Cryptic designs on the peppered moth

In a provocative recent book, Jonathan Wells (2000) decries what he discerns as a systematic pattern in how introductory biology textbooks "blatantly misrepresent" ten routinely cited examples offered as evidence for evolution. Each of these examples, according to Wells, is fraught with interpretive problems and, as such, textbooks that continue to use them should at the very least be accompanied by warning labels. The following essay critiques his reasoning with reference to one of these examples, the phenomenon of industrial melanism. After criticizing Wells's specific argument, the essay draws several conclusions about the nature of science lost in his account.     

Nietzsche's aesthetic critique of Darwin

Despite his position as one of the first philosophers to write in the "post-Darwinian" world, the critique of Darwin by Friedrich Nietzsche is often ignored for a host of unsatisfactory reasons. I argue that Nietzsche's critique of Darwin is important to the study of both Nietzsche's and Darwin's impact on philosophy. Further, I show that the central claims of Nietzsche's critique have been broadly misunderstood. I then present a new reading of Nietzsche's core criticism of Darwin. An important part of Nietzsche's response can best be understood as an aesthetic critique of Darwin, reacting to what he saw as Darwin having drained life of an essential component of objective aesthetic value. For Nietzsche, Darwin's theory is false because it is too intellectual, because it searches for rules, regulations, and uniformity in a realm where none of these are to be found - and, moreover, where they should not be found. Such a reading goes furthest toward making Nietzsche's criticism substantive and relevant. Finally, I attempt to relate this novel explanation of Nietzsche's critique to topics in contemporary philosophy of biology, particularly work on the evolutionary explanation of culture.     

Evolutionary Theory and the Social uses of Biology

Stephen Jay Gould is rightly remembered for many different kinds of contributions to our intellectual life. I focus on his criticisms of uses of evolutionary ideas to defend inegalitarian doctrines and on his attempts to expand the framework of Darwinian evolutionary theory. I argue that his important successes in the former sphere are applications of the idea of local critique, grounded in careful attention to the details of the inegalitarian proposals. As he became more concerned with the second project, Gould was inclined to suggest that the abuses of evolutionary ideas rested on an insufficiently expanded Darwinism. I suggest that what is valuable in Gould's contribution to general evolutionary theory is the original claim about punctuated equilibrium (advanced, with Niles Eldredge in1972), and the careful defense of that claim through the accumulation of paleontological evidence. I try to show that the more ambitious program of a hierarchical expansion of neo-Darwinism is misguided, and that the endeavor to go beyond local critique fails.     

G. Ledyard Stebbins, Jr. and the evolutionary synthesis (1924-1950)

This is an historical paper examining the scientific background of George Ledyard Stebbins, Jr. (b. 1906), one of the foremost botanists of this century and one of the architects of the evolutionary synthesis, the intellectual event that brought together genetics and selection theory in the interval between 1920 and 1950. It considers his scientific influence and research, beginning with his Harvard education in 1924 and ending in 1950 with the publication of his book Variation and Evolution in Plants. The paper also more broadly assesses the contributions of other botanists to the evolutionary synthesis, including discussion of the work of Edgar Anderson (1897-1967) and others. It also traces the larger historical patterns of American botany, which saw a shift from East Coast botany as exemplified by Harvard botany, to West Coast botany, as exemplified by California botany.     

The Privatisation of Home and Hope: Return, Reforms and the Foreign Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Contextualising the foreign-imposed return policies in early post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, this article argues that the return of the displaced – however important it was to many Bosnians – ultimately functioned as the self-perpetuating lynchpin of an externally generated framework for post-war reconstruction, often out of tune with the hopes of its intended beneficiaries. Rather than following conventional anthropological cultural relativist arguments, I propose a critique of the foreign intervention that places it in its social, political and economic context, drawing attention to patterns of longing and belonging in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I contrast the groundings and implications of intervention policies with the experiences and yearnings of displaced Bosnians and show that, while it was legitimised as the implementation of an ostensibly ideologically neutral human rights discourse, the foreign emphasis on property and safety rights over other concerns channelled the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina into a peculiar, normative trajectory of postsocialist neoliberalisation.     

The search for purpose in a post-Darwinian universe: George Bernard Shaw, 'creative evolution', and Shavian eugenics: 'The dark side of the force'

The Irish playwright and socialist George Bernard Shaw has been of marginal concern for historians of biology because his vitalist Lamarckism has been viewed as out of step with contemporary science. However, Julian Huxley and J.B.S. Haldane were certainly of the opinion that Shaw was a man of influence in this regard and took pains to counter his views in their own attempts to engage the public in science. Previously, Shaw's colleague and friend H.G. Wells had also agued with Shaw from his own mechanistic neo-Darwinian perspective. The very public debate between Shaw and Wells, which continued to concern Huxley and Haldane, shows that public concern over the moral implications of Darwinism has a long history. Taking into account the opinions of John Maynard Smith on this matter, I suggest that a consideration of Shaw in this context can give us an understanding of the historical popularity of vitalist teleology as well as of the persistent ambivalence to the non-normative character of Darwinism.     

What are we to make of the concept of race?: Thoughts of a philosopher–scientist

Discussions about the biological bases (or lack thereof) of the concept of race in the human species seem to be never ending. One of the latest rounds is represented by a paper by Neven Sesardic, which attempts to build a strong scientific case for the existence of human races, based on genetic, morphometric and behavioral characteristics, as well as on a thorough critique of opposing positions. In this paper I show that Sesardic’s critique falls far short of the goal, and that his positive case is exceedingly thin. I do this through a combination of analysis of the actual scientific findings invoked by Sesardic and of some philosophical unpacking of his conceptual analysis, drawing on a dual professional background as an evolutionary biologist and a philosopher of science.     

Fleck and the social constitution of scientific objectivity

Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought-styles has been hailed as a pioneer of constructivist science studies and sociology of scientific knowledge. But this consensus ignores an important feature of Fleck’s epistemology. At the core of his account is the ideal of ‘objective truth, clarity, and accuracy’. I begin with Fleck’s account of modern natural science, locating the ideal of scientific objectivity within his general social epistemology. I then draw on Fleck’s view of scientific objectivity to improve upon reflexive accounts of the origin and development of the theory of thought-styles, and reply to objections that Fleck’s epistemological stance is self-undermining or inconsistent. Explicating the role of scientific objectivity in Fleck’s epistemology reveals his view to be an internally consistent alternative to recent social accounts of scientific objectivity by Harding, Daston and Galison. I use these contrasts to indicate the strengths and weaknesses of Fleck’s innovative social epistemology, and propose modifications to address the latter. The result is a renewed version of Fleck’s social epistemology, which reconciles commitment to scientific objectivity with integrated sociology, history and philosophy of science.     

At home among strangers: Alfred Russel Wallace in Russia

Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913) was an influential figure within Russian pre-Synthetic evolutionary biology, i.e. the time period before the Synthetic Theory of Evolution was established (ca. 1880–1930s). His major works were translated into Russian and his general ideas were read and discussed by both insiders and outsiders of scientific evolutionism. At the same time, Wallace played a controversial role in the growth of Darwinism in Russia, and Charles Robert Darwin (1809–1882) has eclipsed Wallace in his influence on Russian evolutionary thinking. In this paper we briefly outline Wallace’s impact on Russian pre-Synthetic scientific evolutionism and its general intellectual climate. We demonstrate that both Russian pro-Darwinian evolutionists and anti-Darwinians (scientific anti-Darwinians as well as creationists) were fully aware of Wallace’s contributions to the development of evolutionary theory. Yet, Wallace’s radical selectionism, as well as his controversial arguments for “design in nature”, predetermined his special place within the Russian intellectual landscape.     

Kin selection under blending inheritance

Why did Darwin fail to develop his insights on kin selection into a proper theory of social adaptation? One suggestion has been that his inadequate understanding of heredity kept the problem out of focus. Here, I determine whether it is possible to develop a quantitative theory of kin selection upon the assumption of blending inheritance. I find that, whilst Hamilton's rule of kin selection can be readily derived under the assumption of blending inheritance, this mechanism complicates the computation of relatedness coefficients, and can even cause them to fluctuate over generations. Nevertheless, I show that the ultimate criterion for selection to favour any social trait - i.e. a time-average of Hamilton's rule - remains the same as under particulate inheritance. By eliminating the gene from the theory of kin selection, I clarify the role that it plays in the theory of social adaptation.     

The interface of natural theology and science in the ethology of W. H. Thorpe

Conclusion It should be clear by now the extent to which many features of Thorpe's interpretation of animal behavior and of the animal mind rested, at bottom, not simply on conventional scientific proofs but on interpretive inferences, which in turn rested on a willingress to make extensions of human experience to animals. This, in turn, rested on his view of evolution and his view of reality. And these were governed by his natural theology, which was the fundamental stratum of his intellectual experience.Contrary to the scientific ethos, which restricts theory choice to scientific issues alone, Thorpe's career suggests that the actual reasons for theory choice among scientists often are not limited to science, but are multiple and may sometimes be difficult to discover. It is largely because Thorpe took a public part in the natural theology enterprise that we can know something about his religious beliefs and so can see their probable influence on his scientific decisions. Similar beliefs of other scientists are sometimes harder to get at. Most may be practically beyond discovery, for the ethos of science has discouraged public professions of personal belief in relation to scientific work.¹⁰¹ Yet does it seem plausible that, for example, the restriction of self-consciousness to humans by some scientists is a purely scientific decision?¹⁰² Surely not, any more than that the strong influence of natural theology on Thorpe's thought means that he was not a good scientist. His natural theology may have led him into incautious enthusiasms regarding the animal mind — such as the potential if unrealizable linguistic ability of chimpanzees — through a bias in favor of the continuity of emergents in a progressive evolutionary system, just as it led him to advocate animal consciousness long before the recent upsurge of interest, but the scientific integrity of his work overall is unimpeachable. And yet, that work is not comprehensible historically as science alone. Personal philosophy must not be discounted in writing the history of recent science. This somewhat obvious conclusion (obvious to historians of science) needs emphasis, for we are still prone to think that the sciences of our own time provide their own internal dynamic that is in itself sufficient to account for their content and development.     

Wilhelm Troll (1897 - 1978): idealistic morphology, physics, and phylogenetics

Idealistic morphology as articulated by the botanist Wilhelm Troll, the main target of the critique voiced by the early phylogeneticists, was firmly embedded in its contemporary scientific, cultural, and political context. Troll appealed to theoretical developments in contemporary physics in support of his research program. He understood burgeoning quantum mechanics not only to threaten the unity of physics, but also the validity of the principle of causality. Troll used this insight in support of his claim of a dualism in biology, relegating the causal-analytical approach to physiology, while rejuvenating the Goethean paradigm in comparative morphology. This embedded idealistic morphology in the v?lkisch tradition that characterized German culture during the Weimar Republic and its aftermath. In contrast, the contemporary phylogeneticists anchored their research program in the rise of logical positivism and in Darwin's principle of natural selection. This, in turn, brought phylogenetic systematists of the late 1930s and early 1940s into the orbit of national-socialist racial theory and eugenics. In conclusion, the early debate between idealistic morphologists and phylogenetic systematists was not only ideologically tainted, but also implied a philosophical impasse that is best characterized as a conflict between the Goethean and Newtonian paradigm of natural science.     

The Use and Abuse of Sir Karl Popper

Karl Popper has been one of the few philosophers of sciences who has influenced scientists. I evaluate Popper's influence on our understanding of evolutionary theory from his earliest publications to the present. Popper concluded that three sorts of statements in evolutionary biology are not genuine laws of nature. I take him to be right on this score. Popper's later distinction between evolutionary theory as a metaphysical research program and as a scientific theory led more than one scientist to misunderstand his position on evolutionary theory as a scientific theory. In his later work Popper also introduced what he took to be improvements of evolutionary theory. Thus far these improvements have had almost no influence on evolutionary biology. I conclude by examining the influence of Popper on the reception of cladistic analysis.     

Husserl's Crisis as a crisis of psychology

This paper places Husserl's mature work, The Crisis of the European Sciences, in the context of his engagement with--and critique of--experimental psychology at the time. I begin by showing (a) that Husserl accorded psychology a crucial role in his philosophy, i.e., that of providing a scientific analysis of subjectivity, and (b) that he viewed contemporary psychology--due to its naturalism--as having failed to pursue this goal in the appropriate manner. I then provide an analysis of Husserl's views about naturalism and scientific philosophy. Some central themes of the Crisis are traced back to Husserl's earlier work and to his relationship with his teacher, Franz Brentano, with whom he disagreed about the status of "inner perception" as the proper scientific method for a phenomenological analysis. The paper then shows that Husserl was well aware of at least one publication about the crisis of psychology (Bühler's 1927 book), and it teases out some aspects of the complicated relationship between Husserl and members of the Würzburg School of thought psychology: The latter had drawn on Husserl's writings, but Husserl felt that they had misunderstood his central thesis. I conclude by placing Husserl's work in the wider context of scientific, cultural, and political crisis-discourses at the time.     

Edward O. Wilson and the Organicist Tradition

Edward O. Wilson’s recent decision to abandon kin selection theory has sent shockwaves throughout the biological sciences. Over the past two years, more than a hundred biologists have signed letters protesting his reversal. Making sense of Wilson’s decision and the controversy it has spawned requires familiarity with the historical record. This entails not only examining the conditions under which kin selection theory first emerged, but also the organicist tradition against which it rebelled. In similar fashion, one must not only examine Wilson’s long career, but also those thinkers who influenced him most, especially his intellectual grandfather, William Morton Wheeler (1865–1937). Wilson belongs to a long line of organicists, biologists whose research highlighted integration and coordination, many of whom struggled over the exact same biological riddles that have long defined Wilson’s career. Drawing inspiration (and sometimes ideas) from these intellectual forebears, Wilson is confident that he has finally identified the origin of the social impulse.     

A Man of His Time: Thorstein Veblen and the University of Chicago Darwinists

The Darwinian economic theory that Thorstein Veblen proposed and refined while he served as a professor of Political Economy at the University of Chicago from 1891 to 1906 should be assessed in the context of the community of Darwinian scientists and social scientists with whom Veblen worked and lived at Chicago. It is important to identify Veblen as a member of this broad community of Darwinian-inclined philosophers, physiologists, geologists, astronomers, and biologists at Chicago because Veblen’s involvement with this circle suggests that the possible sources of his engagement with Darwinism extend beyond the pragmatists and Continental socialists to whom scholars have typically ascribed Veblen’s Darwinian roots. Additionally, that an extensive community continued to use Darwinian evolutionary theory to construct new models of scientific and social scientific analysis at the turn of the twentieth century, a period during which Darwinism was purportedly in decline, suggests that the “eclipse of Darwinism” narrative has been overstated in literature about Darwinism’s intellectual arc.     

Darwinism after Mendelism: the case of Sewall Wright's intellectual synthesis in his shifting balance theory of evolution (1931)

Historians of science have long been agreeing: what many textbooks of evolutionary biology say, about the histories of Darwinism and the New Synthesis, is just too simple to do justice to the complexities revealed to critical scholarship and historiography. There is no current consensus, however, on what grand narratives should replace those textbook histories. The present paper does not offer to contribute directly to any grand, consensual, narrational goals; but it does seek to do so indirectly by showing how, in just one individual case, details of intellectual biography connect with big picture issues. To this end, I examine here how very diverse scientific and metaphysical commitments were integrated in Sewall Wright's own personal synthesis of biology and philosophy. Taking as the decisive text the short final section of Wright's long 1931 paper on 'Evolution in Mendelian populations,' I examine how his shifting balance theory (SBT) related to his optimum breeding strategy research, his physiological genetics, his general theory of homogenising and heterogenesing causation and his panpsychist view of mind and matter; and I discuss how understanding these relations can clarify Wright's place in the longue durée of evolutionary thought.     

God is in the Data: Epistemologies of Knowledge at the Creation Museum

In contemporary American public culture, interest groups increasingly mobilise social constructionist arguments in order to discredit strains of scientific knowledge. According to Latour [2004. Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern. Critical Inquiry, 30:225–48], the field of science studies has contributed to this trend by exposing the ways that scientific facts are socially mediated. In this article, I examine how a narrative of social construction is articulated in the Creation Museum, a young earth creationist museum in Northern Kentucky, USA. I compare the epistemology of science in the Creation Museum with that of conspiracy theory and of social constructionist science studies. I examine how, in the Creation Museum, social constructionist critique is combined with a framing of the Bible as a source of factual data. It is argued that science studies, conspiracy theory and creationism overlap in their critiques of the transparency and objectivity of science. However, they diverge in terms of the degree of recursivity they allow.     

Reflections on Grant Evans’ The Politics of Ritual and Remembrance: Laos since 1975

In this article I reflect on Grant Evans’ landmark and influential The Politics of Ritual and Remembrance: Laos since 1975, the way in which this book relates to the transformation from socialism to post‐socialism in the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), to the crisis of legitimacy of the communist regime, and to issues of social memory, Buddhism, nationalism, iconography, and ethnic minorities. I also consider how other scholars have engaged with The Politics of Ritual and Remembrance both critically and supportively since the publication of the monograph in 1998 . I include in my analysis some observations on Evans’ quite radical change in political views over his career as a student, journalist and academic, culminating in his critique of socialism in general and the LPDR in particular and his controversial sympathy for the Lao monarchy.