Evolution,altruism, and the prisoner's dilemma

I first argue against Peter Singer's exciting thesis that the Prisoner's Dilemma explains why there could be an evolutionary advantage in making reciprocal exchanges that are ultimately motivated by genuine altruism over making such exchanges on the basis of enlightened long-term self-interest. I then show that an alternative to Singer's thesis — one that is also meant to corroborate the view that natural selection favors genuine altruism, recently defended by Gregory Kavka, fails as well. Finally, I show that even granting Singer's and Kavka's claim about the selective advantage of altruism proper, it is doubtful whether that type of claim can be used in a particular sort of sociobiological argument against psychological egoism.     

Types of moral argument against embryo research

Almost all moral objections to embryo research depend on one version or another of a slippery slope argument. There is one absolutist consideration which may be thought to decide the question independently of that argument, to the effect that the early embryo simply is a human being. But any plausible use of that consideration itself relies on the slippery slope argument. This argument may use either of two ideas (or both): that to distinguish between the two cases is not reasonable or that it will not be effective. The argument turns out to be very largely an empirical, consequentialist argument, and its application to early embryo research to rest on doubtful assumptions.     

Are species sets?

I construe the question ‘Are species sets?’ as a question about whether species can be conceived of as sets, as the term ‘set’ is understood by contemporary logicians. The question is distinct from the question ‘Are species classes?’: The conception of classes invoked by Hull and others differs from the logician's conception of a set. I argue that species can be conceived of as sets, insofar as one could identify a set with any given species and that identification would satisfy three desiderata: the set would be a set of organisms, the identification would be apposite, and the identification would permit the formulation of statements about species in set-theoretic terms. One cannot, however, identify a species with any given set. Understanding the claim that species are sets in this way enables one to understand better the dispute between some who accept the claim (e.g., Kitcher 1984, 1987) and some who apparently reject it (e.g., Mayr 1987).     

Egg ejection cost can limit defence strategies against brood parasitism

A cost associated with the evolution of antiparasite strategies is the failure to recognize parasitic eggs, leading the host to evict its own eggs. However, there is evidence that birds recognize their own eggs through imprinting. This leads to the question of why birds accept parasitic eggs if such eggs can be identified. Here, we tested whether egg ejection per se can be costly due to increased predation risk to the remaining clutch and whether olfactory or visual cues of egg ejection increase predation. We carried out three field experiments to answer the following questions: (a) Does ejecting an egg increase nest predation risk? (b) Does the presence of olfactory cues, such as the smell of a broken egg, increase nest predation risk? And (c) Does the presence of visual cues, such as an egg shell below the nest, increase nest predation risk? We found evidence that egg ejection increases nest predation and that olfactory cues alone also increase nest predation. The presence of visual cues did not change predation rates. These data indicate that egg ejection is costly for both host and parasitic eggs that may remain in the nest. Our results suggest why host and parasite eggs are commonly found within the same nests, despite the possibility that hosts recognize and could possibly eject the parasite’s egg.     

Why a right to life rules out infanticide: A final reply to Räsänen

Joona Räsänen has argued that pro‐life arguments against the permissibility of infanticide are not persuasive, and fail to show it to be immoral. We responded to Räsänen’s arguments, concluding that his critique of pro‐life arguments was misplaced. Räsänen has recently replied in ‘Why pro‐life arguments still are not convincing: A reply to my critics’, providing some additional arguments as to why he does not find pro‐life arguments against infanticide convincing. Here, we respond briefly to Räsänen’s critique of the substance view, and also to his most important claim: that possession of a right to life by an infant does not rule out the permissibility of infanticide. We demonstrate that this claim is unfounded, and conclude that Räsänen has not refuted pro‐life arguments against infanticide.     

Synaptic and neuro-muscular transmission

Conclusions The centre of interest in the field of synaptic and neuro-muscular transmission has been for some time occupied by the two conflicting hypotheses of chemical and electrical mediation. Moreover this conflict is not restricted to transmission to any one type of effector,for it now appears certain that, with the exception of diffuse chemical mediation from postganglionic endings, the same hypothesis must cover all transmissions.In their discussion on skeletal muscleDale, Feldberg andVogt (1936) have thus stated the problem of the relation between diffuse chemical mediation from postganglionic endings and the more specialized transmissions: The question which here concerns us is whether in voluntary striated muscle, specialized for the quick contraction of individual fibres in response to nerve impulses, and normally at rest in their absence, this more primitive, chemical method of transmission has been superseded by an entirely different one, in which the chemico-physical disturbance constituting the nerve impulse passes... on to the muscle fibre; or whether, on the other hand, the required specialization has been effected by concentrating the release and the action of the chemical stimulant at the point of immediate contact of the nerve ending with the muscle fibre. From the developmental aspect there is something to be said for both answers, for on the one hand the chemical localization would involve a less fundamental change, and on the other hand with the development of a specialized intracellular propagation by all-or-nothing impulses an associated development of a specialized intercellular propagation might also be expected. At present the chemical and electrical hypotheses must both be regarded as on probation. This uncertainity must be emphasized, as the apparently convincing evidence which has been adduced in support of either hypothesis has led to premature decisions, just as in the case of the biochemistry of muscular contraction. Approached from the pharmacological aspect, the evidence for chemical mediation seems indisputable, and equally convincing is the electrical hypothesis from the electrical point of view; hence coordination of pharmacological and electrical investigation is desirable. Further investigation should also be attempted in relation to the detailed study of the changes which nerve impulses set up in the various effectors, and functional regeneration after cross-union experiments also requires re-investigation from the histological, physiological and pharmacological aspects. An eventual solution may not be easily and quickly attained, for the minute and rapid changes responsible for the transmission can only be indirectly investigated, and theoretical arguments from experimental evidence are hampered by our inadequate knowledge of cell physiology and pharmacology, especially in relation to the behaviour of specialized regions of cells.With 24 figures.     

Association between DRD4 gene polymorphism and personality variation in great tits: a test across four wild populations

Polymorphisms in the dopamine receptor D4 gene (DRD4) have been related to individual variation in novelty‐seeking or exploratory behaviour in a variety of animals, including humans. Recently, the human DRD4 orthologue was sequenced in a wild bird, the great tit (Parus major) and a single nucleotide polymorphism in exon 3 of this gene (SNP830) was shown to be associated with variation in exploratory behaviour of lab‐raised individuals originating from a single wild population. Here we test the generality of this finding in a large sample of free‐living individuals from four European great tit populations, including the originally sampled population. We demonstrate that the association between SNP830 genotype and exploratory behaviour also exists in free‐living birds from the original population. However, in the other three populations we found only limited evidence for an association: in two populations the association appeared absent; while in one there was a nonsignificant tendency. We could not confirm a previously demonstrated interaction with another DRD4 polymorphism, a 15 bp indel in the promoter region (ID15). As yet unknown differences in genetic or environmental background could explain why the same genetic polymorphism (SNP830) has a substantial effect on exploratory behaviour in one population, explaining 4.5–5.8% of the total variance—a large effect for a single gene influencing a complex behavioural trait—but not in three others. The confirmation of an association between SNP830 genotype and personality‐related behaviour in a wild bird population warrants further research into potential fitness effects of the polymorphism, while also the population differences in the strength of the association deserve further investigation. Another important future challenge is the identification of additional loci influencing avian personality traits in the wild.     

The Principle of Procreative Beneficence: Old Arguments and A New Challenge

In the last ten years, there have been a number of attempts to refute Julian Savulescu's Principle of Procreative Beneficence; a principle which claims that parents have a moral obligation to have the best child that they can possibly have. So far, no arguments against this principle have succeeded at refuting it. This paper tries to explain the shortcomings of some of the more notable arguments against this principle. I attempt to break down the argument for the principle and in doing so, I explain what is needed to properly refute it. This helps me show how and why the arguments of Rebecca Bennett, Sarah Stoller and others fail to refute the principle. Afterwards, I offer a new challenge to the principle. I attack what I understand to be a fundamental premise of the argument, a premise which has been overlooked in the literature written about this principle. I argue that there is no reason to suppose, as Savulescu does, that morality requires us to do what we have most reason to do. If we reject this premise, as I believe we have reason to do, the argument for Procreative Beneficence fails.     

Electrical DNA-chip-based identification of different species of the genus Kitasatospora

The identification of different Kitasatospora strains has been shown with a DNA-chip based on an electrical readout scheme. The 16S-23S rDNA internal transcribed spacer region of these Actinomycetes was used for identification. Two different capture probes per strain were immobilized on the chip. The capture probes were spotted on a DNA-chip with electrode structures for an electrical DNA detection. A biotinylated PCR product of the 16S-23S rDNA region was incubated on the chips and bound to its complementary capture sequences. Followed by a gold nanoparticle or enzyme labeling and a deposition of silver, the binding of the PCR product was detected by an increase of the measured conductivity on the chip. To show the applicability of this detection system, four strains of Kitasatospora were chosen for an identification using the DNA-chip with electrical detection. Each strain was clearly identified using the system. Concentrations of the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) products within the range of 1 ng/ml to 1 μg/ml were detected and identified. These tests are the first application of this novel electrical detection scheme for the identification and classification of microorganisms. The presented results show that the DNA-chip with electrical detection can be used for a robust and cost-efficient DNA analysis.     

Developmental stability,sexual selection and speciation

Fluctuating asymmetry occurs when an individual is unable to undergo identical development of an otherwise bilaterally symmetric trait on both sides of its body. Since both sides of a bilaterally symmetric trait are the result of the actions of a single genome, fluctuating asymmetry represents an epigenetic measure of the sensitivity of development to stress. Different morphological traits may show a direct relationship between their functional importance and their degree of developmental canalization. This may explain why some characters show high degrees of fluctuating asymmetry, and why these characters more often become exaggerated secondary sexual ornaments. The degree of fluctuating asymmetry is generally larger in small marginal populations living in novel environments, and this will particularly lead to relatively large degrees of asymmetry in the least developmentally canalized traits. More stringent selection against heterozygotes in marginal populations may further break down developmental stability and linkage groups which would lead to increased genetic variance. Females may prefer to mate with males having large, but relatively symmetric morphological characters, because it is more difficult to make large traits (a good genes argument), a large trait is more easily perceived (a sensory bias preference), and because symmetry signals ability to cope with stress (a good genes argument). The low degree of developmental stability and the large amount of genetic variance in secondary sexual characters in small, marginal populations could set the scene for rapid development of divergence and speciation in marginal populations.     

Longgupo: EarlyHomo colonizer or late plioceneLufengpithecus survivor in south China?

A fragment of mandible and a maxillary incisor of different individuals from the Longgupo Cave, China have been cited as evidence of an early dispersal ofHomo from Africa to Asia. More specifically, these specimens are said to resemble “Homo ergaster” orHomo habilis, rather than the species usually thought to be the first Asian colonizer,Homo erectus. If this supposition is correct, it calls into question which hominid (sensu stricto) first left Africa, and why hominids became a colonizing species. Furthermore, the Longgupo remains have been used to buttress the argument thatHomo erectus evolved uniquely in Asia and was not involved in the origins of modern humans. We question this whole line of argument because the mandibular fragment cannot be distinguished from penecontemporary fossil apes, especially the Late Miocene-Pliocene Chinese genusLufengpithecus, while the incisor is indistinguishable from those of recent and living east Asian people and may be intrusive in the deposit. We believe that the Longgupo mandible represents the relic survival of a Late Miocene ape lineage into a period just prior to the dispersal of hominids into southeastern Asia, with some female dental features that parallel the hominid condition. If the Longgupo mandibular fragment represents a member of theLufengpithecus clade, it demonstrates that hominoids other thanGigantopithecus and the direct ancestor of the orangutan persisted in east Asia into the Late Pliocene, while all other Eurasian large-bodied hominoids disappeared in the Late Miocene.     

Evidence for Scavenging Behavior in the Western Diamondback Rattlesnake (Crotalus atrox)

The use of dead and decaying animals for food appears often as an adaptive strategy in birds and mammals but is apparently rare within the reptiles. Scanty evidence exists for the utilization of such a scavenging strategy by rattlesnakes but convincing data gathered under properly controlled circumstances in this regard have not been forthcoming. Western diamondback rattlesnakes (Crotalus atrox) were cage and arena tested for putrescent mouse preference and putrescent mouse location ability. Adults and neonates readily accepted mice that had been aged up to 48 h while black rat snakes (Elaphe obsoleta) failed to accept putrescent mice and would accept fresh-killed rodents only if the latter were moving. Adult rattlesnakes could locate putrescent mice buried in gravel but failed to find fresh-killed animals. The results were used to document strong evidence for a scavenging feeding strategy for this species and perhaps for the viperids as a whole.     

Another nail in the coffin of the multiple-origins theory?

While mitochondrial sequences can be used to probe the time and place of the mitochondrial ‘Eve,’ nuclear genes can be used to ask a slightly different question: when did humans (members of the genus Homo) or their hominid precursors (the hominids) first leave Africa and fan out over Asia and Europe? If they did so recently, it seems likely that there was a recent African origin of our species, Homo sapiens, rather than multiple origins in various parts of the Old World. A recent paper⁽¹⁾ uses minisatellite data to make the argument that the departure from Africa happened very recently indeed. An alternative explanation for the data is that there was no single and irreversible departure from Africa, but that some peoples migrated back and forth between Africa and the rest of the Old World over the last few tens of thousands of years. For this and other reasons, putting a single date on the farewell to Africa remains problematical.     

How theories became knowledge: Morgan's chromosome theory of heredity in America and Britain

T. H. Morgan, A. H. Sturtevant, H. J. Muller and C. B. Bridges published their comprehensive treatise The Mechanism of Mendelian Heredity in 1915. By 1920 Morgan's ``Chromosome Theory of Heredity' was generally accepted by geneticists in the United States, and by British geneticists by 1925. By 1930 it had been incorporated into most general biology, botany, and zoology textbooks as established knowledge. In this paper, I examine the reasons why it was accepted as part of a series of comparative studies of theory-acceptance in the sciences. In this context it is of interest to look at the persuasiveness of confirmed novel predictions, a factor often regarded by philosophers of science as the most important way to justify a theory. Here it turns out to play a role in the decision of some geneticists to accept the theory, but is generally less important than the CTH's ability to explain Mendelian inheritance, sex-linked inheritance, non-disjunction, and the connection between linkage groups and the number of chromosome pairs; in other words, to establish a firm connection between genetics and cytology. It is remarkable that geneticists were willing to accept the CTH as applicable to all organisms at a time when it had been confirmed only for Drosophila. The construction of maps showing the location on the chromosomes of genes for specific characters was especially convincing for non-geneticists.     

A case study in explanatory power: John Snow's conclusions about the pathology and transmission of cholera

In the mid-1800s, there was much debate about the origin or ‘exciting cause’ of cholera. Despite much confusion surrounding the disease, the so-called miasma theory emerged as the prevalent account about cholera’s cause. Going against this mainstream view, the British physician John Snow inferred several things about cholera’s origin and pathology that no one else inferred. Without observing the vibrio cholerae, however,—data unavailable to Snow and his colleagues—, there was no way of settling the question of what exactly was causing cholera and how, or if, it was passed on. The question then arises as to how Snow arrived at conclusions so systematically different from those of his opponents. In this paper, I want to look at Snow’s reasoning in some detail, and show that there were certain principles, explanatory power in particular, that were epistemologically important to Snow in their own right. I will show that Snow himself takes explanatory power to be an epistemic property, and makes explicit links between explanatory power and confirmation. Systematically juxtaposing Snow’s claims and his opponents’, I will show that Snow was right to tout the explanatory power of his theory, and that his conclusions about the epistemic superiority of his theory over that of the miasmatists’ were justified.     

Hsp12p and PAU genes are involved in ecological interactions between natural yeast strains

The coexistence of different yeasts in a single vineyard raises the question on how they communicate and why slow growers are not competed out. Genetically modified laboratory strains of Saccharomyces cerevisiae are extensively used to investigate ecological interactions, but little is known about the genes regulating cooperation and competition in ecologically relevant settings. Here, we present evidences of Hsp12p‐dependent altruistic and contact‐dependent competitive interactions between two natural yeast isolates. Hsp12p is released during cell death for public benefit by a fast‐growing strain that also produces a killer toxin to inhibit growth of a slow grower that can enjoy the benefits of released Hsp12p. We also show that the protein Pau5p is essential in the defense against the killer effect. Our results demonstrate that the combined action of Hsp12p, Pau5p and a killer toxin is sufficient to steer a yeast community.     

John Harris' argument for a duty to research

John Harris suggests that partcipation in or support research, particularly medical research, is a moral duty. One kind of defence of this position rests on an appeal to the past, and produces two arguments. The first of these arguments is that it is unfair to accept the benefits of research without contributing something back in the form of support for, or participation in, research. A second argument is that we have a social duty to maintain those practices and institutions that sustain us, such as those which contribute to medical knowledge. This argument is related to the first, but it does not rely so heavily on fairness. Another kind of defence of the duty to research rests on an appeal to the future benefits of research: research is an effective way to discharge a duty to rescue others from serious illness or death, therefore we have a duty to research. I suggest that all three of Harris' lines fail to provide a compelling duty to research and spell out why. Moreover, not only do the lines of argument fail in their own terms: in combination, they turn out to be antagonistic to the very position that Harris wants to defend. While it is not my intention here to deny that there might be a duty to research, I claim that Harris' argument for the existence of such a duty is not the best way to establish it.     

MAGPIE HOST MANIPULATION BY GREAT SPOTTED CUCKOOS: EVIDENCE FOR AN AVIAN MAFIA?

Why should the hosts of brood parasites accept and raise parasitic offspring that differ dramatically in appearance from their own? There are two solutions to this evolutionary enigma. (1) Hosts may not yet have evolved the capability to discriminate against the parasite, or (2) parasite-host systems have reached an evolutionary equilibrium. Avian brood parasites may either gain renesting opportunities or force their hosts to raise parasitic offspring by destroying or preying upon host eggs or nestlings following host ejection of parasite offspring. These hypotheses may explain why hosts do not remove parasite offspring because only then will hosts avoid clutch destruction by the cuckoo. Here we show experimentally that if the egg of the parasitic great spotted cuckoo Clamator glandarius is removed from nests of its magpie Pica pica host, nests suffer significantly higher predation rates than control nests in which parasite eggs have not been removed. Using plasticine model eggs resembling those of magpies and observations of parasites, we also confirm that great spotted cuckoos that have laid an ejected egg are indeed responsible for destruction of magpie nests with experimentally ejected parasite eggs. Cuckoos benefit from destroying host offspring because they thereby induce some magpies to renest and subsequently accept a cuckoo egg.     

The Nobel Prize as a Reward Mechanism in the Genomics Era: Anonymous Researchers,Visible Managers and the Ethics of Excellence

The Human Genome Project (HGP) is regarded by many as one of the major scientific achievements in recent science history, a large-scale endeavour that is changing the way in which biomedical research is done and expected, moreover, to yield considerable benefit for society. Thus, since the completion of the human genome sequencing effort, a debate has emerged over the question whether this effort merits to be awarded a Nobel Prize and if so, who should be the one(s) to receive it, as (according to current procedures) no more than three individuals can be selected. In this article, the HGP is taken as a case study to consider the ethical question to what extent it is still possible, in an era of big science, of large-scale consortia and global team work, to acknowledge and reward individual contributions to important breakthroughs in biomedical fields. Is it still viable to single out individuals for their decisive contributions in order to reward them in a fair and convincing way? Whereas the concept of the Nobel prize as such seems to reflect an archetypical view of scientists as solitary researchers who, at a certain point in their careers, make their one decisive discovery, this vision has proven to be problematic from the very outset. Already during the first decade of the Nobel era, Ivan Pavlov was denied the Prize several times before finally receiving it, on the basis of the argument that he had been active as a research manager (a designer and supervisor of research projects) rather than as a researcher himself. The question then is whether, in the case of the HGP, a research effort that involved the contributions of hundreds or even thousands of researchers worldwide, it is still possible to “individualise” the Prize? The “HGP Nobel Prize problem” is regarded as an exemplary issue in current research ethics, highlighting a number of quandaries and trends involved in contemporary life science research practices more broadly.