Is the self always better than a friend? Self-face recognition in Christians and atheists

Early behavioral studies found that human adults responded faster to their own faces than faces of familiar others or strangers, a finding referred to as self-face advantage. Recent research suggests that the self-face advantage is mediated by implicit positive association with the self and is influenced by sociocultural experience. The current study investigated whether and how Christian belief and practice affect the processing of self-face in a Chinese population. Christian and Atheist participants were recruited for an implicit association test (IAT) in Experiment 1 and a face-owner identification task in Experiment 2. Experiment 1 found that atheists responded faster to self-face when it shared the same response key with positive compared to negative trait adjectives. This IAT effect, however, was significantly reduced in Christians. Experiment 2 found that atheists responded faster to self-face compared to a friend's face, but this self-face advantage was significantly reduced in Christians. Hierarchical regression analyses further showed that the IAT effect positively predicted self-face advantage in atheists but not in Christians. Our findings suggest that Christian belief and practice may weaken implicit positive association with the self and thus decrease the advantage of the self over a friend during face recognition in the believers.     

Implicit and Explicit Contributions to Object Recognition: Evidence from Rapid Perceptual Learning

The present study investigated implicit and explicit recognition processes of rapidly perceptually learned objects by means of steady-state visual evoked potentials (SSVEP). Participants were initially exposed to object pictures within an incidental learning task (living/non-living categorization). Subsequently, degraded versions of some of these learned pictures were presented together with degraded versions of unlearned pictures and participants had to judge, whether they recognized an object or not. During this test phase, stimuli were presented at 15 Hz eliciting an SSVEP at the same frequency. Source localizations of SSVEP effects revealed for implicit and explicit processes overlapping activations in orbito-frontal and temporal regions. Correlates of explicit object recognition were additionally found in the superior parietal lobe. These findings are discussed to reflect facilitation of object-specific processing areas within the temporal lobe by an orbito-frontal top-down signal as proposed by bi-directional accounts of object recognition.     

Modulation of Self-Esteem in Self- and Other-Evaluations Primed by Subliminal and Supraliminal Faces

Background

Past research examining implicit self-evaluation often manipulated self-processing as task-irrelevant but presented self-related stimuli supraliminally. Even when tested with more indirect methods, such as the masked priming paradigm, participants'' responses may still be subject to conscious interference. Our study primed participants with either their own or someone else''s face, and adopted a new paradigm to actualize strict face-suppression to examine participants'' subliminal self-evaluation. In addition, we investigated how self-esteem modulates one''s implicit self-evaluation and validated the role of awareness in creating the discrepancy on past findings between measures of implicit self-evaluation and explicit self-esteem.

Methodology/Principal Findings

Participants'' own face or others'' faces were subliminally presented with a Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS) paradigm in Experiment 1, but supraliminally presented in Experiment 2, followed by a valence judgment task of personality adjectives. Participants also completed the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale in each experiment. Results from Experiment 1 showed a typical bias of self-positivity among participants with higher self-esteem, but only a marginal self-positivity bias and a significant other-positivity bias among those with lower self-esteem. However, self-esteem had no modulating effect in Experiment 2: All participants showed the self-positivity bias.

Conclusions/Significance

Our results provide direct evidence that self-evaluation manifests in different ways as a function of awareness between individuals with different self-views: People high and low in self-esteem may demonstrate different automatic reactions in the subliminal evaluations of the self and others; but the involvement of consciousness with supraliminally presented stimuli may reduce this dissociation.     

Look What I Am Doing: Does Observational Learning Take Place in Evocative Task-Sharing Situations?

Two experiments were conducted to investigate whether physical and observational practice in task-sharing entail comparable implicit motor learning. To this end, the social-transfer-of-learning (SToL) effect was assessed when both participants performed the joint practice task (Experiment 1 - complete task-sharing), or when one participant observed the other performing half of the practice task (Experiment 2 - evocative task-sharing). Since the inversion of the spatial relations between responding agent and stimulus position has been shown to prevent SToL, in the present study we assessed it in both complete and evocative task-sharing conditions either when spatial relations were kept constant or changed from the practice to the transfer session. The same pattern of results was found for both complete and evocative task-sharing, thus suggesting that implicit motor learning in evocative task-sharing is equivalent to that obtained in complete task-sharing. We conclude that this motor learning originates from the simulation of the complementary (rather than the imitative) action.     

Reexposure to a sensorimotor perturbation produces opposite effects on explicit and implicit learning processes

The motor system demonstrates an exquisite ability to adapt to changes in the environment and to quickly reset when these changes prove transient. If similar environmental changes are encountered in the future, learning may be faster, a phenomenon known as savings. In studies of sensorimotor learning, a central component of savings is attributed to the explicit recall of the task structure and appropriate compensatory strategies. Whether implicit adaptation also contributes to savings remains subject to debate. We tackled this question by measuring, in parallel, explicit and implicit adaptive responses in a visuomotor rotation task, employing a protocol that typically elicits savings. While the initial rate of learning was faster in the second exposure to the perturbation, an analysis decomposing the 2 processes showed the benefit to be solely associated with explicit re-aiming. Surprisingly, we found a significant decrease after relearning in aftereffect magnitudes during no-feedback trials, a direct measure of implicit adaptation. In a second experiment, we isolated implicit adaptation using clamped visual feedback, a method known to eliminate the contribution of explicit learning processes. Consistent with the results of the first experiment, participants exhibited a marked reduction in the adaptation function, as well as an attenuated aftereffect when relearning from the clamped feedback. Motivated by these results, we reanalyzed data from prior studies and observed a consistent, yet unappreciated pattern of attenuation of implicit adaptation during relearning. These results indicate that explicit and implicit sensorimotor processes exhibit opposite effects upon relearning: Explicit learning shows savings, while implicit adaptation becomes attenuated

Humans learning a new motor task typically improve with repeated practice due to the faster expression of more effective explicit strategies; this study reveals that when motor learning occurs without awareness, performance deteriorates upon relearning.     

Relational Memory Is Evident in Eye Movement Behavior despite the Use of Subliminal Testing Methods

While it is generally agreed that perception can occur without awareness, there continues to be debate about the type of representational content that is accessible when awareness is minimized or eliminated. Most investigations that have addressed this issue evaluate access to well-learned representations. Far fewer studies have evaluated whether or not associations encountered just once prior to testing might also be accessed and influence behavior. Here, eye movements were used to examine whether or not memory for studied relationships is evident following the presentation of subliminal cues. Participants assigned to experimental or control groups studied scene-face pairs and test trials evaluated implicit and explicit memory for these pairs. Each test trial began with a subliminal scene cue, followed by three visible studied faces. For experimental group participants, one face was the studied associate of the scene (implicit test); for controls none were a match. Subsequently, the display containing a match was presented to both groups, but now it was preceded by a visible scene cue (explicit test). Eye movements were recorded and recognition memory responses were made. Participants in the experimental group looked disproportionately at matching faces on implicit test trials and participants from both groups looked disproportionately at matching faces on explicit test trials, even when that face had not been successfully identified as the associate. Critically, implicit memory-based viewing effects seemed not to depend on residual awareness of subliminal scene cues, as subjective and objective measures indicated that scenes were successfully masked from view. The reported outcomes indicate that memory for studied relationships can be expressed in eye movement behavior without awareness.     

Large Scale Brain Functional Networks Support Sentence Comprehension: Evidence from Both Explicit and Implicit Language Tasks

Previous studies have indicated that sentences are comprehended via widespread brain regions in the fronto-temporo-parietal network in explicit language tasks (e.g., semantic congruency judgment tasks), and through restricted temporal or frontal regions in implicit language tasks (e.g., font size judgment tasks). This discrepancy has raised questions regarding a common network for sentence comprehension that acts regardless of task effect and whether different tasks modulate network properties. To this end, we constructed brain functional networks based on 27 subjects’ fMRI data that was collected while performing explicit and implicit language tasks. We found that network properties and network hubs corresponding to the implicit language task were similar to those associated with the explicit language task. We also found common hubs in occipital, temporal and frontal regions in both tasks. Compared with the implicit language task, the explicit language task resulted in greater global efficiency and increased integrated betweenness centrality of the left inferior frontal gyrus, which is a key region related to sentence comprehension. These results suggest that brain functional networks support both explicit and implicit sentence comprehension; in addition, these two types of language tasks may modulate the properties of brain functional networks.     

Effects of unconscious processing on implicit memory for fearful faces

Emotional stimuli can be processed even when participants perceive them without conscious awareness, but the extent to which unconsciously processed emotional stimuli influence implicit memory after short and long delays is not fully understood. We addressed this issue by measuring a subliminal affective priming effect in Experiment 1 and a long-term priming effect in Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, a flashed fearful or neutral face masked by a scrambled face was presented three times, then a target face (either fearful or neutral) was presented and participants were asked to make a fearful/neutral judgment. We found that, relative to a neutral prime face (neutral-fear face), a fearful prime face speeded up participants' reaction to a fearful target (fear-fear face), when they were not aware of the masked prime face. But this response pattern did not apply to the neutral target. In Experiment 2, participants were first presented with a masked faces six times during encoding. Three minutes later, they were asked to make a fearful/neutral judgment for the same face with congruent expression, the same face with incongruent expression or a new face. Participants showed a significant priming effect for the fearful faces but not for the neutral faces, regardless of their awareness of the masked faces during encoding. These results provided evidence that unconsciously processed stimuli could enhance emotional memory after both short and long delays. It indicates that emotion can enhance memory processing whether the stimuli are encoded consciously or unconsciously.     

Human implicit memory for irrelevant dimension values is similar to rats' incidental memory in simultaneous discrimination tasks

Participants completed a category-learning task in which they needed to discover which of three stimulus dimensions (shape, color or size) was relevant. After meeting a learning criterion (nine of 10 consecutive correct responses), participants continued making categorization choices and response latencies associated with these trials were examined. In both Experiments 1 and 2, people responded reliably faster when correct responses matched the previous responses with respect to irrelevant dimension values. Thus, they demonstrated a form of incidental short-term memory analogous to that we previously reported in studies of rats. In Experiment 2, participants' explicit memory for irrelevant dimension values was assessed after category learning was complete. The results indicated that people were unaware of the irrelevant dimension values encountered on trials preceding surprise probe trials. This indicates that memory for the irrelevant dimension values was implicit (i.e. unconscious). The findings are discussed with respect to both human and non-human studies of hippocampus-independent memory and implicit memory.     

Predictive Models to Determine Imagery Strategies Employed by Children to Judge Hand Laterality

A commonly used paradigm to study motor imagery is the hand laterality judgment task. The present study aimed to determine which strategies young children employ to successfully perform this task. Children of 5 to 8 years old (N = 92) judged laterality of back and palm view hand pictures in different rotation angles. Response accuracy and response duration were registered. Response durations of the trials with a correct judgment were fitted to a-priori defined predictive sinusoid models, representing different strategies to successfully perform the hand laterality judgment task. The first model predicted systematic changes in response duration as a function of rotation angle of the displayed hand. The second model predicted that response durations are affected by biomechanical constraints of hand rotation. If observed data could be best described by the first model, this would argue for a mental imagery strategy that does not involve motor processes to solve the task. The second model reflects a motor imagery strategy to solve the task. In line with previous research, we showed an age-related increase in response accuracy and decrease in response duration in children. Observed data for both back and palm view showed that motor imagery strategies were used to perform hand laterality judgments, but that not all the children use these strategies (appropriately) at all times. A direct comparison of response duration patterns across age sheds new light on age-related differences in the strategies employed to solve the task. Importantly, the employment of the motor imagery strategy for successful task performance did not change with age.     

The Impact of Social Context and Language Comprehension on Behaviour: A Kinematic Investigation

We investigated whether and how comprehending sentences that describe a social context influences our motor behaviour. Our stimuli were sentences that referred to objects having different connotations (e.g., attractive/ugly vs. smooth/prickly) and that could be directed towards the self or towards “another person” target (e.g., “The object is ugly/smooth. Bring it to you/Give it to another person”). Participants judged whether each sentence was sensible or non-sensible by moving the mouse towards or away from their body. Mouse movements were analysed according to behavioral and kinematics parameters. In order to enhance the social meaning of the linguistic stimuli, participants performed the task either individually (Individual condition) or in a social setting, in co-presence with the experimenter. The experimenter could either act as a mere observer (Social condition) or as a confederate, interacting with participants in an off-line modality at the end of task execution (Joint condition). Results indicated that the different roles taken by the experimenter affected motor behaviour and are discussed within an embodied approach to language processing and joint actions.     

An FMRI study of the role of the medial temporal lobe in implicit and explicit sequence learning

fMRI was used to investigate the neural substrates supporting implicit and explicit sequence learning, focusing especially upon the role of the medial temporal lobe. Participants performed a serial reaction time task (SRTT). For implicit learning, they were naive about a repeating pattern, whereas for explicit learning, participants memorized another repeating sequence. fMRI analyses comparing repeating versus random sequence blocks demonstrated activation of frontal, parietal, cingulate, and striatal regions implicated in previous SRTT studies. Importantly, mediotemporal lobe regions were active in both explicit and implicit SRTT learning. Moreover, the results provide evidence of a role for the hippocampus and related cortices in the formation of higher order associations under both implicit and explicit learning conditions, regardless of conscious awareness of sequence knowledge.     

Sleep-Effects on Implicit and Explicit Memory in Repeated Visual Search

In repeated visual search tasks, facilitation of reaction times (RTs) due to repetition of the spatial arrangement of items occurs independently of RT facilitation due to improvements in general task performance. Whereas the latter represents typical procedural learning, the former is a kind of implicit memory that depends on the medial temporal lobe (MTL) memory system and is impaired in patients with amnesia. A third type of memory that develops during visual search is the observers’ explicit knowledge of repeated displays. Here, we used a visual search task to investigate whether procedural memory, implicit contextual cueing, and explicit knowledge of repeated configurations, which all arise independently from the same set of stimuli, are influenced by sleep. Observers participated in two experimental sessions, separated by either a nap or a controlled rest period. In each of the two sessions, they performed a visual search task in combination with an explicit recognition task. We found that (1) across sessions, MTL-independent procedural learning was more pronounced for the nap than rest group. This confirms earlier findings, albeit from different motor and perceptual tasks, showing that procedural memory can benefit from sleep. (2) Likewise, the sleep group compared with the rest group showed enhanced context-dependent configural learning in the second session. This is a novel finding, indicating that the MTL-dependent, implicit memory underlying contextual cueing is also sleep-dependent. (3) By contrast, sleep and wake groups displayed equivalent improvements in explicit recognition memory in the second session. Overall, the current study shows that sleep affects MTL-dependent as well as MTL-independent memory, but it affects different, albeit simultaneously acquired, forms of MTL-dependent memory differentially.     

Self-Love or Other-Love? Explicit Other-Preference but Implicit Self-Preference

Do humans prefer the self even over their favorite other person? This question has pervaded philosophy and social-behavioral sciences. Psychology’s distinction between explicit and implicit preferences calls for a two-tiered solution. Our evolutionarily-based Dissociative Self-Preference Model offers two hypotheses. Other-preferences prevail at an explicit level, because they convey caring for others, which strengthens interpersonal bonds–a major evolutionary advantage. Self-preferences, however, prevail at an implicit level, because they facilitate self-serving automatic behavior, which favors the self in life-or-die situations–also a major evolutionary advantage. We examined the data of 1,519 participants, who completed an explicit measure and one of five implicit measures of preferences for self versus favorite other. The results were consistent with the Dissociative Self-Preference Model. Explicitly, participants preferred their favorite other over the self. Implicitly, however, they preferred the self over their favorite other (be it their child, romantic partner, or best friend). Results are discussed in relation to evolutionary theorizing on self-deception.     

Do I Have My Attention? Speed of Processing Advantages for the Self-Face Are Not Driven by Automatic Attention Capture

We respond more quickly to our own face than to other faces, but there is debate over whether this is connected to attention-grabbing properties of the self-face. In two experiments, we investigate whether the self-face selectively captures attention, and the attentional conditions under which this might occur. In both experiments, we examined whether different types of face (self, friend, stranger) provide differential levels of distraction when processing self, friend and stranger names. In Experiment 1, an image of a distractor face appeared centrally – inside the focus of attention – behind a target name, with the faces either upright or inverted. In Experiment 2, distractor faces appeared peripherally – outside the focus of attention – in the left or right visual field, or bilaterally. In both experiments, self-name recognition was faster than other name recognition, suggesting a self-referential processing advantage. The presence of the self-face did not cause more distraction in the naming task compared to other types of face, either when presented inside (Experiment 1) or outside (Experiment 2) the focus of attention. Distractor faces had different effects across the two experiments: when presented inside the focus of attention (Experiment 1), self and friend images facilitated self and friend naming, respectively. This was not true for stranger stimuli, suggesting that faces must be robustly represented to facilitate name recognition. When presented outside the focus of attention (Experiment 2), no facilitation occurred. Instead, we report an interesting distraction effect caused by friend faces when processing strangers’ names. We interpret this as a “social importance” effect, whereby we may be tuned to pick out and pay attention to familiar friend faces in a crowd. We conclude that any speed of processing advantages observed in the self-face processing literature are not driven by automatic attention capture.     

Do Implicit and Explicit Measures of the Sense of Agency Measure the Same Thing?

The sense of agency (SoA) refers to perceived causality of the self, i.e. the feeling of causing something to happen. The SoA has been probed using a variety of explicit and implicit measures. Explicit measures include rating scales and questionnaires. Implicit measures, which include sensory attenuation and temporal binding, use perceptual differences between self- and externally generated stimuli as measures of the SoA. In the present study, we investigated whether the different measures tap into the same self-attribution processes by determining whether individual differences on implicit and explicit measures of SoA are correlated. Participants performed tasks in which they triggered tones via key presses (operant condition) or passively listened to tones triggered by a computer (observational condition). We replicated previously reported effects of sensory attenuation and temporal binding. Surprisingly the two implicit measures of SoA were not significantly correlated with each other, nor did they correlate with the explicit measures of SoA. Our results suggest that some explicit and implicit measures of the SoA may tap into different processes.     

Self–other control processes in social cognition: from imitation to empathy

We review the evidence that an ability to achieve a precise balance between representing the self and representing other people is crucial in social interaction. This ability is required for imitation, perspective-taking, theory of mind and empathy; and disruption to this ability may contribute to the symptoms of clinical and sub-clinical conditions, including autism spectrum disorder and mirror-touch synaesthesia. Moving beyond correlational approaches, a recent intervention study demonstrated that training participants to control representations of the self and others improves their ability to control imitative behaviour, and to take another''s visual perspective. However, it is unclear whether these effects apply to other areas of social interaction, such as the ability to empathize with others. We report original data showing that participants trained to increase self–other control in the motor domain demonstrated increased empathic corticospinal responses (Experiment 1) and self-reported empathy (Experiment 2), as well as an increased ability to control imitation. These results suggest that the ability to control self and other representations contributes to empathy as well as to other types of social interaction.     

My Hand or Yours? Markedly Different Sensitivity to Egocentric and Allocentric Views in the Hand Laterality Task

In the hand laterality task participants judge the handedness of visually presented stimuli--images of hands shown in a variety of postures and views--and indicate whether they perceive a right or left hand. The task engages kinaesthetic and sensorimotor processes and is considered a standard example of motor imagery. However, in this study we find that while motor imagery holds across egocentric views of the stimuli (where the hands are likely to be one's own), it does not appear to hold across allocentric views (where the hands are likely to be another person's). First, we find that psychophysical sensitivity, d', is clearly demarcated between egocentric and allocentric views, being high for the former and low for the latter. Secondly, using mixed effects methods to analyse the chronometric data, we find high positive correlation between response times across egocentric views, suggesting a common use of motor imagery across these views. Correlations are, however, considerably lower between egocentric and allocentric views, suggesting a switch from motor imagery across these perspectives. We relate these findings to research showing that the extrastriate body area discriminates egocentric ('self') and allocentric ('other') views of the human body and of body parts, including hands.     

Implicit, predictive timing draws upon the same scalar representation of time as explicit timing

It is not yet known whether the scalar properties of explicit timing are also displayed by more implicit, predictive forms of timing. We investigated whether performance in both explicit and predictive timing tasks conformed to the two psychophysical properties of scalar timing: the Psychophysical law and Weber's law. Our explicit temporal generalization task required overt estimation of the duration of an empty interval bounded by visual markers, whereas our temporal expectancy task presented visual stimuli at temporally predictable intervals, which facilitated motor preparation thus speeding target detection. The Psychophysical Law and Weber's Law were modeled, respectively, by (1) the functional dependence between mean subjective time and real time (2) the linearity of the relationship between timing variability and duration. Results showed that performance for predictive, as well as explicit, timing conformed to both psychophysical properties of interval timing. Both tasks showed the same linear relationship between subjective and real time, demonstrating that the same representational mechanism is engaged whether it is transferred into an overt estimate of duration or used to optimise sensorimotor behavior. Moreover, variability increased with increasing duration during both tasks, consistent with a scalar representation of time in both predictive and explicit timing. However, timing variability was greater during predictive timing, at least for durations greater than 200 msec, and ascribable to temporal, rather than non-temporal, mechanisms engaged by the task. These results suggest that although the same internal representation of time was used in both tasks, its external manifestation varied as a function of temporal task goals.     

Brand Discrimination: An Implicit Measure of the Strength of Mental Brand Representations

While mental associations between a brand and its marketing elements are an important part of brand equity, previous research has yet to provide a sound methodology to measure the strength of these links. The following studies present the development and validation of an implicit measure to assess the strength of mental representations of brand elements in the mind of the consumer. The measure described in this paper, which we call the Brand Discrimination task, requires participants to identify whether images of brand elements (e.g. color, logo, packaging) belong to a target brand or not. Signal detection theory (SDT) is used to calculate a Brand Discrimination index which gives a measure of overall recognition accuracy for a brand’s elements in the context of its competitors. A series of five studies shows that the Brand Discrimination task can discriminate between strong and weak brands, increases when mental representations of brands are experimentally strengthened, is relatively stable across time, and can predict brand choice, independently and while controlling for other explicit and implicit brand evaluation measures. Together, these studies provide unique evidence for the importance of mental brand representations in marketing and consumer behavior, along with a research methodology to measure this important consumer-based brand attribute.