Historical Museology Meets Tropical Biodiversity Conservation

The great scientific importance of historical collections is a well-established fact. On the contrary, their value as vehicles to promote public awareness and effective conservation projects in some of the most valuable biodiversity hotspots in the tropics appear to have been greatly overlooked by Natural History Museums and similar institutions. Utilising the vertebrate collections of Italian institutions as a case study, the great potential of these medium-sized museums to popularising and promoting biodiversity in some of the most valuable regions of the world, utilising the history of their collections and of the men which collected and studied them, is emphasised.     

Evolution with material symbol systems

Pattee's semantic closure principle is used to study the characteristics and requirements of evolving material symbols systems. By contrasting agents that reproduce via genetic variation with agents that reproduce via self-inspection, we reach the conclusion that symbols are necessary to attain open-ended evolution, but only if the phenotypes of agents are the result of a material, self-organization process. This way, a study of the inter-dependencies of symbol and matter is presented. This study is based first on a theoretical treatment of symbolic representations, and secondly on simulations of simple agents with matter-symbol inter-dependencies. The agent-based simulations use evolutionary algorithms with indirectly encoded phenotypes. The indirect encoding is based on Fuzzy Development programs, which are procedures for combining fuzzy sets in such a way as to model self-organizing development processes.     

Evolution of cooperation under -person snowdrift games

In the animal world, performing a given task which is beneficial to an entire group requires the cooperation of several individuals of that group who often share the workload required to perform the task. The mathematical framework to study the dynamics of collective action is game theory. Here we study the evolutionary dynamics of cooperators and defectors in a population in which groups of individuals engage in N-person, non-excludable public goods games. We explore an N-person generalization of the well-known two-person snowdrift game. We discuss both the case of infinite and finite populations, taking explicitly into consideration the possible existence of a threshold above which collective action is materialized. Whereas in infinite populations, an N-person snowdrift game (NSG) leads to a stable coexistence between cooperators and defectors, the introduction of a threshold leads to the appearance of a new interior fixed point associated with a coordination threshold. The fingerprints of the stable and unstable interior fixed points still affect the evolutionary dynamics in finite populations, despite evolution leading the population inexorably to a monomorphic end-state. However, when the group size and population size become comparable, we find that spite sets in, rendering cooperation unfeasible.     

Evolution as a cognition process: Towards an evolutionary epistemology

Recently, biologist and philosophers have been much attracted by an evolutionary view of knowledge, so-called evolutionary epistemology. Developing this insight, the present paper argues that our cognitive abilities are the outcome of organic evolution, and that, conversely, evolution itself may be described as a cognition process. Furthermore, it is argued that the key to an adequate evolutionary epistemology lies in a system-theoretical approach to evolution which grows from, but goes beyond, Darwin's theory of natural selection.     

Über die Beziehung zwischen Systematik und Evolution

The relation between systematics and evolution The theoretical and methodological decoupling of pattern analysis from the causal explanation of the hierarchical order of nature by the hypothesis of descent with modification is defended. This contrasts with the philosophy of phylogenetic systematics which views acceptance of evolutionary theory as a necessary prerequisite for research in systematics.     

Sewall Wright’s adaptive landscapes: 1932 vs. 1988

Sewall Wright introduced the metaphor of evolution on “adaptive landscapes” in a pair of papers published in 1931 and 1932. The metaphor has been one of the most influential in modern evolutionary biology, although recent theoretical advancements show that it is deeply flawed and may have actually created research questions that are not, in fact, fecund. In this paper I examine in detail what Wright actually said in the 1932 paper, as well as what he thought of the matter at the very end of his career, in 1988. While the metaphor is flawed, some of the problems which Wright was attempting to address are still with us today, and are in the process of being reformulated as part of a forthcoming Extended Evolutionary Synthesis.

Evolution,games theory and polyhedra

The problem of finding an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) for an animal species is defined. It is shown how such strategies are a subset of the equilibrium solutions for a particular non-zero sum game. These equilibrium solutions are then shown to arise from the vertices of a particular convex polyhedron. A method of finding these equilibrium solutions through the vertices and then the ESS solutions is given. This is illustrated by a number of numerical examples taken from the literature. Finally an alternative approach based on solving a Linear Complementarity Problem is discussed.     

How can we model selectively neutral density dependence in evolutionary games

The problem of density dependence appears in all approaches to the modelling of population dynamics. It is pertinent to classic models (i.e., Lotka-Volterra's), and also population genetics and game theoretical models related to the replicator dynamics. There is no density dependence in the classic formulation of replicator dynamics, which means that population size may grow to infinity. Therefore the question arises: How is unlimited population growth suppressed in frequency-dependent models? Two categories of solutions can be found in the literature. In the first, replicator dynamics is independent of background fitness. In the second type of solution, a multiplicative suppression coefficient is used, as in a logistic equation. Both approaches have disadvantages. The first one is incompatible with the methods of life history theory and basic probabilistic intuitions. The logistic type of suppression of per capita growth rate stops trajectories of selection when population size reaches the maximal value (carrying capacity); hence this method does not satisfy selective neutrality. To overcome these difficulties, we must explicitly consider turn-over of individuals dependent on mortality rate. This new approach leads to two interesting predictions. First, the equilibrium value of population size is lower than carrying capacity and depends on the mortality rate. Second, although the phase portrait of selection trajectories is the same as in density-independent replicator dynamics, pace of selection slows down when population size approaches equilibrium, and then remains constant and dependent on the rate of turn-over of individuals.     

The force of selection on the human life cycle

In this article, I present evidence for a robust and quite general force of selection on the human life cycle. The force of selection acts in remarkably invariant ways on human life histories, despite a great abundance of demographic diversity. Human life histories are highly structured, with mortality and fertility changing substantially through the life cycle. This structure necessitates the use of structured population models to understand human life history evolution. Using such structured models, I find that the vital rates to which fitness is most sensitive are prereproductive survival probabilities, particularly the survival of children ages 0 to 4 years. The fact that the preponderance of selection falls on transitions related to recruitment combined with the late age at first reproduction characteristic of the human life cycle creates a fitness bottleneck out of recruitment. Because of this, antagonistic pleiotropy with any trait that detracts from the constituent transitions to recruitment is expected. I explore the predictors of variation in the force of selection on early survival. High fertility increases the selective premium placed on early survivorship, whereas high life expectancy at birth decreases it.     

Evolution of Rotifer Life Histories

When compared to most other multicellular animals, rotifers are all relatively small, short-lived and fast-reproducing organisms. However among and within different rotifer species there is a large variation in life history patterns. This review accounts for such variation in rotifers, with a strong focus on monogonont rotifers. As the life cycle of monogonont rotifers involves both asexual and sexual reproduction, life history patterns can be examined on the level of the genetic individual, which includes all asexual females, sexual females and males that originated from one resting egg. This concept has been applied successfully in many areas, for example in predicting optimal levels of mictic reproduction or sex allocation theory. The benefits and implications of the view of the genetic individual are discussed in detail. Rotifer life histories can also be viewed on the level of physiological individuals. A large part of this review deals with the life histories of individual amictic females and addresses life history traits like body size, egg size and resource allocation patterns. It asks which trade-offs exist among those traits, how these traits change under the influence of environmental factors like food availability or temperature, and whether these changes can be interpreted as adaptive.     

Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals

The paper investigates the class of signaling games with the following properties: (a) the interests of sender and receiver coincide, (b) different signals incur differential costs, and (c) different events (meanings/types) have different probabilities. Necessary and sufficient conditions are presented for a profile to be evolutionarily stable and neutrally stable, and for a set of profiles to be an evolutionarily stable set.The main finding is that a profile belongs to some evolutionarily stable set if and only if a maximal number of events can be reliably communicated. Furthermore, it is shown that under the replicator dynamics, a set of states with a positive measure is attracted to “sub-optimal” equilibria that do not belong to any asymptotically stable set.     

The Evolution of Complex Organs

The origin of complex biological structures has long been a subject of interest and debate. Two centuries ago, natural explanations for their occurrence were considered inconceivable. However, 150 years of scientific investigation have yielded a conceptual framework, abundant data, and a range of analytical tools capable of addressing this question. This article reviews the various direct and indirect evolutionary processes that contribute to the origins of complex organs. The evolution of eyes is used as a case study to illustrate these concepts, and several of the most common misconceptions about complex organ evolution are discussed.

Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with mixed strategies

We develop a new method for studying stochastic evolutionary game dynamics of mixed strategies. We consider the general situation: there are n pure strategies whose interactions are described by an n×n payoff matrix. Players can use mixed strategies, which are given by the vector (p₁,…,p_n). Each entry specifies the probability to use the corresponding pure strategy. The sum over all entries is one. Therefore, a mixed strategy is a point in the simplex S_n. We study evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed population of finite size. Individuals reproduce proportional to payoff. We consider the case of weak selection, which means the payoff from the game is only a small contribution to overall fitness. Reproduction can be subject to mutation; a mutant adopts a randomly chosen mixed strategy. We calculate the average abundance of every mixed strategy in the stationary distribution of the mutation-selection process. We find the crucial conditions that specify if a strategy is favored or opposed by selection. One condition holds for low mutation rate, another for high mutation rate. The result for any mutation rate is a linear combination of those two. As a specific example we study the Hawk-Dove game. We prove general statements about the relationship between games with pure and with mixed strategies.     

Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies

In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games among n strategies in populations of large but finite size. We explore stochastic evolutionary dynamics under weak selection, but for any mutation rate. We analyze the frequency dependent Moran process in well-mixed populations, but almost identical results are found for the Wright-Fisher and Pairwise Comparison processes. Surprisingly simple conditions specify whether a strategy is more abundant on average than 1/n, or than another strategy, in the mutation-selection equilibrium. We find one condition that holds for low mutation rate and another condition that holds for high mutation rate. A linear combination of these two conditions holds for any mutation rate. Our results allow a complete characterization of n×n games in the limit of weak selection.     

Natural selection and the origin and maintenance of standard genetic marker systems

Natural selection has always been assumed to be the major force of evolution, but its presence has been difficult to demonstrate. A review of the evidence for selective differences among genotypes for most human genetic polymorphisms indicates there is little of a direct nature. Indirect theoretical evidence, however, seems to support a major role for natural selection, and it does not seem to support the hypothesis that most amino acid substitutions within the human species are neutral. Among small isolates, most of the gene frequency differences are most likely due to genetic drift or the founder effect, and the principal counterbalancing force is gene flow or migration. But genetic differences among the major human subdivisions do not seem to be due to the same interacting forces. One reason for the inability to detect selection has been an oversimplified view of its operation, which assigns genotypes a constant fitness in every generation. Many recent theoretical developments of more complicated kinds of selection may lead to a resolution of the problem and suggest better interpretations of the enormous amount of data on human genetic variation that is rapidly accumulating.     

Evolution of extraordinary female-biased sex ratios: the optimal schedule of sex ratio in local mate competition

Female-biased sex ratio in local mate competition has been well studied both theoretically and experimentally. However, some experimental data show more female-biased sex ratios than the theoretical predictions by Hamilton [1967. Science 156, 477-488] and its descendants. Here we consider the following two effects: (1) lethal male-male combat and (2) time-dependent control (or schedule) of sex ratio. The former is denoted by a male mortality being an increasing function of the number of males. The optimal schedule is analytically obtained as an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) by using Pontrjagin's maximum principle. As a result, an ESS is a schedule where only males are produced first, then the proportion of females are gradually increased, and finally only females are produced. Total sex ratio (sex ratio averaged over the whole reproduction period) is more female-biased than the Hamilton's result if and only if the two effects work together. The bias is stronger when lethal male combat is severer or a reproduction period is longer. When male-male combat is very severe, the sex ratio can be extraordinary female-biased (less than 5%). The model assumptions and the results generally agree with experimental data on Melittobia wasps in which extraordinary female-biased sex ratio is observed. Our study might provide a new basis for the evolution of female-biased sex ratios in local mate competition.     

Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations

Fixation processes in evolutionary game dynamics in finite diploid populations are investigated. Traditionally, frequency dependent evolutionary dynamics is modeled as deterministic replicator dynamics. This implies that the infinite size of the population is assumed implicitly. In nature, however, population sizes are finite. Recently, stochastic processes in finite populations have been introduced in order to study finite size effects in evolutionary game dynamics. One of the most significant studies on evolutionary dynamics in finite populations was carried out by Nowak et al. which describes “one-third law” [Nowak, et al., 2004. Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428, 646-650]. It states that under weak selection, if the fitness of strategy α is greater than that of strategy β when α has a frequency , strategy α fixates in a β-population with selective advantage. In their study, it is assumed that the inheritance of strategies is asexual, i.e. the population is haploid. In this study, we apply their framework to a diploid population that plays a two-strategy game with two ESSs (a bistable game). The fixation probability of a mutant allele in this diploid population is derived. A “three-tenth law” for a completely recessive mutant allele and a “two-fifth law” for a completely dominant mutant allele are found; other cases are also discussed.