Cumulative cultural dynamics and the coevolution of cultural innovation and transmission: an ESS model for panmictic and structured populations

When individuals in a population can acquire traits through learning, each individual may express a certain number of distinct cultural traits. These traits may have been either invented by the individual himself or acquired from others in the population. Here, we develop a game theoretic model for the accumulation of cultural traits through individual and social learning. We explore how the rates of innovation, decay, and transmission of cultural traits affect the evolutionary stable (ES) levels of individual and social learning and the number of cultural traits expressed by an individual when cultural dynamics are at a steady‐state. We explore the evolution of these phenotypes in both panmictic and structured population settings. Our results suggest that in panmictic populations, the ES level of learning and number of traits tend to be independent of the social transmission rate of cultural traits and is mainly affected by the innovation and decay rates. By contrast, in structured populations, where interactions occur between relatives, the ES level of learning and the number of traits per individual can be increased (relative to the panmictic case) and may then markedly depend on the transmission rate of cultural traits. This suggests that kin selection may be one additional solution to Rogers's paradox of nonadaptive culture.     

The evolution of vocabulary

Human language is unique among the communication systems of the natural world. The vocabulary of human language is unique in being both culturally transmitted and symbolic. In this paper I present an investigation into the factors involved in the evolution of such vocabulary systems. I investigate both the cultural evolution of vocabulary systems and the biological evolution of learning rules for vocabulary acquisition. Firstly, vocabularies are shown to evolve on a cultural time-scale so as to fit the expectations of learners-a population's vocabulary adapts to the biases of the learners in that population. A learning bias in favour of one-to-one mappings between meanings and words leads to the cultural evolution of communicatively optimal vocabulary systems, even in the absence of any explicit pressure for communication. Furthermore, the pressure to conform to the biases of learners is shown to outweigh natural selection acting on cultural transmission. Human language learners appear to bring a one-to-one bias to the acquisition of vocabulary systems. The functionality of human vocabulary may therefore be a consequence of the biases of human language learners. Secondly, the evolutionary stability of genetically transmitted vocabulary learning biases is investigated using both static and dynamic models. A one-to-one learning bias, which leads to the cultural evolution of optimal communication, is shown to be evolutionarily stable. However, the evolution de novo of this bias is complicated by the cumulative nature of the cultural evolution of vocabulary systems. This suggests that the biases of human language learners may not have evolved specifically and exclusively for the acquisition of communicatively functional vocabulary.     

Strategic social learning and the population dynamics of human behavior: the game of Go

Human culture is widely believed to undergo evolution, via mechanisms rooted in the nature of human cognition. A number of theories predict the kinds of human learning strategies, as well as the population dynamics that result from their action. There is little work, however, that quantitatively examines the evidence for these strategies and resulting cultural evolution within human populations. One of the obstacles is the lack of individual-level data with which to link transmission events to larger cultural dynamics. Here, we address this problem with a rich quantitative database from the East Asian board game known as Go. We draw from a large archive of Go games spanning the last six decades of professional play, and find evidence that the evolutionary dynamics of particular cultural variants are driven by a mix of individual and social learning processes. Particular players vary dramatically in their sensitivity to population knowledge, which also varies by age and nationality. The dynamic patterns of opening Go moves are consistent with an ancient, ongoing arms race within the game itself.     

The evolutionary language game.

We explore how evolutionary game dynamics have to be modified to accomodate a mathematical framework for the evolution of language. In particular, we are interested in the evolution of vocabulary, that is associations between signals and objects. We assume that successful communication contributes to biological fitness: individuals who communicate well leave more offspring. Children inherit from their parents a strategy for language learning (a language acquisition device). We consider three mechanisms whereby language is passed from one generation to the next: (i) parental learning: children learn the language of their parents; (ii) role model learning: children learn the language of individuals with a high payoff; and (iii) random learning: children learn the language of randomly chosen individuals. We show that parental and role model learning outperform random learning. Then we introduce mistakes in language learning and study how this process changes language over time. Mistakes increase the overall efficacy of parental and role model learning: in a world with errors evolutionary adaptation is more efficient. Our model also provides a simple explanation why homonomy is common while synonymy is rare.     

The Significance of Non-vertical Transmission of Phenotype for the Evolution of Altruism

My aim in this paper is to demonstrate that a very simple learning rule based on imitation can help to sustain altruism as a culturally transmitted pattern or behaviour among agents playing a standard prisoner’s dilemma game. The point of this demonstration is not to prove that imitation is single-handedly responsible for existing levels of altruism (a thesis that is false), nor is the point to show that imitation is an important factor in explanations for the evolution of altruism (a thesis already prominent in the existing literature). The point is to show that imitation contributes to the evolution of altruism in a particular way that is not always fairly represented by evolutionary game theory models. Specifically, the paper uses a simple model to illustrate that cultural transmission includes mechanisms that do not transmit phenotype vertically (i.e. from parent to related offspring) and that these mechanisms can promote altruism in the absence of any direct biological propensity favouring such behaviour. This is a noteworthy result because it shows that evolutionary models can be built to explicitly reflect the contribution of non-vertical transmission in our explanations for the evolution of altruism among humans and other social species.     

How inconsistency between attitude and behavior persists through cultural transmission

Individuals tend to conform their behavior to that of the majority. Consequently, an individual's behavior is not always consistent with his or her attitude, and such inconsistency sometimes causes mental distress. Understanding the mechanism of sustaining inconsistency between attitude and behavior is a challenging problem from the viewpoint of evolutionary theory. We constructed an evolutionary game theory model in which each player has an attitude and behavior toward a single social norm, and the players' attitudes and behaviors are affected by three types of cultural transmission: vertical, oblique, and horizontal. We assumed that strategy is a combination of attitude and behavior and that the process of learning or transmitting the social norm depends on the life stage of each player. Adults play a coordination game in which players whose behaviors match those of the majority obtain a high payoff, which is diminished by any inconsistency between attitude and behavior. The adults' strategies are passed to newborns via vertical transmission, and the frequency of a newborn's replication of strategy is proportional to the corresponding adult's payoff. Newborns imitate behaviors of unrelated adults via oblique transmission. Juveniles change their attitudes or behaviors by observing other juveniles' behaviors or inferring other juveniles' attitudes (horizontal transmission). We conclude that the key factor for sustaining inconsistency between attitude and behavior is the ability of players to infer and imitate others' attitudes, and that oblique transmission promotes inconsistency.     

Effects of Conformism on the Cultural Evolution of Social Behaviour

Models of cultural evolution study how the distribution of cultural traits changes over time. The dynamics of cultural evolution strongly depends on the way these traits are transmitted between individuals by social learning. Two prominent forms of social learning are payoff-based learning (imitating others that have higher payoffs) and conformist learning (imitating locally common behaviours). How payoff-based and conformist learning affect the cultural evolution of cooperation is currently a matter of lively debate, but few studies systematically analyse the interplay of these forms of social learning. Here we perform such a study by investigating how the interaction of payoff-based and conformist learning affects the outcome of cultural evolution in three social contexts. First, we develop a simple argument that provides insights into how the outcome of cultural evolution will change when more and more conformist learning is added to payoff-based learning. In a social dilemma (e.g. a Prisoner’s Dilemma), conformism can turn cooperation into a stable equilibrium; in an evasion game (e.g. a Hawk-Dove game or a Snowdrift game) conformism tends to destabilize the polymorphic equilibrium; and in a coordination game (e.g. a Stag Hunt game), conformism changes the basin of attraction of the two equilibria. Second, we analyse a stochastic event-based model, revealing that conformism increases the speed of cultural evolution towards pure equilibria. Individual-based simulations as well as the analysis of the diffusion approximation of the stochastic model by and large confirm our findings. Third, we investigate the effect of an increasing degree of conformism on cultural group selection in a group-structured population. We conclude that, in contrast to statements in the literature, conformism hinders rather than promotes the evolution of cooperation.     

Cultural transmission and biological markets

Active cultural transmission of fitness-enhancing behavior (sometimes called “teaching”) can be seen as a costly strategy: one for which its evolutionary stability poses a Darwinian puzzle. In this article, we offer a biological market model of cultural transmission that substitutes or complements existing kin selection-based proposals for the evolution of cultural capacities. We demonstrate how a biological market can account for the evolution of teaching when individual learners are the exclusive focus of social learning (such as in a fast-changing environment). We also show how this biological market can affect the dynamics of cumulative culture. The model works best when it is difficult to have access to the observation of the behavior without the help of the actor. However, in contrast to previous non-mathematical hypotheses for the evolution of teaching, we show how teaching evolves, even when innovations are insufficiently opaque and therefore vulnerable to acquisition by emulators via inadvertent transmission. Furthermore, teaching in a biological market is an important precondition for enhancing individual learning abilities.     

A theoretical investigation of the role of social transmission in evolution

This paper contains an investigation of the interaction between protocultural processes in animals, generated by social learning and the processes of biological evolution. It addresses the question of whether mechanisms of social learning and transmission can play an evolutionary role by allowing learned patterns of behavior to spread through animal populations, in the process changing the selection pressures acting on them. Simple models of social transmission and gene-meme coevolution are developed to investigate three hypotheses related to the role of social transmission in animal evolution. Simulations using the models suggest that social transmission would have to be particularly stable and be associated with estremely strong selection, if it were to result in the fixation of alleles. A more likely hypothesis is that social transmission might allow animals to respond adaptively to novelty in their environment, rendering a genetic response unnecessary, or only partially necessary. Socially transmitted traits appear to spread sufficiently rapidly, relative to changes in gene frequency, that it would be quite feasible for a socially transmitted response to an environmental change to occur, preempting a genetic response. Social transmission is probably more likely to slow down evolutionary rates than to speed them up through changing selection pressures. However, cultural and evolutionary processes are likely to interact in complex ways, and a “behavioral drive” effect cannot be ruled out.     

Evolutionary games under incompetence

The adaptation process of a species to a new environment is a significant area of study in biology. As part of natural selection, adaptation is a mutation process which improves survival skills and reproductive functions of species. Here, we investigate this process by combining the idea of incompetence with evolutionary game theory. In the sense of evolution, incompetence and training can be interpreted as a special learning process. With focus on the social side of the problem, we analyze the influence of incompetence on behavior of species. We introduce an incompetence parameter into a learning function in a single-population game and analyze its effect on the outcome of the replicator dynamics. Incompetence can change the outcome of the game and its dynamics, indicating its significance within what are inherently imperfect natural systems.

     

MATHEMATICS OF KIN‐ AND GROUP‐SELECTION: FORMALLY EQUIVALENT?

Evolutionary game theory is a general mathematical framework that describes the evolution of social traits. This framework forms the basis of many multilevel selection models and is also frequently used to model evolutionary dynamics on networks. Kin selection, which was initially restricted to describe social interactions between relatives, has also led to a broader mathematical approach, inclusive fitness, that can not only describe social evolution among relatives, but also in group structured populations or on social networks. It turns out that the underlying mathematics of game theory is fundamentally different from the approach of inclusive fitness. Thus, both approaches—evolutionary game theory and inclusive fitness—can be helpful to understand the evolution of social traits in group structured or spatially extended populations.     

Critical Social Learning: A Solution to Rogers's Paradox of Nonadaptive Culture

Alan Rogers (1988) presented a game theory model of the evolution of social learning, yielding the paradoxical conclusion that social learning does not increase the fitness of a population. We expand on this model, allowing for imperfections in individual and social learning as well as incorporating a "critical social learning" strategy that tries to solve an adaptive problem first by social learning, and then by individual learning if socially acquired behavior proves unsatisfactory. This strategy always proves superior to pure social learning and typically has higher fitness than pure individual learning, providing a solution to Rogers's paradox of nonadaptive culture. Critical social learning is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) unless cultural transmission is highly unfaithful, the environment is highly variable, or social learning is much more costly than individual learning. We compare the model to empirical data on social learning and on spatial variation in primate cultures and list three requirements for adaptive culture.     

Cultural evolution of cooperation: The interplay between forms of social learning and group selection

The role of cultural group selection in the evolution of human cooperation is hotly debated. It has been argued that group selection is more effective in cultural evolution than in genetic evolution, because some forms of cultural transmission (conformism and/or the tendency to follow a leader) reduce intra-group variation while creating stable cultural variation between groups. This view is supported by some models, while other models lead to contrasting and sometimes opposite conclusions. A consensus view has not yet been achieved, partly because the modelling studies differ in their assumptions on the dynamics of cultural transmission and the mode of group selection. To clarify matters, we created an individual-based model allowing for a systematic comparison of how different social learning rules governing cultural transmission affect the evolution of cooperation in a group-structured population. We consider two modes of group selection (selection by group replacement or by group contagion) and systematically vary the frequency and impact of group-level processes. From our simulations we conclude that the outcome of cultural evolution strongly reflects the interplay of social learning rules and the mode of group selection. For example, conformism hampers or even prevents the evolution of cooperation if group selection acts via contagion; it may facilitate the evolution of cooperation if group selection acts via replacement. In contrast, leader-imitation promotes the evolution of cooperation under a broader range of conditions.     

The evolution of cultural adaptations: Fijian food taboos protect against dangerous marine toxins

The application of evolutionary theory to understanding the origins of our species'' capacities for social learning has generated key insights into cultural evolution. By focusing on how our psychology has evolved to adaptively extract beliefs and practices by observing others, theorists have hypothesized how social learning can, over generations, give rise to culturally evolved adaptations. While much field research documents the subtle ways in which culturally transmitted beliefs and practices adapt people to their local environments, and much experimental work reveals the predicted patterns of social learning, little research connects real-world adaptive cultural traits to the patterns of transmission predicted by these theories. Addressing this gap, we show how food taboos for pregnant and lactating women in Fiji selectively target the most toxic marine species, effectively reducing a woman''s chances of fish poisoning by 30 per cent during pregnancy and 60 per cent during breastfeeding. We further analyse how these taboos are transmitted, showing support for cultural evolutionary models that combine familial transmission with selective learning from locally prestigious individuals. In addition, we explore how particular aspects of human cognitive processes increase the frequency of some non-adaptive taboos. This case demonstrates how evolutionary theory can be deployed to explain both adaptive and non-adaptive behavioural patterns.     

Culture and courtship in vertebrates: a review of social learning and transmission of courtship systems and mating patterns

Female and male animals often choose mates based upon the complementarity of their courtship behaviours and preferences. The importance of this fact on the evolutionary dynamics of populations has long been appreciated. What has not been appreciated is the role that social learning might play in the transmission of systems of courtship behaviour across generations. This paper addresses the social transmission of courtship behavioural traditions in vertebrates. It discusses views of culture in the context of behavioural signals and preferences in courtship. It then reviews empirical evidence for culture-like processes affecting courtship behaviour, focusing on studies of song learning in passerine birds and work on social learning of mating preferences. The paper concludes with potential future directions for research on social traditions in systems of courtship behaviour, including determining mechanisms of transmission, genetic and non-social environmental effects, and selective factors influencing the stability of behavioural traditions over time. By integrating proximate and ultimate questions for the transmission of courtship systems, this work would increase our understanding of the ways individual development, cultural processes, and population evolution influence, and are in turn influenced by, one another.     

Theoretical aspects of the mode of transmission in cultural inheritance.

This study investigates how evolutionary factors interact to determine the relative importance of vertical versus nonvertical mode of transmission in cultural inheritance. Simple mathematical models are provided to study the joint evolution of two cultural characters, one determining the viability and the fertility of individuals, and the other determining the vertical transmission rate of the first trait. Ordinary local stability analyses indicate that intrademic processes should lead to a greater reliance on vertical cultural transmission. On the other hand, when newly arisen variants are adaptive and favored in biased cultural transmission, interdemic processes may lead to a decrease in vertical transmission. This is because biased nonvertical transmission may effectively propagate the adaptive variants, further increasing the average growth rate of the population. These results are verified under several distinct sets of assumptions. It is also inferred that the degree and intensity of transmission bias may be the important determinants of cultural processes.     

How does competition affect the transmission of information?

The use of social information is a prerequisite to the evolution of culture. In humans, social learning allows individuals to aggregate adaptive information and increase the complexity of technology at a level unparalleled in the animal kingdom. However, the potential to use social information is related to the availability of this type of information. Although most cultural evolution experiments assume that social learners are free to use social information, there are many examples of information withholding, particularly in ethnographic studies. In this experiment, we used a computer-based cultural game in which players were faced with a complex task and had the possibility to trade a specific part of their knowledge within their groups. The dynamics of information transmission were studied when competition was within- or exclusively between-groups. Our results show that between-group competition improved the transmission of information, increasing the amount and the quality of information. Further, informational access costs did not prevent social learners from performing better than individual learners, even when between-group competition was absent. Interestingly, between-group competition did not entirely eliminate access costs and did not improve the performance of players as compared with within-group competition. These results suggest that the field of cultural evolution would benefit from a better understanding of the factors that underlie the production and the sharing of information.     

Cultural Transmission and the Diffusion of Innovations: Adoption Dynamics Indicate That Biased Cultural Transmission Is the Predominate Force in Behavioral Change

In challenging the pervasive model of individual actors as cost-benefit analysts who adapt their behavior by learning from the environment, this article analyzes the temporal dynamics of both environmental (individual) learning and biased cultural transmission processes by comparing these dynamics with the robust "5-shaped" curves that emerge from the diffusion of innovations literature. The analysis shows three things: (1) that environmental learning alone never produces the 5-shaped adoption dynamics typically observed in the spread of novel practices, ideas, and technologies; (2) that biased cultural transmission always produces the S-shaped temporal dynamics; and (3) that a combination of environmental learning and biased cultural transmission can generate 5-dynamics but only when biased cultural transmission is the predominate force in the spread of new behaviors. These findings suggest that biased cultural transmission processes are much more important to understanding the diffusion of innovations and sociocultural evolution than is often assumed by most theorists. [ diffusion of innovations, cultural transmission, learning, cultural evolution ]     

Cultural Evolution: A Review of Theory,Findings and Controversies

The last two decades have seen an explosion in research analysing cultural change as a Darwinian evolutionary process. Here I provide an overview of the theory of cultural evolution, including its intellectual history, major theoretical tenets and methods, key findings, and prominent criticisms and controversies. ‘Culture’ is defined as socially transmitted information. Cultural evolution is the theory that this socially transmitted information evolves in the manner laid out by Darwin in The Origin of Species, i.e. it comprises a system of variation, differential fitness and inheritance. Cultural evolution is not, however, neo-Darwinian, in that many of the details of genetic evolution may not apply, such as particulate inheritance and random mutation. Following a brief history of this idea, I review theoretical and empirical studies of cultural microevolution, which entails both selection-like processes wherein some cultural variants are more likely to be acquired and transmitted than others, plus transformative processes that alter cultural information during transmission. I also review how phylogenetic methods have been used to reconstruct cultural macroevolution, including the evolution of languages, technology and social organisation. Finally, I discuss recent controversies and debates, including the extent to which culture is proximate or ultimate, the relative role of selective and transformative processes in cultural evolution, the basis of cumulative cultural evolution, the evolution of large-scale human cooperation, and whether social learning is learned or innate. I conclude by highlighting the value of using evolutionary methods to study culture for both the social and biological sciences.     

On learning dynamics underlying the evolution of learning rules

In order to understand the development of non-genetically encoded actions during an animal’s lifespan, it is necessary to analyze the dynamics and evolution of learning rules producing behavior. Owing to the intrinsic stochastic and frequency-dependent nature of learning dynamics, these rules are often studied in evolutionary biology via agent-based computer simulations. In this paper, we show that stochastic approximation theory can help to qualitatively understand learning dynamics and formulate analytical models for the evolution of learning rules. We consider a population of individuals repeatedly interacting during their lifespan, and where the stage game faced by the individuals fluctuates according to an environmental stochastic process. Individuals adjust their behavioral actions according to learning rules belonging to the class of experience-weighted attraction learning mechanisms, which includes standard reinforcement and Bayesian learning as special cases. We use stochastic approximation theory in order to derive differential equations governing action play probabilities, which turn out to have qualitative features of mutator-selection equations. We then perform agent-based simulations to find the conditions where the deterministic approximation is closest to the original stochastic learning process for standard 2-action 2-player fluctuating games, where interaction between learning rules and preference reversal may occur. Finally, we analyze a simplified model for the evolution of learning in a producer–scrounger game, which shows that the exploration rate can interact in a non-intuitive way with other features of co-evolving learning rules. Overall, our analyses illustrate the usefulness of applying stochastic approximation theory in the study of animal learning.