Sober &; Wilson’s evolutionary arguments for psychological altruism: a reassessment

In their book Unto Others, Sober and Wilson argue that various evolutionary considerations (based on the logic of natural selection) lend support to the truth of psychological altruism. However, recently, Stephen Stich has raised a number of challenges to their reasoning: in particular, he claims that three out of the four evolutionary arguments they give are internally unconvincing, and that the one that is initially plausible fails to take into account recent findings from cognitive science and thus leaves open a number of egoistic responses. These challenges make it necessary to reassess the plausibility of Sober & Wilson’s evolutionary account—which is what I aim to do in this paper. In particular, I try to show that, as a matter of fact, Sober & Wilson’s case remains compelling, as some of Stich’s concerns rest on a confusion, and those that do not are not sufficiently strong to establish all the conclusions he is after. The upshot is that no reason has been given to abandon the view that evolutionary theory has advanced the debate surrounding psychological altruism.     

Brocchi,Darwin, and Transmutation: Phylogenetics and Paleontology at the Dawn of Evolutionary Biology

Giambattista Brocchi’s (1814) monograph (see Dominici, Evo Edu Outreach, this issue, 2010) on the Tertiary fossils of the Subappenines in Italy—and their relation to the living molluscan fauna—contains a theoretical, transmutational perspective (“Brocchian transmutation”). Unlike Lamarck (1809), Brocchi saw species as discrete and fundamentally stable entities. Explicitly analogizing the births and deaths of species with those of individual organisms (“Brocchi’s analogy”), Brocchi proposed that species have inherent longevities, eventually dying of old age unless driven to extinction by external forces. As for individuals, births and deaths of species are understood to have natural causes; sequences of births and deaths of species produce genealogical lineages of descent, and faunas become increasingly modernized through time. Brocchi calculated that over 50% of his fossil species are still alive in the modern fauna. Brocchi’s work was reviewed by Horner (1816) in Edinburgh. Brocchi’s influence as a transmutational thinker is clear in Jameson’s (1827) “geological illustrations” in his fifth edition of his translation of Cuvier’s Theory of the Earth (read by his student Charles Darwin) and in the anonymous essays of 1826 and 1827 published in the Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal—which also carried a notice of Brocchi’s death in 1827. The notion that new species replace older, extinct ones—in what today would be called an explicitly phylogenetic context—permeates these essays. Herschel’s (1830) discussion of temporal replacement of species and the modernization of faunas closely mirrors these prior discussions. His book, dedicated to the search for natural causes of natural phenomena, was read by Charles Darwin while a student at Cambridge. Darwin’s work on HMS Beagle was in large measure an exploration of replacement patterns of “allied forms” of endemic species in time and in space. His earliest discussions of transmutation, in his essay February 1835, as well as the Red Notebook and the early pages of Notebook B (the latter two written in 1837 back in England), contain Brocchi’s analogy, including the idea of inherent species longevities. Darwin’s first theory of the origin of species was explicitly saltational, invoking geographic isolation as the main cause of the abrupt appearance of new species. We conclude that Darwin was testing the predicted patterns of both Brocchian and Lamarckian transmutation as early as 1832 at the outset of his work on the Beagle.     

Last days in the old radiation laboratory (ORL), Berkeley,California, 1954

Govindjee, the founding editor of the Historical Corner of Photosynthesis Research, invited me 3 years ago to tell the story of why I left Melvin Calvin’s laboratory in the mid 1950s long before the 1961 Nobel Prize in Chemistry was awarded to Calvin for the path of carbon in photosynthesis. I have already written my scientific perspective on this topic (see Benson (Photosynth Res 73:29–49, 2002); also see Bassham (Photosynth Res 76:35–52, 2003) as he was also a major player in this research). Here, I present my recollections of my last days in the old radiation laboratory (ORL) at Berkeley, California. References have been added by Govindjee for the benefit of the readers.     

An assessment of orchids’ diversity in Penang Hill,Penang, Malaysia after 115 years

A comprehensive study on the orchid diversity in Penang Hill, Penang, Malaysia was conducted from 2004 to 2008 with the objective to evaluate the presence of orchid species listed by Curtis (J Strait Br R Asiat Soc 25:67–173, 1894) after more than 100 years. A total of 85 species were identified during this study, of which 52 are epiphytic or lithophytic and 33 are terrestrial orchids. This study identified 57 species or 64.8% were the same as those recorded by Curtis (1894), and 78 species or 66.1% of Turner’s (Gardens’ Bull Singap 47(2):599–620, 1995) checklist of 118 species for the state of Penang including 18 species which were not recorded by Curtis (1894) and the current study but are actually collected from Penang Hill. A comparison table of the current findings against Curtis (1894) and Turner (1995) is provided which shows only 56 species were the same in all three studies. The preferred account for comparison was Curtis’ (1894) list as his report was specifically for the areas around Penang Island especially Penang Hill, Georgetown and Ayer Itam areas. Our study reveals that about 50% of Curtis’ collection localities have been converted to residential areas and agricultural land, and this probably explains the decreasing numbers of species found in the current study especially for the terrestrial species as epiphytic species have better adaptation capabilities towards environmental changes. Seven species were identified as new records to Penang Hill as they were not recorded by Curtis (1894). None of the three species recorded as endemic to Penang by Turner (1995) was recollected during the current study, of which only Zeuxine rupestris was in Curtis’ (1894) list. Overall, we concluded that Penang hill harbours at least 136 species of orchids of which 78 species or 57.4% were recollected in this study. This also indicates that this area is still suitable for orchid growth even though it is surrounded by rapid development and mass conversion of forested land into fruit orchards and residential area. The designation of Penang Hill as a Permanent Forest Reserve would better guarantee the survival of some orchid species unless human interventions and climatic changes occur.     

Simulation of biological evolution under attack,but not really: a response to Meester

The leading Intelligent Design theorist William Dembski (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham MD, 2002) argued that the first No Free Lunch theorem, first formulated by Wolpert and Macready (IEEE Trans Evol Comput 1: 67–82, 1997), renders Darwinian evolution impossible. In response, Dembski’s critics pointed out that the theorem is irrelevant to biological evolution. Meester (Biol Phil 24: 461–472, 2009) agrees with this conclusion, but still thinks that the theorem does apply to simulations of evolutionary processes. According to Meester, the theorem shows that simulations of Darwinian evolution, as these are typically set in advance by the programmer, are teleological and therefore non-Darwinian. Therefore, Meester argues, they are useless in showing how complex adaptations arise in the universe. Meester uses the term “teleological” inconsistently, however, and we argue that, no matter how we interpret the term, a Darwinian algorithm does not become non-Darwinian by simulation. We show that the NFL theorem is entirely irrelevant to this argument, and conclude that it does not pose a threat to the relevance of simulations of biological evolution.     

Constraining prior probabilities of phylogenetic trees

Although Bayesian methods are widely used in phylogenetic systematics today, the foundations of this methodology are still debated among both biologists and philosophers. The Bayesian approach to phylogenetic inference requires the assignment of prior probabilities to phylogenetic trees. As in other applications of Bayesian epistemology, the question of whether there is an objective way to assign these prior probabilities is a contested issue. This paper discusses the strategy of constraining the prior probabilities of phylogenetic trees by means of the Principal Principle. In particular, I discuss a proposal due to Velasco (Biol Philos 23:455–473, 2008) of assigning prior probabilities to tree topologies based on the Yule process. By invoking the Principal Principle I argue that prior probabilities of tree topologies should rather be assigned a weighted mixture of probability distributions based on Pinelis’ (P Roy Soc Lond B Bio 270:1425–1431, 2003) multi-rate branching process including both the Yule distribution and the uniform distribution. However, I argue that this solves the problem of the priors of phylogenetic trees only in a weak form.     

A Comparative Analysis of Integration Indices

The degree of integration of multidimensional phenotypes has an important place in evolutionary biology, pertaining to the structure of variation that is available for natural selection to work on and therefore to the evolutionary potential of the phenotype. Various indices have been suggested in the literature for measuring integration level, yet their statistical properties have remained mostly unstudied to date. In this study, I used simulations and resampling procedures in order to compare the distributions and sampling properties of different indices. I simulated heterogeneous correlation matrices that ranged widely in their integration level. I applied non-parametric bootstrapping to explore the effect of sampling on recovering the true integration value of these matrices. In addition, I generated the statistical power space for one of the integration indices—the relative standard deviation of the eigenvalues. The results show that the relative variance of eigenvalues maps exactly onto the mean coefficient of determination, and that the index suggested by Hansen and Houle (J Evol Biol 21:1201–1219, 2008) is the same as Van Valen’s (J Theor Biol 45:235–247, 1974) redundancy index, both of which have some undesirable sampling properties that render them less useful in most practical situations. Based on the power analysis, a sample of 30–40 specimens can be considered a sufficient minimum for most studies. The R codes provided here can be utilized by other researchers to yield case-specific insights.     

The rise and fall of handicap principle: a commentary on the “Modelling and the fall and rise of the handicap principle”

The honesty of animal communication is in the spot lights in the last 30 years. During most of this time the field was dominated by one explanation: Zahavi’s handicap principle (Zahavi, J Theor Biol 67:603–605, 1975; Grafen, J Theor Biol 144:517–546, 1990). Grose (Biol Philos 2011) embarks to explain both the success of the theory and the empirical difficulties that exist despite this success. While I wholeheartedly agree with the criticism offered by Grose and with almost all the claims he makes, the treatment of the issue is far from complete and it still leaves much to be explained. Accordingly, my commentary consist of six sections: in the first section I clear up some technical issues left unexposed, most importantly the role of strategic cost in handicap signalling; in the second section I relate this to empirical testing; in the next section I comment on the historical development of the handicap principle; in the fourth section I review the biological models that came up with conclusions that contradict the handicap principle; in the fifth section I discuss the reasons behind the success of the handicap theory; finally, in the last section I discuss the application of the handicap theory to anthropology and human sciences.     

Computing parametric beta diversity with unequal plot weights: a solution based on resampling methods

Jost (Ecology, 88:2427–2439, 2007) recently showed that the Shannon diversity is the only standard diversity measure that can be partitioned into meaningful independent alpha and beta components when plot weights are unequal. This conclusion is very disappointing if one wants to calculate the beta diversity of unequal weighted plots using a parametric measure with varying sensitivities to the occurrence of rare and abundant species. To overcome this impasse, at least partially, in this paper, I propose a parametric measure of beta diversity that is based on the combination of Shannon’s entropy with Hurlbert’s ‘expected species diversity’. Unlike most parametric measures of diversity, the proposed index has a clear probabilistic interpretation, allowing at the same time a multiplicative partition of diversity into independent alpha and beta components for unequally weighted plots.     

Law of the Minimum Paradoxes

The “Law of the Minimum” states that growth is controlled by the scarcest resource (limiting factor). This concept was originally applied to plant or crop growth (Justus von Liebig, 1840, Salisbury, Plant physiology, 4th edn., Wadsworth, Belmont, 1992) and quantitatively supported by many experiments. Some generalizations based on more complicated “dose-response” curves were proposed. Violations of this law in natural and experimental ecosystems were also reported. We study models of adaptation in ensembles of similar organisms under load of environmental factors and prove that violation of Liebig’s law follows from adaptation effects. If the fitness of an organism in a fixed environment satisfies the Law of the Minimum then adaptation equalizes the pressure of essential factors and, therefore, acts against the Liebig’s law. This is the the Law of the Minimum paradox: if for a randomly chosen pair “organism–environment” the Law of the Minimum typically holds, then in a well-adapted system, we have to expect violations of this law.     

Semioticians Make Strange Bedfellows! Or, Once Again: “Is Language a Primary Modelling System?”

Like other sciences, biosemiotics also has its time-honoured archive, consisting of writings by those who have been invented and revered as ancestors of the discipline. One such example is Jakob von Uexküll. As to the people who ‘invented’ him, they are either, to paraphrase a French cliché, ‘agents du cosmopolitisme sémiotique’ like Thomas Sebeok, or de jure and de facto progenitor like Thure von Uexküll. In the archive is the special issue of Semiotica 42. 1 (1982) edited by the late Sebeok and introduced by Thure von Uexküll. It is in the opening essay that Thure von UexküIl tries to restore Jakob von Uexküll’s role as a precursor of semiotics by negotiating the Elder with Saussure and the linguistics-oriented ‘semiology’ in his wake. However, semiotic mapping, in the strictly ‘disciplinary’ sense, of Jakob von Uexküll is no easy task because he ‘knew neither Peirce nor Saussure and did not use their terminology’ (Thure von Uexküll 1982,2). Because Thure prefers to call the Elder’s science ‘general semiotics’ (Thure von Uexküll 1982), this paper begins by assessing Thure von Uexküll’s semiotic configuration of Jakob, probe into the force and limits of the linguistic analogy, revisit the already time-honoured debate on the primary and secondary modelling systems, which was made famous by the Moscow-Tartu semioticians in the early 1970s, but severely criticized by Sebeok and his followers. The paper engages Sebeok from several fronts, directed first at his relegation of the Saussurian linguistic model, then at his critique of the Primary Modelling System, and finally at his reservation about evolutionism in light of the current debate on gene/meme co-evolution. Paper presented at the Eighth Annual International Gatherings in Biosemiotics University of the Aegean, Syros, Greece, 23–28 June 2008     

Causal Regularities in the Biological World of Contingent Distributions

Former discussions of biological generalizations have focused on the question of whether there are universal laws of biology. These discussions typically analyzed generalizations out of their investigative and explanatory contexts and concluded that whatever biological generalizations are, they are not universal laws. The aim of this paper is to explain what biological generalizations are by shifting attention towards the contexts in which they are drawn. I argue that within the context of any particular biological explanation or investigation, biologists employ two types of generations. One type identifies causal regularities exhibited by particular kinds of biological entities. The other type identifies how these entities are distributed in the biological world.     

A Biosemiotic Approach to the Problem of Structure and Agency

A human being is the simultaneous composite of several different levels of being, from atomic and subatomic to the level of complex social interaction, and these levels are nested within the individual hierarchically (lower levels giving rise to higher levels, etc.). One of the most important and influential approaches developed in the history of science has been that of systems theory and systemic thinking, in which the different levels of the hierarchy, and the interactions between those levels, are considered simultaneously. Although this model provides a comprehensive view of biological being, the transition from one level to the other is not well defined in it. Uexküll and Pauli (Advances: Journal of the Institute for 417 the Advancement of Health 3:158–174, 1986) suggested that semiosis is the translator of the events from one level to the other. From a psychological point of view, a myriad of semiotic events happen inside an individual, and it has been suggested that among other semiotic events, inner speech plays an important role in mediating personal agency. Dialogical theories of the self, Jungian psychology and hypnosis research evidence show that there is a semiotic multiplicity in human agency and consciousness, and that these multiple streams are all converge to a central semiotic singularity. I argue in this paper that by taking a biosemiotic point of view, human ‘agency’ may be defined as the ability of an individual to direct the incoming and internal streams of semioses and the ability to create an integrative and superordinate new stream of semiosis in addition to the upwardly and downwardly component ones, and how such a view might open a new door for research into the concept of human ‘personality’ and ‘agency’.     

Building momentum for systems and synthetic biology in India

Biological systems are inherently noisy. Predicting the outcome of a perturbation is extremely challenging. Traditional reductionist approach of describing properties of parts, vis-a-vis higher level behaviour has led to enormous understanding of fundamental molecular level biology. This approach typically consists of converting genes into junk (knock-down) and garbage (knock-out) and observe how a system responds. To enable broader understanding of biological dynamics, an integrated computational and experimental strategy was formally proposed in mid 1990s leading to the re-emergence of Systems Biology. However, soon it became clear that natural systems were far more complex than expected. A new strategy to address biological complexity was proposed at MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) in June 2004, when the first meeting of synthetic biology was held. Though the term ‘synthetic biology’ was proposed during 1970s (Szybalski in Control of gene expression, Plenum Press, New York, 1974), the usage of the original concept found an experimental proof in 2000 with the demonstration of a three-gene circuit called repressilator (Elowitz and Leibler in Nature, 403:335–338, 2000). This encouraged people to think of forward engineering biology from a set of well described parts.     

Sexual selection for syntax and kin selection for semantics: problems and prospects

The evolution of human language, and the kind of thought the communication of which requires it, raises considerable explanatory challenges. These systems of representation constitute a radical discontinuity in the natural world. Even species closely related to our own appear incapable of either thought or talk with the recursive structure, generalized systematicity, and task-domain neutrality that characterize human talk and the thought it expresses. W. Tecumseh Fitch’s proposal (2004, in press) that human language is descended from a sexually selected, prosodic proto-language that approximated its syntactic complexity, and later acquired semantics thanks to kin selection for its use as a means of pedagogical transmission, has the promise of meeting these explanatory challenges. However, Fitch’s theory raises two problems of its own: (1) according to Boyd and Richerson (1996, Proc. Br. Acad. 88: 77–93), circumstances in which pedagogy is adaptive are inevitably rare in nature, and (2) it is unlikely that our non-discursive precursors had generally systematic, task-domain neutral thoughts to communicate to their offspring. I propose solutions to these problems. Pedagogy would be favored in a population where complex rituals dominated diverse aspects of life. Prosodic proto-language could emerge as the medium of pedagogic transmission. As this medium was used to teach a greater variety of tasks, it would become increasingly general and domain neutral. The presence and importance of such a system of communication in hominid populations could then drive, via Baldwinian mechanisms, the evolution of a kind of ‘thinking for speaking’ (Slobin 1991, Pragmatics 1: 7–25) characterized by recursive structure, generalized systematicity, and task-domain neutrality.     

When love meets drugs: pharmaceuticalizing ambivalence in post-socialist China

In this article, I examine the interaction between intimacy and psychiatry to explore the ambivalences in the use of pharmaceuticals in psychiatric practice. Of particular interest is how pharmaceuticals come to constitute in multiple ways what pathology is and what form of life needs to be restored, and how psychiatric medications reconfigure the ambivalence of intimacy in post-socialist China. Following the life of Mei, a female psychiatric patient, for two years, I have made a series of discoveries related to medicine and intimacy in China. Specifically, I show that psychopharmaceuticals indicate a diseased body that threatens the intimate bond. They also highlight a socially suffering subject that is in lack of love from the intimate partner who demands the latter’s redemption. I discuss how these multiple and contradicting meanings of psychopharmaceuticals and intimacy are socio-historically situated. Thus, while previous research in medical anthropology criticizes pharmaceuticalization for reducing the socio-political life (bios) to a biological body (zoē), I argue that these life forms co-exist in a pharmaceutical “zone of indistinction” (Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998), in which they constitute and contradict each other. This discussion warns researchers against falling back into the usual orientation of either biomedicine or the social sciences.     

Giving an Account of One’s Pain in the Anthropological Interview

In this paper, I analyze the illness stories narrated by a mother and her 13-year-old son as part of an ethnographic study of child chronic pain sufferers and their families. In examining some of the moral, relational and communicative challenges of giving an account of one’s pain, I focus on what is left out of some accounts of illness and suffering and explore some possible reasons for these elisions. Drawing on recent work by Judith Butler (Giving an Account of Oneself, 2005), I investigate how the pragmatic context of interviews can introduce a form of symbolic violence to narrative accounts. Specifically, I use the term “genre of complaint” to highlight how anthropological research interviews in biomedical settings invoke certain typified forms of suffering that call for the rectification of perceived injustices. Interview narratives articulated in the genre of complaint privilege specific types of pain and suffering and cast others into the background. Giving an account of one’s pain is thus a strategic and selective process, creating interruptions and silences as much as moments of clarity. Therefore, I argue that medical anthropologists ought to attend more closely to the institutional structures and relations that shape the production of illness narratives in interview encounters.