The pro-life argument from substantial identity and the pro-choice argument from asymmetric value: a reply to Patrick Lee

Lee claims that foetuses and adult humans are phases of the same identical substance, and thus have the same moral status because: first, foetuses and adults are the same physical organism, and second, the development from foetus to adult is quantitative and thus not a change of substance. Versus the first argument, I contend that the fact that foetuses and adults are the same physical organism implies only that they are the same thing but not the same substance, much as living adults and their corpses are the same thing (same body) but not the same substance. Against Lee's second argument, I contend that Lee confuses the nature of a process with the nature of its result. A process of quantitative change can produce a change in substance. Lee also fails to show that foetuses are rational and thus have all the essential properties of adults, as required for them to be the same substance. Against the pro-choice argument from asymmetric value (that only the fact that a human has become conscious of its life and begun to count on its continuing can explain human life's asymmetric moral value, i.e. that it is vastly worse to kill a human than not to produce one), Lee claims that foetus's lives are asymmetrically valuable to them before consciousness. This leads to counterintuitive outcomes, and it confuses the goodness of life (a symmetric value that cannot account for why it is worse to kill a human than not produce one) with asymmetric value.     

Marquis: A Defense of Abortion?

This is a reply to Don Marquis'Why Abortion is Immoral.' Marquis, who asserts that abortion is morally wrong, bases his argument on the following premise: Killing a being is morally wrong if that being is the sort of being who has a valuable future. I argue that this premise is false. I then assert that if I am correct about this premise being false, Marquis is faced with a dilemma. If he does not alter the premise in a way that makes it true, his argument is unsound. However, if he does make such an alteration, he must also alter a second premise in his argument, and this second change opens him to the charge of question begging. In addition, I conclude that such an alteration requires Marquis to adopt a position much like that taken by Judith J. Thompson in 'A Defense of Abortion,' a position he initially states is indefensible.     

DOES A NORMAL FOETUS REALLY HAVE A FUTURE OF VALUE? A REPLY TO MARQUIS

The traditional approach to the abortion debate revolves around numerous issues, such as whether the foetus is a person, whether the foetus has rights, and more. Don Marquis suggests that this traditional approach leads to a standoff and that the abortion debate 'requires a different strategy.' Hence his 'future of value' strategy, which is summarized as follows: (1) A normal foetus has a future of value. (2) Depriving a normal foetus of a future of value imposes a misfortune on it. (3) Imposing a misfortune on a normal foetus is prima facie wrong. (4) Therefore, depriving a normal foetus of a future of value is prima facie wrong. (5) Killing a normal foetus deprives it of a future value. (6) Therefore, killing a normal foetus is prima facie wrong. In this paper, I argue that Marquis's strategy is not different since it involves the concept of person--a concept deeply rooted in the traditional approach. Specifically, I argue that futures are valuable insofar as they are not only dominated by goods of consciousness, but are experienced by psychologically continuous persons. Moreover, I argue that his strategy is not sound since premise (1) is false. Specifically, I argue that a normal foetus, at least during the first trimester, is not a person. Thus, during that stage of development it is not capable of experiencing its future as a psychologically continuous person and, hence, it does not have a future of value.     

The deprivation argument against abortion

The most plausible pro-life argument claims that abortion is seriously wrong because it deprives the foetus of something valuable. This paper examines two recent versions of this argument. Don Marquis's version takes the valuable thing to be a 'future like ours', a future containing valuable experiences and activities. Jim Stone's version takes the valuable thing to be a future containing conscious goods, which it is the foetus's biological nature to make itself have. I give three grounds for rejecting these arguments. First, they lead to unacceptable inequalities in the wrongness of killing. Second, they lead to counterintuitive results in a range of imaginary cases. Third, they ignore the role of psychological connectedness in determining the magnitude or seriousness of deprivation-based harms: because the foetus is only weakly psychologically connected to its own future, it cannot be seriously harmed by being deprived of that future.     

Reconsidering cochlear implants: the lessons of Martha's Vineyard

I distinguish and assess three separate arguments utilized by the opponents of cochlear implants: that treating deafness as a medical condition is inappropriate since it is not a disability; that so treating it sends a message to the Deaf that they are of lesser worth; and that the use of such implants would signal the end of Deaf culture. I give some qualified support to the first and second claim, but find that the principal weight of the argument must be borne by the third argument: that use of the cochlear implants is impermissible because Deaf culture is intrinsically valuable. I show that this claim is, in practice, incompatible with the claim that deafness is not a disability: that the significant disadvantages suffered by the hearing impaired can only be corrected by measures that would end Deaf culture. Since the potential recipients of cochlear implants are, in the main, the prelingually deaf children of hearing parents, the burden of banning the implants would be borne by people who are not members of Deaf culture, and who owe that culture nothing over and above what we all owe cultures in general. I conclude that we cannot ask the parents of these children to sacrifice the interests of their children for the sake of Deaf culture.     

Violinists,demandingness, and the impairment argument against abortion

The ‘impairment argument’ against abortion developed by Perry Hendricks aims to derive the wrongness of abortion from the wrongness of causing foetal alcohol syndrome (FAS). Hendricks endorses an ‘impairment principle’, which states that, if it is wrong to inflict an impairment of a certain degree on an organism, then, ceteris paribus, it is also wrong to inflict a more severe impairment on that organism. Causing FAS is wrong in virtue of the impairment it inflicts. But abortion inflicts an even more severe impairment (death), and so, ceteris paribus, is also wrong. Notably, Hendricks thinks that this argument does not require the claim that the foetus is a person. Here, I respond to Hendricks by arguing that the ceteris paribus clause of the impairment principle is not met in ordinary cases of pregnancy. Carrying an unwanted pregnancy to term is much more burdensome than is refraining from excessive drinking for nine months. This provides a pro tanto justification for obtaining an abortion that does not apply to causing FAS. If the foetus is not a person, it seems fairly clear to me that this justification is strong enough to render abortion permissible. Hendricks is therefore incorrect in claiming that the impairment argument can go without claims concerning foetal personhood. If the foetus is a person, then whether burdensomeness justifies abortion depends on certain questions relating to Thomson’s famous violinist argument. I will not attempt to answer those. But anyone who is otherwise sympathetic to Thomson’s argument should not be moved by the impairment argument.     

Defending the social value of knowledge as a safeguard for public trust

The ‘socially valuable knowledge’ (SVK) principle has been widely acknowledged as one of the most important guiding principles for biomedical research involving human subjects. The principle states that the potential of producing socially valuable knowledge is a necessary requirement, although not sufficient, for the ethical conduct of research projects. This is due to the assumption that the social value of knowledge avoids exploitation of research subjects and justifies the use of health resources. However, more recently, several authors have started interrogating the validity of SVK in research and offered various lines of argument against the SVK principle as a necessary constraint to research. In this article, I will reconstruct the main arguments of this discussion between defenders and debunkers of the SVK principle and offer a third way to consider the social value of knowledge in research studies. I will argue that the social value of knowledge can be supported by an independent justification. This justification of the SVK principle addresses the rationality and common interest of researchers. Thus, I will introduce the SVK principle as a safeguarding principle for public trust based on a conceptual framework by Alex John London. My approach justifies keeping the principle as a precautionary and rational requirement for human health research that all rational stakeholders can agree upon.     

Two puzzles for Marquis's conservative view on abortion

Don Marquis argues that abortion is morally wrong in most cases since it deprives the fetus of the value of its future. I criticize Marquis’s argument for the modified conservative view by adopting an argumentative strategy in which I work within his basic account: if it is granted that his fundamental idea is sound, what follows about the morality of abortion? I conclude that Marquis is faced with a dilemma: either his position must shift towards the extreme conservative view on which abortion is never morally permissible, or he must abandon any recognizably conservative view. This dilemma suggests that Marquis’s view is either deeply implausible or that he cannot use this argument to successfully support his preferred position.     

Flexible nets. The roles of intrinsic disorder in protein interaction networks

Proteins participate in complex sets of interactions that represent the mechanistic foundation for much of the physiology and function of the cell. These protein-protein interactions are organized into exquisitely complex networks. The architecture of protein-protein interaction networks was recently proposed to be scale-free, with most of the proteins having only one or two connections but with relatively fewer 'hubs' possessing tens, hundreds or more links. The high level of hub connectivity must somehow be reflected in protein structure. What structural quality of hub proteins enables them to interact with large numbers of diverse targets? One possibility would be to employ binding regions that have the ability to bind multiple, structurally diverse partners. This trait can be imparted by the incorporation of intrinsic disorder in one or both partners. To illustrate the value of such contributions, this review examines the roles of intrinsic disorder in protein network architecture. We show that there are three general ways that intrinsic disorder can contribute: First, intrinsic disorder can serve as the structural basis for hub protein promiscuity; secondly, intrinsically disordered proteins can bind to structured hub proteins; and thirdly, intrinsic disorder can provide flexible linkers between functional domains with the linkers enabling mechanisms that facilitate binding diversity. An important research direction will be to determine what fraction of protein-protein interaction in regulatory networks relies on intrinsic disorder.     

New insights in toxoplasmosis immunology during pregnancy. Perspective for vaccine prevention

Toxoplasma gondii is one of the few pathogens that can cross the placenta. Frequency and severity of transmission vary with gestational age. While acquired toxoplasmosis is already well explored, the control of maternal-foetal transmission of the parasite remains almost unknown. This is partly due to inherent inadequacies of animal models. This review summarises the studies which have been undertaken and shows that the mouse is a valuable model despite obvious differences to the human case. The paramount role of the cellular immune response during primary infection has been consistently shown. Surprisingly, IFN-g has a dual role in this process. While its beneficial effects in the control of toxoplasmosis are well known, it also seems to have transmission-enhancing effects within the placenta and can also directly harm the developing foetus. This shows the importance of designing vaccines which protects both mother and foetus. Therefore, it is useful to study the mechanisms of natural resistance against transmission during a secondary infection. In this setting, the process is more complicated, involving cellular, but also humoral components of the immune system. In summary, even if the whole process is far from being elucidated, important insights have been gained so far which will help us to undertake rational vaccine research.     

Contribution of the intrinsic curvature to measured DNA persistence length

The persistence length of DNA, a, depends both on the intrinsic curvature of the double helix and on the thermal fluctuations of the angles between adjacent base-pairs. We have evaluated two contributions to the value of a by comparing measured values of a for DNA containing a generic sequence and for an "intrinsically straight" DNA. In each 10 bp segment of the intrinsically straight DNA an initial sequence of five bases is repeated in the sequence of the second five bases, so any bends in the first half of the segment are compensated by bends in the opposite direction in the second half. The value of a for the latter DNA depends, to a good approximation, on thermal fluctuations only; there is no intrinsic curvature. The values of a were obtained from measurements of the cyclization efficiency for short DNA fragments, about 200 bp in length. This method determines the persistence length of DNA with exceptional accuracy, due to the very strong dependence of the cyclization efficiency of short fragments on the value of a. We find that the values of a for the two types of DNA fragment are very close and conclude that the contribution of the intrinsic curvature to a is at least 20 times smaller than the contribution of thermal fluctuations. The relationship between this result and the angles between adjacent base-pairs, which specify the intrinsic curvature, is analyzed.     

THE SUBSTANCE VIEW: A CRITIQUE

According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing called the ‘substance view,’ what makes it prima facie seriously wrong to kill adult human beings, human infants, and even human fetuses is the possession of the essential property of the basic capacity for rational moral agency – a capacity for rational moral agency in root form and thereby not remotely exercisable. In this critique, I cover three distinct reductio charges directed at the substance view's conclusion that human fetuses have the same intrinsic value and moral standing as adult human beings. After giving consideration to defenders of the substance view's replies to these charges, I then critique each of them, ultimately concluding that none is successful. Of course, in order to understand all of these things – the reductio charges, defenders of the substance view's replies to them, and my criticisms of their replies – one must have a better understanding of the substance view (in particular, its understanding of rational moral agency) as well as its defense. Accordingly, I address the substance view's understanding of rational moral agency as well as present its defense.     

Development of a method for the production of hemicellulosic gels from Sitka spruce

Timber can be used as a sustainable source for process chemicals (Silvichemicals), with particular emphasis being placed on wood as source of chemical feedstocks. Bulk Silvichemicals are unlikely to be cost competitive with fossil fuel derived chemicals at present so ideally, research should be directed towards materials with exploitable properties and high intrinsic value in the market place. Research has generally been aimed at the utilisation of cellulose, extractives or degradation products with only minor interest in the utilisation of undegraded hemicelluloses. To increase the intrinsic value the environmental credentials of the product must be considered. The aim of this study was to development a mechanical and/or mild chemical method for the extraction of hemicelluloses in the form of gels. A number of parameters were tested and are detailed and discussed in terms of effectiveness and feasibility. Mechanical refining followed by mild alkaline extraction was found to be effective on a laboratory scale.     

Screening and Identification of Biomarkers in Ascites Related to Intrinsic Chemoresistance of Serous Epithelial Ovarian Cancers

Objective

The ability to predict responses to chemotherapy for serous epithelial ovarian cancer (EOC) would be valuable since intrinsically chemoresistant EOC patients (persistent or recurrent disease within 6 months) gain little benefit from standard chemotherapy. The aim of this study was to screen and identify distinctive biomarkers in ascites of serous EOC associated with intrinsic chemoresistance.

Methods

Protein samples from ascites of 12 chemosensitive and 7 intrinsically chemoresistant serous EOC patients were analyzed using two-dimensional fluorescence difference in gel electrophoresis (2-D DIGE) coupled with matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization time-of-flight mass spectrometry (MALDI-TOF/TOF MS). Furthermore, the identified proteins were validated by ELISA in ascites samples from 19 chemosensitive and 9 intrinsically chemoresistant EOC patients.

Results

The number of spots detected in all 2-D DIGE gels ranged from 1523–1711 using DeCyder software analysis. Thirty-four spots were differentially expressed based on the criteria of an average ratio of more than 1.5 and a student t-test P value <0.05. After MALDI-TOF/TOF MS analysis, 11 differentially expressed proteins, including 3 up-regulated and 8 down-regulated proteins, in ascites of chemoresistant tumors were successfully identified. Of the four selected proteins (ceruloplasmin, apoliprotein A-IV, transthyretin and haptoglobin) in ascites tested by ELISA, only ceruloplasmin was present at significantly different levels between the chemoresistant and chemosensitive ascites samples with average concentrations of 192.2 µg/ml and 157.5 µg/ml, respectively (P = 0.001).

Conclusion

The significantly up-regulated level of ceruloplasmin in the ascites fluid of intrinsic chemoresistant serous EOC patients suggests its potential as a prognostic biomarker for responses to chemotherapy. This finding prompts further investigation with a larger study in order to validate the clinical utility of ceruloplasmin.     

African communal basis for autonomy and life choices

I argue that the metaphysical capacity of autonomy is not intrinsically valuable; it is valuable only when used in relation to a community's values and instrumentally for making the proper choices that will promote one's own and the community's well‐being. I use the example of the choice to take one's life by suicide to illuminate this view. I articulate a plausible African conception of personhood as a basis for the idea of relational autonomy. I argue that this conception is better understood as a social‐moral thesis, and not a metaphysical thesis. A metaphysical thesis gives an account of the abstract nature of an atomic individual, his agency, and rational choice. The social‐moral thesis indicates that personhood and autonomy are positive and relational to the life plans, well‐being, material conditions, and the best means for achieving them that are made available and possible by harmonious living in a community. This idea of autonomy is not just having the capacity of freewill; it also involves how such freewill is used, in terms of how an individual's choices are guided by internalized communal values.     

Altruistic surrogacy and informed consent

A crucial premise in many recent arguments against the moral permissibility of surrogate motherhood arrangements is the claim that a woman cannot autonomously consent to gestating and relinquishing a child to another couple, because she cannot be fully informed about what her future emotional responses will be to the foetus developing within her, and to the giving up of the newborn infant to its social parents. When conjoined with some moral principle about the justifiable limits on the ways others can be expected to exercise their autonomy on our behalf, this claim is often taken to establish that various forms of surrogate motherhood arrangements are morally wrong. In this paper I want to show that there is a serious non sequitur in this kind of argument. That is, I want to show that even if women cannot in fact have this kind of information about what their future emotional responses to pregnancy and relinquishment will be, nothing follows about the wrongness or otherwise of surrogacy. For, when we consider what counts as informed consent in the context of other important ventures with uncertain consequences, it becomes clear that informed consent does not require having this kind of information about one's future emotional states. In putting these arguments, I also hope to clarify some of the connections which might be thought to hold between informed consent and autonomous decision-making generally.     

Alternative logical states

N. W. H. Mason, J. B. Wilson and J. B. Steel argue that there is no logical conceptual basis, and no empirical data, to support an association between environmental adversity and the occurrence of alternative stable states. While we agree that robust debate on the relative frequency of occurrence of alternative stable states is valuable, any apparent logic in their argument is confounded by misinterpretation and direct misrepresentation of our earlier arguments ( Didham et al. 2005 ), despite the fact that we clarified many of the same issues in response to T. Fukami and W. G. Lee ( Didham and Norton 2006 ). Opinion, not logic or evidence, underlies Mason, Wilson and Steel's argument, and this does little to further our understanding of why some systems exhibit alternative stable states that are resilient to restoration management efforts.     

Why Alcoholics Ought to Compete Equally for Liver Transplants

Some philosophers and physicians have argued that alcoholic patients, who are responsible for their liver failure by virtue of alcoholism, ought to be given lower priority for a transplant when donated livers are being allocated to patients in need of a liver transplant. The primary argument for this proposal, known as the Responsibility Argument, is based on the more general idea that patients who require scarce medical resources should be given lower priority for those resources when they are responsible for needing them and when they are competing with patients who need the same resources through no fault of their own. Since alcoholic patients are responsible for needing a new liver and are in direct competition with other patients who need a new liver through no fault of their own, it follows that alcoholic patients ought to be given lower priority for a transplant. In this article, I argue against the Responsibility Argument by suggesting that in order for it to avoid the force of plausible counter examples, it must be revised to say that patients who are responsible for needing a scarce medical resource due to engaging in behavior that is not socially valuable ought to be given lower priority. I'll then argue that allocating organs according to social value is inconsistent or in tension with liberal neutrality on the good life. Thus, if one is committed to liberal neutrality, one ought to reject the Responsibility Argument.     

The Principle of Procreative Beneficence: Old Arguments and A New Challenge

In the last ten years, there have been a number of attempts to refute Julian Savulescu's Principle of Procreative Beneficence; a principle which claims that parents have a moral obligation to have the best child that they can possibly have. So far, no arguments against this principle have succeeded at refuting it. This paper tries to explain the shortcomings of some of the more notable arguments against this principle. I attempt to break down the argument for the principle and in doing so, I explain what is needed to properly refute it. This helps me show how and why the arguments of Rebecca Bennett, Sarah Stoller and others fail to refute the principle. Afterwards, I offer a new challenge to the principle. I attack what I understand to be a fundamental premise of the argument, a premise which has been overlooked in the literature written about this principle. I argue that there is no reason to suppose, as Savulescu does, that morality requires us to do what we have most reason to do. If we reject this premise, as I believe we have reason to do, the argument for Procreative Beneficence fails.     

Determination of saltiness from the laws of thermodynamics--estimating the gas constant from psychophysical experiments

One can relate the saltiness of a solution of a given substance to the concentration of the solution by means of one of the well-known psychophysical laws. One can also compare the saltiness of solutions of different solutes which have the same concentration, since different substances are intrinsically more salty or less salty. We develop here an equation that relates saltiness both to the concentration of the substance (psychophysical) and to a distinguishing physical property of the salt (intrinsic). For a fixed standard molar entropy of the salt being tasted, the equation simplifies to Fechner's law. When one allows for the intrinsic 'noise' in the chemoreceptor, the equation generalizes to include Stevens's law, with corresponding decrease in the threshold for taste. This threshold reduction exemplifies the principle of stochastic resonance. The theory is validated with reference to experimental data.