A Shared Neural Substrate for Mentalizing and the Affective Component of Sentence Comprehension

Using event-related fMRI in a sample of 42 healthy participants, we compared the cerebral activity maps obtained when classifying spoken sentences based on the mental content of the main character (belief, deception or empathy) or on the emotional tonality of the sentence (happiness, anger or sadness). To control for the effects of different syntactic constructions (such as embedded clauses in belief sentences), we subtracted from each map the BOLD activations obtained during plausibility judgments on structurally matching sentences, devoid of emotions or ToM. The obtained theory of mind (ToM) and emotional speech comprehension networks overlapped in the bilateral temporo-parietal junction, posterior cingulate cortex, right anterior temporal lobe, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and in the left inferior frontal sulcus. These regions form a ToM network, which contributes to the emotional component of spoken sentence comprehension. Compared with the ToM task, in which the sentences were enounced on a neutral tone, the emotional sentence classification task, in which the sentences were play-acted, was associated with a greater activity in the bilateral superior temporal sulcus, in line with the presence of emotional prosody. Besides, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex was more active during emotional than ToM sentence processing. This region may link mental state representations with verbal and prosodic emotional cues. Compared with emotional sentence classification, ToM was associated with greater activity in the caudate nucleus, paracingulate cortex, and superior frontal and parietal regions, in line with behavioral data showing that ToM sentence comprehension was a more demanding task.     

Evidence of social understanding impairment in patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis

The present study aims at clarifying the nature of the Theory of Mind (ToM) deficits associated with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS). ToM is the ability to attribute mental states such as intentions and beliefs to others in order to understand and predict their behaviour and to behave accordingly. Several neuroimaging studies reported the prefrontal cortices as the brain region underlying a key ToM ability, i.e. the comprehension of social intentions. Dysfunction of the prefrontal cortices in patients with ALS has been indicated by a range of neuroimaging studies. The frontal syndrome that appears to characterize up to 50% of ALS has been noted to be similar to the profile that characterizes patients with frontotemporal dementia (FTD), a neurodegenerative condition characterised by ToM deficits. In the present paper, we hypothesize that the performance of patients with ALS is significantly worse than healthy controls' performance on tasks requiring the comprehension of social contexts, whereas patients' performance is comparable to healthy controls' performance on tasks not requiring the comprehension of social contexts. To this end, we tested 15 patients with ALS with an experimental protocol that distinguishes between private (non-social) intentions and social intentions. The pattern of results followed the experimental hypothesis: the performance of patients with ALS and healthy controls significantly differed on the comprehension of social context only, with an impairment in patients with ALS. Single case analysis confirmed the findings at an individual level. The present study is the first which has examined and compared the understanding of social and non-social contexts in patients with ALS and shown a specific and selective deficit in the former only. The current findings further support the notion of a continuum of cognitive dysfunction ranging from ALS to FTD, with parallel cognitive profiles in both disorders.     

Neuroanatomical Correlates of Theory of Mind Deficit in Parkinson’s Disease: A Multimodal Imaging Study

BackgroundParkinson’s disease (PD) patients show theory of mind (ToM) deficit since the early stages of the disease, and this deficit has been associated with working memory, executive functions and quality of life impairment. To date, neuroanatomical correlates of ToM have not been assessed with magnetic resonance imaging in PD. The main objective of this study was to assess cerebral correlates of ToM deficit in PD. The second objective was to explore the relationships between ToM, working memory and executive functions, and to analyse the neural correlates of ToM, controlling for both working memory and executive functions.MethodsThirty-seven PD patients (Hoehn and Yahr median = 2.0) and 15 healthy controls underwent a neuropsychological assessment and magnetic resonance images in a 3T-scanner were acquired. T1-weighted images were analysed with voxel-based morphometry, and white matter integrity and diffusivity measures were obtained from diffusion weighted images and analysed using tract-based spatial statistics.ResultsPD patients showed impairments in ToM, working memory and executive functions; grey matter loss and white matter reduction compared to healthy controls. Grey matter volume decrease in the precentral and postcentral gyrus, middle and inferior frontal gyrus correlated with ToM deficit in PD. White matter in the superior longitudinal fasciculus (adjacent to the parietal lobe) and white matter adjacent to the frontal lobe correlated with ToM impairment in PD. After controlling for executive functions, the relationship between ToM deficit and white matter remained significant for white matter areas adjacent to the precuneus and the parietal lobe.ConclusionsFindings reinforce the existence of ToM impairment from the early Hoehn and Yahr stages in PD, and the findings suggest associations with white matter and grey matter volume decrease. This study contributes to better understand ToM deficit and its neural correlates in PD, which is a basic skill for development of healthy social relationships.     

An Investigation of Emotion Recognition and Theory of Mind in People with Chronic Heart Failure

Objectives

Cognitive deficits are common in patients with chronic heart failure (CHF), but no study has investigated whether these deficits extend to social cognition. The present study provided the first empirical assessment of emotion recognition and theory of mind (ToM) in patients with CHF. In addition, it assessed whether each of these social cognitive constructs was associated with more general cognitive impairment.

Methods

A group comparison design was used, with 31 CHF patients compared to 38 demographically matched controls. The Ekman Faces test was used to assess emotion recognition, and the Mind in the Eyes test to measure ToM. Measures assessing global cognition, executive functions, and verbal memory were also administered.

Results

There were no differences between groups on emotion recognition or ToM. The CHF group’s performance was poorer on some executive measures, but memory was relatively preserved. In the CHF group, both emotion recognition performance and ToM ability correlated moderately with global cognition (r = .38, p = .034; r = .49, p = .005, respectively), but not with executive function or verbal memory.

Conclusion

CHF patients with lower cognitive ability were more likely to have difficulty recognizing emotions and inferring the mental states of others. Clinical implications of these findings are discussed.     

How frontoparietal brain regions mediate imitative and complementary actions: an FMRI study

The 'mirror neuron system' (MNS), located within inferior parietal lobe (IPL) and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), creates an internal motor representation of the actions we see and has been implicated in imitation. Recently, the MNS has been implicated in non-identical responses: when the actions we must execute do not match those that we observe. However, in such conflicting situations non action-specific cognitive control networks also located in frontoparietal regions may be involved. In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study participants made both similar and dissimilar actions within two action contexts: imitative and complementary. We aimed to determine whether activity within IPL/IFG depends on (i) responding under an imitative versus complementary context (ii) responding with similar versus dissimilar responses, and (iii) observing hand actions versus symbolic arrow cue stimuli. Activity within rIPL/rIFG regions was largest during observation of hand actions compared with arrow cues. Specifically, rIPL/rIFG were recruited only during the imitative context, when participants responded with similar actions. When responding to symbolic arrow cues, rIPL/rIFG activity increased during dissimilar responses, reflecting increased demands placed on general cognitive control mechanisms. These results suggest a specific role of rIPL/rIFG during imitation of hand actions, and also a general role of frontoparietal areas in mediating dissimilar responses to both hand actions and symbolic stimuli. We discuss our findings in relation to recent work that has examined the role of frontoparietal brain structures in joint-actions and inter-actor cooperation. We conclude that the specific brain regions identified here to show increased activation during action observation conditions are likely to form part of a mechanism specifically involved in matching observed actions directly with internal motor plans. Conversely, observation of arrow cues recruited part of a wider cognitive control network involved in the rapid remapping of stimulus-response associations.     

Frequency and topography in monkey electroencephalogram during action observation: possible neural correlates of the mirror neuron system

The observation of actions executed by others results in desynchronization of electroencephalogram (EEG) in the alpha and beta frequency bands recorded from the central regions in humans. On the other hand, mirror neurons, which are thought to be responsible for this effect, have been studied only in macaque monkeys, using single-cell recordings. Here, as a first step in a research programme aimed at understanding the parallels between human and monkey mirror neuron systems (MNS), we recorded EEG from the scalp of two monkeys during action observation. The monkeys were trained to fixate on the face of a human agent and subsequently to fixate on a target upon which the agent performed a grasping action. We found that action observation produced desynchronization in the 19–25 Hz band that was strongest over anterior and central electrodes. These results are in line with human data showing that specific frequency bands within the power spectrum of the ongoing EEG may be modulated by observation of actions and therefore might be a specific marker of MNS activity.     

Aplasics born without hands mirror the goal of hand actions with their feet

The premotor and parietal mirror neuron system (MNS) is thought to contribute to the understanding of observed actions by mapping them onto "corresponding" motor programs of the observer [1-24], but how would the MNS respond to the observation of hand actions if the observer never had hands? Would it not show changes of blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) signal, because the observer lacks motor programs that can resonate [12, 25, 26], or would it show significant changes because the observer has motor programs for the foot or mouth with corresponding goals [15, 17, 19, 27, 28]? We scanned two aplasic subjects, born without arms or hands, while they watched hand actions and compared their brain activity with that of 16 control subjects. All subjects additionally executed actions with different effectors (feet, mouth, and, for controls, hands). The BOLD signal of aplasic individuals within the putative MNS was augmented when they watched hand actions, demonstrating the brain's capacity to mirror actions that deviate from the embodiment of the observer by recruiting voxels involved in the execution of actions that achieve corresponding goals by different effectors. This sheds light on the functional organization of the MNS and predominance of goals in imitation.     

Social neuroscience: mirror neurons recorded in humans

New single-cell recordings show that humans do have mirror neurons, and in more brain regions than previously suspected. Some action-execution neurons were seen to be inhibited during observation, possibly preventing imitation and helping self/other discrimination.     

Impaired motor facilitation during action observation in individuals with autism spectrum disorder

It has been suggested that social impairments observed in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) can be partly explained by an abnormal mirror neuron system (MNS) 1., 2.. Studies on monkeys have shown that mirror neurons are cells in premotor area F5 that discharge when a monkey executes or sees a specific action or when it hears the corresponding action-related sound 3., 4., 5.. Evidence for the presence of a MNS in humans comes in part from studies using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), where a change in the amplitude of the TMS-induced motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) during action observation has been demonstrated 6., 7., 8., 9.. These data suggest that actions are understood when the representation of that action is mapped onto the observer's own motor structures [10]. To determine if the neural mechanism matching action observation and execution is anomalous in individuals with ASD, TMS was applied over the primary motor cortex (M1) during observation of intransitive, meaningless finger movements. We show that overall modulation of M1 excitability during action observation is significantly lower in individuals with ASD compared with matched controls. In addition, we find that basic motor cortex abnormalities do not underlie this impairment.     

FMRI supports the sensorimotor theory of motor resonance

The neural mechanisms mediating the activation of the motor system during action observation, also known as motor resonance, are of major interest to the field of motor control. It has been proposed that motor resonance develops in infants through Hebbian plasticity of pathways connecting sensory and motor regions that fire simultaneously during imitation or self movement observation. A fundamental problem when testing this theory in adults is that most experimental paradigms involve actions that have been overpracticed throughout life. Here, we directly tested the sensorimotor theory of motor resonance by creating new visuomotor representations using abstract stimuli (motor symbols) and identifying the neural networks recruited through fMRI. We predicted that the network recruited during action observation and execution would overlap with that recruited during observation of new motor symbols. Our results indicate that a network consisting of premotor and posterior parietal cortex, the supplementary motor area, the inferior frontal gyrus and cerebellum was activated both by new motor symbols and by direct observation of the corresponding action. This tight spatial overlap underscores the importance of sensorimotor learning for motor resonance and further indicates that the physical characteristics of the perceived stimulus are irrelevant to the evoked response in the observer.     

Using Fiction to Assess Mental State Understanding: A New Task for Assessing Theory of Mind in Adults

Social functioning depends on the ability to attribute and reason about the mental states of others – an ability known as theory of mind (ToM). Research in this field is limited by the use of tasks in which ceiling effects are ubiquitous, rendering them insensitive to individual differences in ToM ability and instances of subtle ToM impairment. Here, we present data from a new ToM task – the Short Story Task (SST) - intended to improve upon many aspects of existing ToM measures. More specifically, the SST was designed to: (a) assess the full range of individual differences in ToM ability without suffering from ceiling effects; (b) incorporate a range of mental states of differing complexity, including epistemic states, affective states, and intentions to be inferred from a first- and second-order level; (c) use ToM stimuli representative of real-world social interactions; (d) require participants to utilize social context when making mental state inferences; (e) exhibit adequate psychometric properties; and (f) be quick and easy to administer and score. In the task, participants read a short story and were asked questions that assessed explicit mental state reasoning, spontaneous mental state inference, and comprehension of the non-mental aspects of the story. Responses were scored according to a rubric that assigned greater points for accurate mental state attributions that included multiple characters’ mental states. Results demonstrate that the SST is sensitive to variation in ToM ability, can be accurately scored by multiple raters, and exhibits concurrent validity with other social cognitive tasks. The results support the effectiveness of this new measure of ToM in the study of social cognition. The findings are also consistent with studies demonstrating significant relationships among narrative transportation, ToM, and the reading of fiction. Together, the data indicate that reading fiction may be an avenue for improving ToM ability.     

Viewing lip forms: cortical dynamics

Viewing other persons' actions automatically activates brain areas belonging to the mirror-neuron system (MNS) assumed to link action execution and observation. We followed, by magnetoencephalographic cortical dynamics, subjects who observed still pictures of lip forms, on-line imitated them, or made similar forms in a self-paced manner. In all conditions and in both hemispheres, cortical activation progressed in 20-70 ms steps from the occipital cortex to the superior temporal region (where the strongest activation took place), the inferior parietal lobule, and the inferior frontal lobe (Broca's area), and finally, 50-140 ms later, to the primary motor cortex. The signals of Broca's area and motor cortex were significantly stronger during imitation than other conditions. These results demonstrate that still pictures, only implying motion, activate the human MNS in a well-defined temporal order.     

Autism spectrum disorders and schizophrenia: meta-analysis of the neural correlates of social cognition

Context

Impaired social cognition is a cardinal feature of Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) and Schizophrenia (SZ). However, the functional neuroanatomy of social cognition in either disorder remains unclear due to variability in primary literature. Additionally, it is not known whether deficits in ASD and SZ arise from similar or disease-specific disruption of the social cognition network.

Objective

To identify regions most robustly implicated in social cognition processing in SZ and ASD.

Data Sources

Systematic review of English language articles using MEDLINE (1995–2010) and reference lists.

Study Selection

Studies were required to use fMRI to compare ASD or SZ subjects to a matched healthy control group, provide coordinates in standard stereotactic space, and employ standardized facial emotion recognition (FER) or theory of mind (TOM) paradigms.

Data Extraction

Activation foci from studies meeting inclusion criteria (n = 33) were subjected to a quantitative voxel-based meta-analysis using activation likelihood estimation, and encompassed 146 subjects with ASD, 336 SZ patients and 492 healthy controls.

Results

Both SZ and ASD showed medial prefrontal hypoactivation, which was more pronounced in ASD, while ventrolateral prefrontal dysfunction was associated mostly with SZ. Amygdala hypoactivation was observed in SZ patients during FER and in ASD during more complex ToM tasks. Both disorders were associated with hypoactivation within the Superior Temporal Sulcus (STS) during ToM tasks, but activation in these regions was increased in ASD during affect processing. Disease-specific differences were noted in somatosensory engagement, which was increased in SZ and decreased in ASD. Reduced thalamic activation was uniquely seen in SZ.

Conclusions

Reduced frontolimbic and STS engagement emerged as a shared feature of social cognition deficits in SZ and ASD. However, there were disease- and stimulus-specific differences. These findings may aid future studies on SZ and ASD and facilitate the formulation of new hypotheses regarding their pathophysiology.     

Microstructural Changes across Different Clinical Milestones of Disease in Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis

Neurodegenerative process in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) has been proven to involve several cortical and subcortical brain regions within and beyond motor areas. However, how ALS pathology spreads progressively during disease evolution is still unknown. In this cross-sectional study we investigated 54 ALS patients, divided into 3 subsets according to the clinical stage, and 18 age and sex-matched healthy controls, by using tract-based spatial statistics (TBSS) diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) and voxel-based morphometry (VBM) analyses. We aimed to identify white (WM) and gray matter (GM) patterns of disease distinctive of each clinical stage, corresponding to specific clinical milestones. ALS cases in stage 2A (i.e., at diagnosis) were characterized by GM and WM impairment of left motor and premotor cortices and brainstem at ponto-mesenchephalic junction. ALS patients in clinical stage 2B (with impairment of two functional regions) exhibited decreased fractional anisotropy (FA) (p<0.001, uncorrected) and increased mean (MD) and radial diffusivity (RD) (p<0.001, uncorrected) in the left cerebellar hemisphere and brainstem precerebellar nuclei, as well as in motor areas, while GM atrophy (p<0.001, uncorrected) was detected only in the left inferior frontal gyrus and right cuneus. Finally, ALS patients in stage 3 (with impairment of three functional regions) exhibited decreased FA and increased MD and RD (p<0.05, corrected) within WM underneath bilateral pre and postcentral gyri, corpus callosum midbody, long associative tracts and midbrain, while no significant clusters of GM atrophy were observed. Our findings reinforce the hypothesis that the neurodegenerative process propagates along the axonal pathways and develops beyond motor areas from early stages, involving progressively several frontotemporal regions and their afferents and efferents, while the detection of GM atrophy in earlier stages and its disappearance in later stages may be the result of reactive gliosis.     

Patterns of Spontaneous Brain Activity in Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis: A Resting-State fMRI Study

By detecting spontaneous low-frequency fluctuations (LFF) of blood oxygen level–dependent (BOLD) signals, resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rfMRI) measurements are believed to reflect spontaneous cerebral neural activity. Previous fMRI studies were focused on the examination of motor-related areas and little is known about the functional changes in the extra-motor areas in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) patients. The aim of this study is to investigate functional cerebral abnormalities in ALS patients on a whole brain scale. Twenty ALS patients and twenty age- and sex-matched healthy volunteers were enrolled. Voxel-based analysis was used to characterize the alteration of amplitude of low frequency fluctuation (ALFF). Compared with the controls, the ALS patients showed significantly decreased ALFF in the visual cortex, fusiform gyri and right postcentral gyrus; and significantly increased ALFF in the left medial frontal gyrus, and in right inferior frontal areas after grey matter (GM) correction. Taking GM volume as covariates, the ALFF results were approximately consistent with those without GM correction. In addition, ALFF value in left medial frontal gyrus was negatively correlated with the rate of disease progression and duration. Decreased functional activity observed in the present study indicates the underlying deficits of the sensory processing system in ALS. Increased functional activity points to a compensatory mechanism. Our findings suggest that ALS is a multisystem disease other than merely motor dysfunction and provide evidence that alterations of ALFF in the frontal areas may be a special marker of ALS.     

Evidence for cognition without grammar from causal reasoning and 'theory of mind' in an agrammatic aphasic patient

Understanding the inter-relationship between language and thought is fundamental to the study of human cognition [1] [2] [3]. Some investigators have proposed that propositions in natural language serve to scaffold thinking, by providing, for example, a sequential structure to a massively parallel process [4]. Others have maintained that certain thoughts, such as inferring the mental states of others, termed 'theory of mind' (ToM) reasoning, and identifying causal relationships, necessarily involve language propositions [5]. It has been proposed that ToM reasoning depends upon the possession of syntactic structures such as those that permit the embedding of false propositions within true statements ('Mary knows that John (falsely) thinks chocolates are in the cupboard') [6]. The performance on reasoning tasks of individuals with severe agrammatic aphasia (an impairment of language following a lesion of the perisylvian areas of the language-dominant hemisphere) offers novel insights into the relation between grammar and cognition. We report the unusual case of a patient with agrammatic aphasia of such severity that language propositions were not apparently available at an explicit processing level in any modality of language use. Despite this profound impairment in grammar, he displayed simple causal reasoning and ToM understanding. Thus, reasoning about causes and beliefs involve processes that are independent of propositional language.     

Investigating the Genetic Basis of Theory of Mind (ToM): The Role of Catechol-O-Methyltransferase (COMT) Gene Polymorphisms

The ability to deduce other persons'' mental states and emotions which has been termed ‘theory of mind (ToM)’ is highly heritable. First molecular genetic studies focused on some dopamine-related genes, while the genetic basis underlying different components of ToM (affective ToM and cognitive ToM) remain unknown. The current study tested 7 candidate polymorphisms (rs4680, rs4633, rs2020917, rs2239393, rs737865, rs174699 and rs59938883) on the catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) gene. We investigated how these polymorphisms relate to different components of ToM. 101 adults participated in our study; all were genetically unrelated, non-clinical and healthy Chinese subjects. Different ToM tasks were applied to detect their theory of mind ability. The results showed that the COMT gene rs2020917 and rs737865 SNPs were associated with cognitive ToM performance, while the COMT gene rs5993883 SNP was related to affective ToM, in which a significant gender-genotype interaction was found (p = 0.039). Our results highlighted the contribution of DA-related COMT gene on ToM performance. Moreover, we found out that the different SNP at the same gene relates to the discriminative aspect of ToM. Our research provides some preliminary evidence to the genetic basis of theory of mind which still awaits further studies.     

Subthalamic Nucleus Stimulation Affects Theory of Mind Network: A PET Study in Parkinson's Disease

Background

There appears to be an overlap between the limbic system, which is modulated by subthalamic nucleus (STN) deep brain stimulation (DBS) in Parkinson''s disease (PD), and the brain network that mediates theory of mind (ToM). Accordingly, the aim of the present study was to investigate the effects of STN DBS on ToM of PD patients and to correlate ToM modifications with changes in glucose metabolism.

Methodology/Principal Findings

To this end, we conducted ¹⁸FDG-PET scans in 13 PD patients in pre- and post-STN DBS conditions and correlated changes in their glucose metabolism with modified performances on the Eyes test, a visual ToM task requiring them to describe thoughts or feelings conveyed by photographs of the eye region. Postoperative PD performances on this emotion recognition task were significantly worse than either preoperative PD performances or those of healthy controls (HC), whereas there was no significant difference between preoperative PD and HC. Conversely, PD patients in the postoperative condition performed within the normal range on the gender attribution task included in the Eyes test. As far as the metabolic results are concerned, there were correlations between decreased cerebral glucose metabolism and impaired ToM in several cortical areas: the bilateral cingulate gyrus (BA 31), right middle frontal gyrus (BA 8, 9 and 10), left middle frontal gyrus (BA 6), temporal lobe (fusiform gyrus, BA 20), bilateral parietal lobe (right BA 3 and right and left BA 7) and bilateral occipital lobe (BA 19). There were also correlations between increased cerebral glucose metabolism and impaired ToM in the left superior temporal gyrus (BA 22), left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 13 and BA 47) and right inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47). All these structures overlap with the brain network that mediates ToM.

Conclusion/Significance

These results seem to confirm that STN DBS hinders the ability to infer the mental states of others and modulates a distributed network known to subtend ToM.     

Is the Medial Prefrontal Cortex Necessary for Theory of Mind?

Background

Successful social interaction relies on the ability to attribute mental states to other people. Previous functional neuroimaging studies have shown that this process, described as Theory of Mind (ToM) or mentalization, is reliably associated with activation of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). However, this study presents a novel and surprising finding that provides new insight into the role of the mPFC in mentalization tasks.

Methodology/Principal Findings

Twenty healthy individuals were recruited from a wide range of ages and social backgrounds. Participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while viewing a well-established ToM visual paradigm involving moving triangles. Functional MRI data were analyzed using a classical general linear model. No activation was detected in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) during movement patterns that typically elicit ToM. However, increased activity was observed in the right middle occipital gyrus, right temporoparietal junction (TPJ), left middle occipital gyrus and right inferior frontal gyrus. No correlation was found between participants’ age and BOLD response.

Conclusions/Significance

In contrast with previous neuroimaging research, our findings support the notion that mPFC function is not critical for reasoning about the mental states of others; furthermore, our data indicate that the right TPJ and right inferior frontal gyrus are able to perform mentalization without any contributions from the mPFC.     

Neural systems involved in "theory of mind"

What is the nature of our ability to understand and reason about the beliefs of others--the possession of a "theory of mind", or ToM? Here, we review findings from imaging and lesion studies indicating that ToM reasoning is supported by a widely distributed neural system. Some functional components of this system, such as language-related regions of the left hemisphere, the frontal lobes and the right temporal parietal cortex, are not solely dedicated to the computation of mental states. However, the system also includes a core, domain-specific component that is centred on the amygdala circuitry. We provide a framework in which impairments of ToM can be viewed in terms of abnormalities of the core system, the failure of a co-opted system that is necessary for performance on a particular set of tasks, or the absence of an experiential trigger for the emergence of ToM.