The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents

In daily life, perceivers often need to predict and interpret the behavior of group agents, such as corporations and governments. Although research has investigated how perceivers reason about individual members of particular groups, less is known about how perceivers reason about group agents themselves. The present studies investigate how perceivers understand group agents by investigating the extent to which understanding the ‘mind’ of the group as a whole shares important properties and processes with understanding the minds of individuals. Experiment 1 demonstrates that perceivers are sometimes willing to attribute a mental state to a group as a whole even when they are not willing to attribute that mental state to any of the individual members of the group, suggesting that perceivers can reason about the beliefs and desires of group agents over and above those of their individual members. Experiment 2 demonstrates that the degree of activation in brain regions associated with attributing mental states to individuals—i.e., brain regions associated with mentalizing or theory-of-mind, including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and precuneus—does not distinguish individual from group targets, either when reading statements about those targets'' mental states (directed) or when attributing mental states implicitly in order to predict their behavior (spontaneous). Together, these results help to illuminate the processes that support understanding group agents themselves.     

The Social Bayesian Brain: Does Mentalizing Make a Difference When We Learn?

When it comes to interpreting others'' behaviour, we almost irrepressibly engage in the attribution of mental states (beliefs, emotions…). Such "mentalizing" can become very sophisticated, eventually endowing us with highly adaptive skills such as convincing, teaching or deceiving. Here, sophistication can be captured in terms of the depth of our recursive beliefs, as in "I think that you think that I think…" In this work, we test whether such sophisticated recursive beliefs subtend learning in the context of social interaction. We asked participants to play repeated games against artificial (Bayesian) mentalizing agents, which differ in their sophistication. Critically, we made people believe either that they were playing against each other, or that they were gambling like in a casino. Although both framings are similarly deceiving, participants win against the artificial (sophisticated) mentalizing agents in the social framing of the task, and lose in the non-social framing. Moreover, we find that participants'' choice sequences are best explained by sophisticated mentalizing Bayesian learning models only in the social framing. This study is the first demonstration of the added-value of mentalizing on learning in the context of repeated social interactions. Importantly, our results show that we would not be able to decipher intentional behaviour without a priori attributing mental states to others.     

Differentiating Self-Projection from Simulation during Mentalizing: Evidence from fMRI

We asked participants to predict which of two colors a similar other (student) and a dissimilar other (retiree) likes better. We manipulated if color-pairs were two hues from the same color-category (e.g. green) or two conceptually different colors (e.g. green versus blue). In the former case, the mental state that has to be represented (i.e., the percept of two different hues of green) is predominantly non-conceptual or phenomenal in nature, which should promote mental simulation as a strategy for mentalizing. In the latter case, the mental state (i.e. the percept of green versus blue) can be captured in thought by concepts, which facilitates the use of theories for mentalizing. In line with the self-projection hypothesis, we found that cortical midline areas including vmPFC / orbitofrontal cortex and precuneus were preferentially activated for mentalizing about a similar other. However, activation was not affected by the nature of the color-difference, suggesting that self-projection subsumes simulation-like processes but is not limited to them. This indicates that self-projection is a universal strategy applied in different contexts—irrespective of the availability of theories for mentalizing. Along with midline activations linked to self-projection, we also observed activation in right lateral frontal and dorsal parietal areas showing a theory-like pattern. Taken together, this shows that mentalizing does not operate based on simulation or theory, but that both strategies are used concurrently to predict the choices of others.     

Metacognition and mentalizing are associated with distinct neural representations of decision uncertainty

Metacognition and mentalizing are both associated with meta-level mental state representations. Conventionally, metacognition refers to monitoring one’s own cognitive processes, while mentalizing refers to monitoring others’ cognitive processes. However, this self-other dichotomy is insufficient to delineate the 2 high-level mental processes. We here used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to systematically investigate the neural representations of different levels of decision uncertainty in monitoring different targets (the current self, the past self [PS], and others) performing a perceptual decision-making task. Our results reveal diverse formats of internal mental state representations of decision uncertainty in mentalizing, separate from the associations with external cue information. External cue information was commonly represented in the right inferior parietal lobe (IPL) across the mentalizing tasks. However, the internal mental states of decision uncertainty attributed to others were uniquely represented in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), rather than the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) that also represented the object-level mental states of decision inaccuracy attributed to others. Further, the object-level and meta-level mental states of decision uncertainty, when attributed to the PS, were represented in the precuneus and the lateral frontopolar cortex (lFPC), respectively. In contrast, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) represented currently experienced decision uncertainty in metacognition, and also uncertainty about the estimated decision uncertainty (estimate uncertainty), but not the estimated decision uncertainty per se in mentalizing. Hence, our findings identify neural signatures to clearly delineate metacognition and mentalizing and further imply distinct neural computations on internal mental states of decision uncertainty during metacognition and mentalizing.

The relationship between metacognition and mentalizing is still a matter of debate, as both are associated with meta-representations. This study adapts a task paradigm used in metacognition to apply in mentalizing and compares the neural representations of decision uncertainty in metacognition and mentalizing.     

Sex-age stereotyping: Social perceivers as lay adaptationists

Why do perceivers categorize and stereotype others by their biological sex and age? We suggest that perceivers do so because sex and age interactively shape adaptive goals (e.g., mating, parenting) and strategies. And because such goals and strategies pose different fitness-relevant opportunities and threats, social perceivers use others' sex-age as a cue for predicting others' behaviors. This perspective has multiple implications, which we test in a range of U.S. undergraduate and online survey samples. First, we find that perceivers categorize others not by sex and age independently, but by the interaction of their sex and age (i.e., people mentally group others as females and males of specific ages) (Studies 1 and 2). Second, perceivers hold stereotypes of men and women of specific ages as being differentially oriented towards short- and long-term mating as well as parenting goals (e.g., women are stereotyped to be more oriented towards long-term mating goals than men are, but only at younger ages) (Studies 3 and 4). Finally, providing perceivers with direct information about others' adaptive goals can influence the extent to which perceivers apply stereotypes of agency, communion, and competence, and can even override typical sex stereotypes (e.g., men are generally stereotyped to be more agentic than women, but this sex stereotype disappears when both men and women are presented as engaging in short-term mating goals) (Studies 5 and 6). The current findings challenge existing thinking about sex and age stereotyping, and demonstrate the value of an adaptationist approach for thinking about social perception and stereotypes.     

Mind blindness and the brain in autism.

Experimental evidence shows that the inability to attribute mental states, such as desires and beliefs, to self and others (mentalizing) explains the social and communication impairments of individuals with autism. Brain imaging studies in normal volunteers highlight a circumscribed network that is active during mentalizing and links medial prefrontal regions with posterior superior temporal sulcus and temporal poles. The brain abnormality that results in mentalizing failure in autism may involve weak connections between components of this system.     

Is the Medial Prefrontal Cortex Necessary for Theory of Mind?

Background

Successful social interaction relies on the ability to attribute mental states to other people. Previous functional neuroimaging studies have shown that this process, described as Theory of Mind (ToM) or mentalization, is reliably associated with activation of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). However, this study presents a novel and surprising finding that provides new insight into the role of the mPFC in mentalization tasks.

Methodology/Principal Findings

Twenty healthy individuals were recruited from a wide range of ages and social backgrounds. Participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while viewing a well-established ToM visual paradigm involving moving triangles. Functional MRI data were analyzed using a classical general linear model. No activation was detected in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) during movement patterns that typically elicit ToM. However, increased activity was observed in the right middle occipital gyrus, right temporoparietal junction (TPJ), left middle occipital gyrus and right inferior frontal gyrus. No correlation was found between participants’ age and BOLD response.

Conclusions/Significance

In contrast with previous neuroimaging research, our findings support the notion that mPFC function is not critical for reasoning about the mental states of others; furthermore, our data indicate that the right TPJ and right inferior frontal gyrus are able to perform mentalization without any contributions from the mPFC.     

The Human Factor: Behavioral and Neural Correlates of Humanized Perception in Moral Decision Making

The extent to which people regard others as full-blown individuals with mental states (“humanization”) seems crucial for their prosocial motivation towards them. Previous research has shown that decisions about moral dilemmas in which one person can be sacrificed to save multiple others do not consistently follow utilitarian principles. We hypothesized that this behavior can be explained by the potential victim’s perceived humanness and an ensuing increase in vicarious emotions and emotional conflict during decision making. Using fMRI, we assessed neural activity underlying moral decisions that affected fictitious persons that had or had not been experimentally humanized. In implicit priming trials, participants either engaged in mentalizing about these persons (Humanized condition) or not (Neutral condition). In subsequent moral dilemmas, participants had to decide about sacrificing these persons’ lives in order to save the lives of numerous others. Humanized persons were sacrificed less often, and the activation pattern during decisions about them indicated increased negative affect, emotional conflict, vicarious emotions, and behavioral control (pgACC/mOFC, anterior insula/IFG, aMCC and precuneus/PCC). Besides, we found enhanced effective connectivity between aMCC and anterior insula, which suggests increased emotion regulation during decisions affecting humanized victims. These findings highlight the importance of others’ perceived humanness for prosocial behavior - with aversive affect and other-related concern when imagining harming more “human-like” persons acting against purely utilitarian decisions.     

Explicit Mentalizing Mechanisms and Their Adaptive Role in Memory Conformity

Memory conformity occurs when an individual endorses what other individuals remember about past events. Research on memory conformity is currently dominated by a ‘forensic’ perspective, which views the phenomenon as inherently undesirable. This is because conformity not only distorts the accuracy of an individual''s memory, but also produces false corroboration between individuals, effects that act to undermine criminal justice systems. There is growing awareness, however, that memory conformity may be interpreted more generally as an adaptive social behavior regulated by explicit mentalizing mechanisms. Here, we provide novel evidence in support of this emerging alternative theoretical perspective. We carried out a memory conformity experiment which revealed that explicit belief-simulation (i.e. using one''s own beliefs to model what other people believe) systematically biases conformity towards like-minded individuals, even when there is no objective evidence that they have a more accurate memory than dissimilar individuals. We suggest that this bias is functional, i.e. adaptive, to the extent that it fosters trust, and hence cooperation, between in-group versus out-group individuals. We conclude that memory conformity is, in more fundamental terms, a highly desirable product of explicit mentalizing mechanisms that promote adaptive forms of social learning and cooperation.     

The role of social cognition in decision making

Successful decision making in a social setting depends on our ability to understand the intentions, emotions and beliefs of others. The mirror system allows us to understand other people's motor actions and action intentions. 'Empathy' allows us to understand and share emotions and sensations with others. 'Theory of mind' allows us to understand more abstract concepts such as beliefs or wishes in others. In all these cases, evidence has accumulated that we use the specific neural networks engaged in processing mental states in ourselves to understand the same mental states in others. However, the magnitude of the brain activity in these shared networks is modulated by contextual appraisal of the situation or the other person. An important feature of decision making in a social setting concerns the interaction of reason and emotion. We consider four domains where such interactions occur: our sense of fairness, altruistic punishment, trust and framing effects. In these cases, social motivations and emotions compete with each other, while higher-level control processes modulate the interactions of these low-level biases.     

The neural bases of social intention understanding: the role of interaction goals

Decoding others' intentions is a crucial aspect of social cognition. Neuroimaging studies suggest that inferring immediate goals engages the neural system for action understanding (i.e. mirror system), while the decoding of long-term intentions requires the system subserving the attribution of mental states (i.e. mentalizing). A controversial issue, stimulated by recent inconsistent results, concerns whether the two systems are concurrently vs. exclusively involved in intention understanding. This issue is particularly relevant in the case of social interactions, whose processing has been mostly, but not uncontroversially, associated with the mentalizing system. We tested the alternative hypothesis that the relative contribution of the two systems in intention understanding may also depend on the shared goal of interacting agents. To this purpose, 27 participants observed social interactions differing in their cooperative vs. affective shared goal during functional-Magnetic-Resonance-Imaging. The processing of both types of interactions activated the right temporo-parietal junction involved in mentalizing on action goals. Additionally, whole-brain and regions-of-interest analyses showed that the action understanding system (inferior prefrontal-parietal cortex) was more strongly activated by cooperative interactions, while the mentalizing-proper system (medial prefrontal cortex) was more strongly engaged by affective interactions. These differences were modulated by individual differences in empathizing. Both systems can thus be involved in understanding social intentions, with a relative weighting depending on the specific shared goal of the interaction.     

Abnormal neural responses to social exclusion in schizophrenia

Social exclusion is an influential concept in politics, mental health and social psychology. Studies on healthy subjects have implicated the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), a region involved in emotional and social information processing, in neural responses to social exclusion. Impairments in social interactions are common in schizophrenia and are associated with reduced quality of life. Core symptoms such as delusions usually have a social content. However little is known about the neural underpinnings of social abnormalities. The aim of this study was to investigate the neural substrates of social exclusion in schizophrenia. Patients with schizophrenia and healthy controls underwent fMRI while participating in a popular social exclusion paradigm. This task involves passing a 'ball' between the participant and two cartoon representations of other subjects. The extent of social exclusion (ball not being passed to the participant) was parametrically varied throughout the task. Replicating previous findings, increasing social exclusion activated the mPFC in controls. In contrast, patients with schizophrenia failed to modulate mPFC responses with increasing exclusion. Furthermore, the blunted response to exclusion correlated with increased severity of positive symptoms. These data support the hypothesis that the neural response to social exclusion differs in schizophrenia, highlighting the mPFC as a potential substrate of impaired social interactions.     

Simulating Fiction: Individual Differences in Literature Comprehension Revealed with fMRI

When we read literary fiction, we are transported to fictional places, and we feel and think along with the characters. Despite the importance of narrative in adult life and during development, the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying fiction comprehension are unclear. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate how individuals differently employ neural networks important for understanding others’ beliefs and intentions (mentalizing), and for sensori-motor simulation while listening to excerpts from literary novels. Localizer tasks were used to localize both the cortical motor network and the mentalizing network in participants after they listened to excerpts from literary novels. Results show that participants who had high activation in anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC; part of the mentalizing network) when listening to mentalizing content of literary fiction, had lower motor cortex activity when they listened to action-related content of the story, and vice versa. This qualifies how people differ in their engagement with fiction: some people are mostly drawn into a story by mentalizing about the thoughts and beliefs of others, whereas others engage in literature by simulating more concrete events such as actions. This study provides on-line neural evidence for the existence of qualitatively different styles of moving into literary worlds, and adds to a growing body of literature showing the potential to study narrative comprehension with neuroimaging methods.     

The neural correlates of emotional prosody comprehension: disentangling simple from complex emotion

Background

Emotional prosody comprehension (EPC), the ability to interpret another person''s feelings by listening to their tone of voice, is crucial for effective social communication. Previous studies assessing the neural correlates of EPC have found inconsistent results, particularly regarding the involvement of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). It remained unclear whether the involvement of the mPFC is linked to an increased demand in socio-cognitive components of EPC such as mental state attribution and if basic perceptual processing of EPC can be performed without the contribution of this region.

Methods

fMRI was used to delineate neural activity during the perception of prosodic stimuli conveying simple and complex emotion. Emotional trials in general, as compared to neutral ones, activated a network comprising temporal and lateral frontal brain regions, while complex emotion trials specifically showed an additional involvement of the mPFC, premotor cortex, frontal operculum and left insula.

Conclusion

These results indicate that the mPFC and premotor areas might be associated, but are not crucial to EPC. However, the mPFC supports socio-cognitive skills necessary to interpret complex emotion such as inferring mental states. Additionally, the premotor cortex involvement may reflect the participation of the mirror neuron system for prosody processing particularly of complex emotion.     

Differential Reward Learning for Self and Others Predicts Self-Reported Altruism

In social environments, decisions not only determine rewards for oneself but also for others. However, individual differences in pro-social behaviors have been typically studied through self-report. We developed a decision-making paradigm in which participants chose from card decks with differing rewards for themselves and charity; some decks gave similar rewards to both, while others gave higher rewards for one or the other. We used a reinforcement-learning model that estimated each participant''s relative weighting of self versus charity reward. As shown both in choices and model parameters, individuals who showed relatively better learning of rewards for charity – compared to themselves – were more likely to engage in pro-social behavior outside of a laboratory setting indicated by self-report. Overall rates of reward learning, however, did not predict individual differences in pro-social tendencies. These results support the idea that biases toward learning about social rewards are associated with one''s altruistic tendencies.     

There Is No Joy like Malicious Joy: Schadenfreude in Young Children

Human emotions are strongly shaped by the tendency to compare the relative state of oneself to others. Although social comparison based emotions such as jealousy and schadenfreude (pleasure in the other misfortune) are important social emotions, little is known about their developmental origins. To examine if schadenfreude develops as a response to inequity aversion, we assessed the reactions of children to the termination of unequal and equal triadic situations. We demonstrate that children as early as 24 months show signs of schadenfreude following the termination of an unequal situation. Although both conditions involved the same amount of gains, the children displayed greater positive expressions following the disruption of the unequal as compared to the equal condition, indicating that inequity aversion can be observed earlier than reported before. These results support an early evolutionary origin of inequity aversion and indicate that schadenfreude has evolved as a response to unfairness.     

The Complexity of Jokes Is Limited by Cognitive Constraints on Mentalizing

Although laughter is probably of deep evolutionary origin, the telling of jokes, being language-based, is likely to be of more recent origin within the human lineage. In language-based communication, speaker and listener are engaged in a process of mutually understanding each other’s intentions (mindstates), with a conversation minimally requiring three orders of intentionality. Mentalizing is cognitively more demanding than non-mentalizing cognition, and there is a well-attested limit at five orders in the levels of intentionality at which normal adult humans can work. Verbal jokes commonly involve commentary on the mindstates of third parties, and each such mindstate adds an additional level of intentionality and its corresponding cognitive load. We determined the number of mentalizing levels in a sample of jokes told by well-known professional comedians and show that most jokes involve either three or five orders of intentionality on the part of the comedian, depending on whether or not the joke involves other individuals’ mindstates. Within this limit there is a positive correlation between increasing levels of intentionality and subjective ratings of how funny the jokes are. The quality of jokes appears to peak when they include five or six levels of intentionality, which suggests that audiences appreciate higher mentalizing complexity whilst working within their natural cognitive constraints.     

Examining Effects of Anticipated Stigma,Centrality, Salience,Internalization, and Outness on Psychological Distress for People with Concealable Stigmatized Identities

Understanding how stigmatized identities contribute to increased rates of depression and anxiety is critical to stigma reduction and mental health treatment. There has been little research testing multiple aspects of stigmatized identities simultaneously. In the current study, we collected data from a diverse, urban, adult community sample of people with a concealed stigmatized identity (CSI). We targeted 5 specific CSIs – mental illness, substance abuse, experience of domestic violence, experience of sexual assault, and experience of childhood abuse – that have been shown to put people at risk for increased psychological distress. We collected measures of the anticipation of being devalued by others if the identity became known (anticipated stigma), the level of defining oneself by the stigmatized identity (centrality), the frequency of thinking about the identity (salience), the extent of agreement with negative stereotypes about the identity (internalized stigma), and extent to which other people currently know about the identity (outness). Results showed that greater anticipated stigma, greater identity salience, and lower levels of outness each uniquely and significantly predicted variance in increased psychological distress (a composite of depression and anxiety). In examining communalities and differences across the five identities, we found that mean levels of the stigma variables differed across the identities, with people with substance abuse and mental illness reporting greater anticipated and internalized stigma. However, the prediction pattern of the variables for psychological distress was similar across the substance abuse, mental illness, domestic violence, and childhood abuse identities (but not sexual assault). Understanding which components of stigmatized identities predict distress can lead to more effective treatment for people experiencing psychological distress.     

Neural Correlates of Belief and Emotion Attribution in Schizophrenia

Impaired mental state attribution is a core social cognitive deficit in schizophrenia. With functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), this study examined the extent to which the core neural system of mental state attribution is involved in mental state attribution, focusing on belief attribution and emotion attribution. Fifteen schizophrenia outpatients and 14 healthy controls performed two mental state attribution tasks in the scanner. In a Belief Attribution Task, after reading a short vignette, participants were asked infer either the belief of a character (a false belief condition) or a physical state of an affair (a false photograph condition). In an Emotion Attribution Task, participants were asked either to judge whether character(s) in pictures felt unpleasant, pleasant, or neutral emotion (other condition) or to look at pictures that did not have any human characters (view condition). fMRI data were analyzing focusing on a priori regions of interest (ROIs) of the core neural systems of mental state attribution: the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and precuneus. An exploratory whole brain analysis was also performed. Both patients and controls showed greater activation in all four ROIs during the Belief Attribution Task than the Emotion Attribution Task. Patients also showed less activation in the precuneus and left TPJ compared to controls during the Belief Attribution Task. No significant group difference was found during the Emotion Attribution Task in any of ROIs. An exploratory whole brain analysis showed a similar pattern of neural activations. These findings suggest that while schizophrenia patients rely on the same neural network as controls do when attributing beliefs of others, patients did not show reduced activation in the key regions such as the TPJ. Further, this study did not find evidence for aberrant neural activation during emotion attribution or recruitment of compensatory brain regions in schizophrenia.