Transcendental Niche Construction

I discuss various reactions to my article "Again, what the philosophy of science is not" [Callebaut (Acta Biotheor 53:92-122 (2005a))], most of which concern the naturalism issue, the place of the philosophy of biology within philosophy of science and philosophy at large, and the proper tasks of the philosophy of biology.     

基于空间句法的扬州何园空间组织特征分析

何园是最具代表性的扬州园林之一,以复道回廊、宅园互渗等空间布局特色最负盛名。基于空间句法理论的视域分析法,选取整合度、连接度、平均深度等参数从可行与可视层面量化描述与分析何园的空间组织特色与发展变化。研究表明：1）宅园互渗的何园在其私园及公园时期主要住宅空间和主要园林空间在可达性与可视性上均符合不同功能要求,何园公园化后各出入口位置与功能的调整相对合理;2）定量分析方法有助于进一步把握古典园林的造园思想与布局特色和在现代园林的功能要求、空间配置中的融合与应用。     

Doing Philosophy Effectively: Student Learning in Classroom Teaching

An important aim of teaching philosophy in Dutch secondary schools is to learn about philosophy (i.e., the great philosophers) by doing philosophy. We examined doing philosophy and focused specifically on the relationship between student learning activities and teacher behavior; in doing so, a qualitative cross-case analysis of eight philosophy lessons was performed. The effectiveness of doing philosophy was operationalized into five learning activities comprising rationalizing, analyzing, testing, producing criticism, and reflecting, and scored by means of qualitative graphical time registration. Using CA we find a quantitative one-dimensional scale for the lessons that contrasts lessons that are more and less effective in terms of learning and teaching. A relationship was found between teaching by teachers and doing philosophy by students. In particular we found students to produce a higher level of doing philosophy with teachers who chose to organize a philosophical discussion with shared guidance by the teacher together with the students.     

Size doesn’t matter: towards a more inclusive philosophy of biology

Philosophers of biology, along with everyone else, generally perceive life to fall into two broad categories, the microbes and macrobes, and then pay most of their attention to the latter. ‘Macrobe’ is the word we propose for larger life forms, and we use it as part of an argument for microbial equality. We suggest that taking more notice of microbes – the dominant life form on the planet, both now and throughout evolutionary history – will transform some of the philosophy of biology’s standard ideas on ontology, evolution, taxonomy and biodiversity. We set out a number of recent developments in microbiology – including biofilm formation, chemotaxis, quorum sensing and gene transfer – that highlight microbial capacities for cooperation and communication and break down conventional thinking that microbes are solely or primarily single-celled organisms. These insights also bring new perspectives to the levels of selection debate, as well as to discussions of the evolution and nature of multicellularity, and to neo-Darwinian understandings of evolutionary mechanisms. We show how these revisions lead to further complications for microbial classification and the philosophies of systematics and biodiversity. Incorporating microbial insights into the philosophy of biology will challenge many of its assumptions, but also give greater scope and depth to its investigations.     

Checks and balances: the welcomed tension between philosophy and science

There is a tension between science and philosophy, but this tension need not engender enmity or derision. Scientists and philosophers can work together, and we argue that working together is beneficial to both, even if it is sometimes uncomfortable. We offer examples of how philosophy can autonomously and effectively inform scientific practice. Science and philosophy share certain methodological concerns and practices; therefore, scientists who disregard philosophy are vulnerable to critical conceptual mistakes. If our arguments are correct, and if it can also be shown that science informs philosophy, then, while it is possible for both disciplines to operate autonomously, each should welcome the checks and balances that each provides for one another in the investigation and explanation of reality.     

IMPRESSIONS OF SOVIET PSYCHIATRY

Psychiatry in the Soviet Union is essentially conservative, middle-of-the-road and eclectic. It rejects both extremes: radical surgical treatment such as prefrontal lobotomy, and Freudian psychoanalysis. It is Pavlovian and neurophysiological in its orientation and closely linked to Marxian philosophy; most personal problems are believed to be sociocultural in origin, and they are expected to diminish as the country moves closer toward its political and economic goals, making psychiatry progressively more circumscribed in its applications.The varieties of therapy include work therapy, aimed toward returning patients to society quickly and productively; electrosleep therapy and electroconvulsive therapy, both of which seem to be falling into disrepute; insulin-coma therapy, widely used in psychosis; hunger therapy; pharmacotherapy similar to our own but lacking in the large numbers of drugs we use; tissue therapy; psychotherapy, of limited depth and chiefly concerned with the rational, conscious elements in the patient''s life.     

Philosophy of Biology: Naturalistic or Transcendental?

The aim of this article is to clarify the meaning of a naturalistic position within philosophy of biology, against the background of an alternative view, founded on the basic insights of transcendental philosophy. It is argued that the apparently minimal and neutral constraints naturalism imposes on philosophy of science turn out to involve a quite heavily constraining metaphysics, due to the naturalism's fundamental neglect of its own perspective. Because of its intrinsic sensitivity to perspectivity and historicity, transcendental philosophy can avoid this type of hidden metaphysics.     

Philosophy of medicine is what philosophers of medicine do

Philosophy of medicine cannot be precisely defined because neither philosophy nor medicine can be precisely defined. Furthermore, philosophers of medicine do not constitute a well-defined class because they come not only from the fields of philosophy and medicine, but also from various other disciplines. Hence, I argue for a broad conception of philosophy of medicine that includes philosophical reflection on any matter considered to belong to medicine. A brief survey of the philosophy of medicine literature supports this view. Of the 625 articles surveyed for the years 1997-2006, nearly three-quarters dealt with matters of ethics, and of the 36 books surveyed, nearly 60% were primarily on ethics. Nonetheless, articles and books focusing on all other major branches of philosophy--metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and logic--were also published. Moreover, many of the articles, even those primarily on ethics, dealt in significant ways with more than one branch of philosophy. I conclude that philosophy of medicine includes all sorts of philosophical reflection on medicine but is currently dominated by ethics. Given the stated purpose of journals and book series devoted to philosophy and medicine, this leaves ample room to expand other philosophical reflection on medicine.     

The future of philosophy

There is no sharp dividing line between science and philosophy, but philosophical problems tend to have three special features. First, they tend to concern large frameworks rather than specific questions within the framework. Second, they are questions for which there is no generally accepted method of solution. And third they tend to involve conceptual issues. For these reasons a philosophical problem such as the nature of life can become a scientific problem if it is put into a shape where it admits of scientific resolution. Philosophy in the 20th century was characterized by a concern with logic and language, which is markedly different from the concerns of earlier centuries of philosophy. However, it shared with the European philosophical tradition since the 17th century an excessive concern with issues in the theory of knowledge and with scepticism. As the century ends, we can see that scepticism no longer occupies centre stage, and this enables us to have a more constructive approach to philosophical problems than was possible for earlier generations. This situation is somewhat analogous to the shift from the sceptical concerns of Socrates and Plato to the constructive philosophical enterprise of Aristotle. With that in mind, we can discuss the prospects for the following six philosophical areas: (1) the traditional mind-body problem; (ii) the philosophy of mind and cognitive science; (iii) the philosophy of language; (iv) the philosophy of society; (v) ethics and practical reasons; (vi) the philosophy of science. The general theme of these investigations, I believe, is that the appraisal of the true significance of issues in the philosophy of knowledge enables us to have a more constructive account of various other philosophical problems than has typically been possible for the past three centuries.     

EPIDEMIOLOGY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN LIGHT OF SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH RESEARCH

The present article identifies how social determinants of health raise two categories of philosophical problems that also fall within the smaller domain of ethics; one set pertains to the philosophy of epidemiology, and the second set pertains to the philosophy of health and social justice. After reviewing these two categories of ethical concerns, the limited conclusion made is that identifying and responding to social determinants of health requires inter-disciplinary reasoning across epidemiology and philosophy. For the reasoning used in epidemiology to be sound, for its scope and (moral) purpose as a science to be clarified as well as for social justice theory to be relevant and coherent, epidemiology and philosophy need to forge a meaningful exchange of ideas that happens in both directions.     

A note on communicating environmental change for non-market valuation

Communicating change in environmental condition is a critical component of non-market valuation studies. However, the underlying assumptions and implications associated with alternative ways of expressing change in environmental condition for surveys are rarely discussed in the literature. Our review found no cases where alternative formulations were both discussed and tested. In this note we report on our multi-disciplinary analysis of how best to express such change. We interrogate the meaning of, and inferences from, four formulations for quantitative expressions, or metrics, of environmental indicators that are used in the field of ecology and we then evaluate their usefulness in non-market valuation. The assumptions and limitations of each formulation are discussed using seven hypothetical cases of change in environmental condition. We show that formulations for expressing change can be grouped based on two inherent philosophies potentially held by people when they consider their preferences for environmental changes: ‘more is better philosophy’ and ‘restoration philosophy’. We contend that, without careful consideration of which philosophy people may apply, it is possible to inadvertently bias respondent choices when a particular formulation is used in a valuation study. If this happens, resulting value estimates will be a poor reflection of what researchers seek. An alternative approach that does not presuppose a philosophy but instead helps reveal a respondent’s philosophy, is proposed.     

The Philosophy of Donald T. Campbell: A Short Review and Critical Appraisal

Aside from his remarkable studies in psychology and the social sciences, Donald Thomas Campbell (1916–1996) made significant contributions to philosophy, particularly philosophy of science,epistemology, and ethics. His name and his work are inseparably linked with the evolutionary approach to explaining human knowledge (evolutionary epistemology). He was an indefatigable supporter of the naturalistic turn in philosophy and has strongly influenced the discussion of moral issues (evolutionary ethics). The aim of this paper is to briefly characterize Campbells work and to discuss its philosophical implications. In particular, I show its relevance to some current debates in the intersection of biology and philosophy. In fact, philosophy of biology would look poorer without Campbells influence. The present paper is not a hagiography but an attempt to evaluate and critically discuss the meaning of Campbells work for philosophy of biology and to encourage scholars working in this field to read and re-read this work which is both challenging and inspiring.     

Again,What the Philosophy of Biology is not

There are many things that philosophy of biology might be. But, given the existence of a professional philosophy of biology that is arguably a progressive research program and, as such, unrivaled, it makes sense to define philosophy of biology more narrowly than the totality of intersecting concerns biologists and philosophers (let alone other scholars) might have. The reasons for the success of the “new” philosophy of biology remain poorly understood. I reflect on what Dutch and Flemish, and, more generally, European philosophers of biology could do to improve the situation of their discipline locally, regionally, and internationally, paying particular attention to the lessons to be learned from the “Science Wars.” This paper grew out of my contribution to the symposium Philosophy of Biology in the Netherlands and Flanders organized by Thomas Reydon and Sabina Leonelli in Amsterdam in February 2004. It is a rather personal reaction to many of the opinions voiced in the quite heated atmosphere of the Symposium. My main concern is to convey an idea of what, according to me, is required to turn “our” philosophy of biology into a more successful enterprise than it currently is. This is motivated by a disconcerting discovery I made at the Symposium: Contrary to my expectations, a sensitivity for the sorts of things that make possible philosophy of biology of the best kind available today seems to be largely lacking in our part of the world. I wish to stress from the outset that although I will be quite polemical at times, this is always intended in the spirit of constructive dialogue.     

Philosophy of Biology: About the Fossilization of Disciplines and Other Embryonic Thoughts

This paper focuses on a running dispute between Werner Callebaut's naturalistic view and Filip Kolen and Gertrudis Van de Vijver's transcendentalist view on the nature of philosophy of biology and the relation of this discipline to biological sciences. It is argued that, despite differences in opinion, both positions agree that philosophy of biology's ultimate goal is to 'move' biology or at least be 'meaningful' to it. In order to make this goal clear and effective, more is needed than a polarizing debate which hardly touches upon biology. Therefore, a redirection in discussion is suggested towards a reflection on the possibilities of incorporating philosophy in interdisciplinary research, and on finding concrete research questions which are of interest both to the philosopher and to the biologist.     

Les thérapies comportementales et cognitives, l’épicurisme et le stoïcisme

This article aims to show that philosophy, particularly Epicureanism and Stoicism, had an essentially therapeutic role in antiquity — the various schools of philosophy dispensing specific teachings aimed at treating mental suffering, in a precise place (the scholé), with a master and a specified methodology. Of course, it may seem anachronistic to try and compare a modern, progressive and proven therapeutic method such as cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT, TCC in French) with a frequently dogmatic, 2000-year-old school of philosophy. And yet, the difference is not as clear-cut as we might think, since the two have much in common, such as similar kinds of suffering, a referent (or therapist), common methods (language, reasoning) and a common goal (peace of mind). We therefore intend to try and synthesise the meeting points and also the differences between two main schools of antique philosophy and CBT.     

Interdisciplinary integration in biology? An overview

Philosophical theories about reduction and integration in science are at variance with what is happenign in science. A realistic approach to science show that possibilities for reduction and integration are limited. The classical ideal of a unified science has since long been rejected in philosophy. But the current emphasis on interdisciplinary integration in philosophy and in science shows that it survives in a different guise. It is necessary to redress the balance, specifically in biology. Methodological analysis shows that many of the grand interdisciplinary theories involving biology actually represent pseudo-integration covered up by inappropriate, overgeneral concepts. Integrationism is not bad, but it must be kept within reasonable bounds. If the present analysis is appropriate, there will have to be fundamental changes in research strategy both in science and in the philosophy of science.     

The philosophical "mind-body problem" and its relevance for the relationship between psychiatry and the neurosciences

Parallel to psychiatry, "philosophy of mind" investigates the relationship between mind (mental domain) and body/brain (physical domain). Unlike older forms of philosophy of mind, contemporary analytical philosophy is not exclusively based on introspection and conceptual analysis, but also draws upon the empirical methods and findings of the sciences. This article outlines the conceptual framework of the "mind-body problem" as formulated in contemporary analytical philosophy and argues that this philosophical debate has potentially far-reaching implications for psychiatry as a clinical-scientific discipline, especially for its own autonomy and its relationship to neurology/neuroscience. This point is illustrated by a conceptual analysis of the five principles formulated in Kandel's 1998 article "A New Intellectual Framework for Psychiatry." Kandel's position in the philosophical mind-body debate is ambiguous, ranging from reductive physicalism (psychophysical identity theory) to non-reductive physicalism (in which the mental "supervenes" on the physical) to epiphenomenalist dualism or even emergent dualism. We illustrate how these diverging interpretations result in radically different views on the identity of psychiatry and its relationship with the rapidly expanding domain of neurology/neuroscience.     

Philosophy and tinkering

I characterize Wimsatt’s approach to philosophy of science as philosophy for science and then briefly consider a theme emerging from his work that informs just one of the many current developments in philosophy of biology that he inspired: scaffolding as a problem of mechanistic explanation for functionalists.