China's U-Shaped Line in the South China Sea Revisited

Despite its existence on the Chinese maps for more than six decades, the U-shaped line, as a traditional maritime boundary line of China in the South China Sea, has never received a wide recognition in the world community, much less by the other claimant states in the South China Sea. The U-shaped line is a legal conundrum not only for China but also for the world community, particularly after the map with the U-shaped line, together with China's Notes Verbale with respect to the claims to the outer continental shelves made by Malaysia and Vietnam, were submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf in May 2009. This article discusses China's recent practice relating to the U-shaped line as well as the external factors that affect the validity of the line and tries to unravel the legal puzzle posed by the line.     

Coastal States in the South China Sea and Submissions on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf

The purpose of this article is to examine the outer continental shelf submissions made by the coastal states of the South China Sea and their potential impact on legal and political developments in the South China Sea. In accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 and the guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, coastal states are to establish the outer limits of their continental shelf where it extends beyond 200 nautical miles. Meeting this obligation is complicated in enclosed or semienclosed seas where there are maritime disputes such as in the South China Sea.     

China's Nine Dotted Lines in the South China Sea: The 2011 Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Between the Philippines and China

Important events relating to the sovereignty dispute over the Spratly Islands have arisen by fits and starts since 2009, marking the start of a new phase in the legal battle over territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea. While the exchange of legal arguments between the parties has gradually laid bare their maritime claims, much still remains shrouded in uncertainty. Among the obscure claims wanting clarification is China's infamous nine-dotted-line map, which in 2011 elicited a response and counterresponse between the Philippines and China. This article examines the maritime and territorial claims of the Philippines and China as revealed in the recent discord over the nine-dotted-line map.     

Regional Cooperation in the South China Sea: Analysis of Existing Practices and Prospects

This article identifies potential areas of cooperation in the South China Sea, particularly on ocean-related matters. Several regional mechanisms related to marine and coastal environments have been established and, to an extent, have achieved their goals. Nevertheless, some improvements to existing mechanisms are highly desirable. Recommended is a regional mechanism that involves all bordering parties; limits its geographic scope to the South China Sea; is initiated and operates without the assistance of global organizations; is embodied in a legally binding instrument; and broadens the scope of cooperation to include marine living resources, maritime safety, and maritime security.     

Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Coordinating Coastal and User State Priorities

Maritime security concerns in the South China Sea are increasing for several reasons: higher volumes of shipping traffic, protection of exclusive economic zone resources, piracy, terrorist threats, greater international scrutiny of ports and shipping, and the modernization of regional naval and coast guard forces. Coastal states and international user states have many overlapping interests in the South China Sea, for example, in promoting safe navigation through its busy sea-lanes. On other issues, in particular, antipiracy or anti-maritime terrorism measures, they have different views about the seriousness of the threats and the responses necessary to address them. This article examines the convergent and divergent maritime security interests of coastal states (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) and international user states (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) in the South China Sea. It finds that multiple stakeholders pursuing diverse interests have yet to close the gap between goals and means of achieving maritime security.     

China and Japan Maritime Disputes in the East China Sea: A Note on Recent Developments

This article examines recent developments in the East China Sea maritime disputes, focusing primarily on the Principled Consensus agreed on by China and Japan for the joint development of energy resources. The article also provides a perspective on the East China Sea maritime disputes between the two countries within the context of international relations.     

The Impact of the Law of the Sea Convention on Conflict and Conflict Management in the South China Sea

This article examines the impact of the UN Law of the Sea Convention on conflict behavior and management in the South China Sea during four periods: during its negotiation (1973–1982); from its signing to the entry into force (1982–1994); from then until the China-ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (1995–2002); and from the setting of a timeline for outer limits of continental shelf submissions to the events following the 2009 submissions (2003–2013). Ambiguous effects were found. On the one hand, the Convention has generated or exacerbated conflict by raising the stakes, failing to resolve key legal issues, and encouraging overlapping zone claims. On the other hand, it has provided obligations, language, and techniques for conflict management and resolution. The conflict-enhancing impact was found to have been more substantial than the peace-promoting effects. Nevertheless, the balance has shifted toward more emphasis on conflict management and also some utilization of the Convention's peacemaking potential. If this long-term trend continues and the Convention is more rigorously respected and applied, the Convention may in the end be found to have contributed to regional peace.     

Vietnam and the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea

This article portrays and characterizes the Vietnamese position toward the settlement of the island disputes in the South China Sea. The situation in the South China Sea has become more complicated since 1988 when China made its steps toward the Spratlys. After analyzing the situation in the South China Sea, the author emphasizes the need to have a code of conduct for this disputed area.     

China,Vietnam, and the South China Sea: Disputes and Dispute Management

This article examines recent developments in the South China Sea; in particular, the China-Vietnam relationship. The developments are presented in the broader context of the Sino-Vietnamese approach to managing border disputes since full normalization of relations in late 1991. The challenges for China and Vietnam in managing their disputes and related tension in the South China Sea are also discussed.     

The Spratlys: Are They Rocks or Islands?

The South China Sea is a multilateral battlefield of conflicting claims to sovereignty over island features and vast areas of maritime jurisdiction. In the middle of the South China Sea lies the Spratly archipelago - some 150 small island features to which six states have made claims. The core of the SCS dispute is access to natural resources, and the rivalling claims to sovereignty over islands are largely based on the assumption that whoever has sovereignty to the features can also claim large areas of ocean space attached to them. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has codified the regimes of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, and it is accepted that islands, as well as continental territory, generate such zones of maritime jurisdiction. However, one category of islands cannot generate these extensive maritime zones. Article 121(3) of the convention states that "rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf." This provision, if applied to certain features, has the potential to significantly change the scope of the conflict in the Spratlys.     

Maritime Delimitation in the Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty

During a visit to Norway by the Russian president in the spring of 2010, the president and the Norwegian prime minister surprisingly announced agreement on a delimitation line in the Barents Sea ending almost 40 years of negotiations. The agreement was signed in Murmansk on 15 September 2010. This article presents the background of the dispute and undertakes an assessment of the agreement and its implications for the Barents Sea, Svalbard, and other Arctic maritime delimitations.     

A Code of Conduct for Human and Regional Security Around the South China Sea

In the past decade, there have been calls for a regional code of conduct for the South China Sea to ensure peace and stability in a region replete with conflicting territorial claims over offshore geographical features. This paper will distinguish between the process of codification of rules and principles in one document, on the one hand, and the process of implementing existing rules and principles, on the other hand. It will be argued that rules and principles governing conduct for human and regional security around the South China Sea already exist in many forms and that the South China Sea states are obligated by international law to implement them without waiting for their consolidation in one document.     

Historic Rights in International Law and in China's Practice

Despite the great expansion of maritime zones of the coastal states, consequent to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, state practice indicates continued attempts at using concepts of historic waters and/or historic rights to assert jurisdiction. The Chinese claim to historic rights in its 1998 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf is a new addition to the whole picture. It is the People's Republic of China's clear intention that the historic claim applies to the water areas in the South China Sea wherever China could not establish its 200-nm exclusive economic zone. This article assesses China's historic claim in the context of international law, state practice, and judicial pronouncements.     

The U-Shaped Line and a Categorization of the Ocean Disputes in the South China Sea

A principal aspect of the territorial and boundary delimitation disputes in the South China Sea is the so-called U-shaped line. This article addresses the genesis and substantiation of the U-shaped line claims as well as the possible change in positions of the governments of the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China with respect to the historical waters claim, which is an integral part of their U-shaped line positions. A legal analysis of the various communications of the South China Sea players with respect to the U-shaped line helps to clarify and identify the nature of four kinds of legal disputes. It is also possible to differentiate the various degrees of difficulty involved in settling each of these disputes.     

Historic Titles and Historic Rights in the Law of the Sea in the Light of the South China Sea Arbitration

Historic titles and historic rights have been a complicated issue in the law of the sea both conceptually and practically. The South China Sea Arbitration between the Philippines and China raised important issues regarding the contemporary relevance and validity of historic claims, and the relationship between the Law of the Sea Convention and historic rights. This articles examines historic rights and historic titles in the law of the sea in the light of the South China Sea Arbitration and evaluates the contribution of the Tribunal's Awards to the clarification of these concepts.     

Reflections on the Interpretation and Application of Article 121(3) in the South China Sea Arbitration (Merits)

The 2016 South China Sea Arbitration Award provided a detailed review of the interpretation of Article 121(3) of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. According to the Tribunal, Article 121(3) performs a preventive function by disabling tiny features from unfairly generating enormous entitlements to maritime space that does not serve the local population. This provision also contributes to safeguarding of the Common Heritage of Mankind. The Tribunal's interpretation seems to reflect development of the law of the sea toward protection of the common interests of the international community. However, since the Tribunal's interpretation is not anchored in state practice and the jurisprudence, whether the interpretation can be generalized needs careful consideration.     

Setting Up International (Adversary) Regimes in the South China Sea: Analyzing the Obstacles from a Chinese Perspective

If the sovereignty issue can be shelved, solved, or resolved, the six claimant states of the South China Sea will have to establish a series of international regimes. The following questions need to be answered: Do all the claimants understand the concept of international regimes? Would the regimes be imposed? Would there be hegemon(s) in the South China Sea? If so, which country or multiple entities will be involved? What would be the outcome of having international regimes in the South China Sea? Can the experience elsewhere be applied to the South China Sea?     

The Islands in the South China Sea: How Does Their Presence Limit the Extent of the High Seas and the Area and the Maritime Zones of the Mainland Coasts?

A number of small islands (the Paracel Islands, Pratas Island, the Spratly Islands, and Scarborough Reef) may have a considerable influence on the extent of maritime zones in the South China Sea. The maritime zones of these islands can limit the extent of the high seas and the Area in the South China Sea and the extent of the maritime zones of the mainland coasts. To assess the impact of the islands, it is necessary to establish whether they can generate the full suite of maritime zones. Under international law, some islands do not have an entitlement to an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. Where islands can generate these maritime zones, a second issue arises, namely, how to delimit these zones with those of the mainland coasts bordering the South China Sea.     

Larval Anisakid Infections in Marine Fish from Three Sea Areas of the Republic of Korea

The present study was performed to determine the infection status of anisakid larvae in marine fish collected from 3 sea areas of the Republic of Korea. Total 86 marine fish (8 species) collected from the East Sea (Goseong-gun, Gangwon-do), 171 fish (10 species) from the South Sea (Sacheon-si, Gyeongsangnam-do), and 92 fish (7 species) from the Yellow Sea (Incheon Metropolitan City) were examined by both naked eyes and artificial digestion method. Among the total of 349 fish examined, 213 (61.0%) were infected with 8 species of anisakid larvae, i.e., Anisakis simplex, 6 types of Contracaecum spp., and Raphidascaris sp., and the mean larval density was 13.8 per infected fish. Anisakid larvae were detected in 45 fish (52.3%) from the East Sea, 131 fish (76.6%) from the South Sea, and 37 fish (40.2%) from the Yellow Sea. The average numbers of larvae detected were 4.0, 16.6, and 15.9, respectively. Anisakis simplex larvae were detected in 149 fish (42.7%), and the mean larval density was 9.0 per infected fish. They were found in 26 fish (30.2%) collected from the East Sea, 96 fish (56.1%) from the South Sea, and 27 fish (29.3%) from the Yellow Sea. The average numbers of larvae detected were 2.9, 10.3, and 10.5, respectively. Conclusively, the present study suggests that the infection rate and density of anisakid larvae are more or less higher in the fish from the South Sea than those from the East Sea or the Yellow Sea.     

Due Diligence and Overlooked Evidence in the South China Sea Arbitration: A Note

Abstract

In the South China Sea Arbitration, the Tribunal decided that China had not breached the due diligence obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment under Articles 192 and 194(5) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning Chinese fishers fishing with explosives, but that China had breached the same obligation regarding Chinese fishers harvesting endangered species. This article looks at how the Tribunal interpreted and applied the due diligence obligation and argues, from a Chinese perspective, that there were facts overlooked by the Tribunal that China could have presented to counter the evidence of the Philippines, which might have been enough to affect the decision on destructive fishing had China participated in the Arbitration.