The death of dignity is greatly exaggerated: Reflections 15 years after the declaration of dignity as a useless concept

Fifteen years ago, Ruth Macklin shook the medical community with her claim in the BMJ that dignity is a useless concept. Her essay provoked a storm of reactions. What have we learned from the debate? In this article I analyse the responses to her essay and the following debate to investigate whether she was right that “[d]ignity is a useless concept in medical ethics and can be eliminated without any loss of content.” While some of the commentaries misconstrued her claim and argue against strawmen, others forcefully maintained that the concept of dignity has functions beyond “respect for persons and their autonomy.” One important point that came out of the debate is that dignity is a generic concept that covers more ground than “respect for persons or their autonomy.” In particular, dignity seems to have a wide range of protective functions as well as having reciprocal, relational, and social aspects. Dignity appears more attributional and norm-formative than respect for persons and autonomy. While the claim that dignity is unclear, vague, and can be used sloganistically seems highly relevant, it is argued that this vagueness fulfils important functions in ethics. Moreover, dismissing dignity because of its lack of clarity has implications for “respect for persons” and “autonomy,” which are also used vaguely and sloganistically. No doubt medical ethics should use as a clear concept as the context requires. Nonetheless, dignity still seems to be a widely used generic concept in ethical debates and doing as much ethical work as “respect for persons” or “respect for autonomy.” Therefore, the death of dignity seems to be greatly exaggerated.     

CLARIFYING APPEALS TO DIGNITY IN MEDICAL ETHICS FROM AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Over the past few decades the concept of (human) dignity has deeply pervaded medical ethics. Appeals to dignity, however, are often unclear. As a result some prefer to eliminate the concept from medical ethics, whereas others try to render it useful in this context. We think that appeals to dignity in medical ethics can be clarified by considering the concept from an historical perspective. Firstly, on the basis of historical texts we propose a framework for defining the concept in medical debates. The framework shows that dignity can occur in a relational, an unconditional, a subjective and a Kantian form. Interestingly, all forms relate to one concept since they have four features in common: dignity refers, in a restricted sense, to the 'special status of human beings'; it is based on essential human characteristics; the subject of dignity should live up to it; and it is a vulnerable concept, it can be lost or violated. We argue that being explicit about the meaning of dignity will prevent dignity from becoming a conversation-stopper in moral debate. Secondly, an historical perspective on dignity shows that it is not yet time to dispose of dignity in medical ethics. At least Kantian and relational dignity can be made useful in medical ethics.     

An undignified bioethics: there is no method in this madness

In a recent article, Alasdair Cochrane argues for the need to have an undignified bioethics. His is not, of course, a call to transform bioethics into an inelegant, pathetic discipline, or one failing to meet appropriate disciplinary standards. His is a call to simply eliminate the concept of human dignity from bioethical discourse. Here I argue that he fails to make his case. I first show that several of the flaws that Cochrane identifies are not flaws of the conceptions of dignity he discusses but rather flaws of his, often problematic, understanding of such conceptions. Second, I argue that Cochrane's case against the concept of human dignity goes too far. I thus show that were one to agree that these are indeed flaws that require that we discard our ethical concepts, then following Cochrane's recommendations would commit us not only to an undignified bioethics, i.e. a bioethics without dignity, but to a bioethics without much ethics at all.     

The Concept of Human Dignity in the Ethics of Genetic Research

Despite criticism that dignity is a vague and slippery concept, a number of international guidelines on bioethics have cautioned against research that is contrary to human dignity, with reference specifically to genetic technology. What is the connection between genetic research and human dignity? In this article, I investigate the concept of human dignity in its various historical forms, and examine its status as a moral concept. Unlike Kant's ideal concept of human dignity, the empirical or relational concept takes human dignity as something that is affected by one's circumstances and what others do. I argue that the dignity objection to some forms of genetic research rests on a view of human nature that gives humans a special status in nature – one that is threatened by the potential of genetic research to reduce individuals to their genetic endowment. I distinguish two main philosophical accounts of human nature. One of these, the Aristotelian view, is compatible with the use of genetic technology to help humans realize their inherent potential to a fuller extent.     

END‐OF‐LIFE CARE IN THE 21st CENTURY: ADVANCE DIRECTIVES IN UNIVERSAL RIGHTS DISCOURSE

This article explores universal normative bases that could help to shape a workable legal construct that would facilitate a global use of advance directives. Although I believe that advance directives are of universal character, my primary aim in approaching this issue is to remain realistic. I will make three claims. First, I will argue that the principles of autonomy, dignity and informed consent, embodied in the Oviedo Convention and the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, could arguably be regarded as universal bases for the global use of advance directives. Second, I will demonstrate that, despite the apparent consensus of ethical authorities in support of their global use, it is unlikely, for the time being, that such consensus could lead to unqualified legal recognition of advance directives, because of different understandings of the nature of the international rules, meanings of autonomy and dignity which are context‐specific and culture‐specific, and existing imperfections that make advance directives either unworkable or hardly applicable in practice. The third claim suggests that the fact that the concept of the advance directive is not universally shared does not mean that it should not become so, but never as the only option in managing incompetent patients. A way to proceed is to prioritize work on developing higher standards in managing incompetent patients and on progressing towards the realization of universal human rights in the sphere of bioethics, by advocating a universal, legally binding international convention that would outlaw human rights violations in end‐of‐life decision‐making.     

Human dignity: a guide to policy making in the biotechnology era?

This article explores the ways in which human dignity is used in debates about controversial biotechnologies, including biobanks, human gene patents, stem cell research and human cloning. Increasingly, human dignity is used as a form of general condemnation and as blanket justification for regulatory restraint. However, this use of human dignity marks a significant departure from the traditional, human-rights informed view of human dignity that has dominated bioethics debates for decades. In addition, on its own, it stands as dubious justification for policies that are aimed at constraining controversial biotechnologies.     

Beneficial Coercion in Psychiatric Care: Insights from African Ethico‐Cultural System

There is a ‘catch 22’ situation about applying coercion in psychiatric care. Autonomous choices undeniably are rights of patients. However, emphasizing rights for a mentally‐ill patient could jeopardize the chances of the patient receiving care or endanger the public. Conversely, the beneficial effects of coercion are difficult to predict. Thus, applying coercion in psychiatric care requires delicate balancing of individual‐rights, individual well‐being and public safety, which has not been achieved by current frameworks. Two current frameworks may be distinguished: the civil liberty approach and the Stone model. Both frameworks are restrictive, and not respectful of human dignity. In a civil liberty approach, individuals who are severely mentally‐ill but not dangerous would be denied care because they do not meet the dangerousness threshold or because the use of coercion will not lead to rebirthing of autonomy. This is unsatisfactory. Albeit involuntary interventions such as talk therapies, peer‐support etc., may not always lead to rebirthing of autonomy or free patients from mental illness; they can however help to maintain the dignity of each mentally ill patient. In place of these frameworks, this study proposes a new ethical framework for applying coercion in psychiatric care that is respectful of human dignity. Specifically, it draws on insights from the African ethico‐cultural system by using the Yoruba concept Omo‐olu‐iwabi to develop this new framework. This way, the study shows that only a more respectful approach for applying coercion in psychiatric care can lead to the careful balancing of the competing interests of individual's rights, individual's well‐being and public safety.     

From Ethical Exceptionalism to Ethical Exceptions: The Rule and exception Model and the Changing Meaning of Ethics In German Bioregulation

Germany is an interesting case with respect to the governance of reprogenetics. It has a strong profile in the technosciences and high aims regarding the global bioeconomy, yet her regulation of human genetics, reproductive medicine and embryo research has for a long time been rather restrictive. German biopolitical exceptionalism has often been explained by reference to Catholicism and the legacy of the Nazi past. The Germans, so goes the common story, have learnt the lessons of history and translated them into unconditional respect for human dignity, which in turn translates into unconditional protection of human life, including the human embryo, and the firm repudiation of any eugenic distinction between ‘life worth to live’ and ‘life not worth to live’. This, however, is not the whole story. Alongside deontological strictness we find another strand of governing body politics and reprogenetics in Germany, the rule‐and‐exception model, running from the mid‐1970s abortion law via the 2002 Stem Cell Act to the 2011 regulation of pre‐implantation genetic diagnosis. In contrast to the former, that strongly draws on Kant and his concept of human dignity, the latter bears resemblances to Carl Schmitt's concept of state of exception. The article will show that the rule‐and‐exception model builds the exception into the rule and transforms the meaning and mandate of ethics, namely from safeguarding ethical standards to deciding about the exception. Given that the exception has now tended to become the rule, the question is whether the lessons of history will govern German reprogenetics for much longer.     

The Indignity of Relative Concepts of Animal Dignity: A Qualitative Study of People Working with Nonhuman Animals

The Swiss animal welfare legislation is considered to be one of the strictest such laws worldwide. One unique feature is the inclusion of the concept of “dignity of the creature” and, more precisely, animal dignity. We interviewed 19 people from Switzerland and Germany about their concepts of animal dignity. Thereby, we investigated whether the very specific concept of the Swiss law is reflected in the minds of those who work with nonhuman animals on a daily basis. The results of our qualitative interviews revealed an awareness of the legal term among Swiss interviewees, but their personal concepts of animal dignity were not based on or similar to the legal definitions. The interviewed participants presented a broad range of concepts, including: similarities to human dignity, replacing concepts such as respect or integrity, and context-dependent, contingent forms of dignity. The applicability or usefulness of animal dignity was questioned by several participants; many judged it to be confusing or difficult. Therefore, we conclude by discussing animal integrity as an alternative concept that reflects the interviewees’ ideas of treating nonhuman animals in a respectful and appropriate way, and at the same time does not have the strongly metaphysical connotations of a concept such as human dignity.     

Does human genome editing reinforce or violate human dignity?

Germline genome editing is often disapproved of at the international policy level because of its possible threats to human dignity. However, from a critical perspective the relationship between this emerging technology and human dignity is relatively understudied. We explore the main principles that are referred to when ‘human dignity' is invoked in this context; namely, the link with eugenics, the idea of a common genetic heritage, the principle of equal birth and broader equality and justice concerns. Yet the concept is also used in favour of germline genome editing as it might improve the overall well-being of future generations. We conclude that dignity concerns do not justify a complete ban on safe heritable genome editing but should inform the implementation of side constraints to ensure that the value judgements about human traits that are inherent in this practice do not result in a diminished basic respect for those people affected by them.     

HUMAN DIGNITY IN INTERNATIONAL POLICY DOCUMENTS: A USEFUL CRITERION FOR PUBLIC POLICY?

Current developments in biomedicine are presenting us with difficult ethical decisions and raising complex policy questions about how to regulate these new developments. Particularly vexing for governments have been issues related to human embryo experimentation. Because some of the most promising biomedical developments, such as stem cell research and nuclear somatic transfer, involve such experimentation, several international bodies have drafted documents aimed to provide guidance to governments when developing biomedical science policy. Here I focus on two such documents: the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being and the Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being. I argue that by using human dignity as a criterion to determine the permissibility of particular human embryo research practices, these documents cannot aid in identifying research that would be contrary to human dignity. Thus, they fail to guide public policy on embryo experimentation. Their use of human dignity as a criterion makes their task of offering guidance unfeasible because the concept as used in these documents is too vague and is applied in contradictory ways. I discuss the main goals of these documents and their claims in relation to human embryo research. I then discuss how they have influenced public policy in several countries. Finally, I show that although these Council of Europe treaties attempt to serve as public policy guides in the area of embryo research, they fail to do so.     

Pancreatic transplant surgery and stem cell therapy: Finding the balance between therapeutic advances and ethical principles

The latest achievements in the field of pancreas transplantation and stem cell therapy require an effort by the scientific community to clarify the ethical implications of pioneering treatments, often characterized by high complexity from a surgical point of view, due to transplantation of multiple organs at the same time or at different times, and from an immunological point of view for stem cell therapy. The fundamental value in the field of organ transplants is, of course, a solidarity principle, namely that of protecting the health and life of people for whom transplantation is a condition of functional recovery, or even of survival. The nature of this value is that of a concept to which the legal discipline of transplants entrusts its own ethical dignity and for which it has ensured a constitutional recognition in different systems. The general principle of respect for human life, both of the donor and of the recipient, evokes the need not to put oneself and one’s neighbor in dangerous conditions. The present ethical reflection aims to find a balance between the latest therapeutic advances and several concepts including the idea of the person, the respect due to the dead, the voluntary nature of the donation and the consent to the same, the gratuitousness of the donation, the scientific progress and the development of surgical techniques, and the policies of health promotion.     

The incompatibility of the United Nations' goals and conventionalist ethical relativism

The Universal Draft Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights seeks to provide moral direction to nations and their citizens on a series of bioethical concerns. In articulating principles, it ranks respect for human rights, human dignity and fundamental freedoms ahead of respect for cultural diversity and pluralism. This ranking is controversial because it entails the rejection of the popular theory, conventionalist ethical relativism. If consistently defended, this theory also undercuts other United Nations activities that assume member states and people around the world can reach trans-cultural judgments having moral authority about health, pollution, aggression, rights, slavery, and so on. To illustrate problems with conventionalist ethical relativism and the importance of rejecting it for reasons of health, human rights, human dignity and fundamental freedoms, the widespread practice of female genital circumcision or cutting is discussed. These surgeries are virtually a test case for conventionalist ethical relativism since they are widely supported within these cultures as religious and health practices and widely condemned outside them, including by the United Nations.     

Human Non-persons, Feticide, and the Erosion of Dignity

Feticide, the practice of terminating the life of an otherwise viable fetus in utero, has become an increasingly common practice in obstetric centres around the globe, a concomitant of antenatal screening technologies. This paper examines this expanding practice in light of the concept of human dignity. Although it is assumed from the outset that even viable human fetuses are not persons and as such do not enjoy full membership in the moral community, it is argued that the fact that these are nevertheless human fetuses affords them prima facie moral status. Thus even those who accept a liberal position with regard to therapeutic abortion, should be concerned about these more recent developments. Indeed, how we treat viable human fetuses has implications for our prospective treatment of other human non-persons and could undermine the common human dignity we all share.     

Deciding with dignity: The account of human dignity as an attitude and its implications for assisted suicide

Discussions about assisted suicide have hitherto been based on accounts of dignity conceived only as an inherent value or as a status; accounts of dignity in which it appears as a (contingent) attitude, by contrast, have been neglected. Yet there are two good reasons to consider dignity to be an attitude. First, this concept of dignity best allows us to grasp a crucial aspect of everyday language: people often express fears of losing their dignity—and it is not possible to explain this with an account in which dignity is inherent. Second, such a concept allows us to adduce new argumentation where the argument based on status ends. Dignity considered as a status provides grounds to argue for the moral permissibility of assisted suicide, in the sense that in such an account individuals possess the normative power to waive their right to life. But the question then remains of how to decide what counts as a good reason for assisted suicide—and this is where an argument based on dignity as an attitude can provide illumination.     

The moral challenge of natality: towards a post-traditional concept of family and privacy in repro-genetics

Modern repro-genetics is going to change the way we conceive our children, and will have a substantial influence on the family. Two concepts of the family have been present in the ethical debate: the traditional model and the care model of the family. The first one has been rightly criticized because it privileges form over function. I will show that the second model is also insufficient and does not answer to the moral challenge of human natality, particularly from a child's point of view. Instead, I will suggest a third, kinship model of the family as moral agent. In post-traditional and post-patriarchal societies, the family must be reconsidered as actor in the ethical debates. This poses a challenge for ethical theory. The family's interests are best protected by a concept of relational privacy.     

The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights

Since 1985, UNESCO studies ethical questions arising in genetics. In 1992, I established the International Bioethics Committee at UNESCO with the mission to draft the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, which was adopted by UNESCO in 1997 and the United Nations in 1998. The Declaration relates the human genome with human dignity, deals with the rights of the persons concerned by human genome research and provides a reference legal framework for both stimulating the ethical debate and the harmonization of the law worldwide, favouring useful developments that respect human dignity.     

Biotechnology and the birth of a third culture

Biotechnology represents such an important challenge for present day culture that one can speak of a biotechnological revolution in many other scientific fields as well, such as biology, clinical medicine, pharmacology, and genetic engineering. It also significantly affects political and economic choices to such a degree that they call for a new kind of attention from jurisprudence which has to regulate an ever changing world. Many important queries arise particularly at a bioethical level, issues that will also affect future generations. Scientific progress has unexpectedly widened the biological knowledge of human kind. Thanks to the contribution of continuously more refined and advanced technology, it has nurtured the hope of solving all problems and of overcoming all limits. The scientist's intellectual curiosity, encompassing these new resources, is spurred on by the desire for knowledge and understanding. However sometimes he loses sight of the repercussions and of the possible uses his achievements may have. Only a profound personal education, integrated with the scientist's technical and scientific expertise, will allow science to knock down some barriers, advancing constantly but without losing respect for man's dignity. However the separation between scientific and ethical expertise can only raise new barriers and create limits to the freedom of science which will appear just restrictive, while a kind of medieval obscurantism will be opposed to ethical rigour.     

Principles of ethical decision making regarding embryonic stem cell research in Germany

The availability of embryonic stem (ES) cells isolated from human blastocysts may open novel avenues for medical treatment of otherwise incurable diseases. Yet the generation of human ES cells requires the destruction of early human embryos. This confronts us with the moral problem of whether it is justifiable to sacrifice human life in order to treat other human life. This article outlines the development of the German debate about research with ES cells and explicates the arguments that are central to that debate with respect to the aims and means of research with ES cells. With regard to the means, the isolation of ES cells from human embryos raises the question of the moral status of the human embryo. A restrictive position acknowledges the human dignity of the embryo in its very early stage of development and claims that the embryo's life must be protected accordingly. In contrast, a gradualist position acknowledges human dignity, and therefore the full level of protection, only when the embryo has reached a certain stage of development. In addition, the intentions behind the generation of human embryos, i.e. exclusively for research purposes, and the mode of generating them, i.e. by nuclear transfer technology, have strong ethical relevance in the German debate. Based on these results, the ethical reasoning underlying the draft of a Stem Cell Act recently passed by the German Parliament is outlined.     

Bioethics for human geneticists: models for reasoning and methods for teaching.

The ethical issues raised by the Human Genome Project (HGP) and by human genetics in general are not entirely novel. In fact, the ethical issues surrounding genetic research and the provision of genetic services fit into the evolution of bioethics, a field of inquiry which has its roots in concerns of the 1970s, concerns about the dignity and self-determination of individuals and about the development of medical technologies. Although bioethics has been largely occupied with patient-centered concerns, attention is currently shifting toward socially oriented issues, such as the justice of the existing health-care system. Genetic counseling has already incorporated many of the lessons of early bioethics and, as a profession, adheres to a consultand-centered ethic which reflects the values incorporated into the doctrine of informed consent, which is a cornerstone of bioethics. The mandate of the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications Program of the HGP--to anticipate ethical problems arising from advances in genetics and to educate the public about genetics--reflects not only the nonpaternalistic approach of early bioethics but also bioethics' increasing attention to the ethical import of systemic and institutional factors, as well as an anticipatory and preventive approach to dealing with ethical concerns. Because bioethics has so much to contribute to current consideration of ethical issues in human genetics, it is important to provide training in ethics to those working in the field. Guidelines for using a case-oriented approach are suggested.