NO ETHICAL BYPASS OF MORAL STATUS IN STEM CELL RESEARCH

Recent advances in reprogramming technology do not bypass the ethical challenge of embryo sacrifice. Induced pluripotent stem cell (iPS) research has been and almost certainly will continue to be conducted within the context of embryo sacrifice. If human embryos have moral status as human beings, then participation in iPS research renders one morally complicit in their destruction; if human embryos have moral status as mere precursors of human beings, then advocacy of iPS research policy that is inhibited by embryo sacrifice concerns renders one morally complicit in avoidable harms to persons. Steps may be taken to address these complicity concerns, but in the final analysis there is no alternative to achieving clarity with respect to the moral status of the human embryo.     

Being human: Why and in what sense it is morally relevant

The debate on the question of the moral status of human beings and the boundaries of the moral community has long been dominated by the antagonism between personism and speciesism: either certain mental properties or membership of the human species is considered morally crucial. In this article, I argue that both schools of thought are equally implausible in major respects, and that these shortcomings arise from the same reason in both cases: a biological notion of being human. By contrast, I show to what extent being human is morally relevant in a non-biological sense. I establish the living human form as the essential criterion for belonging to the moral community, and defend it against a number of possible objections. This new morphological approach is capable of capturing essential elements of personism and speciesism without sharing their faults, and of reconstructing widespread moral intuitions.     

Benefiting from 'evil': an incipient moral problem in human stem cell research

When does benefiting from others’ wrongdoing effectively make one a moral accomplice in their evil deeds? If stem cell research lives up to its therapeutic promise, this question (which has previously cropped up in debates over fetal tissue research or the use of Nazi research data) is likely to become a central one for opponents of embryo destruction. I argue that benefiting from wrongdoing is prima facie morally wrong under any of three conditions: (1) when the wrongdoer is one’s agent; (2) when acceptance of benefit directly encourages the repetition of the wrongful deed (even though no agency relationship is involved); and (3) when acceptance of a benefit legitimates a wrongful practice. I conclude by showing that, because of the ways in which most embryonic stem cell lines come into being, people who oppose embryo destruction may use human embryonic stem cells without incurring moral blame.     

Embryos,The Principle of Proportionality,and the Shaky Ground of Moral Respect

The debate concerning the moral permissibility of using human embryos in human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research has long centred on the question of the embryo's supposed right to life. However, in focussing only on this question, many opponents to hESC research have escaped rigorous scrutiny by making vague and unfounded appeals to the concept of moral respect in order to justify their opposition to certain hESC practices. In this paper, I offer a critical analysis of the concept of moral respect, and its use to support the intuitively appealing principle of proportionality in hESC research. I argue that if proponents of this principle are to justify its adoption by appealing to the concept of moral respect, they must explain two things concerning the nature of the moral respect owed to embryos. First, they must explain which particular aspect of the embryo is morally relevant, and why. Second, they must explain why some uses of embryos in research fail to acknowledge what is morally relevant about the embryo, and thereby involve a violation of the moral respect that they are due. I shall show that providing such explanations may be more difficult than it first appears.     

Human embryonic stem cell research: why the discarded-created-distinction cannot be based on the potentiality argument

Discussions about the use and derivation of pluripotent human embryonic stem cells are a stumbling block in developing public policy on stem cell research. On the one hand there is a broad consensus on the benefits of these cells for science and biomedicine; on the other hand there is the controversial issue of killing human embryos. I will focus on the compromise position that accepts research on spare embryos, but not on research embryos ('discarded-created-distinction', from now on d-c-d). I will point out that this viewpoint is hard to maintain. The main focus is that the 'revealed beliefs' of its defenders are inconsistent with their 'professed beliefs', more specifically with their main argument, i.e. the potentiality argument. I will point out that (1) the defenders of d-c-d actually grant a relative moral status to the human embryo, (2) this moral status is dependent on internal and external criteria of potentiality, (3) potentiality seen as a variable value that also depends on external criteria cannot justify d-c-d, and (4) an approach to human embryonic stem cell-research that would also allow the use of research embryos is more compatible with the feelings, attitudes and values of those who currently defend d-c-d and, therefore, could lead to a broader consensus and to actions that alleviate individual human suffering.     

Stemming the Tide of Normalisation: An Expanded Feminist Analysis of the Ethics and Social Impact of Embryonic Stem Cell Research

Feminists have indicated the inadequacies of bioethical debates about human embryonic stem cell research, which have for the most part revolved around concerns about the moral status of the human embryo. Feminists have argued, for instance, that inquiry concerning the ethics and politics of human embryonic stem cell research should consider the relations of social power in which the research is embedded. My argument is that this feminist work on stem cells is itself inadequate, however, insofar as it has not incorporated an analysis of disability into its considerations of the ethical and political issues that surround the phenomena. Thus, I consider claims that disability theorists and anti-disability activists have made about the research. I conclude by indicating that stem cell research must be situated within a cultural matrix that operates in the service of normalisation.     

An ironic reductio for a 'pro-life' argument: Hurlbut's proposal for stem cell research

William Hurlbut, a Stanford University bioethicist and member of the President's Council on Bioethics, recently proposed a solution to the current impasse over human embryonic stem cell research in the United States. He suggested that researchers could use genetic engineering and somatic cell nuclear transfer (i.e. cloning) to develop human 'pseudo-embryos' that have no potential to develop fully into human persons. According to Hurlbut, even thinkers who typically ascribe high moral status to human embryos could approve of destroying these 'pseudo-embryos' for the sake of harvesting human embryonic stem cells. This essay argues, first, that an argument based on the 'paradox of the heap' (an argument that many 'pro-life' thinkers employ in order to defend the notion that human embryos have high moral value from the moment of conception) challenges the ethical legitimacy of Hurlbut's proposal. Second, the paper argues that this conflict may illustrate a reductio ad absurdum for this 'pro-life' argument itself rather than being a problem for Hurlbut's proposal. As a result, the paper challenges the 'pro-life'strategy of arguing that one should respond to uncertainty about the moral status of developing embryos by being morally 'cautious' and granting all human embryos full moral status from the moment of conception. It appears that one is faced with a complex series of choices (about where to draw the moral line between entities that are human persons and entities that are not), and a strict moral 'cautiousness' about this series of choices may ultimately lead to absurdity.     

Embryonic stem cells in science and medicine,part II: Law,ethics, and the continuing need for dialogue

Just as our first article, “Embryonic Stem Cells in Science and Medicine: An Invitation for Dialogue,” in the December 2007 issue of Gender Medicine went to press, two groups of researchers had just announced that adult human somatic cells had been reprogrammed to behave like pluripotent stem cells, and that the reprogrammed cells were able to differentiate into cell types of the 3 germ layers in vitro and in a mouse model. A third group has since done so. Because the reprogrammed cells were not embryonic in origin, the announcements were heralded as “stunning” and “leaps forward,” because, it was argued, the ability to generate stem cells, without destroying embryos in the process, would avoid the difficult ethical questions raised by human embryonic stem (hES) cell research. This article addresses the most recent announcements and briefly retraces the relevant history so that we may consider whether the moral, ethical, and social issues do in fact disappear as a result of these new advancements. We conclude that, despite the hoopla, little has changed. If indeed there were ethical issues surrounding hES cell research, they remain—and remain as urgent to address and resolve as they had been previously. Lastly, we argue that the medical and scientific communities continue to do themselves a disservice by failing to create a cohesive governing body to address and make concrete recommendations concerning the moral, ethical, and related social issues affecting their communities.     

What Justifies a Future with Humans in It?

Antinatalist commentators recommend that humanity bring itself to a close, on the theory that pain and suffering override the value of any possible life. Other commentators do not require the voluntary extinction of human beings, but they defend that outcome if people were to choose against having children. Against such views, Richard Kraut has defended a general moral obligation to people the future with human beings until the workings of the universe render such efforts impossible. Kraut advances this view on the grounds that we are obliged to exercise beneficence toward others and on the grounds that the goods available in human lives are morally compelling. This account ultimately succeeds in making no more than a prima facie defense of human perpetuation because considerations of beneficence could override – in some cases probably should – override any duty to perpetuate human beings. While the goods of human life may be distinctive, they cannot serve as reason‐giving in regard to their own perpetuation. Ironically, the exercise of beneficence may authorize the extinction of human beings, if it becomes possible to enhance the goods available to human descendants in a way that moves them away from human nature as now given. The defense of a morally obligatory and strictly human future remains elusive, even as it becomes morally desirable to work against Fateful Catastrophes, those human‐caused events that threaten to extinguish existing lives already good and enriching for their bearers.     

Parental virtue: a new way of thinking about the morality of reproductive actions

In this paper I explore the potential of virtue ethical ideas to generate a new way of thinking about the ethical questions surrounding the creation of children. Applying ideas from neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics to the parental sphere specifically, I develop a framework for the moral assessment of reproductive actions that centres on the concept of parental virtue. I suggest that the character traits of the good parent can be used as a basis for determining the moral permissibility of a particular reproductive action. I posit three parental virtues and argue that we can see the moral status of a reproductive action as determined by the relationship between such an action and (at least) these virtues. Using a case involving selection for deafness, I argue that thinking in terms of the question ‘would a virtuous parent do this?’ when morally assessing reproductive action is a viable and useful way of thinking about issues in reproductive ethics.     

Are there morally acceptable alternatives to blastocyst derived ESC?

ESC derivation, use and SCNT have raised many moral and ethical issues. In this opinion piece I have focused on the argument that morally less ambiguous alternatives to ESC derived from the ICM of blastocysts exist. These possibilities range from using multiple adult stem cell populations each of which is uniquely suited for a particular disease target or identifying adult ESC-like populations, using transdifferentiated ESC-like cells or alternate methods of deriving ESC. I suggest that while it is important to support such efforts, current results do not provide sufficient compelling data to allow one to stop the use of ESC and perhaps adult cells will never be a reliable alternative. All options need to be fully explored and decisions need to be made with scientific rigor and respect for each individual's moral compass.     

Derivation of stem cells from human embryos: the principled arguments of potential donors and recipients

Evidence is emerging that embryonic stem cells may have the potential to alleviate many debilitating conditions, but opinions remain polarized on the derivation of stem cells from human embryos obtained during in vitro fertilization treatment. The views of scientists, donors and unaffected members of the general public have been sought, but not those of patients likely to benefit. Semi-structured interviews were completed with 15 people living with Parkinson's disease, 15 with type I diabetes, 15 couples living with infertility and 21 members of the general public. In all four groups, religious, cultural and personal beliefs affected perceptions of the moral status of the embryo and the system of regulating science and scientists involved, overriding differences resulting from their status as potential beneficiaries or facilitators. Whether they came to the interview to defend or promote stem cell research, they cited the same four justifications (utilitarian, ecologic, moral duty and eugenic) but varied in their capacity to present a consistent argument.     

Moral Bioenhancement: Much Ado About Nothing?

Recently, some have proposed moral bioenhancement as a solution to the serious moral evils that humans face. Seemingly disillusioned with traditional methods of moral education, proponents of bioenhancement believe that we should pursue and apply biotechnological means to morally enhance human beings. Such proposal has generated a lively debate about the permissibility of moral bioenhancement. We argue here that such debate is specious. The claim that moral bioenhancement is a solution – whether permissible or not – to the serious moral problems that affect human beings is based on several problematic framing assumptions. We evaluate here three of such assumptions: the first rests on a contested understanding of morality, the second consist in a mistaken conception of human moral problems, and the third relates to problematic presuppositions grounding the interpretation of existent scientific evidence presented to defend moral bioenhancement. Once these framing assumptions are identified and critically evaluated, it becomes clear that the moral bioenhancement debate is misguided.     

Bioethical aspects of regenerative and reproductive medicine

The birth announced in 1997 of Dolly, the lamb cloned from the somatic mammary cells of an adult ewe, and the discovery of human embryonic stem cells in 1998 have been the most exciting developments in the biological sciences in the past decade. Reproductive somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) in additional species has been inefficient in that relatively few births, harmful side effects and high fetal and neonatal death rates have resulted from many attempts. Ongoing debates about the ethics of reproductive SCNT have revealed that some researchers regard human reproductive SCNT as morally unacceptable in all circumstances, others see merit in reproductive SCNT in certain circumstances and others await more information before making judgment about the ethical status of the procedure. Regenerative medicine and emerging biotechnologies started to revolutionize the practice of medicine. Advances in stem cell biology, including embryonic and postnatal somatic stem cells, have made the prospect of tissue regeneration a potential reality. Mammal cloning experiments have provided new impetus to the prospect of regenerative medicine through stem cell research. The procedure of SCNT could be used to create the raw material to replace defective or senescent tissue as a natural extension of the biology of stem cells. Researchers working in reproductive medicine should consider the potential hope given to many patients against the requisite and ethically contentious creation of human blastocysts for therapeutic intent.     

Potential applications of germline cell-derived pluripotent stem cells in organ regeneration

Impressive progress has been made since the turn of the century in the field of stem cells. Different types of stem cells have now been isolated from different types of tissues. Pluripotent stem cells are the most promising cell source for organ regeneration. One such cell type is the germline cell-derived pluripotent cell, which is derived from adult spermatogonial stem cells. The germline cell-derived pluripotent stem cells have been obtained from both human and mouse and, importantly, are adult stem cells with embryonic stem cell-like properties that do not require specific manipulations for pluripotency acquisition, hence bypassing problems related to induced pluripotent stem cells and embryonic stem cells. The germline cell-derived pluripotent stem cells have been induced to differentiate into cells deriving from the three germ layers and shown to be functional in vitro. This review will discuss the plasticity of the germline cell-derived pluripotent stem cells and their potential applications in human organ regeneration, with special emphasis on liver regeneration. Potential problems related to their use are also highlighted.     

The Beginning of Personhood: A Thomistic Biological Analysis

‘When did I, a human person, begin to exist?’ In developing an answer to this question, I utilize a Thomistic framework, which holds that the human person is a composite of a biological organism and an intellective soul. Eric Olson and Norman Ford both argue that the beginning of an individual human biological organism occurs at the moment when implantation of the zygote in the uterus occurs and the ‘primitive streak’ begins to form. Prior to this point, there does not exist an individual human organism, but a cluster of biological cells which has the potential to split and develop as one or more separate human organisms (identical twinning). Ensoulment (the instantiation of a human intellective soul in biological matter) does not occur until the point of implantation. This conception of the beginning of human personhood has moral implications concerning the status of pre‐implantation biological cell clusters. A new understanding of the beginning of human personhood entails a new understanding of the morality of certain medical procedures which have a direct affect on these cell clusters which contain human DNA. Such procedures discussed in this article are embryonic stem cell research, in vitro fertilization, procured abortion, and the use of abortifacient contraceptives.     

Genes, embryos, and future people

Testing embryonic cells for genetic abnormalities gives us the capacity to predict whether and to what extent people will exist with disease and disability. Moreover, the freezing of embryos for long periods of time enables us to alter the length of a normal human lifespan. After highlighting the shortcomings of somatic-cell gene therapy and germ-line genetic alteration, I argue that the testing and selective termination of genetically defective embryos is the only medically and morally defensible way to prevent the existence of people with severe disability, pain and suffering that make their lives not worth living for them on the whole. In addition, I consider the possible harmful effects on children born from frozen embryos after the deaths of their biological parents, or when their parents are at an advanced age. I also explore whether embryos have moral status and whether the prospects for disease-preventing genetic alteration can justify long-term cryopreservation of embryos.     

Aspects on properties, use and ethical considerations of embryonic stem cells – A short review

Mammalian embryonic stem cells have the potential to differentiate into all cell types of an adult individual. The culturing of human embryonic stem cells renders possible studies that were previously only available in animal models. Embryonic stem cells constitute a particularly attractive tool for studies of self-renewal, commitment, differentiation, maturation and cell-cell interaction. There is currently considerable hope that studies of embryonic stem cells will lead to new therapies; either by themselves, through cell replacement strategies, or by generating results assisting other fields of research to reach clinical results. There are, however, considerable challenges to be met before embryonic stem cells can be used in large-scale clinical trials.Stem cell research is an area that has given rise to much debate internationally, within science, law and politics as well as within philosophy and ethics. The ethical attitudes expressed in the public debate over stem cell research notably divide over three important distinctions: (1) Reproductive versus therapeutic cloning; (2) Using already existing embryos versus producing new embryos for research purposes; (3) Production of embryos from eggs and sperm versus through somatic-cell nuclear transfer. The potential medical benefits that may result from embryonic stem cell research arguably support a continued development in this area. However, some opponents argue that this research offends the (relative or absolute) moral status of an unborn human. Furthermore, the research would probably prove to be a both time-consuming and very expensive method for treating disease. Thus, the questions arise whom the new technique wouldbenefit and at what cost, if ever developed. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Potentiality and human embryos

Consideration of the potentiality of human embryos to develop characteristics of personhood, such as intellect and will, has figured prominently in arguments against abortion and the use of human embryos for research. In particular, such consideration was the basis for the call of the US President's Council on Bioethics for a moratorium on stem cell research on human embryos. In this paper, I critique the concept of potentiality invoked by the Council and offer an alternative account. In contrast to the Council's view that an embryo's potentiality is determined by definition and is not affected by external conditions that may prevent certain possibilities from ever being realized, I propose an empirically grounded account of potentiality that involves an assessment of the physical and decisional conditions that may restrict an embryo's possibilities. In my view, some human embryos lack the potentiality to become a person that other human embryos have. Assuming for the sake of argument that the potential to become a person gives a being special moral status, it follows that some human embryos lack this status. This argument is then used to support Gene Outka's suggestion that it is morally permissible to experiment on 'spare' frozen embryos that are destined to be destroyed.     

成体干细胞的生物学特点及应用前景

成体干细胞存在于人和哺乳动物组织中,具有自我更新和一定的分化潜能,现已从骨髓,软骨,血液,神经,肌肉,脂肪,皮肤,角膜缘,肝脏,胰腺等许多组织中获得成体干细胞,发现部分组织成体干细胞具有多向分化潜能,成体干细胞的研究在再生医学中有十分广阔的应用前景。