Explaining the evolution of parochial punishment in humans

Humans usually favour members of their own group, ethnicity or culture (parochial cooperation), and punish out-group wrongdoers more harshly (parochial punishment). The evolution of parochial cooperation is mainly explained by intergroup conflict, as restricting cooperation to in-groups can provide a relative advantage during conflict. However, explanations for the evolution of parochial punishment are still lacking. It is unclear whether conflict can also explain parochial punishment, because conflict is expected to lead to full hostility towards out-groups, irrespective of their behaviour. Here, we use an agent-based simulation to explore which conditions favour the evolution of parochial third-party punishment. We show that when groups interact and then engage in conflict with each other, third-party punishment is not parochial but spiteful, and directed towards all out-groups. A parochial bias in punishment decisions evolves (i) without conflict, when groups compete against nature and enforcing cooperation requires many punitive actions, and (ii) with conflict, when groups come into conflict with a group other than one they previously interacted with. Our findings suggest that intergroup conflict does not always lead to parochial punishment, and that stable collaborative relations between groups is a key factor promoting third-party parochial punishment. Our findings also provide novel predictions on how punishment and intergroup conflict influence in-group bias in human societies.     

Asymmetric interaction will facilitate the evolution of cooperation

Explaining the evolution of cooperation remains one of the greatest problems for both biology and social science. The classical theories of cooperation suggest that cooperation equilibrium or evolutionary stable strategy between partners can be maintained through genetic similarity or reciprocity relatedness. These classical theories are based on an assumption that partners interact symmetrically with equal payoffs in a game of cooperation interaction. However, the payoff between partners is usually not equal and therefore they often interact asymmetrically in real cooperative systems. With the Hawk-Dove model, we find that the probability of cooperation between cooperative partners will depend closely on the payoff ratio. The higher the payoff ratio between recipients and cooperative actors, the greater will be the probability of cooperation interaction between involved partners. The greatest probability of conflict between cooperative partners will occur when the payoff between partners is equal. The results show that this asymmetric relationship is one of the key dynamics of the evolution of cooperation, and that pure cooperation strategy (i.e., Nash equilibrium) does not exist in asymmetrical cooperation systems, which well explains the direct conflict observed in almost all of the well documented cooperation systems. The model developed here shows that the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is also negatively correlated with the probability of cooperation interaction. A smaller cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation might be created by the limited dispersal ability or exit cost of the partners involved, and it will make the punishment of the non-cooperative individuals by the recipient more credible, and therefore make it more possible to maintain stable cooperation interaction.     

Cooperation and conflict between women in the family

Here I review recent research on reproductive conflict between females in families and how it influences their reproductive behaviour. Kin selection can favor cooperation between parent and offspring, siblings, or unrelated co‐residents who share interests in other family members such as grand‐offspring. However, these are also the individuals most likely to be sharing resources, and so conflict can also emerge. While substantial interest has arisen in evolutionary anthropology, especially over the last two decades, in the possibility of cooperative breeding in humans, less attention has been paid to reproductive conflict among female kin. Communal breeding in animals is generally understood as emerging from competition over the resources needed to breed. Competition for household resources is a problem that also faces human families. Models suggest that in some circumstances, inclusive fitness can be maximized by sharing reproduction rather than harming relatives by fighting with them, even if the shares that emerge are not equal. Thus, competition and cooperation turn out to be strongly related to each other. Reproductive competition within and between families may have underpinned the biological evolution of fertility patterns (such as menopause) and the cultural evolution of marriage, residence, and inheritance norms (such as late male marriage or primogeniture), which can enhance cooperation and minimize the observed incidence of such conflicts.     

Cooperation in the dark: signalling and collective action in quorum-sensing bacteria

The study of quorum-sensing bacteria has revealed a widespread mechanism of coordinating bacterial gene expression with cell density. By monitoring a constitutively produced signal molecule, individual bacteria can limit their expression of group-beneficial phenotypes to cell densities that guarantee an effective group outcome. In this paper, we attempt to move away from a commonly expressed view that these impressive feats of coordination are examples of multicellularity in prokaryotic populations. Here, we look more closely at the individual conflict underlying this cooperation, illustrating that, even under significant levels of genetic conflict, signalling and resultant cooperative behaviour can stably exist. A predictive two-trait model of signal strength and of the extent of cooperation is developed as a function of relatedness (reflecting multiplicity of infection) and basic population demographic parameters. The model predicts that the strength of quorum signalling will increase as conflict (multiplicity of infecting strains) increases, as individuals attempt to coax more cooperative contributions from their competitors, leading to a devaluation of the signal as an indicator of density. Conversely, as genetic conflict increases, the model predicts that the threshold density for cooperation will increase and the subsequent strength of group cooperation will be depressed.     

Suppression of social conflict and evolutionary transitions to cooperation

Evolutionary conflict arises at all levels of biological organization and presents a barrier to the evolution of cooperation. This barrier can be overcome by mechanisms that reduce the disparity between the fitness optima of subunits, sometimes called the "battleground" of conflict. An alternative, unstudied possibility is that effort invested in conflict is unprofitable. This possibility has received little attention because most existing models of social conflict assume that fitness depends on the ratio of players' conflict efforts, so that "peaceful" outcomes featuring zero conflict effort are evolutionarily unstable. Here I show that peaceful outcomes are stable where success depends on the difference rather than the ratio of efforts invested in conflict. These difference form models are particularly appropriate to model strategies of suppression or policing. The model suggests that incomplete information and asymmetries in strength can act to eliminate costly conflict within groups, even among unrelated individuals, and thereby facilitate the evolution of cooperation.     

Cooperation or Conflict in a Changing Arctic?

The possibility of conflict among nations has dominated discussions of the future of the Arctic. Are there no opportunities for cooperation? This article explores the avenues and incentives for Arctic cooperation through the common issues outlined in the strategy statements of the five coastal Arctic states. Incentives to cooperate can be found in all the thematic areas examined: sovereignty, scientific research, resource development, shipping, and environmental concerns. Cooperation is already occurring on some salient issues. Additional cooperation may occur as issues become increasingly pressing. From this perspective, Arctic conflict is by no means inevitable. Numerous avenues for cooperation exist.     

THE SOCIAL ORGANISM: CONGRESSES,PARTIES, AND COMMITTEES

We propose that what makes an organism is nearly complete cooperation, with strong control of intraorganism conflicts, and no affiliations above the level of the organism as unified as those at the organism level. Organisms can be made up of like units, which we call fraternal organisms, or different units, making them egalitarian organisms. Previous definitions have concentrated on the factors that favor high cooperation and low conflict, or on the adapted outcomes of organismality. Our approach brings these definitions together, conceptually unifying our understanding of organismality. Although the organism is a concerted cluster of adaptations, nearly all directed toward the same end, some conflict may remain. To understand such conflict, we extend Leigh's metaphor of the parliament of genes to include parties with different interests and committees that work on particular tasks.     

Duration and outcome of intergroup conflict influences intragroup affiliative behaviour

Theoreticians have long suggested that the amount of intergroup conflict in which a group is involved could influence the level of cooperation or affiliation displayed by its members. Despite the prevalence of intergroup conflicts in many social animal species, however, few empirical studies have investigated this potential link. Here, I show that intragroup allopreening rates are highest in green woodhoopoe (Phoeniculus purpureus) groups that have the greatest involvement in intergroup conflict. One reason for this relationship is a post-conflict increase in allopreening, and I demonstrate for the first time that both conflict duration and outcome influence subsequent allopreening rates: group members allopreened more following long conflicts and those they lost compared with short conflicts and those they won, perhaps because the former are more stressful. The increase in affiliative behaviour was the result of more allopreening of subordinate helpers by the dominant breeding pair, which may be because the breeders are trying to encourage helpers to participate in future conflicts; relative group size influences conflict outcome and helpers contribute more to conflicts than do the breeding pair. These results emphasize that our understanding of cooperation and group dynamics can be enhanced by investigations of how intergroup interactions affect intragroup processes.     

Learning to get along despite struggling to get by

How cooperation can evolve by natural selection is important for understanding the evolutionary transition from unicellular to multicellular life. Here we review the evolutionary theories for cooperation, with emphasis on the mechanisms that can favor cooperation and reduce conflict in multicellular organisms.     

Nuclear–mitochondrial epistasis: a gene's eye view of genomic conflict

We use population genetic models to investigate the cooperative and conflicting synergistic fitness effects between genes from the nucleus and the mitochondrion. By varying fitness parameters, we examine the scope for conflict relative to cooperation among genomes and the utility of the “gene's eye view” analytical approach, which is based on the marginal average fitness of specific alleles. Because sexual conflict can maintain polymorphism of mitochondrial haplotypes, we can explore two types of evolutionary conflict (genomic and sexual) with one epistatic model. We find that the nuclear genetic architecture (autosomal, X‐linked, or Z‐linked) and the mating system change the regions of parameter space corresponding to the evolution by sexual and genomic conflict. For all models, regardless of conflict or cooperation, we find that population mean fitness increases monotonically as evolution proceeds. Moreover, we find that the process of gene frequency change with positive, synergistic fitnesses is self‐accelerating, as the success of an allele in one genome or in one sex increases the frequency of the interacting allele upon which its success depends. This results in runaway evolutionary dynamics caused by the positive intergenomic associations generated by selection. An inbreeding mating system tends to further accelerate these runaway dynamics because it maintains favorable host–symbiont or male–female gene combinations. In contrast, where conflict predominates, the success of an allele in one genome or in one sex diminishes the frequency of the corresponding allele in the other, resulting in considerably slower evolutionary dynamics. The rate of change of mean fitness is also much faster with positive, synergistic fitnesses and much slower where conflict is predominant. Consequently, selection rapidly fixes cooperative gene combinations, while leaving behind a slowing evolving residue of conflicting gene combinations at mutation–selection balance. We discuss how an emphasis on marginal fitness averages may obscure the interdependence of allelic fitness across genomes, making the evolutionary trajectories appear independent of one another when they are not.     

Between-group competition and human cooperation

A distinctive feature of human behaviour is the widespread occurrence of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Explaining the maintenance of costly within-group cooperation is a challenge because the incentive to free ride on the efforts of other group members is expected to lead to decay of cooperation. However, the costs of cooperation can be diminished or overcome when there is competition at a higher level of organizational hierarchy. Here we show that competition between groups resolves the paradigmatic 'public goods' social dilemma and increases within-group cooperation and overall productivity. Further, group competition intensifies the moral emotions of anger and guilt associated with violations of the cooperative norm. The results suggest an important role for group conflict in the evolution of human cooperation and moral emotions.     

A social learning model of conflict and cooperation in human societies

Patterns of conflict and cooperation both within and between societies may be related to the degree of cultural similarity within and between the same societies. A simple model of social learning is used to predict patterns of conflict and cooperation in hypothetical societies that differ in the roles of relatives and nonrelatives in the enculturation of children. The model is illustrated by comparing its predictions to known differences in the patterns of conflict between males inpatrilocal and matrilocal societies.     

The honeybee queen influences the regulation of colony drone production

Social insect colonies invest in reproduction and growth, buthow colonies achieve an adaptive allocation to these life-historycharacters remains an open question in social insect biology.Attempts to understand how a colony's investment in reproductionis shaped by the queen and the workers have proved complicatedbecause of the potential for queen–worker conflict overthe colony's investment in males versus females. Honeybees,in which this conflict is expected to be minimal or absent,provide an opportunity to more clearly study how the actionsand interactions of individuals influence the colony's productionand regulation of males (drones). We examined whether honeybeequeens can influence drone regulation by either allowing orpreventing them from laying drone eggs for a period of timeand then examining their subsequent tendency to lay drone andworker eggs. Queens who initially laid drone eggs subsequentlylaid fewer drone eggs than the queens who were initially preventedfrom producing drone eggs. This indicates that a colony's regulationof drones may be achieved not only by the workers, who buildwax cells for drones and feed the larvae, but also by the queen,who can modify her production of drone eggs. In order to betterunderstand how the queen and workers contribute to social insectcolony decisions, future work should attempt to distinguishbetween actions that reflect conflict over sex allocation andthose that reflect cooperation and shared control over the colony'sinvestment in reproduction.     

A chemically triggered transition from conflict to cooperation in burying beetles

Although interspecific competition has long been recognised as a major driver of trait divergence and adaptive evolution, relatively little effort has focused on how it influences the evolution of intraspecific cooperation. Here we identify the mechanism by which the perceived pressure of interspecific competition influences the transition from intraspecific conflict to cooperation in a facultative cooperatively breeding species, the Asian burying beetle Nicrophorus nepalensis. We not only found that beetles are more cooperative at carcasses when blowfly maggots have begun to digest the tissue, but that this social cooperation appears to be triggered by a single chemical cue – dimethyl disulfide (DMDS) – emitted from carcasses consumed by blowflies, but not from control carcasses lacking blowflies. Our results provide experimental evidence that interspecific competition promotes the transition from intraspecific conflict to cooperation in N. nepalensis via a surprisingly simple social chemical cue that is a reliable indicator of resource competition between species.     

Cooperation and conflict in the evolution of individuality. IV. Conflict mediation and evolvability in Volvox carteri

The continued well being of evolutionary individuals (units of selection and evolution) depends upon their evolvability, that is their capacity to generate and evolve adaptations at their level of organization, as well as their longer term capacity for diversifying into more complex evolutionary forms. During a transition from a lower- to higher-level individual, such as the transition between unicellular and multicellular organisms, the evolvability of the lower-level (cells) must be restricted, while the evolvability of the new higher-level unit (multicellular organism) must be enhanced. For these reasons, understanding the factors leading to an evolutionary transition should help us to understand the factors underlying the emergence of evolvability of a new evolutionary unit. Cooperation among lower-level units is fundamental to the origin of new functions in the higher-level unit. Cooperation can produce a new more complex evolutionary unit, with the requisite properties of heritable fitness variations, because cooperation trades fitness from a lower-level (the costs of cooperation) to the higher-level (the benefits for the group). For this reason, the evolution of cooperative interactions helps us to understand the origin of new and higher-levels of fitness and organization. As cooperation creates a new level of fitness, it also creates the opportunity for conflict between levels of selection, as deleterious mutants with differing effects at the two levels arise and spread. This conflict can interfere with the evolvability of the higher-level unit, since the lower and higher-levels of selection will often "disagree" on what adaptations are most beneficial to their respective interests. Mediation of this conflict is essential to the emergence of the new evolutionary unit and to its continued evolvability. As an example, we consider the transition from unicellular to multicellular organisms and study the evolution of an early-sequestered germ-line in terms of its role in mediating conflict between the two levels of selection, the cell and the cell group. We apply our theoretical framework to the evolution of germ/soma differentiation in the green algal group Volvocales. In the most complex member of the group, Volvox carteri, the potential conflicts among lower-level cells as to the "right" to reproduce the higher-level individual (i.e. the colony) have been mediated by restricting immortality and totipotency to the germ-line. However, this mediation, and the evolution of an early segregated germ-line, was achieved by suppressing mitotic and differentiation capabilities in all post-embryonic cells. By handicapping the soma in this way, individuality is ensured, but the solution has affected the long-term evolvability of this lineage. We think that although conflict mediation is pivotal to the emergence of individuality at the higher-level, the way in which the mediation is achieved can greatly affect the longer-term evolvability of the lineage.     

Critical dynamics in the evolution of stochastic strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma

The observed cooperation on the level of genes, cells, tissues, and individuals has been the object of intense study by evolutionary biologists, mainly because cooperation often flourishes in biological systems in apparent contradiction to the selfish goal of survival inherent in Darwinian evolution. In order to resolve this paradox, evolutionary game theory has focused on the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), which incorporates the essence of this conflict. Here, we encode strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) in terms of conditional probabilities that represent the response of decision pathways given previous plays. We find that if these stochastic strategies are encoded as genes that undergo Darwinian evolution, the environmental conditions that the strategies are adapting to determine the fixed point of the evolutionary trajectory, which could be either cooperation or defection. A transition between cooperative and defective attractors occurs as a function of different parameters such as mutation rate, replacement rate, and memory, all of which affect a player's ability to predict an opponent's behavior. These results imply that in populations of players that can use previous decisions to plan future ones, cooperation depends critically on whether the players can rely on facing the same strategies that they have adapted to. Defection, on the other hand, is the optimal adaptive response in environments that change so quickly that the information gathered from previous plays cannot usefully be integrated for a response.     

Does kin selection moderate sexual conflict in Drosophila?

Two recent studies provide provocative experimental findings about the potential influence of kin recognition and cooperation on the level of sexual conflict in Drosophila melanogaster. In both studies, male fruit flies apparently curbed their mate-harming behaviours in the presence of a few familiar or related males, suggesting some form of cooperation mediated by kin selection. In one study, the reduction in agonistic behaviour by brothers apparently rendered them vulnerable to dramatic loss of paternity share when competing with an unrelated male. If these results are robust and generalizable, fruit flies could be a major new focus for the experimental study of kin selection and social evolution. In our opinion, however, the restrictive conditions required for male cooperation to be adaptive in this species make it unlikely to evolve. We investigated these phenomena in two different populations of D. melanogaster using protocols very similar to those in the two previous studies. Our experiments show no evidence for a reduction in mate harm based upon either relatedness or familiarity between males, and no reduction in male reproductive success when two brothers are in the presence of an unfamiliar, unrelated, ‘foreign’ male. Thus, the reduction of sexual conflict owing to male cooperation does not appear to be a general feature of the species, at least under domestication, and these contrasting results call for further investigation: in new populations, in the field and in the laboratory populations in which these phenomena have been reported.     

Limited food induces nepotism in drywood termites

The evolution of cooperation and altruistic behaviour where individuals forego their own reproduction to help others reproduce can be explained by kin selection. Depending on the costs and benefits provided, altruism can be evolutionarily favoured if it is directed at close relatives. A considerable body of data supports the role of relatedness as a key determinant of cooperation and conflict within societies. However, the role of ecological factors and, in particular, how these costs and benefits interact with relatedness remains poorly understood. By studying 16 colonies, here I show that in a drywood termite ecological factors determine the importance of relatedness. In colonies with limited food supply, nestmates restrict cooperative interactions mainly to close relatives, while non-discriminative cooperation occurs when food is abundant. This shows for the first time directly the interaction between ecological conditions and relatedness in shaping cooperation.     

Variation and the response to variation as a basis for successful cooperation

In applying game theory to problems in biology, differences between individuals are often ignored. In particular, when analysing the evolution of cooperation it is often implicitly assumed that ignoring variation will produce predictions that approximate the solution when differences are included. This need not be true. As we demonstrate, differences are not innocuous noise, but can fundamentally change the nature of a game. Even small amounts of variability can stabilize cooperation by, for example, maintaining the need to deal with cheaters. Differences promote the need to learn about others in an interaction, leading to contingent behaviour that can reduce conflict, and to negotiated outcomes that may or may not be more cooperative than unconditional actions. Once there are mechanisms such as mutation and environmental influences that maintain variation within populations, whether cooperation evolves may depend on the variation in the cooperativeness trait. Variation means that it may be worth taking a chance that a partner is cooperative by being cooperative. When there are markets, so that individuals can break off interactions to seek a better partner, variation promotes choosiness and hence penalizes those uncooperative individuals, who are rejected. Variation promotes the need to monitor the previous behaviour of others, and once this social sensitivity exists, the need to maintain a good reputation can promote cooperation.     

The sociobiology of biofilms

Biofilms are densely packed communities of microbial cells that grow on surfaces and surround themselves with secreted polymers. Many bacterial species form biofilms, and their study has revealed them to be complex and diverse. The structural and physiological complexity of biofilms has led to the idea that they are coordinated and cooperative groups, analogous to multicellular organisms. We evaluate this idea by addressing the findings of microbiologists from the perspective of sociobiology, including theories of collective behavior (self-organization) and social evolution. This yields two main conclusions. First, the appearance of organization in biofilms can emerge without active coordination. That is, biofilm properties such as phenotypic differentiation, species stratification and channel formation do not necessarily require that cells communicate with one another using specialized signaling molecules. Second, while local cooperation among bacteria may often occur, the evolution of cooperation among all cells is unlikely for most biofilms. Strong conflict can arise among multiple species and strains in a biofilm, and spontaneous mutation can generate conflict even within biofilms initiated by genetically identical cells. Biofilms will typically result from a balance between competition and cooperation, and we argue that understanding this balance is central to building a complete and predictive model of biofilm formation.