Manipulating Individual Decisions and Environmental Conditions Reveal Individual Quality in Decision-Making and Non-Lethal Costs of Predation Risk

Habitat selection is a crucial decision for any organism. Selecting a high quality site will positively impact survival and reproductive output. Predation risk is an important component of habitat quality that is known to impact reproductive success and individual condition. However, separating the breeding consequences of decision-making of wild animals from individual quality is difficult. Individuals face reproductive decisions that often vary with quality such that low quality individuals invest less. This reduced reproductive performance could appear a cost of increased risk but may simply reflect lower quality. Thus, teasing apart the effects of individual quality and the effect of predation risk is vital to understand the physiological and reproductive costs of predation risk alone on breeding animals. In this study we alter the actual territory location decisions of pied flycatchers by moving active nests relative to breeding sparrowhawks, the main predators of adult flycatchers. We experimentally measure the non-lethal effects of predation on adults and offspring while controlling for effects of parental quality, individual territory choice and initiation of breeding. We found that chicks from high predation risk nests (<50 m of hawk) were significantly smaller than chicks from low risk nests (>200 m from hawk). However, in contrast to correlative results, females in manipulated high risk nests did not suffer decreased body condition or increased stress response (HSP60 and HSP70). Our results suggest that territory location decisions relative to breeding avian predators cause spatial gradients in individual quality. Small adjustments in territory location decisions have crucial consequences and our results confirm non-lethal costs of predation risk that were expressed in terms of smaller offspring produced. However, females did not show costs in physiological condition which suggests that part of the costs incurred by adults exposed to predation risk are quality determined.     

Stop-Signaling Reduces Split Decisions without Impairing Accuracy in the Honeybee Nest-Site Selection Process

In the honeybee swarm nest-site selection process, individual bees gather information about available candidate sites and communicate the information to other bees. The swarm makes an agreement for a candidate site when the number of bees that supports the site reaches a threshold. This threshold is usually referred to as the quorum threshold and it is shown by many studies as a key parameter that is a compromise between the accuracy and speed of decisions. In the present work, we use a model of the honeybee Apis mellifera nest-site selection process to study how the quorum threshold and discovery time of candidate sites have major impact on two unfavorable situations in selecting a nest site: decision deadlock and decision split. We show that cross-inhibitory stop-signaling, delivered among bees supporting different sites, enables swarms to avoid the decision split problem in addition to avoiding the decision deadlock problem that has been previously proposed. We also show that stop-signaling improves decision speed, but compromises decision accuracy in swarms using high quorum thresholds by causing the swarms to be trapped in local optima (e.g., choosing a sub-optimal option that is encountered first). On the other hand, we demonstrate that stop-signaling can reduce split decisions without compromising decision accuracy in swarms using low quorum thresholds when it is compared to the accuracy of swarms using the same threshold values but not exhibiting stop-signaling. Based on our simulations, we suggest that swarms using low quorum thresholds (as well as swarms with large population sizes) would benefit more from exhibiting the stop-signaling activity than not exhibiting it.     

Cortical and Hippocampal Correlates of Deliberation during Model-Based Decisions for Rewards in Humans

How do we use our memories of the past to guide decisions we''ve never had to make before? Although extensive work describes how the brain learns to repeat rewarded actions, decisions can also be influenced by associations between stimuli or events not directly involving reward — such as when planning routes using a cognitive map or chess moves using predicted countermoves — and these sorts of associations are critical when deciding among novel options. This process is known as model-based decision making. While the learning of environmental relations that might support model-based decisions is well studied, and separately this sort of information has been inferred to impact decisions, there is little evidence concerning the full cycle by which such associations are acquired and drive choices. Of particular interest is whether decisions are directly supported by the same mnemonic systems characterized for relational learning more generally, or instead rely on other, specialized representations. Here, building on our previous work, which isolated dual representations underlying sequential predictive learning, we directly demonstrate that one such representation, encoded by the hippocampal memory system and adjacent cortical structures, supports goal-directed decisions. Using interleaved learning and decision tasks, we monitor predictive learning directly and also trace its influence on decisions for reward. We quantitatively compare the learning processes underlying multiple behavioral and fMRI observables using computational model fits. Across both tasks, a quantitatively consistent learning process explains reaction times, choices, and both expectation- and surprise-related neural activity. The same hippocampal and ventral stream regions engaged in anticipating stimuli during learning are also engaged in proportion to the difficulty of decisions. These results support a role for predictive associations learned by the hippocampal memory system to be recalled during choice formation.     

Time Devours Things: How Impulsivity and Time Affect Temporal Decisions in Pathological Gamblers

Impulsivity is associated with several psychiatric disorders in which the loss of control of a specific behavior determines the syndrome itself. One particularly interesting population characterized by reported high impulsivity and problematic decision-making are those diagnosed with pathological gambling. However the association between impulsivity and decision making in pathological gambling has been only partially confirmed until now. We tested 23 normal controls and 23 diagnosed pathological gamblers in an intertemporal choice task, as well as other personality trait measurements. Results showed that gamblers scored higher on impulsivity questionnaires, and selected a higher percentage of impatient choices (higher percentage of smaller, sooner rewards), when compared to normal controls. Moreover, gamblers were faster in terms of reaction times at selecting the smaller, sooner options and discounted rewards more rapidly over time. Importantly, regression analyses clarified that self-reported measures of impulsivity played a significant role in biasing decisions towards small but more rapidly available rewards. In the present study we found evidence for impulsivity in personality traits and decisions in pathological gamblers relative to controls. We conclude by speculating on the need to incorporate impulsivity and decision biases in the conceptualization of pathological gambling for a better understanding and treatment of this pathology.     

Tracking the Unconscious Generation of Free Decisions Using UItra-High Field fMRI

Recently, we demonstrated using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) that the outcome of free decisions can be decoded from brain activity several seconds before reaching conscious awareness. Activity patterns in anterior frontopolar cortex (BA 10) were temporally the first to carry intention-related information and thus a candidate region for the unconscious generation of free decisions. In the present study, the original paradigm was replicated and multivariate pattern classification was applied to functional images of frontopolar cortex, acquired using ultra-high field fMRI at 7 Tesla. Here, we show that predictive activity patterns recorded before a decision was made became increasingly stable with increasing temporal proximity to the time point of the conscious decision. Furthermore, detailed questionnaires exploring subjects'' thoughts before and during the decision confirmed that decisions were made spontaneously and subjects were unaware of the evolution of their decision outcomes. These results give further evidence that FPC stands at the top of the prefrontal executive hierarchy in the unconscious generation of free decisions.     

Under pressure: response urgency modulates striatal and insula activity during decision-making under risk

When deciding whether to bet in situations that involve potential monetary loss or gain (mixed gambles), a subjective sense of pressure can influence the evaluation of the expected utility associated with each choice option. Here, we explored how gambling decisions, their psychophysiological and neural counterparts are modulated by an induced sense of urgency to respond. Urgency influenced decision times and evoked heart rate responses, interacting with the expected value of each gamble. Using functional MRI, we observed that this interaction was associated with changes in the activity of the striatum, a critical region for both reward and choice selection, and within the insula, a region implicated as the substrate of affective feelings arising from interoceptive signals which influence motivational behavior. Our findings bridge current psychophysiological and neurobiological models of value representation and action-programming, identifying the striatum and insular cortex as the key substrates of decision-making under risk and urgency.     

Genetic Testing for Huntington's Disease: How Is the Decision Taken?

Research on genetic decision-making normally constructs the decision as an opportunity for choice. However, minimal research investigates how these decisions are taken and whether those who live with genetic risk perceive the test as an opportunity for choice. Employing semistructured interviews with at-risk persons, this study explored decisions about genetic testing for Huntington's disease (HD)--a fatal genetic disorder. A primary aim was to understand how test decisions were perceived. Qualitative data analysis revealed four decision pathways: (1) no decision to be made, (2) constrained decisions, (3) reevaluating the decision, and (4) indicators of HD. Contrary to the rational, "information-processor" approach to decision making, some test decisions were immediate and automatic. These stories challenged the conventional construction of a genetic-test decision as an opportunity for choice. Participant narratives suggested that this construction may be inadequate, at least for some people who live with genetic risk. Test decisions were sometimes constrained by perceived responsibility to other family members, notably offspring. For others at risk, the test decision was a dynamic process of critical thought and evaluation. Finally, behaviors that could be symptoms of HD were the catalyst for testing.     

Evidence-Based Health Care Policy in Reimbursement Decisions: Lessons from a Series of Six Equivocal Case-Studies

Context

Health care technological evolution through new drugs, implants and other interventions is a key driver of healthcare spending. Policy makers are currently challenged to strengthen the evidence for and cost-effectiveness of reimbursement decisions, while not reducing the capacity for real innovations. This article examines six cases of reimbursement decision making at the national health insurance authority in Belgium, with outcomes that were contested from an evidence-based perspective in scientific or public media.

Methods

In depth interviews with key stakeholders based on the adapted framework of Davies allowed us to identify the relative impact of clinical and health economic evidence; experience, expertise & judgment; financial impact & resources; values, ideology & political beliefs; habit & tradition; lobbyists & pressure groups; pragmatics & contingencies; media attention; and adoption from other payers & countries.

Findings

Evidence was not the sole criterion on which reimbursement decisions were based. Across six equivocal cases numerous other criteria were perceived to influence reimbursement policy. These included other considerations that stakeholders deemed crucial in this area, such as taking into account the cost to the patient, and managing crisis scenarios. However, negative impacts were also reported, in the form of bypassing regular procedures unnecessarily, dominance of an opinion leader, using information selectively, and influential conflicts of interest.

Conclusions

‘Evidence’ and ‘negotiation’ are both essential inputs of reimbursement policy. Yet, purposely selected equivocal cases in Belgium provide a rich source to learn from and to improve the interaction between both. We formulated policy recommendations to reconcile the impact of all factors identified. A more systematic approach to reimburse new care may be one of many instruments to resolve the budgetary crisis in health care in other countries as well, by separating what is truly innovative and value for money from additional ‘waste’.     

Motor Cost Influences Perceptual Decisions

Perceptual decision making has been widely studied using tasks in which subjects are asked to discriminate a visual stimulus and instructed to report their decision with a movement. In these studies, performance is measured by assessing the accuracy of the participants’ choices as a function of the ambiguity of the visual stimulus. Typically, the reporting movement is considered as a mere means of reporting the decision with no influence on the decision-making process. However, recent studies have shown that even subtle differences of biomechanical costs between movements may influence how we select between them. Here we investigated whether this purely motor cost could also influence decisions in a perceptual discrimination task in detriment of accuracy. In other words, are perceptual decisions only dependent on the visual stimulus and entirely orthogonal to motor costs? Here we show the results of a psychophysical experiment in which human subjects were presented with a random dot motion discrimination task and asked to report the perceived motion direction using movements of different biomechanical cost. We found that the pattern of decisions exhibited a significant bias towards the movement of lower cost, even when this bias reduced performance accuracy. This strongly suggests that motor costs influence decision making in visual discrimination tasks for which its contribution is neither instructed nor beneficial.     

The value of being a resource specialist: behavioral support for a neural hypothesis

The neural hypothesis of diet breadth proposes that selecting an appropriate behavior is more efficient if simple or exaggerated cues can be used as a basis of decision making rather than making a choice among many complex sensory inputs. I propose that simple signals overcome the problem of multiple sensory inputs and the consequent need for the brain to decide among inputs from these multiple channels. Experiments on grasshoppers show that there is a significant time cost in having to make a choice, relative to situations in which individuals have grown accustomed to having no choice. Those with a choice were shown to be less decisive by two different measures than those without a choice. It is argued that the data, showing lengthy decision times as a result of having a choice, would involve a significant ecological risk. It is further argued that the reduced risk of quick decisions would favor specialization of resource use. The evolution of resource-specific cues that have often been called sign stimuli are considered critical elements of restricted resource use.     

Incorporating Science,Technology, Fairness,and Accountability in Environmental,Health, and Safety Decisions

The Precautionary Principle is in sharp political focus today because (1) the nature of scientific uncertainty is changing and (2) there is increasing pressure to base governmental action on more “rational” schemes, such as cost-benefit analysis and quantitative risk assessment, the former being an embodiment of ‘rational choice theory’ promoted by the Chicago school of law and economics. The Precautionary Principle has been criticized as being both too vague and too arbitrary to form a basis for rational decision making. The assumption underlying this criticism is that any scheme not based on cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment is both irrational and without secure foundation in either science or economics. This paper contests that view and makes explicit the rational tenets of the Precautionary Principle within an analytical framework as rigorous as uncertainties permit, and one that mirrors democratic values embodied in regulatory, compensatory, and common law. Unlike other formulations that reject risk assessment, this paper argues that risk assessment can be used within the formalism of tradeoff analysis—a more appropriate alternative to traditional cost-benefit analysis and one that satisfies the need for well-grounded public policy decision making. This paper will argue that the precautionary approach is the most appropriate basis for policy, even when large uncertainties do not exist, especially where the fairness of the distributions of costs and benefits of hazardous activities and products are a concern. Furthermore, it will offer an approach to making decisions within an analytic framework, based on equity and justice, to replace the economic paradigm of utilitarian cost-benefit analysis.     

Costs of Refuge Use Affect Escape Decisions of Iberian Rock Lizards Lacerta monticola

Theoretical models of anti-predator escape behaviour suggest that prey may adjust their escape response such that the optimal flight distance is the point at which the costs of staying exceed the costs of fleeing. Anti-predatory decisions should be made based also on consequences for long-term expected fitness, such as the costs of refuge use. For example, in lizards, the maintenance of an optimal body temperature is essential to maximize physiological processes. However, if unfavourable thermal conditions of refuges can decrease the body temperature of lizards, their escape decision should be influenced by refuge conditions. Analyses of the variation in flight distances and emergence latency from a refuge for the lizard Lacerta monticola under two different predation risk levels, and their relationship with the thermal environment, supported these predictions. When risk increased, lizards had longer emergence latencies, and thus costs of refuge use increased (a greater loss of time and body temperature). In the low-risk situation, lizards that were farther from the refuge had longer flight distances, whereas thermal conditions were less important. When risk increased, lizards had longer flight distances when refuges were farther off, but also when the external heating rate and the refuge cooling rate were lower. The results suggest that, in addition to the risk of predation, expected long-term fitness costs of refuges can also affect escape decisions.     

Economic Decisions for Others: An Exception to Loss Aversion Law

In everyday life, people often make decisions on behalf of others. The current study investigates whether risk preferences of decision-makers differ when the reference point is no longer their own money but somebody else money. Thirty four healthy participants performed three different monetary risky choices tasks by making decisions for oneself and for another unknown person. Results showed that loss aversion bias was significantly reduced when participants were choosing on behalf of another person compared to when choosing for themselves. The influence of emotions like regret on decision-making may explain these results. We discuss the importance of the sense of responsibility embodied in the emotion of regret in modulating economic decisions for self but not for others. Moreover, our findings are consistent with the Risk-as-feelings hypothesis, suggesting that self-other asymmetrical behavior is due to the extent the decision-maker is affected by the real and emotional consequences of his/her decision.     

Patch Choice Decisions among Ifaluk Fishers

Studies of patch choice decisions among human foragers have failed to explain why foragers do not exclusively exploit the patch with the highest mean profitability. One possible explanation is that profitability rankings are likely to vary daily; however, this instability is not captured when profitabilities are calculated as a sampled average over a longer time span. Here I present data on the patch choice decisions of Ifaluk fishers to evaluate whether men are responding to daily variation in the profitability of their primary fishing patch. Results show that men choose to fish most frequently in the patch with the highest mean profitability. Men fish in alternative patches (alternative from the most profitable patch) when, on that morning or the previous day, return rates in the most profitable patch are lower than the overall mean per capita return rate of alternative patches. Results also indicate that when fishers pursue alternative patches after fishing in the patch with the highest profitability, their mean per capita return rates are generally higher in the alternative patches exploited. However, variance in the profitability of the most profitable patch cannot explain why men exploit two patches, the Nine-mile reef and the dogtoothed tuna patch, which on average have very low profitability. These results and directions for future research are discussed. [Keywords: human behavioral ecology, patch choice decisions, Micronesia]     

Collective Learning and Optimal Consensus Decisions in Social Animal Groups

Learning has been studied extensively in the context of isolated individuals. However, many organisms are social and consequently make decisions both individually and as part of a collective. Reaching consensus necessarily means that a single option is chosen by the group, even when there are dissenting opinions. This decision-making process decouples the otherwise direct relationship between animals'' preferences and their experiences (the outcomes of decisions). Instead, because an individual''s learned preferences influence what others experience, and therefore learn about, collective decisions couple the learning processes between social organisms. This introduces a new, and previously unexplored, dynamical relationship between preference, action, experience and learning. Here we model collective learning within animal groups that make consensus decisions. We reveal how learning as part of a collective results in behavior that is fundamentally different from that learned in isolation, allowing grouping organisms to spontaneously (and indirectly) detect correlations between group members'' observations of environmental cues, adjust strategy as a function of changing group size (even if that group size is not known to the individual), and achieve a decision accuracy that is very close to that which is provably optimal, regardless of environmental contingencies. Because these properties make minimal cognitive demands on individuals, collective learning, and the capabilities it affords, may be widespread among group-living organisms. Our work emphasizes the importance and need for theoretical and experimental work that considers the mechanism and consequences of learning in a social context.     

Female Oviposition Decisions and Their Impact on Progeny Life-History Traits

An important factor affecting the life-history of an organism is parental investment in reproduction: reproductive decisions are almost invariably costly. Therefore, reproductive decisions should be beneficial in terms of increased offspring number or fitness. For example, egg laying decisions in many insects can influence resource availability of the offspring through changes in the larval density, and resource availability will have effects on many life-history traits. Here we studied whether female reproductive decisions affect offspring fitness in Callosobruchus maculatus seed beetles. Females laid more eggs on black-eye beans than on mung beans. However, when the difference in the surface area of the beans was accounted for, the number of eggs was not higher in black-eye beans. This together with the poisson distribution of eggs on each of the bean types suggests that females tend to lay their eggs randomly. We found that development time was longer, larval mortality lower and adult survival higher in black-eye beans. We also found interactions between bean type and larval density on size of the offspring such that in mung beans the emergence mass and pronotum width decreased with increasing larval density, but in black-eye beans larval density did not affect the size measures. We conclude that when there is a risk that larval denisty will become high within a bean and there is variable resources available, there exist clear benefits that females might obtain by choosing black-eye beans as a resource for their offspring. However, in contrast to many earlier studies, our results suggest that females may not be making any active oviposition decisions. Therefore, to unequivocally determine whether females do capitalise the potential benefits by active decision making, some further experimentation is required.     

Collective Decision-Making in Homing Pigeons: Larger Flocks Take Longer to Decide but Do Not Make Better Decisions

Social animals routinely are challenged to make consensus decisions about movement directions and routes. However, the underlying mechanisms facilitating such decision-making processes are still poorly known. A prominent question is how group members participate in group decisions. We addressed this question by examining how flocks of homing pigeons (Columba livia) decide their homing direction. We released newly formed flocks varying in size and determined the time taken to choose a homing direction (decision-making period) and the accuracy of that choice. We found that the decision-making period increases exponentially with flock size, which is consistent with a participatory decision-making process. We additionally found that there is no effect of flock size on the accuracy of the decisions made, which does not match with current theory for democratic choices of flight directions. Our combined results are better explained by a participatory choice of leaders that subsequently undertake the flock directional decisions. However, this decision-making model would only entirely fit with our results if leaders were chosen based on traits other than their navigational experience. Our study provides rare empirical evidence elucidating decision-making processes in freely moving groups of animals.     

Decisions,decisions, decisions: choosing a biological science of choice

Behavioral ecologists argue that evolution drives animal behavior to efficiently solve the problems animals face in their environmental niches. The ultimate evolutionary causes of decision making, they contend, can be found in economic analyses of organisms and their environments. Neurobiologists interested in how animals make decisions have, in contrast, focused their efforts on understanding the neurobiological hardware that serves as a more proximal cause of that same behavior. Describing the flow of information within the nervous system without regard to these larger goals has been their focus. Recent work in a number of laboratories has begun to suggest that these two approaches are beginning to fuse. It may soon be possible to view the nervous system as a representational process that solves the mathematically defined economic problems animals face by making efficient decisions. These developments in the neurobiological theory of choice, and the new schema they imply, form the subject of this article.     

A theory for optimal monitoring of marine reserves

Monitoring of marine reserves has traditionally focused on the task of rejecting the null hypothesis that marine reserves have no impact on the population and community structure of harvested populations. We consider the role of monitoring of marine reserves to gain information needed for management decisions. In particular we use a decision theoretic framework to answer the question: how long should we monitor the recovery of an over‐fished stock to determine the fraction of that stock to reserve? This exposes a natural tension between the cost (in terms of time and money) of additional monitoring, and the benefit of more accurately parameterizing a population model for the stock, that in turn leads to a better decision about the optimal size for the reserve with respect to harvesting. We found that the optimal monitoring time frame is rarely more than 5 years. A higher economic discount rate decreased the optimal monitoring time frame, making the expected benefit of more certainty about parameters in the system negligible compared with the expected gain from earlier exploitation.