Irrational choices in hummingbird foraging behaviour

It is conventionally assumed that, when animals evaluate alternative options, the value assigned to an option is absolute and independent of the other options available. It follows that animal choices should exhibit the rational property of regularity whereby the proportion of choices for an option cannot be increased by the addition of further options to the choice set. However, violations of regularity occur in human decision making, suggesting that humans may use comparative evaluation mechanisms whereby the value of an option is computed relative to the other options available. For example, in the asymmetrically dominated decoy effect the preference for a target option over a competitor is altered by the addition of a decoy option that is inferior to the target and competitor on one attribute, but lies between them on a second. We tested whether foraging wild rufous hummingbirds, Selasphorus rufus, would demonstrate violations of regularity in response to an asymmetrically dominated decoy. Sixteen birds chose between three artificial flower types (Target: 15 μl, 40% sucrose; Competitor: 45 μl, 30%; Decoy: 10 μl, 35%) in Binary (Target versus Competitor) and Trinary (Target versus Competitor versus Decoy) treatments. We predicted higher preference for the Target in the Trinary treatment. The birds ranked the three options in the same order in the Binary and Trinary treatments (Competitor>Target>Decoy). Seven birds showed violations of regularity, six increasing their absolute preference for the Competitor in the Trinary treatment. Overall, relative preference for the Competitor over the Target was higher in the Trinary than in the Binary treatment. These changes in preference are incompatible with an absolute evaluation mechanism.     

Context-dependent foraging choices in risk-sensitive starlings

Existing models of risk-sensitive foraging assume that animals assign value to different options according to an absolute currency. It follows from this assumption that choices are expected to be both transitive and regular, because the value assigned to an option is independent of its context. I tested these predictions by comparing preferences obtained in binary and trinary contexts. European starlings, Sturnus vulgaris, were trained using an operant paradigm to forage for three options: Constant (C) that provided a fixed number of food pellets; Low variance (L) with a coefficient of variation of 71% in the number of pellets; High variance (H) with a coefficient of variation of 106%. The preferences of the birds were tested in three binary choice treatments (CL, CH, LH) and one trinary choice treatment (CLH). Overall, there was no evidence for violations of either transitivity or regularity. However, overall, a bird's relative preference for its most preferred option over its second most preferred option was significantly greater in the trinary treatment than in the comparable binary treatment. This effect of context on choice is compatible with starlings' use of comparative instead of absolute currencies in decision making. Copyright 2002 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.     

Context-dependent decisions among options varying in a single dimension

Contrary to theories of rational choice, adding alternatives to a choice set can change the choices made by both humans and animals. This is usually done by adding an inferior decoy to a choice set of two favoured options that are characterized on two distinct dimensions. We presented wild, free-living rufous hummingbirds (Selasphorus rufus) with choices between two or three options that varied in a single dimension only. The options varied in concentration, in volume or in corolla length. When the options varied in concentration, the addition of a medium option to a choice set of a low and a high concentration caused birds to increase their preference for the high option. However, they decreased their preference for the high concentration option when a low option was added to a choice set of high and medium concentrations. When the options varied only in volume, the addition of a high volume option to a choice set of low and medium options decreased the birds’ preference for the medium option. We saw no effects of adding a third option when the options varied in corolla length alone. Hummingbirds, then, make context-dependent decisions even when the options vary in only a single dimension although which effect occurs seems to depend on the dimension being manipulated. None of the current theories alone adequately explain these results.     

Rational mate choice decisions vary with female age and multidimensional male signals in swordtails

Biologists have long been interested in intransitive preferences: circular preferences in which options cannot be ranked and no single option dominates, similar to a game of rock‐paper‐scissors. Intransitive preferences violate rational decision‐making, an assumption made by models of evolution by mate choice. Despite its potential importance in the study of sexual selection, few studies have tested for intransitive preferences. Even fewer have asked whether females differ in whether they choose mates transitively or intransitively and what factors might predict (in)transitive choice. Though intransitive choice is thought to be more common as options become more complex, this prediction is untested in animals. To fill this gap, we tested whether female Xiphophorus nigrensis swordtails can rank digitally animated males differing in size, courtship intensity, or both size and courtship intensity, and whether female responses were predicted by a female's age. Females choosing among males that varied only in size showed higher than expected levels of intransitivity, whereas females choosing among males that varied in their courtship or both properties did not. Older females were more likely to be irrational than younger females when evaluating male size, suggesting that experience modifies transitive decision‐making processes. These results show that mate choice irrationality may vary by a female's experience and the signal characteristics during decision‐making.     

Cognitive mechanisms of risky choice: is there an evaluation cost?

We contrast two classes of choice processes, those assuming time-consuming comparisons and those where stimuli for each option act independently, competing for expression by cross censorship. The Sequential Choice Model (SCM) belongs in the latter category, and has received empirical support in several procedures involving deterministic alternatives. Here we test this model in risky choices. In two treatments, each with five conditions, European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) faced choices between options with unpredictable outcomes and risk-free alternatives. In the delay treatment the five conditions involved choices between a variable option offering two equiprobable delays to reward and a fixed option with delay differing between conditions. The amount treatment was structurally similar, but amount of reward rather than delay was manipulated. As assumed (and required) by the SCM, latency to respond in no-choice trials reflected each option's richness with respect to the background alternatives, and, crucially, preferences in simultaneous choices were predictable from latencies to each option in forced trials. However, we did not detect reliable differences in response times between forced and choice trials, neither the lengthening expected from evaluation models nor the shortening expected from the SCM.     

When flexibility is stable: implicit long-term shaping of olfactory preferences

Preferences are traditionally assumed to be stable. However, empirical evidence such as preference modulation following choices calls this assumption into question. The evolution of such postchoice preference over long time spans, even when choices have been explicitly forgotten, has so far not been studied. In two experiments, we investigated this question by using a variant of the free choice paradigm: In a first session, participants evaluated the pleasantness of a number of odors. We then formed pairs of similarly rated odors, and asked participants to choose their favorite, for each pair. Participants were then presented with all odors again, and asked for another pleasantness rating. In a second session 1 week later, a third pleasantness rating was obtained, and participants were again asked to choose between the same options. Results suggested postchoice preference modulation immediately and 1 week after choice for both chosen and rejected options, even when choices were not explicitly remembered. A third experiment, using another paradigm, confirmed that choice can have a modulatory impact on preferences, and that this modulation can be long-lasting. Taken together, these findings suggest that although preferences appear to be flexible because they are modulated by choices, this modulation also appears to be stable over time and even without explicit recollection of the choice. These results bring a new argument to the idea that postchoice preference modulation could rely on implicit mechanisms, and are consistent with the recent proposal that cognitive dissonance reduction could to some extent be implicit.     

A range-normalization model of context-dependent choice: a new model and evidence

Most utility theories of choice assume that the introduction of an irrelevant option (called the decoy) to a choice set does not change the preference between existing options. On the contrary, a wealth of behavioral data demonstrates the dependence of preference on the decoy and on the context in which the options are presented. Nevertheless, neural mechanisms underlying context-dependent preference are poorly understood. In order to shed light on these mechanisms, we design and perform a novel experiment to measure within-subject decoy effects. We find within-subject decoy effects similar to what have been shown previously with between-subject designs. More importantly, we find that not only are the decoy effects correlated, pointing to similar underlying mechanisms, but also these effects increase with the distance of the decoy from the original options. To explain these observations, we construct a plausible neuronal model that can account for decoy effects based on the trial-by-trial adjustment of neural representations to the set of available options. This adjustment mechanism, which we call range normalization, occurs when the nervous system is required to represent different stimuli distinguishably, while being limited to using bounded neural activity. The proposed model captures our experimental observations and makes new predictions about the influence of the choice set size on the decoy effects, which are in contrast to previous models of context-dependent choice preference. Critically, unlike previous psychological models, the computational resource required by our range-normalization model does not increase exponentially as the set size increases. Our results show that context-dependent choice behavior, which is commonly perceived as an irrational response to the presence of irrelevant options, could be a natural consequence of the biophysical limits of neural representation in the brain.     

I Choose,Therefore I Like: Preference for Faces Induced by Arbitrary Choice

Behavioral choice alters one’s preference rather than simply reflecting it. This effect to fit preferences with past choice, is known as “choice-induced preference change.” After making a choice between two equally attractive options, one tends to rate the chosen option better than they initially did and/or the unchosen option worse. The present study examined how behavioral choice changes subsequent preference, using facial images for the choice options as well as blind choice techniques. Participants rated their facial preference for each face, and chose between two equally preferred faces and subsequently rated their facial preference. Results from four experiments demonstrated that randomly chosen faces were more preferred only after participants were required to choose “a preferred face,” (in Experiment 1) but not “an unpreferred face,” (in Experiment 2) or “a rounder face” (in Experiment 3). Further, preference change was still observed after participants were informed that choices were actually random (in Experiment 4). Our findings provide new and important implications characterizing the conditions under which random choice changes preference, and show that people are tempted to make a biased evaluation even after they know that they did not make the choice for themselves.     

Optimal risky choice in humans: effects of amount of variability

The present study investigated whether the predictions of an optimal risk-sensitive foraging model (the energy-budget rule) would extend to humans’ choices between high- and low-variance monetary response options. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with repeated choices between two options that had the same mean values but different variances across positive- and negative-budget conditions. In Experiment 2, a within-subject comparison was conducted to investigate choice under positive- and negative-budget conditions when the options were either (a) a fixed option and a high-variance option, or (b) a low-variance option and a high-variance option. Session-wide choices were analyzed in relation to the predictions of the energy-budget rule and sequential choices were analyzed with dynamic optimization modeling. When both options were variable choice was generally consistent with predictions of the energy-budget rule and was more risk prone under negative-budget than positive-budget conditions. Sequential choices were sensitive to local budget conditions, but choices were less consistent with optimality when both options were variable, possibly because of the greater similarity in expected earnings for optimal and nonoptimal choices in these conditions. Overall, the results provide further evidence that the energy-budget rule may have broad applicability and that it can extend to human risky choice between multiple variable response options.     

Irrational time allocation in decision-making

Time is an extremely valuable resource but little is known about the efficiency of time allocation in decision-making. Empirical evidence suggests that in many ecologically relevant situations, decision difficulty and the relative reward from making a correct choice, compared to an incorrect one, are inversely linked, implying that it is optimal to use relatively less time for difficult choice problems. This applies, in particular, to value-based choices, in which the relative reward from choosing the higher valued item shrinks as the values of the other options get closer to the best option and are thus more difficult to discriminate. Here, we experimentally show that people behave sub-optimally in such contexts. They do not respond to incentives that favour the allocation of time to choice problems in which the relative reward for choosing the best option is high; instead they spend too much time on problems in which the reward difference between the options is low. We demonstrate this by showing that it is possible to improve subjects'' time allocation with a simple intervention that cuts them off when their decisions take too long. Thus, we provide a novel form of evidence that organisms systematically spend their valuable time in an inefficient way, and simultaneously offer a potential solution to the problem.     

Comparative evaluation and its implications for mate choice

Experiments on decision making by humans show that the choices that we make can be very labile. The magnitude of our preferences, and even our rank ordering of options, can vary according to the number and type of alternatives available for comparison. This apparent irrationality has been argued to result from our use of decision heuristics that have evolved to enable us to choose quickly and efficiently between options differing in multiple attributes. Here, we argue that, because there is also selective pressure for animals to make mating decisions quickly, and because potential mates also differ in multiple attributes, similar decision heuristics might have evolved for mate choice. Following this reasoning, the attractiveness of a given mate will depend on the others with whom he or she is being compared, rather than being an absolute function of his or her underlying quality. We describe some of the ramifications of such comparative evaluation, and argue that it could offer new insights into some of the biggest outstanding problems in mate choice and sexual selection.     

Evolutionary pressures on primate intertemporal choice

From finding food to choosing mates, animals must make intertemporal choices that involve fitness benefits available at different times. Species vary dramatically in their willingness to wait for delayed rewards. Why does this variation across species exist? An adaptive approach to intertemporal choice suggests that time preferences should reflect the temporal problems faced in a species''s environment. Here, I use phylogenetic regression to test whether allometric factors relating to body size, relative brain size and social group size predict how long 13 primate species will wait in laboratory intertemporal choice tasks. Controlling for phylogeny, a composite allometric factor that includes body mass, absolute brain size, lifespan and home range size predicted waiting times, but relative brain size and social group size did not. These findings support the notion that selective pressures have sculpted intertemporal choices to solve adaptive problems faced by animals. Collecting these types of data across a large number of species can provide key insights into the evolution of decision making and cognition.     

Starlings uphold principles of economic rationality for delay and probability of reward

Rationality principles are the bedrock of normative theories of decision-making in biology and microeconomics, but whereas in microeconomics, consistent choice underlies the notion of utility; in biology, the assumption of consistent selective pressures justifies modelling decision mechanisms as if they were designed to maximize fitness. In either case, violations of consistency contradict expectations and attract theoretical interest. Reported violations of rationality in non-humans include intransitivity (i.e. circular preferences) and lack of independence of irrelevant alternatives (changes in relative preference between options when embedded in different choice sets), but the extent to which these observations truly represent breaches of rationality is debatable. We tested both principles with starlings (Sturnus vulgaris), training subjects either with five options differing in food delay (exp. 1) or with six options differing in reward probability (exp. 2), before letting them choose repeatedly one option out of several binary and trinary sets of options. The starlings conformed to economic rationality on both tests, showing strong stochastic transitivity and no violation of the independence principle. These results endorse the rational choice and optimality approaches used in behavioural ecology, and highlight the need for functional and mechanistic enquiring when apparent violations of such principles are observed.     

Irrational decision-making in an amoeboid organism: transitivity and context-dependent preferences

Most models of animal foraging and consumer choice assume that individuals make choices based on the absolute value of items and are therefore ‘economically rational’. However, frequent violations of rationality by animals, including humans, suggest that animals use comparative valuation rules. Are comparative valuation strategies a consequence of the way brains process information, or are they an intrinsic feature of biological decision-making? Here, we examine the principles of rationality in an organism with radically different information-processing mechanisms: the brainless, unicellular, slime mould Physarum polycephalum. We offered P. polycephalum amoebas a choice between food options that varied in food quality and light exposure (P. polycephalum is photophobic). The use of an absolute valuation rule will lead to two properties: transitivity and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Transitivity is satisfied if preferences have a consistent, linear ordering, while IIA states that a decision maker''s preference for an item should not change if the choice set is expanded. A violation of either of these principles suggests the use of comparative rather than absolute valuation rules. Physarum polycephalum satisfied transitivity by having linear preference rankings. However, P. polycephalum''s preference for a focal alternative increased when a third, inferior quality option was added to the choice set, thus violating IIA and suggesting the use of a comparative valuation process. The discovery of comparative valuation rules in a unicellular organism suggests that comparative valuation rules are ubiquitous, if not universal, among biological decision makers.     

Bonobos and chimpanzees exhibit human-like framing effects

Humans exhibit framing effects when making choices, appraising decisions involving losses differently from those involving gains. To directly test for the evolutionary origin of this bias, we examined decision-making in humans'' closest living relatives: bonobos (Pan paniscus) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). We presented the largest sample of non-humans to date (n = 40) with a simple task requiring minimal experience. Apes made choices between a ‘framed’ option that provided preferred food, and an alternative option that provided a constant amount of intermediately preferred food. In the gain condition, apes experienced a positive ‘gain’ event in which the framed option was initially presented as one piece of food but sometimes was augmented to two. In the loss condition, apes experienced a negative ‘loss'' event in which they initially saw two pieces but sometimes received only one. Both conditions provided equal pay-offs, but apes chose the framed option more often in the positive ‘gain’ frame. Moreover, male apes were more susceptible to framing than were females. These results suggest that some human economic biases are shared through common descent with other apes and highlight the importance of comparative work in understanding the origins of individual differences in human choice.     

Female mate choice in convict cichlids is transitive and consistent with a self-referent directional preference

Introduction

One of the most important decisions that an animal has to make in its life is choosing a mate. Although most studies in sexual selection assume that mate choice is rational, this assumption has not been tested seriously. A crucial component of rationality is that animals exhibit transitive choices: if an individual prefers option A over B, and B over C, then it also prefers A over C.

Results

We assessed transitivity in mate choice: 40 female convict cichlids had to make a series of binary choices between males of varying size. Ninety percent of females showed transitive choices. The mean preference index was significantly higher when a female chose between their most preferred and least preferred male (male 1 vs. male 3) compared to when they chose between males of adjacent ranks (1 vs. 2 or 2 vs. 3). The results are consistent with a simple underlying preference function leading to transitive choice: females preferred males about one third larger than themselves. This rule of thumb correctly predicted which male was preferred in 67% of the cases and the ordering in binary choices in 78% of cases.

Conclusions

This study provides the first evidence for strong stochastic transitivity in a context of mate choice. The females exhibited ordinal preferences and the direction and magnitude of these preferences could be predicted from a simple rule. The females do not necessarily compare two males to choose the best; it is sufficient to use a self-referent evaluation. Such a simple decision rule has important implications for the evolution of the mating strategies and it is consistent with patterns of assortative mating repeatedly observed at population level.

     

Led into Temptation? Rewarding Brand Logos Bias the Neural Encoding of Incidental Economic Decisions

Human decision-making is driven by subjective values assigned to alternative choice options. These valuations are based on reward cues. It is unknown, however, whether complex reward cues, such as brand logos, may bias the neural encoding of subjective value in unrelated decisions. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we subliminally presented brand logos preceding intertemporal choices. We demonstrated that priming biased participants' preferences towards more immediate rewards in the subsequent temporal discounting task. This was associated with modulations of the neural encoding of subjective values of choice options in a network of brain regions, including but not restricted to medial prefrontal cortex. Our findings demonstrate the general susceptibility of the human decision making system to apparently incidental contextual information. We conclude that the brain incorporates seemingly unrelated value information that modifies decision making outside the decision-maker's awareness.     

Choice in multi-alternative environments: A trial-by-trial implementation of the Sequential Choice Model

The sequential choice model (SCM) proposes that latencies to accept options presented alone can be used to predict preferences between these options when they are presented simultaneously. SCM has been proposed and tested in experiments where only two alternatives were present. To further challenge the model, we trained and tested European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) in an environment with a background of four alternatives differing in delay to reinforcement. Unexpected binary choices between the six possible pairs of alternatives were used to assess preference. The model's predictions of the strength of preference roughly corresponded to the bird's choices for each of the six choice situations. More importantly, a trial-by-trial test of the model correctly predicted 84% of all individual choice trials.     

Design and Analysis of Simple Choice Surveys for Natural Resource Management

Abstract: We used a simple yet powerful method for judging public support for management actions from randomized surveys. We asked respondents to rank choices (representing management regulations under consideration) according to their preference, and we then used discrete choice models to estimate probability of choosing among options (conditional on the set of options presented to respondents). Because choices may share similar unmodeled characteristics, the multinomial logit model, commonly applied to discrete choice data, may not be appropriate. We introduced the nested logit model, which offers a simple approach for incorporating correlation among choices. This forced choice survey approach provides a useful method of gathering public input; it is relatively easy to apply in practice, and the data are likely to be more informative than asking constituents to rate attractiveness of each option separately.     

Manipulation Detection and Preference Alterations in a Choice Blindness Paradigm

Objectives

It is commonly believed that individuals make choices based upon their preferences and have access to the reasons for their choices. Recent studies in several areas suggest that this is not always the case. In choice blindness paradigms, two-alternative forced-choice in which chosen-options are later replaced by the unselected option, individuals often fail to notice replacement of their chosen option, confabulate explanations for why they chose the unselected option, and even show increased preferences for the unselected-but-replaced options immediately after choice (seconds). Although choice blindness has been replicated across a variety of domains, there are numerous outstanding questions. Firstly, we sought to investigate how individual- or trial-factors modulated detection of the manipulations. Secondly, we examined the nature and temporal duration (minutes vs. days) of the preference alterations induced by these manipulations.

Methods

Participants performed a computerized choice blindness task, selecting the more attractive face between presented pairs of female faces, and providing a typewritten explanation for their choice on half of the trials. Chosen-face cue manipulations were produced on a subset of trials by presenting the unselected face during the choice explanation as if it had been selected. Following all choice trials, participants rated the attractiveness of each face individually, and rated the similarity of each face pair. After approximately two weeks, participants re-rated the attractiveness of each individual face online.

Results

Participants detected manipulations on only a small proportion of trials, with detections by fewer than half of participants. Detection rates increased with the number of prior detections, and detection rates subsequent to first detection were modulated by the choice certainty. We show clear short-term modulation of preferences in both manipulated and non-manipulated explanation trials compared to choice-only trials (with opposite directions of effect). Preferences were altered in the direction that subjects were led to believe they selected.