Kant on biological teleology: Towards a two-level interpretation

According to Kant's Critique of the power of judgment, teleological considerations are unavoidable for conceptualizing organisms. Does this mean that teleology is more than merely heuristic? Kant stresses the regulative status of teleological attributions, but sometimes he seems to treat teleology as a constitutive condition for biology. To clarify this issue, the concept of natural purpose and its role for biology are examined. I suggest that the concept serves an identificatory function: it singles out objects as natural purposes, whereby the special science of biology is constituted. This relative constitutivity of teleology is explicated by means of a distinction of levels: on the object level of biological science, teleology is taken as constitutive, though it is merely regulative on the philosophical meta level. This distinction also concerns the place of Aristotelian teleology in Kant: on the object level, the Aristotelian view is accepted, whereas on the meta level, an agnostic stance is taken concerning teleology.     

A complex systems theory of teleology

Part I [sections 2–4] draws out the conceptual links between modern conceptions of teleology and their Aristotelian predecessor, briefly outlines the mode of functional analysis employed to explicate teleology, and develops the notion of cybernetic organisation in order to distinguish teleonomic and teleomatic systems. Part II is concerned with arriving at a coherent notion of intentional control. Section 5 argues that intentionality is to be understood in terms of the representational properties of cybernetic systems. Following from this, section 6 argues that intentional control needs to be seen as a particular type of relationship between the system and its environment.I would like to gratefully acknowledge the large guiding input of Professor C. A. Hooker, who supervised the development of this paper from its inception. Bill herfel also provided valuable criticism of late drafts.     

Applying Aristotle's Doctrine of Causation to Aboriginal and Biomedical Understandings of Diabetes

Aristotle's doctrine on causationidentifies four distinct types of cause: formal, efficient,material, and final. Science is said to have differentiateditself from philosophy by concentrating solely on efficientcauses. Nonetheless, when applied to narratives of causation,Aristotle's doctrine provides a useful heuristic to explore theissues such as Aboriginal and biomedical perceptions of causalfactors for non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus (NIDDM) onManitoulin Island, Ontario. This paper also outlines twodivergent causal stories for NIDDM and the associated moralpositions regarding the righteous pursuit of health. Biomedical narratives emphasize the role of lifestyle factors,particularly the impact of obesity, in causation. In the case ofdiabetes, the moral course of action is pursued through lifestylechoices. In contrast, Aboriginal narratives emphasize the roleof genetics in causation. These narratives describe diabetes ascollectively affecting Aboriginal people – thus identifyingAboriginal people as different. Aboriginal frameworks for healthventure beyond the efficient cause of biomedicine and thus themoral pursuit of health within this framework involves returningto an initial state of health and purity through traditionalknowledge.     

Aristotle's biology and the transplantation of organs

Conclusion It would be redundant to repeat the general thesis and specific claims advanced in the introduction. Yet in concluding I should like to draw attention to several broader themes that run through the article. One is that understanding Aristotle's biology demands attention to his psychology and metaphysics as well as to what some readers may regard as his strictly biological writings.Another is that Aristotle's views on homonymy and potentiality     

The problem of teleology in biology as a problem of biology-teacher education

The paper sketches the ways ‘the problem of teleology’ appears in pupil-texts, teacher-guides, and college-level texts. Excerpts from the literature in the field of philosophy and history of science are then quoted, which illustrate that ‘the problem of teleology’ cannot be handled dogmatically, as if the issues were indisputable. It is pointed out, that teacher-education does not enable the prospective teacher to analyse the teacher and pupil texts objectively and critically as to their philosophical implications. Suggestions are made which might alter this situation.     

Darwin on Aristotle

Charles Darwin's famous 1882 letter, in response to a gift by his friend, William Ogle of Ogle's recent translation of Aristotle's Parts of Animals, in which Darwin remarks that his “two gods,” Linnaeus and Cuvier, were “mere school-boys to old Aristotle,” has been thought to be only an extravagantly worded gesture of politeness. However, a close examination of this and other Darwin letters, and of references to Aristotle in Darwin's earlier work, shows that the famous letter was written several weeks after a first, polite letter of thanks, and was carefully formulated and literally meant. Indeed, it reflected an authentic, and substantial, increase in Darwin's already high respect for Aristotle, as a result of a careful reading both of Ogle's Introduction and of more or less the portion of Ogle's translation which Darwin says he has read. Aristotle's promotion to the pantheon, as an examination of the basis for Darwin's admiration of Linnaeus and Cuvier suggests, was most likely the result specifically of Darwin's late discovery that the man he already knew as “one of the greatest ... observers that ever lived” (1879) was also the ancient equivalent both of the great modern systematist and of the great modern advocate of comparative functional explanation. It may also have reflected some real insight on Darwin's part into the teleological aspect of Aristotle's thought, indeed more insight than Ogle himself had achieved, as a portion of their correspondence reveals. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

On some theoretical grounds for an organism-centered biology: Property emergence, supervenience, and downward causation

In this paper, we investigate some theoretical grounds for bridging the gap between an organism-centered biology and the chemical basis of biological explanation, as expressed in the prevailing molecular perspective in biological research. First, we present a brief survey of the role of the organism concept in biological thought. We advance the claim that emergentism (with its fundamental tenets: ontological physicalism, qualitative novelty, property emergence, theory of levels, irreducibility of the emergents, and downward causation) can provide a metaphysical basis for a coherent sort of organicism. Downward causation (DC) is the key notion in emergentist philosophy, as shown by the tension between the aspects of dependence and nonreducibility in the concept of supervenience, preferred by many philosophers to emergence as a basis for nonreductive physicalism. As supervenience physicalism does not lead, arguably, to a stable nonreductive physicalist account, we maintain that a philosophical alternative worthy of investigation is that of a combination of supervenience and property emergence in the formulation of such a stance. Taking as a starting-point O’Connor’s definition of an emergent property, we discuss how a particular interpretation of downward causation (medium DC), inspired by Aristotelian causal modes, results in an explanation of property emergence compatible with both physicalism and non-reductionism. In this account of emergence, one may claim that biology, as a science of living organization, is and remains a science of the organism, even if completely explained by the laws of chemistry. We conclude the paper with a new definition of an emergent property.     

A semiotical reflection on biology,living signs and artificial life

It is argued, that theory sf signs, especially in the tradition of the great philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) can inspire the study of central problems in the philosophy of biology. Three such problems are considered: (1) The nature of biology as a science, where a semiotically informed pluralistic approach to the theory of science is introduced. (2) The peculiarity of the general object of biology, where a realistic interpretation of sign- and information-concepts is required to see sign-processes as immanent in nature. (3) The possibility of an artificial construction of life, hereby discussed as a conceptual problem in the present form of the artificial life project and its implied definition of life.     

The Function Debate in Philosophy

This paper reviews the debate on the notion of biological function and on functional explanation as this takes place in philosophy. It describes the different perspectives, issues, intuitions, theories and arguments that have emerged. The author shows that the debate has been too heavily influenced by the concerns of a naturalistic philosophy of mind and argues that in order to improve our understanding of biology the attention should be shifted from the study of intuitions to the study of the actual practice of biological inquiry.     

Holism and Kantian teleology in C.J. Van De Klaauw's structuralization of oecology

The Dutch biologist C J. van der Klaauw (1893–1972) structuralized the epistemology of oecology using concepts which exceeded the limits of a strictly teleological interpretation of nature. This article relates to his theory of holistic oecology which van der Klaauw formulated departing from a critical confrontation with Kant's teleological view on nature. He substituted this extra-scientifically heuristic maxim by the holistic notion of network-like associations between organisms within a community. The analogous similarities between the organization of individual organisms and communities drawn up by van der Klaauw, merely remained propaedeutics for a genuine holistic oecology, which would only employ epistemological principles specifically referring to the organization of supra-individual communities of organisms. This article discusses the process of structuralizing the theory of holistic oecology by van der Klaauw in his dialogue with Kantian philosophy.     

Wholes that cause their parts: organic self-reproduction and the reality of biological teleology

A well-rehearsed move among teleological realists in the philosophy of biology is to base the idea of genuinely teleological forms of organic self-reproduction on a type of causality derived from Kant. Teleological realists have long argued for the causal possibility of this form of causality--in which a whole is considered the cause of its parts--as well as formulated a set of teleological criteria of adequacy for it. What is missing, to date, is an account of the mereological principles that govern the envisioned whole-to-part causality. When the latter principles are taken into account, we find that there is no version of whole-to-part causality that is mereologically, causally and teleologically possible all at once, as teleological realism requires.     

Natural selection and the conditions for existence: representational vs. conditional teleology in biological explanation

Human intentional action, including the design and use of artifacts, involves the prior mental representation of the goal (end) and the means to achieve that goal. This representation is part of the efficient cause of the action, and thus can be used to explain both the action and the achievement of the end. This is intentional teleological explanation. More generally, teleological explanation that depends on the real existence of a representation of the goal (and the means to achieve it) can be called representational teleological explanation. Such explanations in biology can involve both external representations (e.g., ideas in the mind of God) and internal representations (souls, vital powers, entelechies, developmental programs, etc.). However, another type of explanation of intentional action (or any other process) is possible. Given that an action achieving a result occurs, the action can be explained as fulfilling the necessary conditions (means) for that result (end), and, reciprocally, the result explained by the occurrence of those necessary conditions. This is conditional teleological explanation. For organisms, natural selection is often understood metaphorically as the designer, intentionally constructing them for certain ends. Unfortunately, this metaphor is often taken rather too literally, because it has been difficult to conceive of another way to relate natural selection to the process of evolution. I argue that combining a conditional teleological explanation of organisms and of evolution provides such an alternative. This conditional teleology can be grounded in existence or survival. Given that an organism exists, we can explain its existence by the occurrence of the necessary conditions for that existence. This principle of the 'conditions for existence' was introduced by Georges Cuvier in 1800, and provides a valid, conditional teleological method for explaining organismal structure and behavior. From an evolutionary perspective, the conditions for existence are the range of boundary conditions within which the evolutionary process must occur. Moreover, evolutionary change itself can be subjected to conditional teleological explanation, because natural selection theory is primarily a theory about the relation between the conditions for the existence of organisms and the conditions for the existence of traits in populations. I show that failure to distinguish representational from conditional teleological explanation has confused previous attempts to clarify the relation of teleology to biology.