58), would be a valuable tool for investigating the role of proinflammatory cytokines in chickens infected with HPAI viruses, as well as for exploring the pathogenesis of the more-virulent Asian H5N1 HPAI virus, because of the antigenic and molecular similarities between them.In this study, we compared the pathogenicities in chickens of the less-virulent and more-virulent Asian H5N1 HPAI viruses based on MDT, fever, cytokine responses, and viral replication. Our results suggest that the shift in the Asian H5N1 virus to increased virulence may be associated with efficient and rapid replication of the virus in chickens, accompanied by early destruction of host immune responses and followed by peracute death before fever can be induced. Finally, we discuss candidate genes that may account for the high pathogenicity of Asian H5N1 HPAI viruses in chickens.     

Dendritic Cell Activation by Recombinant Hemagglutinin Proteins of H1N1 and H5N1 Influenza A Viruses

Since dendritic cells may play a key role in defense against influenza virus infection, we examined the effects of recombinant hemagglutinin (HA) proteins derived from mouse-adapted H1N1 (A/WSN/1933), swine-origin 2009 pandemic H1N1 (A/Texas/05/2009), and highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 (A/Thailand/KAN-1/2004) viruses on mouse myeloid dendritic cells (mDCs). The results reveal that tumor necrosis factor alpha (TNF-α), interleukin-12 (IL-12) p70, and major histocompatibility complex class II (MHC-II) expression was increased in mDCs after treatment with recombinant HA proteins of H1N1 and H5N1. The specificity of recombinant HA treatments for mDC activation was diminished after proteinase K digestion. HA apparently promotes mDC maturation by enhancing CD40 and CD86 expression and suppressing endocytosis. No significant differences in mDC activation were observed among recombinant proteins of H1N1 and H5N1. The stimulation of mDCs by HA proteins of H1N1 and H5N1 was completely MyD88 dependent. These findings may provide useful information for the development of more-effective influenza vaccines.Influenza viruses trigger seasonal epidemics or pandemics of contagious diseases with mild to severe consequences in human and poultry populations worldwide (28). Members of the Orthomyxoviridae family, influenza viruses consist of single-stranded, eight-segment, negative-sense genomic RNAs, helical viral ribonucleoprotein (RNP) complexes (RNA segments, NP, PB2, PB1, and PA) and four viral envelope proteins (hemagglutinin [HA], neuraminidase [NA], and M1 and M2 matrix proteins). Type A influenza viruses are further classified into various serotypes based on the antigenic characteristics of HA and NA glycoproteins (14).In 2009, a swine-origin H1N1 strain emerged from the genetic reassortants of existing human, avian, and swine influenza viruses, resulting in a global pandemic marked by symptoms more severe than those associated with seasonal influenza virus (3, 24). According to comparative pathology in macaque monkeys, H5N1 induces greater cytokinemia, tissue damage, and interference with immune regulatory mechanisms than H1N1 infection (2). The HA spike protein of influenza virus is believed to play important roles in viral receptor binding, fusion, transmission, host range restriction, virulence, and pathogenesis (13, 27-30).Dendritic cells (DCs), considered the most potent professional antigen-presenting cells, serve as links between innate and adaptive immunity (31). Upon encountering microbial pathogens, endogenous danger signals, or inflammatory mediators, DCs mature and elicit rapid and short-lived innate immune responses before migrating to secondary lymphoid organs and enhancing adaptive immunity (17). Two major subsets of DCs are recognized in mice and humans: (i) myeloid DCs (mDCs, also called conventional DCs), which participate most directly in antigen presentation and activation of naïve T cells, and (ii) plasmacytoid DCs (pDCs), which produce type I interferons in response to viral infection (16, 42) and are also capable of inducing immunotolerance under some conditions (9). mDCs and pDCs also comprise different heterologous subsets, with unique localizations, phenotypes, and functions (36). Due to their key role in immune regulation, DCs have been developed for immunotherapeutic agents or prophylactic or therapeutic vaccines for cancer, infectious diseases, and immune system-related diseases (32, 34).DCs are essential in controlling the innate and adaptive immune responses against influenza virus infection (21). Viral RNA is recognized by various pattern recognition receptors (PRRs), including RIG-I-like receptors (RLRs), Toll-like receptors (TLRs), and nucleotide oligomerization domain (NOD)-like receptors (NLRs). TLRs play an especially important role in detecting virus invasion and activating DCs (18, 35). However, the mechanisms causing DC activation and maturation in response to influenza viruses are not clear. HA has been described as playing an important role in modulating influenza virus virulence and host immune responses (29). In this study, we examined the effects of several recombinant HA proteins (rHAs) derived from rHA of H1N1 (rH1HA) (A/WSN/1933) and (A/Texas/05/2009) and rHA of H5N1 (rH5HA) (A/Thailand/KAN-1/2004) viruses on the activation and maturation of the mDC subset derived from mouse bone marrow.     

Virulence-Associated Substitution D222G in the Hemagglutinin of 2009 Pandemic Influenza A(H1N1) Virus Affects Receptor Binding

The clinical impact of the 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) virus (pdmH1N1) has been relatively low. However, amino acid substitution D222G in the hemagglutinin of pdmH1N1 has been associated with cases of severe disease and fatalities. D222G was introduced in a prototype pdmH1N1 by reverse genetics, and the effect on virus receptor binding, replication, antigenic properties, and pathogenesis and transmission in animal models was investigated. pdmH1N1 with D222G caused ocular disease in mice without further indications of enhanced virulence in mice and ferrets. pdmH1N1 with D222G retained transmissibility via aerosols or respiratory droplets in ferrets and guinea pigs. The virus displayed changes in attachment to human respiratory tissues in vitro, in particular increased binding to macrophages and type II pneumocytes in the alveoli and to tracheal and bronchial submucosal glands. Virus attachment studies further indicated that pdmH1N1 with D222G acquired dual receptor specificity for complex α2,3- and α2,6-linked sialic acids. Molecular dynamics modeling of the hemagglutinin structure provided an explanation for the retention of α2,6 binding. Altered receptor specificity of the virus with D222G thus affected interaction with cells of the human lower respiratory tract, possibly explaining the observed association with enhanced disease in humans.In April 2009, the H1N1 influenza A virus of swine origin was detected in humans in North America (9, 12, 42). Evidence for its origin came from analyses of the viral genome, with six gene segments displaying the closest resemblance to American “triple-reassortant” swine viruses and two to “Eurasian-lineage” swine viruses (13, 42). After this first detection in humans, the virus spread rapidly around the globe, starting the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century. The 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) virus (pdmH1N1) has been relatively mild, with a spectrum of disease ranging from subclinical infections or mild upper respiratory tract illness to sporadic cases of severe pneumonia and acute respiratory distress syndrome (3, 11, 27, 29, 30, 37). Overall, the case-fatality rate during the start of the pandemic was not significantly higher than in seasonal epidemics in most countries. However, a marked difference was observed in the case-fatality rate in specific age groups, with seasonal influenza generally causing highest mortality in elderly and immunocompromised individuals, and the pdmH1N1 affecting a relatively large proportion of (previously healthy) young individuals (3, 11, 27, 29, 30, 37).Determinants of influenza A virus virulence have been mapped for a wide variety of zoonotic and pandemic influenza viruses to the polymerase genes, hemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA), and nonstructural protein 1 (NS1). Such virulence-associated substitutions generally facilitate more efficient replication in humans via improved interactions with host cell factors. Since most of these virulence-associated substitutions were absent in the earliest pdmH1N1s, it has been speculated that the virus could acquire some of these mutations, potentially resulting in the emergence of more pathogenic viruses. Such virulence markers could be acquired by gene reassortment with cocirculating influenza A viruses, or by mutation. The influenza virus polymerase genes, in particular PB2, have been shown to be important determinants of the virulence of the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 and H7N7 viruses and the transmission of the 1918 H1N1 Spanish influenza virus (17, 26, 34, 51). One of the most commonly identified virulence markers to date is E627K in PB2. The glutamic acid (E) residue is generally found in avian influenza viruses, while human viruses have a lysine (K), and this mutation was described as a determinant of host range in vitro (48). Given that all human and many zoonotic influenza viruses of the last century contained 627K, it was surprising that the pdmH1N1 had 627E. In addition, an aspartate (D)-to-asparagine (N) substitution at position 701 (D701N) of PB2 has previously been shown to expand the host range of avian H5N1 virus to mice and humans and to increase virus transmission in guinea pigs (26, 46). Like E627K, D701N was absent in the genome of pdmH1N1. Thus, the pdmH1N1 was the first known human pandemic virus with 627E and 701D, and it has been speculated that pdmH1N1 could mutate into a more virulent form by acquiring one of these mutations or both. Recently, it was shown that neither E627K nor D701N in PB2 of pdmH1N1 increased its virulence in ferrets and mice (18). The PB1-F2 protein has previously also been associated with high pathogenicity of the 1918 H1N1 and HPAI H5N1 viruses (8). The PB1-F2 protein of the pdmH1N1 is truncated due to premature stop codons. However, restoration of the PB1-F2 reading frame did not result in viruses with increased virulence (15). The NS1 protein of pdmH1N1 is also truncated due to a stop codon and, as a result, does not contain a PDZ ligand domain that is involved in cell-signaling pathways and has been implicated in the pathogenicity of 1918 H1N1 and HPAI H5N1 viruses (5, 8, 21). Surprisingly, restoration of a full-length version of the NS1 gene did not result in increased virulence in animal models (16). Mutations affecting virulence and host range have further frequently been mapped to hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) in relation to their interaction with α2,3- or α2,6-linked sialic acids (SAs), the virus receptors on host cells (17, 32, 35, 50). The HA gene of previous pandemic viruses incorporated substitutions that allow efficient attachment to α2,6-SAs—the virus receptor on human cells—compared to ancestral avian viruses that attach more efficiently to α2,3-SAs (35, 47, 50).To search for mutations of potential importance to public health, numerous laboratories performed genome sequencing of pdmH1N1s, resulting in the real-time accumulation of information on emergence of potential virulence markers. Of specific interest were reports on amino acid substitutions from aspartic acid (D) to glycine (G) at position 222 (position 225 in H3) in HA of pdmH1N1. This substitution was observed in a fatal case of pdmH1N1 infection in June 2009 in the Netherlands (M. Jonges et al., unpublished data). Between July and December 2009, viruses from 11 (18%) of 61 cases with severe disease outcome in Norway have also been reported to harbor the D222G substitution upon direct sequencing of HA in clinical specimens. Such mutant viruses were not observed in any of 205 mild cases investigated, and the frequency of detection of this mutation was significantly higher in severe cases than in mild cases (23). In Hong Kong, the D222G substitution was detected in 12.5% (6) and 4.1% (31) of patients with severe disease and in 0% of patients with mild disease, in two different studies without prior propagation in embryonated chicken eggs. In addition to Norway and Hong Kong, the mutation has been detected in Brazil, Japan, Mexico, Ukraine, and the United States (56). Thus, D222G in HA could be the first identified “virulence marker” of pdmH1N1. pdmH1N1 with D222G in HA have not become widespread in the population, although they were detected in several countries. However, D222G in HA is of special interest, since it has also been described as the single change in HA between two strains of the “Spanish” 1918 H1N1 virus that differed in receptor specificity (47). Furthermore, upon propagation in embryonated chicken eggs, pdmH1N1 can acquire the mutation rapidly, presumably because it results in virus adaptation to avian (α2,3-SAs) receptors (49). The presence of the substitution in pdmH1N1s in the human population and its potential association with more severe disease prompted us to test its effect on pdmH1N1 receptor binding, replication, antigenic properties, and pathogenesis and transmission in animal models.     

Hemagglutinin-Dependent Tropism of H5N1 Avian Influenza Virus for Human Endothelial Cells

Although current H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) are inefficiently transmitted to humans, infected individuals can suffer from severe disease, often progressing rapidly to acute respiratory distress syndrome and multiorgan failure. This is in contrast with the situation with human influenza viruses, which in immunocompetent individuals usually cause only a respiratory disease which is less aggressive than that observed with avian H5N1 viruses. While the biological basis of inefficient transmission is well documented, the mechanisms by which the H5N1 viruses cause fatal disease remain unclear. In the present study, we demonstrate that human pulmonary microvascular endothelial cells (hPMEC) had a clearly higher susceptibility to infection by H5N1 HPAIV than to infection by human influenza viruses. This was measurable by de novo intracellular nucleoprotein production and virus replication. It was also related to a relatively higher binding capacity to cellular receptors. After infection of hPMEC, cell activation markers E-selectin and P-selectin were upregulated, and the proinflammatory cytokines interleukin-6 and beta interferon were secreted. H5N1 virus infection was also associated with an elevated rate of cell death. Reverse genetics analyses demonstrated a major role for the viral hemagglutinin in this cell tropism. Overall, avian H5N1 viruses have a particular receptor specificity targeting endothelial cells that is different from human influenza viruses, and this H5N1 receptor specificity could contribute to disease pathogenesis.Certain highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) expressing the H5 and H7 hemagglutinins (HA) have acquired the capacity to infect humans. Particularly, HPAIV with the H5 HA and the neuraminidase (NA) type 1 (H5N1) can cause severe disease, often with a fatal outcome in humans and other mammals (27). With such infections in humans, there are two striking differences compared to infection by human influenza A viruses (IAV). First, bird-to-human and human-to-human transmission has been considered inefficient, and second, the mortality rate of H5N1 virus infections has been unexpectedly high. There is a lot of experimental evidence that inefficient transmission rate is related to several viral gene products not optimally adapted to facilitate infection and replication in the primary target cells, the epithelial cells of the respiratory tract. Of particular importance is the HA determining receptor specificity with human viruses preferentially recognizing sialic acid (SA)-α-2,6-Gal-terminated saccharides (α-2,6-SA), abundantly expressed in the upper respiratory tract, and avian viruses preferentially binding to α-2,3-SA, expressed mainly in the lower respiratory tract and on ciliated epithelial cells (23, 33, 39). In addition, the viral polymerases determining the rate of replication as well as the NS1 protein involved in multiple processes enabling efficient viral replication and evasion of cellular antiviral responses are of importance in determining host tropism (17, 26).However, in contrast to infections with human influenza viruses, avian H5N1 virus infections more often cause severe pneumonia. These are associated with high levels of proinflammatory cytokines and chemokines in the respiratory tract, severe inflammatory reactions, and infiltration of leukocytes. Furthermore, a generalized inflammatory reaction with elevated cytokine and chemokine levels in the circulation, together with leukopenia and multiorgan failure, indicates that an aberrant immunological reaction is an important factor contributing to the fatality of H5N1 virus infections (19). This is supported by in vitro studies of human macrophages, dendritic cells, and epithelial cells, in which it was demonstrated that H5N1 viruses can induce higher levels of inflammatory cytokine and chemokine responses than human IV isolates (2, 3, 37). Based on this, it was proposed that factors of the innate and adaptive immune response are of central importance for the outcome of disease (8, 26).Endothelial cells (EDC) are abundant in all organs, particularly the lung, and play an important role in inflammatory processes through the regulation of leukocyte extravasation, the production of inflammatory cytokines and chemokines, and the regulation of coagulation (4). During systemic disease in chickens infected with H5N1 isolates, the cardiovascular system can be affected with coagulopathy and viral antigen detectable in EDC (15, 25, 36). This also relates to a report demonstrating a targeted infection of EDC in chicken embryo by A/FPV/Rostock/34 (H7N1) virus (6). In this study, the infection of human umbilical vein EDC is also reported. Finally, in humans, various degrees of hemorrhages as well as signs of disseminated intravascular coagulation have been found (1).Accordingly, the present study compared influenza virus isolates of avian and human origin with respect to their characteristics of interaction with human EDC. To this end, we infected primary human lung EDC with different naturally occurring virus isolates as well as viruses created by reverse genetics. Viruses expressing the H5 clearly possessed the greatest potency to infect and replicate in EDC, resulting in activation and inflammatory responses.     

Selection of H5N1 Influenza Virus PB2 during Replication in Humans

Highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses continue to cause concern, even though currently circulating strains are not efficiently transmitted among humans. For efficient transmission, amino acid changes in viral proteins may be required. Here, we examined the amino acids at positions 627 and 701 of the PB2 protein. A direct analysis of the viral RNAs of H5N1 viruses in patients revealed that these amino acids contribute to efficient virus propagation in the human upper respiratory tract. Viruses grown in culture or eggs did not always reflect those in patients. These results emphasize the importance of the direct analysis of original specimens.Given the continued circulation of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza viruses and their sporadic transmission to humans, the threat of a pandemic persists. However, for H5N1 influenza viruses to be efficiently transmitted among humans, amino acid substitutions in the avian viral proteins may be necessary.Two positions in the PB2 protein affect the growth of influenza viruses in mammalian cells (3, 11, 18): the amino acid at position 627 (PB2-627), which in most human influenza viruses is lysine (PB2-627Lys) and most avian viruses is glutamic acid (PB2-627Glu), and the amino acid at position 701. PB2-627Lys is associated with the efficient replication (16) and high virulence (5) of H5N1 viruses in mice. Moreover, an H7N7 avian virus isolated from a fatal human case of pneumonia possessed PB2-627Lys, whereas isolates from a nonfatal human case of conjunctivitis and from chickens during the same outbreak possessed PB2-627Glu (2).The amino acid at position 701 in PB2 is important for the high pathogenicity of H5N1 viruses in mice (11). Most avian influenza viruses possess aspartic acid at this position (PB2-701Asp); however, A/duck/Guangxi/35/2001 (H5N1), which is highly virulent in mice (11), possesses asparagine at this position (PB2-701Asn). PB2-701Asn is also found in equine (4) and swine (15) viruses, as well as some H5N1 human isolates (7, 9). Thus, both amino acids appear to be markers for the adaptation of H5N1 viruses in humans (1, 3, 17).Massin et al. (13) reported that the amino acid at PB2-627 affects viral RNA replication in cultured cells at low temperatures. Recently, we demonstrated that viruses, including those of the H5N1 subtype, with PB2-627Lys (human type) grow better at low temperatures in cultured cells than those with PB2-627Glu (avian type) (6). This association between the PB2 amino acid and temperature-dependent growth correlates with the body temperatures of hosts; the human upper respiratory tract is at a lower temperature (around 33°C) than the lower respiratory tract (around 37°C) and the avian intestine, where avian influenza viruses usually replicate (around 41°C). The ability to replicate at low temperatures may be crucial for viral spread among humans via sneezing and coughing by being able to grow in the upper respiratory organs. Therefore, the Glu-to-Lys mutation in PB2-627 is an important step for H5N1 viruses to develop pandemic potential.However, there is no direct evidence that the substitutions of PB2-627Glu with PB2-627Lys and PB2-701Asp with PB2-701Asn occur during the replication of H5N1 avian influenza viruses in human respiratory organs. Therefore, here, we directly analyzed the nucleotide sequences of viral genes from several original specimens collected from patients infected with H5N1 viruses.     

Evolutionary Dynamics of Multiple Sublineages of H5N1 Influenza Viruses in Nigeria from 2006 to 2008

Highly pathogenic A/H5N1 avian influenza (HPAI H5N1) viruses have seriously affected the Nigerian poultry industry since early 2006. Previous studies have identified multiple introductions of the virus into Nigeria and several reassortment events between cocirculating lineages. To determine the spatial, evolutionary, and population dynamics of the multiple H5N1 lineages cocirculating in Nigeria, we conducted a phylogenetic analysis of whole-genome sequences from 106 HPAI H5N1 viruses isolated between 2006 and 2008 and representing all 25 Nigerian states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) reporting outbreaks. We identified a major new subclade in Nigeria that is phylogenetically distinguishable from all previously identified sublineages, as well as two novel reassortment events. A detailed analysis of viral phylogeography identified two major source populations for the HPAI H5N1 virus in Nigeria, one in a major commercial poultry area (southwest region) and one in northern Nigeria, where contact between wild birds and backyard poultry is frequent. These findings suggested that migratory birds from Eastern Europe or Russia may serve an important role in the introduction of HPAI H5N1 viruses into Nigeria, although virus spread through the movement of poultry and poultry products cannot be excluded. Our study provides new insight into the genesis and evolution of H5N1 influenza viruses in Nigeria and has important implications for targeting surveillance efforts to rapidly identify the spread of the virus into and within Nigeria.Since its emergence in 1996 in Guangdong, China, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus of the H5N1 subtype (HPAI H5N1 virus) has disseminated widely across Asia, Europe, and Africa, infecting a range of domestic and wild avian species and sporadically spilling over into humans and other mammals (4, 35). Over time, the HPAI H5N1 virus has diversified into multiple phylogenetically distinct lineages, classified as clades 0 to 9 according to the unified nomenclature system (33). The H5N1 lineage currently circulating in central Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa is referred to as clade 2.2 (33) and has also been described as “EMA” or Qinghai-like in previous publications (4, 17, 27). This clade originated in April 2005 during a large outbreak of a phylogenetically distinct H5N1 virus among wild bird populations at Qinghai Lake in western China (4, 17) and rapidly spread west through central Asia and Europe, eventually reaching Africa in 2006 (27). Clade 2.2 has further diversified, forming the genetic third-order clade 2.2.1 (32) and three genetically distinct sublineages (I, II, and III) (2, 19, 28), all of which are found in Africa.Since 2006 HPAI H5N1 viruses belonging to clade 2.2 have disseminated across multiple countries in western, eastern, and northern Africa: Egypt, Niger, Cameroon, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria (2). With a large poultry industry, estimated at 140 million birds (11), Nigeria has experienced several major outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 virus, posing a serious threat to food security and public health in Africa. The first case of HPAI H5N1 virus in Nigeria (sublineage I) occurred in January 2006 in the state of Kaduna, and the virus subsequently was detected in Ghana, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, and Sudan (2). In February 2006 sublineage II was reported in Nigeria, and it disseminated widely across the country during 2006 and 2007, also appearing in Togo (2). Clade 2.2.1, which has been prevalent in Egypt, Israel, and the Gaza Strip from 2006 to 2008, was also detected in Nigeria in 2006 (10).By the end of 2007, outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 virus in Nigeria appeared to have been successfully controlled by measures such as “stamping out with compensation,” restrictions on movement of poultry, and enhanced surveillance (13). However, in July 2008 new cases of HPAI H5N1 from a sublineage never previously detected in Africa (sublineage III) were registered in the Nigerian states of Kano and Katsina and in live bird markets in Gombe and Kebbi states (13, 21). Hence, Nigeria is the only African country where viruses belonging to clade 2.2.1 and to three different sublineages (I, II, and III) of clade 2.2 have all been detected. At least three different reassortment events between sublineages have been documented in Nigeria. Salzberg et al. identified the first reassortant strain (which we refer to as “R1”), in which four genome segments (hemagglutinin [HA], NP, NS, and PB1) belong to sublineage I and the other four segments (NA, MP, PA, and PB2) are derived from sublineage II (27). Subsequently, phylogenetic analysis showed that a 2007 reassortant strain (which we refer to as “R3”) contained the HA and NS segments from sublineage I and the other six segments from sublineage II (19, 22). Another reassortant virus (which we refer to as “R5”) contained only the NS gene segment from sublineage I, while the other seven segments were derived from sublineage II (22).Although the genetic diversity of the Nigerian HPAI H5N1 virus population has been well characterized, including multiple introductions of the virus into Nigeria and several reassortment events, little is known about the evolutionary and population growth dynamics of the virus within Nigeria. Particularly understudied are the spatial movements of individual sublineages among Nigeria''s vast poultry population. To explore the spatial, evolutionary, and population dynamics of the multiple H5N1 lineages cocirculating in Nigeria, we conducted a phylogenetic analysis of whole-genome sequences from 106 HPAI H5N1 viruses isolated between 2006 and 2008 and representing all 25 Nigerian states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) reporting outbreaks. Using the exact date and location of collection for each viral isolate, we inferred from their phylogenetic relationships the directionality of viral gene flow among Nigerian states and identified critical regions that are likely to serve as key sources for the H5N1 virus in Nigeria.     

Differential Activation of NK Cells by Influenza A Pseudotype H5N1 and 1918 and 2009 Pandemic H1N1 Viruses

Natural killer (NK) cells are the effectors of innate immunity and are recruited into the lung 48 h after influenza virus infection. Functional NK cell activation can be triggered by the interaction between viral hemagglutinin (HA) and natural cytotoxicity receptors NKp46 and NKp44 on the cell surface. Recently, novel subtypes of influenza viruses, such as H5N1 and 2009 pandemic H1N1, transmitted directly to the human population, with unusual mortality and morbidity rates. Here, the human NK cell responses to these viruses were studied. Differential activation of heterogeneous NK cells (upregulation of CD69 and CD107a and gamma interferon [IFN-γ] production as well as downregulation of NKp46) was observed following interactions with H5N1, 1918 H1N1, and 2009 H1N1 pseudotyped particles (pps), respectively, and the responses of the CD56^dim subset predominated. Much stronger NK activation was triggered by H5N1 and 1918 H1N1 pps than by 2009 H1N1 pps. The interaction of pps with NK cells and subsequent internalization were mediated by NKp46 partially. The NK cell activation by pps showed a dosage-dependent manner, while an increasing viral HA titer attenuated NK activation phenotypes, cytotoxicity, and IFN-γ production. The various host innate immune responses to different influenza virus subtypes or HA titers may be associated with disease severity.Influenza is a contagious, acute respiratory disease caused by influenza viruses and has caused substantial human morbidity and mortality over the past century (24, 27). The 1918-1919 pandemic caused by influenza virus type A H1N1 was responsible for an estimated 50 million deaths (21). In recent years, novel subtype influenza viruses, such as H5N1 and the 2009 pandemic H1N1, have been transmitted directly from animals to the human population. These infections were characterized by unusually high rates of severe respiratory disease and mortality among young patients (8, 18). Various genetic shifts have occurred in these viruses, allowing them to evade the host protective effects of specific antihemagglutinin (HA) or antineuraminidase (NA) antibodies (27). Therefore, host innate immunity in the early phase of infection, which includes a variety of pattern recognition molecules, inflammatory cytokines, and immune cells, such as macrophages and natural killer (NK) cells, plays a critical role in host defense.NK cells are bone marrow-derived, large, granular lymphocytes and are key effector cells in innate immunity for host defense against invading infectious pathogens and malignant transformation through cytolytic activity and production of cytokines, such as gamma interferon (IFN-γ) (10, 28, 43, 51). In humans, NK cells account for approximately 10% of all blood lymphocytes and are identified by their expression of the CD56 surface antigen and their lack of CD3. Two distinct subsets of human NK cells have been defined according to the cell surface density of CD56 expression (10). The majority (∼90% in blood) of human NK cells are CD56^dim, and a minor population (∼10% in blood) is CD56^bright. These NK subsets are functionally distinct, with the immunoregulatory CD56^bright cells producing abundant cytokines and the cytotoxic CD56^dim cells probably functioning as efficient effectors of natural and antibody-dependent target cell lysis (11).Many lines of evidence suggest that NK cells can be functionally activated by the interaction between natural cytotoxicity receptors (NCRs) on the cell surface and influenza virus HA protein or stress-induced proteins from infected cells (2, 13, 33, 44, 46). On the other hand, influenza virus is able to evade host immunity by infecting NK cells and triggering cell apoptosis or by attenuating NK cell lysis of H3N2-infected cells, owing to alterations in HA binding properties (35, 39). The infiltration of macrophages and lymphocytes into the lung and strong inflammatory responses were detected in H5N1 and the 1918 and 2009 pandemic H1N1 infections. Nevertheless, little is known about the precise roles of NK cells in these infections.In this study, the responses of NK cells to 1918 H1N1, 2009 H1N1, and H5N1 influenza A viruses were evaluated using three strains of influenza A virus pseudotyped particles (pps). Our findings may aid in understanding the pathogenicity of influenza viruses and its correlation with clinical severity.     

A Single Immunization with CoVaccine HT-Adjuvanted H5N1 Influenza Virus Vaccine Induces Protective Cellular and Humoral Immune Responses in Ferrets

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A viruses of the H5N1 subtype continue to circulate in poultry, and zoonotic transmissions are reported frequently. Since a pandemic caused by these highly pathogenic viruses is still feared, there is interest in the development of influenza A/H5N1 virus vaccines that can protect humans against infection, preferably after a single vaccination with a low dose of antigen. Here we describe the induction of humoral and cellular immune responses in ferrets after vaccination with a cell culture-derived whole inactivated influenza A virus vaccine in combination with the novel adjuvant CoVaccine HT. The addition of CoVaccine HT to the influenza A virus vaccine increased antibody responses to homologous and heterologous influenza A/H5N1 viruses and increased virus-specific cell-mediated immune responses. Ferrets vaccinated once with a whole-virus equivalent of 3.8 μg hemagglutinin (HA) and CoVaccine HT were protected against homologous challenge infection with influenza virus A/VN/1194/04. Furthermore, ferrets vaccinated once with the same vaccine/adjuvant combination were partially protected against infection with a heterologous virus derived from clade 2.1 of H5N1 influenza viruses. Thus, the use of the novel adjuvant CoVaccine HT with cell culture-derived inactivated influenza A/H5N1 virus antigen is a promising and dose-sparing vaccine approach warranting further clinical evaluation.Since the first human case of infection with a highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus of the H5N1 subtype in 1997 (9, 10, 37), hundreds of zoonotic transmissions have been reported, with a high case-fatality rate (10, 44). Since these viruses continue to circulate among domestic birds and human cases are regularly reported, it is feared that they will adapt to their new host or exchange gene segments with other influenza A viruses, become transmissible from human to human, and cause a new pandemic. Recently, a novel influenza A virus of the H1N1 subtype emerged. This virus, which originated from pigs, was transmitted between humans efficiently, resulting in the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century (8, 45). Although millions of people have been inoculated with the (H1N1)2009 virus, the case-fatality rate was relatively low compared to that for infections with the H5N1 viruses (11, 31). However, the unexpected pandemic caused by influenza A/H1N1(2009) viruses has further highlighted the importance of rapid availability of safe and effective pandemic influenza virus vaccines. Other key issues for the development of pandemic influenza A virus vaccines include optimal use of the existing (limited) capacity for production of viral antigen and effectiveness against viruses that are antigenically distinct. Ideally, a single administration of a low dose of antigen would be sufficient to induce protective immunity against the homologous strain and heterologous antigenic variant strains. However, since the population at large will be immunologically naïve to a newly introduced virus, high doses of antigen are required to induce protective immunity in unprimed subjects (23, 36). The use of safe and effective adjuvants in pandemic influenza virus vaccines is considered a dose-sparing strategy. Clinical trials evaluating candidate inactivated influenza A/H5N1 virus vaccines showed that the use of adjuvants can increase their immunogenicity and broaden the specificity of the induced antibody responses (2, 7, 19, 23, 27, 36, 41). These research efforts have resulted in the licensing of adjuvanted vaccines against seasonal and pandemic influenza viruses (17). The protective efficacy of immune responses induced with candidate influenza A/H5N1 virus vaccines was demonstrated in ferrets after two immunizations (1, 22, 24, 25) or after a single immunization. The latter was achieved with a low dose of antigen in combination with the adjuvant Iscomatrix (26).Recently, a novel adjuvant that consists of a sucrose fatty acid sulfate ester (SFASE) immobilized on the oil droplets of a submicrometer emulsion of squalane in water has been developed (4). It has been demonstrated that the addition of this novel adjuvant, called CoVaccine HT, to multiple antigens increased the immune response to these antigens in pigs and horses and was well tolerated in both species (4, 16, 40). Furthermore, it was shown that the use of CoVaccine HT increased the virus-specific antibody responses in mice and ferrets after vaccination with a cell culture-derived whole inactivated influenza A/H5N1 virus vaccine (5, 13). One of the mode of actions of CoVaccine HT is the activation of antigen-presenting cells such as dendritic cells, most likely through Toll-like receptor 4 (TLR4) signaling (5).In the present study, we evaluated the protective potential of CoVaccine HT-adjuvanted cell culture-derived whole inactivated influenza A/H5N1 virus (WIV) vaccine in the ferret model, which is considered the most suitable animal model for the evaluation of candidate influenza virus vaccines (6, 14, 15). To this end, ferrets were vaccinated once or twice with various antigen doses with or without the adjuvant to test whether dose sparing could be achieved. The use of CoVaccine HT increased virus-specific antibody responses and T cell responses. A single administration of 3.8 μg hemagglutinin (HA) of WIV NIBRG-14 vaccine preparation in combination with CoVaccine HT conferred protection against challenge infection with the homologous highly pathogenic A/H5N1 virus strain A/VN/1194/04 and partial protection against infection with a heterologous, antigenically distinct strain, A/IND/5/05. Therefore, it was concluded that the use of CoVaccine HT in inactivated influenza virus vaccines induced protective virus-specific humoral and cell-mediated immune responses and that it could be suitable as adjuvant in (pre)pandemic A/H5N1 virus vaccines. Further clinical testing of these candidate vaccines seems to be warranted.     

Transmission of Pandemic H1N1 Influenza Virus and Impact of Prior Exposure to Seasonal Strains or Interferon Treatment

Novel swine-origin influenza viruses of the H1N1 subtype were first detected in humans in April 2009. As of 12 August 2009, 180,000 cases had been reported globally. Despite the fact that they are of the same antigenic subtype as seasonal influenza viruses circulating in humans since 1977, these viruses continue to spread and have caused the first influenza pandemic since 1968. Here we show that a pandemic H1N1 strain replicates in and transmits among guinea pigs with similar efficiency to that of a seasonal H3N2 influenza virus. This transmission was, however, partially disrupted when guinea pigs had preexisting immunity to recent human isolates of either the H1N1 or H3N2 subtype and was fully blocked through daily intranasal administration of interferon to either inoculated or exposed animals. Our results suggest that partial immunity resulting from prior exposure to conventional human strains may blunt the impact of pandemic H1N1 viruses in the human population. In addition, the use of interferon as an antiviral prophylaxis may be an effective way to limit spread in at-risk populations.A pandemic of novel swine-origin influenza virus (H1N1) is developing rapidly. As of 12 August 2009, nearly 180,000 cases had been reported to the WHO from around the globe (36). Sustained human-to-human transmission has furthermore been observed in multiple countries, prompting the WHO to declare a public health emergency of international concern and to raise the pandemic alert level to phase 6 (7).Swine are a natural host of influenza viruses, and although sporadic incidences of human infection with swine influenza viruses occur (8, 9, 14, 29, 35), human-to-human transmission is rare. H1N1 influenza viruses have likely circulated in swine since shortly after the 1918 human influenza pandemic (38). From the 1930s, when a swine influenza virus was first isolated, to the late 1990s, this classical swine lineage has remained relatively stable antigenically (34). In the late 1990s, however, genetic reassortment between a human H3N2 virus, a North American avian virus, and a classical swine influenza virus produced a triple reassortant virus, which subsequently spread among North American swine (34). Further reassortment events involving human influenza viruses led to the emergence in pigs of triple reassortants of the H1N1 and H1N2 subtypes (34). None of these swine viruses have demonstrated the potential for sustained human-to-human transmission.The swine-origin influenza viruses now emerging in the human population possess a previously uncharacterized constellation of eight genes (28). The NA and M segments derive from a Eurasian swine influenza virus lineage, having entered pigs from the avian reservoir around 1979, while the HA, NP, and NS segments are of the classical swine lineage and the PA, PB1, and PB2 segments derive from the North American triple reassortant swine lineage (13). This unique combination of genetic elements (segments from multiple swine influenza virus lineages, some of them derived from avian and human influenza viruses) may account for the improved fitness of pandemic H1N1 viruses, relative to that of previous swine isolates, in humans.Several uncertainties remain about how this outbreak will develop over time. Although the novel H1N1 virus has spread over a broad geographical area, the number of people known to be infected remains low in many countries, which could be due, at least in part, to the lack of optimal transmission of influenza viruses outside the winter season; thus, it is unclear at this point whether the new virus will become established in the long term. Two major factors will shape the epidemiology of pandemic H1N1 viruses in the coming months and years: the intrinsic transmissibility of the virus and the degree of protection offered by previous exposure to seasonal human strains. Initial estimates of the reproductive number (R₀) have been made based on the epidemiology of the virus to date and suggest that its rate of spread is intermediate between that of seasonal flu and that of previous pandemic strains (3, 11). However, more precise estimates of R₀ will depend on better surveillance data in the future. The transmission phenotype of pandemic H1N1 viruses in a ferret model was also recently reported and was found to be similar to (16, 27) or less efficient (25) than that of seasonal H1N1 strains. The reason for this discrepancy in the ferret model is unclear.Importantly, in considering the human population, the impact of immunity against seasonal strains on the transmission potential of pandemic H1N1 viruses is not clear. According to conventional wisdom, an influenza virus must be of a hemagglutinin (HA) subtype which is novel to the human population in order to cause a pandemic (18, 38). Analysis of human sera collected from individuals with diverse influenza virus exposure histories has indicated that in those born in the early part of the 20th century, neutralizing activity against A/California/04/09 (Cal/04/09) virus is often present (16). Conversely, serological analyses of ferret postinfection sera (13) and human pre- and postvaccination sera (4a) revealed that neutralizing antibodies against recently circulating human H1N1 viruses do not react with pandemic H1N1 isolates. These serological findings may explain the relatively small number of cases seen to date in individuals greater than 65 years of age (6). Even in the absence of neutralizing antibodies, however, a measure of immune protection sufficient to dampen transmission may be present in a host who has recently experienced seasonal influenza (10). If, on the other hand, transmission is high and immunity is low, then pandemic H1N1 strains will likely continue to spread rapidly through the population. In this situation, a range of pharmaceutical interventions will be needed to dampen the public health impact of the pandemic.Herein we used the guinea pig model (4, 21-24, 26, 30) to assess the transmissibility of the pandemic H1N1 strains Cal/04/09 and A/Netherlands/602/09 (NL/602/09) relative to that of previous human and swine influenza viruses. To better mimic the human situation, we then tested whether the efficiency of transmission is decreased by preexisting immunity to recent human H1N1 or H3N2 influenza viruses. Finally, we assessed the efficacy of intranasal treatment with type I interferon (IFN) in limiting the replication and transmission of pandemic H1N1 viruses.     

Virulence Determinants of Avian H5N1 Influenza A Virus in Mammalian and Avian Hosts: Role of the C-Terminal ESEV Motif in the Viral NS1 Protein

We assessed the prediction that access of the viral NS1 protein to cellular PDZ domain protein networks enhances the virulence of highly pathogenic avian influenza A viruses. The NS1 proteins of most avian influenza viruses bear the C-terminal ligand sequence Glu-Ser-Glu-Val (ESEV) for PDZ domains present in multiple host proteins, whereas no such motif is found in the NS1 homologues of seasonal human virus strains. Previous analysis showed that a C-terminal ESEV motif increases viral virulence when introduced into the NS1 protein of mouse-adapted H1N1 influenza virus. To examine the role of the PDZ domain ligand motif in avian influenza virus virulence, we generated three recombinants, derived from the prototypic H5N1 influenza A/Vietnam/1203/04 virus, expressing NS1 proteins that either have the C-terminal ESEV motif or the human influenza virus RSKV consensus or bear a natural truncation of this motif, respectively. Cell biological analyses showed strong control of NS1 nuclear migration in infected mammalian and avian cells, with only minor differences between the three variants. The ESEV sequence attenuated viral replication on cultured human, murine, and duck cells but not on chicken fibroblasts. However, all three viruses caused highly lethal infections in mice and chickens, with little difference in viral titers in organs, mean lethal dose, or intravenous pathogenicity index. These findings demonstrate that a PDZ domain ligand sequence in NS1 contributes little to the virulence of H5N1 viruses in these hosts, and they indicate that this motif modulates viral replication in a strain- and host-dependent manner.The transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza A viruses (HPAIV) of the H5N1 subtype to humans since the year 1997 has caused a high mortality rate of almost 60% (62). Patients infected with H5N1 influenza virus developed mainly severe respiratory disease, characterized by fever, cough, shortness of breath, and pneumonia, that frequently progressed to acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) and multiorgan failure (28, 68, 69). In fatal cases, the median time from onset to death was 9 to 10 days (1). Systemic spread (18) and hypercytokinemia (11) have been described as possible disease-aggravating factors of HPAIV-H5N1 viruses, but the reasons for their high virulence in humans are incompletely understood.Due to the potential pandemic threat presented by H5N1 viruses, there is great interest in the identification of viral virulence determinants and their mode of action. This is critical not only for a better understanding of the pathogenic mechanisms induced by these viruses but also for the development of new drugs to treat the infections. The high virulence of HPAIV-H5N1 isolates in the avian host correlates with the presence of a polybasic cleavage site in the hemagglutinin (HA), facilitating its intracellular cleavage by furin-like proteases (27, 50). Further, amino acid substitutions in the PA protein (T515A) (30) and in the NS1 protein (V149A) (40) have been reported to regulate the virulence of corresponding HPAIV-H5N1 isolates in ducks and chickens. The known molecular determinants of virulence in mammalian hosts also include the polybasic cleavage site in the HA (23) and several polymorphisms in the PB2 polymerase subunit and the proapoptotic PB1-F2 protein. Thus, a serine residue at position 66 in the PB1-F2 protein increased viral replication and decreased survival in the mouse model (9). Also, specific amino acid polymorphisms within PB2 (E627K or D701N) can increase virulence in mice (23, 39) and viral replication in mammalian cells (7, 57, 58). Furthermore, the nonstructural NS1 protein, which has a major function in the inhibition of type I interferon (IFN) (17, 19) and in the limitation of the antiviral effects of IFN-induced proteins, including PKR (4, 22), OAS/RNase L (45), and RIG-I (16, 48, 63, 64), contributes to virulence in mammals (34, 55).The domain structure of the NS1 protein is well characterized; it includes an N-terminal RNA binding and dimerization domain and a nuclear localization signal (NLS) at positions 34 to 38 (summarized in reference 19). The NS1 proteins of most human strains circulating between 1950 and 1986 also contain a second NLS at positions 219 to 227 (NLS-2), which includes four conserved basic amino acids (K219, R220, R224, R227) (44). A large-scale sequence analysis showed that the NS1 proteins of avian and human influenza viruses differ in their C-terminal sequences, indicating possible differences in the associated activity (46). Among most high- and low-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses, the last four NS1 amino acids consist of the conserved sequence ESEV (3,007 of 3,692 isolates described in the NCBI database [3]), while for the majority of seasonal human influenza viruses, the motif RSKV is typical (1,911 of 2,713 isolates). Significantly, only the NS1 protein carrying the “avian” ESEV motif interacted in vitro with 24 cellular factors carrying a PDZ (postsynaptic density protein 95, Drosophila disc large tumor suppressor, and zonula occludens 1 protein) domain. The human genome encodes at least 214 proteins containing one or more of these protein interaction modules that recognize short peptide motifs, which are most often present at the C termini of their targets (36, 38). Many PDZ domain proteins have been shown to mediate the formation and localization of higher-order complexes and to participate in various cellular signaling events regulating, for instance, cell polarity and neuronal function (31). Therefore, it was hypothesized that the abundant expression of “avian” NS1 protein capable of interacting with human PDZ domains could possibly disturb their function and aggravate disease severity in H5N1 infections (46). However, there is only limited experimental support for the universal validity of this hypothesis. The grafting of the “avian” ESEV sequence into the C terminus of NS1 protein expressed by mouse-adapted influenza A/WSN/33 virus (H1N1) decreased the mean lethal dose by about 1 order of magnitude (32). Still, it is not clear to what extent this motif contributes to the virulence of HPAIV-H5N1 and other natural influenza A viruses in avian and mammalian hosts.The goal of the present study was to elucidate the role of the C-terminal NS1 motif in viral replication and disease caused by the prototypic influenza A/Vietnam/1203/04 (VN/1203) virus, isolated in a fatal human case (60). This virus expresses an NS1 protein that is very similar or identical at positions 1 to 215 to homologues expressed by other HPAIV-H5N1 strains but naturally lacks the 10 C-terminal amino acids (aa), including the terminal ESEV motif, due to a premature stop codon (Fig. ​(Fig.1).1). We used reverse genetics to produce a recombinant VN/1203 wild-type (WT) virus and two variants with reconstituted NS1 C termini ending either with the “avian” ESEV or with the “human” RSKV sequence. Experimental infections of mice and chickens revealed that all three viruses caused highly lethal infections in both species, with only moderate differences in viral titers in the organs of the mice. Thus, we show that the C-terminal ESEV motif of the NS1 protein contributes little to the virulence of H5N1 viruses in mice and chickens, and we suggest that this motif modulates viral virulence in a strain- and host-dependent manner.Open in a separate windowFIG. 1.Growth kinetics of recombinant VN/1203 viruses expressing WT or elongated NS1 proteins in human, murine, and avian cells. (A) Scheme of the viral VN/1203-NS1 protein with the RNA binding domain and the nuclear localization signals (NLS) at positions 34 to 38 and 214 to 225 indicated. Amino acids involved in NLS2 function are underlined. The C-terminal sequences of the WT and elongated mutant NS1 proteins are given, and the PL motif is shown in boldface. (B to E) Human A549 alveolar cells, murine NIH 3T3 fibroblasts, chicken embryo fibroblasts (CEFs), or EFB-R1 duck embryo fibroblasts (DEFs) were infected with recombinant VN/1203-WT, -ESEV, or -RSKV viruses at an MOI of 0.001. Aliquots of supernatants were harvested at the indicated time points, and samples were titrated by plaque assays in MDCK cells. (F) Human A549 cells were infected at an MOI of 2, and virus titers in supernatants taken at the indicated time points were determined by plaque assays. Results are averages for at least two independent experiments with biological duplicates. Error bars indicate standard deviations.