Temporal dimensions of selfhood: theories of person among the Suruí of Rondônia (Brazilian Amazon)

In reply to the cognitivist criticism that claims that selfhood cannot be studied by ethnographical tools, the author argues that the study of indigenous ‘theories of person’ should focus on the temporal dimensions of selfhood rather than on notions such as ‘body’ or ‘soul’, and should pay attention to the contexts in which such concepts and discourses occur. An ethnographical case study of Native Amazonia, in which the conceptions of persons include numerous souls and bodies, shows that this multiplicity corresponds to several fields of social relationships and several scales of temporality as multiple ways of differing from others and becoming different from oneself.     

Religious and secular death: a parting of the ways

Most organized religions have indicated a level of support for organ donation including the diagnosis of death by the brain criterion. Organ donation is seen as a gift of love and fits within a communitarian ethos that most religions embrace. The acceptance of the determination of death by the brain criterion, where it has been explained, is reconciled with religious views of soul and body by using a notion of integration. Because the soul may be seen as that which integrates the human body, in the absence of any other signs of human functioning, loss of integration is considered to be an indication that soul and body have separated. To some extent this view would seem to be informed by an Aristotelian notion of the soul, but it fits well enough with religious notions of the person continuing after death. There have been several developments internationally that indicate that the acceptance of so-called 'brain death' by organized religions has been challenged by new developments including the acceptance of a lesser standard than loss of all brain function and a rejection by the US President's Council on Bioethics of the notion of loss of integration as an explanation of death by the brain criterion.     

Bony pelvic canal size and shape in relation to body proportionality in humans

Obstetric selection acts on the female pelvic canal to accommodate the human neonate and contributes to pelvic sexual dimorphism. There is a complex relationship between selection for obstetric sufficiency and for overall body size in humans. The relationship between selective pressures may differ among populations of different body sizes and proportions, as pelvic canal dimensions vary among populations. Size and shape of the pelvic canal in relation to body size and shape were examined using nine skeletal samples (total female n = 57; male n = 84) from diverse geographical regions. Pelvic, vertebral, and lower limb bone measurements were collected. Principal component analyses demonstrate pelvic canal size and shape differences among the samples. Male multivariate variance in pelvic shape is greater than female variance for North and South Africans. High‐latitude samples have larger and broader bodies, and pelvic canals of larger size and, among females, relatively broader medio‐lateral dimensions relative to low‐latitude samples, which tend to display relatively expanded inlet antero‐posterior (A‐P) and posterior canal dimensions. Differences in canal shape exist among samples that are not associated with latitude or body size, suggesting independence of some canal shape characteristics from body size and shape. The South Africans are distinctive with very narrow bodies and small pelvic inlets relative to an elongated lower canal in A‐P and posterior lengths. Variation in pelvic canal geometry among populations is consistent with a high degree of evolvability in the human pelvis. Am J Phys Anthropol 151:88–101, 2013. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Modelling person-shapes for thermal comfort studies

Numerical modelling of radiation exchange between a person and the surrounding environment has proven to be a difficult problem in thermal comfort studies, largely because of the complexity of the human shape. However, recent procedures suggest that, if the orientation of a person is not important, the human body may be represented by the combination of a number of simple geometric shapes which are weighted by reference to experimental data. These procedures are extended and are shown to satisfactorily approximate the human form when the orientation of the person with respect to a radiating surface is important.     

Rethinking Anthropological Studies of the Body: Manas and Bōdham in Kerala

Anthropological research that focuses on the body has been prolific in the last two decades. This trend has provided an important reorientation away from a tendency to focus on mental representations of experience and has allowed for a more holistic understanding of the human condition. However, this article argues that much research on the body has created a false dichotomy: Westerners are seen as living in a world of mentalistic bias and mind–body dualism while all others are understood as more grounded in their bodies. Ethnographic research conducted among people suffering psychopathology and possession in Kerala, India, challenges these assumptions about the embodied Other by showing that these patients experience a continuum of states of being that includes the body, mind, consciousness, and self/soul. This approach demonstrates how an examination of a local culturally and historically formed phenomenological orientation can provide a useful alternative to the tendency to discover embodied peoples. [Keywords: body, embodiment, India, Kerala]     

A Thomistic understanding of human death

I investigate Thomas Aquinas's metaphysical account of human death, which is defined in terms of a rational soul separating from its material body. The question at hand concerns what criterion best determines when this separation occurs. Aquinas argues that a body has a rational soul only insofar as it is properly organised to support the soul's vegetative, sensitive, and rational capacities. According the 'higher-brain' concept of death, when a body can no longer provide the biological foundation necessary for the operation of conscious rational thought and volition, a substantial change occurs in which the rational soul departs and the body left behind is a 'humanoid animal' or a mere 'vegetable.' I argue that the separation of soul and body does not occur until the body ceases to function as a unified, integrated organism. A rational soul is not only the seat of a human being's rational capacities; it is also the principle of the body's sensitive and vegetative capacities. Since Aquinas defines a human being as a composite of soul and body, and not with merely the exercise of rational capacities, the determination of death requires incontrovertible evidence that the body has ceased all the operations that correspond to the soul's proper capacities. The evidence of this is the body's loss of its integrative organic unity and the criterion for determining when this loss occurs is the irreversible cessation of whole-brain functioning.     

From dividual and individual selves to porous subjects

The distinction between understanding persons as dividuals versus individuals began to develop in the latter half of the twentieth century. Originating in Louis Dumont’s comparative work into the differences between Western and Indian subjects in the 1950s, it perhaps reached its zenith in the 1980s when Marilyn Strathern used it to differentiate between Melanesian and Western concepts of the person. By the end of the century, critique and reconceptualisation of the individual:dividual distinction was so well established in the anthropological literature that its explanatory capacity was largely negated. The aim of this paper is to attempt to clarify the different modes of personhood that the dividual:individual distinction sought to elucidate by introducing a useful distinction between the self and the human subject and further developing Charles Taylor’s distinction between porous and buffered selves.     

Endothelium specific Weibel-Palade bodies in a continuous human cell line,EA.hy926

Summary Weibel-Palade bodies are ultrastructurally defined organelles found only in vascular endothelial cells. Because endothelium in corpo is very dispersed, isolation and further characterization of this organelle has been dependent on increasing the number of cells in culture. However, primary isolates of endothelial cells have a limited replication potential and tend to senesce in culture. In this report, EA.hy926, a continuously replicating cell line derived from human endothelium, is shown to contain Weibel-Palade bodies. Electron micrographs demonstrate the ultrastructural characteristics of these tissue-specific organelles and their cytoplasmic distribution in EA.hy926 cells. Von Willebrand factor, which has been shown to exist in Weibel Palade bodies, is demonstrated by immunofluorescence in discrete rod-shaped organelles whose size, shape, and distribution are consistent with that of Weibel-Palade bodies in primary endothelial cell cultures. Rapid release of von Willebrand factor can be induced by calcium ionophore, and large multimeric forms of the protein are found in EA.hy926 cells. These two properties are consistent with the function currently ascribed to Weibel Palade bodies: storage of multimerized von Willebrand factor. Thus ultrastructural, immunologic, and functional data establish the existence of this as yet poorly understood tissue-specific organelle in a continuous, vigorously replicating human cell line.     

Automata, Living and Non-Living: Descartes' Mechanical Biology and His Criteria for Life

Despite holding to the essential distinction between mind and body, Descartes did not adopt a life-body dualism. Though humans are the only creatures which can reason, as they are the only creatures whose body is in an intimate union with a soul, they are not the only finite beings who are alive. In the present note, I attempt to determine Descartes' criteria for something to be 'living.' Though certain passages associate such a principle with the presence of a properly functioning heart, I show that there are important reasons for also understanding life in terms of a degree of complexity of design.     

The Global Traffic in Human Organs1

Inspired by Sweetness and Power, in which Sidney Mintz traces the colonial and mercantilist routes of enslaving tastes and artificial needs, this paper maps a late-20th-century global trade in bodies, body parts, desires, and invented scarcities. Organ transplant takes place today in a transnational space with surgeons, patients, organ donors, recipients, brokers, and intermediaries-some with criminal connections-following new paths of capital and technology in the global economy. The stakes are high, for the technologies and practices of transplant surgery have demonstrated their power to reconceptualize the human body and the relations of body parts to the whole and to the person and of people and bodies to each other. The phenomenal spread of these technologies and the artificial needs, scarcities, and new commodities (i.e., fresh organs) that they inspire-especially within the context of a triumphant neoliberalism-raise many issues central to anthropology's concern with global dominations and local resistances, including the reordering of relations between individual bodies and the state, between gifts and commodities, between fact and rumor, and between medicine and magic in postmodernity.     

Owning an Overweight or Underweight Body: Distinguishing the Physical,Experienced and Virtual Body

Our bodies are the most intimately familiar objects we encounter in our perceptual environment. Virtual reality provides a unique method to allow us to experience having a very different body from our own, thereby providing a valuable method to explore the plasticity of body representation. In this paper, we show that women can experience ownership over a whole virtual body that is considerably smaller or larger than their physical body. In order to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying body ownership, we use an embodiment questionnaire, and introduce two new behavioral response measures: an affordance estimation task (indirect measure of body size) and a body size estimation task (direct measure of body size). Interestingly, after viewing the virtual body from first person perspective, both the affordance and the body size estimation tasks indicate a change in the perception of the size of the participant''s experienced body. The change is biased by the size of the virtual body (overweight or underweight). Another novel aspect of our study is that we distinguish between the physical, experienced and virtual bodies, by asking participants to provide affordance and body size estimations for each of the three bodies separately. This methodological point is important for virtual reality experiments investigating body ownership of a virtual body, because it offers a better understanding of which cues (e.g. visual, proprioceptive, memory, or a combination thereof) influence body perception, and whether the impact of these cues can vary between different setups.     

Patterns of basal body addition in ciliary rows in Tetrahymena

Most naked basal bodies visualized in protargol stains on the surface of Tetrahymena are new basal bodies which have not yet developed cilia. The rarity of short cilia is explained by the rapid development of the ciliary shaft once it begins to grow. The high frequency of naked basal bodies (about 50 percent) in log cultures indicates that the interval between assembly of the basal body and the initiation of the cilium is long, approximately a full cell cycle. Naked basal bodies are more frequent in the mid and posterior parts of the cell and two or more naked basal bodies may be associated with one ciliated basal body in these regions. Daughter cells produced at division are apparently asymmetric with respect to their endowment of new and old organelles.     

Soul Citizenship: The Black Hebrews and the State of Israel

Based on the experiences of the Black Hebrews in Israel, this article introduces "soul citizenship," an alternate discourse that asserts the right of individuals and groups to match their self–defined identities with existing states. After years of living in the Jewish State as an illegal yet tolerated presence, the African Hebrew Israelite Community (AHIC) gained temporary residence status, or according to the postnational model of membership, de facto citizenship. Nonetheless, having reformulated their claims in terms of Jewish cultural pluralism instead of race, the Black Hebrews continue to demand full Israeli citizenship. Rejecting postnational splits among identity, legal status, and territory, their soulful claims suggest a model of citizenship that opens new space for misplaced peopled) to gain membership in the states that meet their cultural aspirations and nourish their souls. [Keywords: citizenship, Black Hebrews, Israel, diasporas]     

The Beginning of Personhood: A Thomistic Biological Analysis

‘When did I, a human person, begin to exist?’ In developing an answer to this question, I utilize a Thomistic framework, which holds that the human person is a composite of a biological organism and an intellective soul. Eric Olson and Norman Ford both argue that the beginning of an individual human biological organism occurs at the moment when implantation of the zygote in the uterus occurs and the ‘primitive streak’ begins to form. Prior to this point, there does not exist an individual human organism, but a cluster of biological cells which has the potential to split and develop as one or more separate human organisms (identical twinning). Ensoulment (the instantiation of a human intellective soul in biological matter) does not occur until the point of implantation. This conception of the beginning of human personhood has moral implications concerning the status of pre‐implantation biological cell clusters. A new understanding of the beginning of human personhood entails a new understanding of the morality of certain medical procedures which have a direct affect on these cell clusters which contain human DNA. Such procedures discussed in this article are embryonic stem cell research, in vitro fertilization, procured abortion, and the use of abortifacient contraceptives.     

Larval ecomorphology of 13 Libellulidae (Anisoptera, Odonata) of the Middle Rio Doce Valley, Minas Gerais, Brazil.

In the lakes of the Middle Rio Doce, Minas Gerais (MG), two groups of larval Libellulidae are distinguished by preferences of habitat use: one uses mainly aquatic macrophytes and the other uses the bottom substrate. The goal of this work was to verify if there is a morphological distinction between the two groups of species. Thirteen body measures were taken from the larvae and analyzed. No difference was found between the two groups of species regarding the body size, but shape differences were observed for two morphological variables. The species that use mainly macrophytes tend to have larger relative measures of the labium and smaller measures of the abdomen width. Advantages in resource obtainment and in vulnerability to predation are probably the explanations for the morphological divergence among these larval groups.     

A Day in the Life of Dr K. or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Lysozyme: a tragedy in six acts.

About the play: In modern drama, the agonizing nature of membrane protein work has not been adequately acknowledged. It is perhaps significant that the first attempt to bring this darker aspect of human existence into focus comes from a Scandinavian author, writing in the tradition of Ibsen and Strindberg but with a distinctly turn-of-the-millenium approach to the inner life of his characters: the despairing Dr K; the cynical Dr R with his post-modernistic life credo; the ambitious but unfeeling Dr C; the modern Ubermensch, Dr B. , with his almost Nietzschean view of human nature. This is a play that is brutally honest, yet full of empathy for the poor souls that get caught between the Scylla of unreachable scientific glory and the Charybdis of helpless mediocrity.James Glib-Burdock, drama critic for The Stratford Observer.     

Material translations in the Cartesian brain

This article reexamines the controversial doctrine of the pineal gland in Cartesian psychophysiology. It argues initially that Descartes' combined metaphysics and natural philosophy yield a distinctly human subject who is rational, willful, but also a living and embodied being in the world, formed in the union and through the dynamics of the interaction between the soul and the body. However, Descartes only identified one site at which this union was staged: the brain, and more precisely, the pineal gland, the small bulb of nervous tissue at the brain's center. The pineal gland was charged with the incredible task of ensuring the interactive mutuality between the soul and body, while also maintaining the necessary ontological incommensurability between them. This article reconsiders the theoretical obligations placed on the pineal gland as the site of the soul-body union, and looks at how the gland was consequently forced to adopt a very precarious ontological status. The article ultimately questions how successfully the Cartesian human could be localized in the pineal gland, while briefly considering the broader historical consequences of the ensuing equivalence of the self and brain.     

Apprenticeship in western India

A number of recent attempts to describe what happens in the 'embodied' space between action and the discursive language used to describe that action have been primarily informed by various Western theories of mind. In this article, I present an indigenous theory of what happens among Sunni Muslims in a South Asian context in the gap between linguistic utterances and the actions they purport to represent. The ethnography focuses on learning craft and social skills among apprentices in the shipyards in the Indian state of Gujarat. It is argued that acquiring both kinds of skills is underscored by particular conceptions of the body and the possible transformations of the soul through physical activity.     

Ectomycorrhizal fungi have larger fruit bodies than saprotrophic fungi

Currently we have only a limited understanding of the evolutionary and ecological significance of reproductive traits of fungi. We compared data on fruit body size, spore size and shape between saprotrophic and mutualistic (ectomycorrhizal) fungi in Northern and Central Europe. Lifestyle and reproductive traits showed strong phylogenetic signals. A phylogenetically informed analysis demonstrated that saprotrophs produce on average smaller fruit bodies than mutualistic species. The two guilds, however, do not differ in spore size. Overall this suggests that fruit bodies of ectomycorrhizal fungi produce on average more spores than saprotrophic fungi. We argue that this difference is related to resource availability: ectomycorrhizal fungi receive carbon from their hosts and, therefore, evolution favours large fruit bodies, whereas the fruit body size of saprotrophic fungi might have responded to resource availability and the distribution and size of resource patches.     

Weathering climate: telescoping change

As the scientific distinction between climate and weather suggests, knowledge about climate is supposed to be beyond indigenous peoples’ everyday experience of the environment in that it requires a long-term record. On the basis of ethnographic work among geoscientists in Scotland and West Greenland, I show that practitioners of this discipline have mastered the craft of turning ‘visible’ what is ‘invisible’ to the senses by playing with shorter time-scales. In thinking and communicating about the past, geoscientists would compress and accelerate long-term environmental processes, often at the cost of dissociating them from processes occurring at shorter time-scales, particularly the adaptation of living organisms. Attending to the historical circumstances around the development of this skill, I argue that it relates to an ideal of objectivity in science that corresponds to an optical understanding of time, inspired by the image of the telescope. Challenging the distinction between climate and weather, and the epistemic distance on which it rests, I discuss recent approaches in environmental anthropology that have uncritically adopted this distinction to distinguish indigenous knowledge of the environment from climate science. In conclusion, informed by research with indigenous peoples of the Arctic, I speculate on alternative ways of understanding climate knowledge, beyond the climate-weather distinction.