Reconciling Conservation and Development: Are Landscapes the Answer?

The landscape approach is being used for initiatives that have the dual objectives of conserving biodiversity and alleviating poverty. However, working at such landscape scales greatly expands the level of ambition of conservation organizations and requires them to use skills that differ from those that they have traditionally deployed. Influencing landscape change requires major commitments for long periods of time and since there is still little evidence for the success of such approaches they should be used cautiously. Landscape programmes must be based on a comprehensive understanding of landscape dynamics and of the underlying drivers of social, economic and ecological change. Just as in any other investment in conservation it is important to set objectives in clear and measurable terms. Landscape approaches should therefore complement and not replace more conventional biodiversity conservation measures. They should be guided by scenarios agreed by concerned stakeholders, should be constructivist and in most cases their success will require major changes in the behavior of local people.     

Model-based Conservation Decision Aiding in the Presence of Goal Conflicts and Uncertainty

Goal conflicts and uncertainty are two major problems in decision-making for conservation and species protection. Conflicts can often be found between ecological goals on the one hand and socio-economic goals on the other, but also among different ecological goals. They can be formally analysed by methods of multi-criteria analysis. As the solution of a multi-criteria decision problem usually depends on the weights put on the individual criteria (objectives), sensitivity and robustness analyses are necessary to understand the decision problem, concentrate on the essential aspects, and support actual decision processes fully. Uncertainty in the decision problem is often caused by scarcity of information needed to predict the consequences of management actions. The so-called outranking concept proved very useful in the consideration of such uncertainty. Based on a simple fictitious case study the paper demonstrates how multi-criteria decision analysis (in particular the PROMETHEE outranking method) in combination with population model analysis can assist in conservation biological decision-making.     

医学科研资源管理中的博弈问题探讨

医学科研资源管理是医学科研的调控手段,涉及医学科研团队和医科管理部门之间的利益损益。基于利益差异的行为冲突就成为了制约医学科研顺利进行的主要因素之一。博弈理论的思想和方法适用于分析存在的互动关系的行为人决策过程及其规律,为解释医学科研进程中的利益冲突、分析医科管理缺陷的形成机理提供了很好的思路和方法。     

The evolution of punishment through reputation

Punishment of non-cooperators has been observed to promote cooperation. Such punishment is an evolutionary puzzle because it is costly to the punisher while beneficial to others, for example, through increased social cohesion. Recent studies have concluded that punishing strategies usually pay less than some non-punishing strategies. These findings suggest that punishment could not have directly evolved to promote cooperation. However, while it is well established that reputation plays a key role in human cooperation, the simple threat from a reputation of being a punisher may not have been sufficiently explored yet in order to explain the evolution of costly punishment. Here, we first show analytically that punishment can lead to long-term benefits if it influences one''s reputation and thereby makes the punisher more likely to receive help in future interactions. Then, in computer simulations, we incorporate up to 40 more complex strategies that use different kinds of reputations (e.g. from generous actions), or strategies that not only include punitive behaviours directed towards defectors but also towards cooperators for example. Our findings demonstrate that punishment can directly evolve through a simple reputation system. We conclude that reputation is crucial for the evolution of punishment by making a punisher more likely to receive help in future interactions, and that experiments investigating the beneficial effects of punishment in humans should include reputation as an explicit feature.     

自然保护区管理的博弈分析

自然保护区作为地球上生态保育的基石,其管理的有效性和可持续性一直是备受关注的热点问题之一。自然保护区管理涉及自然环境和社会经济两大系统,具有复杂性特征。为解析这种复杂性,可以把自然保护区管理看成是博弈问题,将博弈论作为有力工具来解决自然保护区管理中的各种矛盾冲突,协调各种利益关系,以促进自然保护区管理的科学性、有效性和可持续性。一般地,自然保护区可以描述为n人博弈,能够通过Nash均衡和n人合作博弈的Shapley值以及核仁(Nucleolus)等方法求解。作者用博弈论思想分析了自然保护区管理中天然林保护、以电代柴和适度开发等典型案例,总结了自然保护区管理博弈分析的一般步骤。认为必须通过政策、体制和机制创新,促进自然保护区管理中各利益主体的广泛参与和密切合作,才能实现自然保护区管理中公平与效率、高效与持续的统一。     

Resolving the Conflicts Between Biodiversity Conservation and Socioeconomic Development in China: Fuzzy Clustering Approach

Resolving the conflicts between biodiversity conservation and socioeconomic development is a global pursuit for the long-run prospects of the human species. Based on Wenchuan County, a typical county in southwestern China, a group of 20 indicators quantifying regional biodiversity and socioeconomic development was established to classify and evaluate the county area spatially. A fuzzy c-means clustering (FCM) algorithm was used as the classification method. Three indices including BD, DL and DR characterizing the value of biodiversity, the level and rate of socioeconomic development of the delineated regions were formulated. The results indicated that Wenchuan County was optimally classified into 4 types of regions (region I to IV). The area percentages of the regions vary widely from 4.3 to 65.7%. The sequences of the regions on biodiversity, socioeconomic development level, and socioeconomic development rate were, respectively, IV > II > III > I, I > III > II > IV and III >I >II >IV. The spatial strategy on coordinating biodiversity conservation and regional development is to develop mainly from the east(I, II, III) and to conserve mainly in the west(IV). Eco-industry, such as eco-tourism and eco-agriculture, need to be emphasized in the process of regional development. The quantitative methods used here may have a wide applicability.     

Integrated Modeling and its Potential for Resolving Conflicts between Conservation and People in the Rangelands of East Africa

A major challenge for contemporary conservation policies and practices is formulating workable compromises between wildlife conservation and the people who live with wildlife. We strongly support the view that anthropology has a critical role to play in contributing to our understanding of human-environment interactions. The study of complex biophysical and human systems can be greatly assisted by appropriate simulation models that integrate what is known about ecological and human decision-making processes. We have developed an integrated modeling system for assessing scenarios in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area in northern Tanzania to modify the situation there to improve human welfare without compromising conservation value. We present the results of some scenarios that indicate that the current situation there is not sustainable, and that tough policy decisions need to be taken if household well-being of the pastoralists who live there is to be improved or even sustained.     

Participatory Development and Community-Based Conservation: Opportunities Missed for Lessons Learned?

This paper traces the evolution as well as key elements, and provides examples of implementation of participatory development and community-based conservation, two concepts that resemble distant cousins in the intersecting worlds of development assistance and environmental conservation. The paper examines the connections between the concepts, the implications of participatory development for community-based conservation, and the reasons for the differences in their conceptualization and implementation. The paper is based on a review of the literature in both fields and on the authors' research and experience with participatory development and community-based conservation. Several keys to understanding the disconnection between the concepts emerge; intellectual and pragmatic origins of and impetus for the concepts, the expertise and interests of their promoters, and the differing emphasis on participation as means versus end. Results may inform our understandings of why many participatory approaches to conservation have failed to achieve meaningful participation in practice.     

Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations

Evolutionary dynamics shape the living world around us. At the centre of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individuals. The structure of that population affects evolutionary dynamics. The individuals can be molecules, cells, viruses, multicellular organisms or humans. Whenever the fitness of individuals depends on the relative abundance of phenotypes in the population, we are in the realm of evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game theory is a general approach that can describe the competition of species in an ecosystem, the interaction between hosts and parasites, between viruses and cells, and also the spread of ideas and behaviours in the human population. In this perspective, we review the recent advances in evolutionary game dynamics with a particular emphasis on stochastic approaches in finite sized and structured populations. We give simple, fundamental laws that determine how natural selection chooses between competing strategies. We study the well-mixed population, evolutionary graph theory, games in phenotype space and evolutionary set theory. We apply these results to the evolution of cooperation. The mechanism that leads to the evolution of cooperation in these settings could be called ‘spatial selection’: cooperators prevail against defectors by clustering in physical or other spaces.     

Evolutionary stability on graphs

Evolutionary stability is a fundamental concept in evolutionary game theory. A strategy is called an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), if its monomorphic population rejects the invasion of any other mutant strategy. Recent studies have revealed that population structure can considerably affect evolutionary dynamics. Here we derive the conditions of evolutionary stability for games on graphs. We obtain analytical conditions for regular graphs of degree k>2. Those theoretical predictions are compared with computer simulations for random regular graphs and for lattices. We study three different update rules: birth-death (BD), death-birth (DB), and imitation (IM) updating. Evolutionary stability on sparse graphs does not imply evolutionary stability in a well-mixed population, nor vice versa. We provide a geometrical interpretation of the ESS condition on graphs.     

Asynchronous snowdrift game with synergistic effect as a model of cooperation

The snowdrift (or chicken) game emerges as a new paradigm inthe study of nonkin cooperation in animals. Many situations,for example, cooperative hunting, group foraging, territorialdefense, predator watching, or parental care, can be adequatelydescribed as a snowdrift game. In this paper, we investigatethe asynchronous version of the game in which, contrary to therather unrealistic assumption of simultaneous moves, one ofthe players acts first and the other responds by knowing itsdecision. Players are assigned to be first or second moversrandomly and with the same probability. We found that both asynergistic effect of cooperation (i.e., cooperative effortis better than the sum of the individual efforts) and populationstructure (low dispersal, spatial confinement, or group formation)are crucial for mutual cooperation to emerge. Otherwise, onlyone of the players will carry the burden of cooperation.     

Spatial effects in social dilemmas

Social dilemmas and the evolutionary conundrum of cooperation are traditionally studied through various kinds of game theoretical models such as the prisoner's dilemma, public goods games, snowdrift games or by-product mutualism. All of them exemplify situations which are characterized by different degrees of conflicting interests between the individuals and the community. In groups of interacting individuals, cooperators produce a common good benefitting the entire group at some cost to themselves, whereas defectors attempt to exploit the resource by avoiding the costly contributions. Based on synergistic or discounted accumulation of cooperative benefits a unifying theoretical framework was recently introduced that encompasses all games that have traditionally been studied separately (Hauert, Michor, Nowak, Doebeli, 2005. Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas. J. Theor. Biol., in press.). Within this framework we investigate the effects of spatial structure with limited local interactions on the evolutionary fate of cooperators and defectors. The quantitative effects of space turn out to be quite sensitive to the underlying microscopic update mechanisms but, more general, we demonstrate that in prisoner's dilemma type interactions spatial structure benefits cooperation-although the parameter range is quite limited-whereas in snowdrift type interactions spatial structure may be beneficial too, but often turns out to be detrimental to cooperation.     

Spatial invasion of cooperation

The evolutionary puzzle of cooperation describes situations where cooperators provide a fitness benefit to other individuals at some cost to themselves. Under Darwinian selection, the evolution of cooperation is a conundrum, whereas non-cooperation (or defection) is not. In the absence of supporting mechanisms, cooperators perform poorly and decrease in abundance. Evolutionary game theory provides a powerful mathematical framework to address the problem of cooperation using the prisoner's dilemma. One well-studied possibility to maintain cooperation is to consider structured populations, where each individual interacts only with a limited subset of the population. This enables cooperators to form clusters such that they are more likely to interact with other cooperators instead of being exploited by defectors. Here we present a detailed analysis of how a few cooperators invade and expand in a world of defectors. If the invasion succeeds, the expansion process takes place in two stages: first, cooperators and defectors quickly establish a local equilibrium and then they uniformly expand in space. The second stage provides good estimates for the global equilibrium frequencies of cooperators and defectors. Under hospitable conditions, cooperators typically form a single, ever growing cluster interspersed with specks of defectors, whereas under more hostile conditions, cooperators form isolated, compact clusters that minimize exploitation by defectors. We provide the first quantitative assessment of the way cooperators arrange in space during invasion and find that the macroscopic properties and the emerging spatial patterns reveal information about the characteristics of the underlying microscopic interactions.     

Parasite Threat to Panda Conservation

The giant panda is a global symbol of wildlife conservation that is threatened by historic and current habitat loss. Despite a great deal of research on the physiology, reproductive biology, and diet of pandas in the wild and in captivity, there is little information on wild panda mortality. Here we integrate previously unavailable data on the mortality of wild pandas. We report on three recent phases of panda mortality: deaths due to bamboo flowering in the 1970s and 1980s, surprisingly extensive poaching in the 1980s and 1990s, and a parasitic infection over the past few years. Our analyses suggest that the current most significant threat to wild panda survival is disease due to extraintestinal migration (visceral larval migrans) by an ascarid nematode. We demonstrate that the probability of death of wild pandas being caused by this disease increased significantly between 1971 and 2005 and discuss the possible factors leading to the emergence of this disease. Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article (doi:) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.     

Effects of asynchronism on evolutionary games

We analyze the influence of the update dynamics on symmetric 2-player evolutionary games, which are among the most used tools to study the emergence of cooperation in populations of interacting agents. A synchronous dynamics means that, at each time step, all the agents of the population update their strategies simultaneously. An extreme case of asynchronism is sequential dynamics, in which only one agent is updated each time. We first show that these two opposite update dynamics can lead to very different outcomes and that sequential dynamics is detrimental to the emergence of cooperation only when the probability of imitating the most successful neighbors is high. In this sense, we can say that, when the update dynamics has some influence, in general asynchronism is beneficial to the emergence of cooperation. We then explore the consequences of using intermediate levels of asynchronism, where only a fraction of the agents update their behavior each time. In general, the level of cooperation changes smoothly and monotonically as we gradually go from synchronous to sequential dynamics. However, there are some exceptions that should be taken into account. In addition, the results show that the possibility of agents taking irrational decisions has a key role in the sensitivity of these models to changes in the update dynamics. Explanations for the observed behaviors are advanced.     

Probabilistic participation in public goods games

Voluntary participation in public goods games (PGGs) has turned out to be a simple but effective mechanism for promoting cooperation under full anonymity. Voluntary participation allows individuals to adopt a risk-aversion strategy, termed loner. A loner refuses to participate in unpromising public enterprises and instead relies on a small but fixed pay-off. This system leads to a cyclic dominance of three pure strategies, cooperators, defectors and loners, but at the same time, there remain two considerable restrictions: the addition of loners cannot stabilize the dynamics and the time average pay-off for each strategy remains equal to the pay-off of loners. Here, we introduce probabilistic participation in PGGs from the standpoint of diversification of risk, namely simple mixed strategies with loners, and prove the existence of a dynamical regime in which the restrictions ono longer hold. Considering two kinds of mixed strategies associated with participants (cooperators or defectors) and non-participants (loners), we can recover all basic evolutionary dynamics of the two strategies: dominance; coexistence; bistability; and neutrality, as special cases depending on pairs of probabilities. Of special interest is that the expected pay-off of each mixed strategy exceeds the pay-off of loners at some interior equilibrium in the coexistence region.     

Tools of the trade to aid decision-making for species survival

As wildlife populations and habitats continue to diminish at alarming rates all over the world, those responsible for wildlife management recognize that global, integrated, multi-dimensional strategies must be developed to respond to the escalating crisis that the world's biodiversity is facing. It is also recognized that resources available for the preservation of the world's biodiversity are limited and must be carefully apportioned not only where they are most needed but also where they can do the most good. Concomitantly, if current rates of extinction are to be slowed, global cooperation and coordination of efforts for species preservation are essential. In response to these challenges, the Conservation Breeding Specialist Group (CBSG) of IUCN's Species Survival Commission has assisted in the development and application of a series of tools and processes to expedite the development of scientifically-based management strategies for threatened species. These tools, based on small population and conservation biology, are used in intensive, problem-solving workshop processes designed to contribute to the development of realistic and achievable strategies for species conservation. The primary tools used by the CBSG include: (i) providing an objective workshop environment and a facilitation process that supports sharing of available information, reaching agreement on the issues, available information, and useful management recommendations; (ii) the Mace-Lande criteria for evaluation of threat, and, currently their derivative draft IUCN Red List criteria for threat; (iii) VORTEX, a stochastic, small population simulation modelling program (developed by Dr Robert Lacy of the Chicago Zoological Society) that considers genetics, demography, and environmental variation; (iv) topographic maps and Geographical Information System (GIS) tools to organize and visually to present species distribution information in relation to habitat, land use, and local human population distribution; and (v) demographic analysis of the local human populations with projections of growth patterns. The workshop processes employing these tools include: (i) Conservation Assessment and Management Planning (CAMP); and (ii) Population and Habitat Viability Assessment (PHVA). These processes have assisted in scientific decision-making and setting of priorities for species management activities aimed at halting the on-going decline in the planet's biodiversity. Recommendations for intensive management stemming from CAMP and PHVA workshops are as varied as the species analysed. This Papers presents case summaries that demonstrate how these tools and workshop processes have aided in the formulation of holistic and viable conservation strategies for threatened species and lessons that have been learned in the process.     

Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals

The paper investigates the class of signaling games with the following properties: (a) the interests of sender and receiver coincide, (b) different signals incur differential costs, and (c) different events (meanings/types) have different probabilities. Necessary and sufficient conditions are presented for a profile to be evolutionarily stable and neutrally stable, and for a set of profiles to be an evolutionarily stable set.The main finding is that a profile belongs to some evolutionarily stable set if and only if a maximal number of events can be reliably communicated. Furthermore, it is shown that under the replicator dynamics, a set of states with a positive measure is attracted to “sub-optimal” equilibria that do not belong to any asymptotically stable set.     

Conservation strategies to mitigate impacts from climate change in Amazonia

Protected area systems and conservation corridors can help mitigate the impacts of climate change on Amazonian biodiversity. We propose conservation design criteria that will help species survive in situ or adjust range distributions in response to increased drought. The first priority is to protect the western Amazon, identified as the 'Core Amazon', due to stable rainfall regimes and macro-ecological phenomena that have led to the evolution of high levels of biodiversity. Ecotones can buffer the impact from climate change because populations are genetically adapted to climate extremes, particularly seasonality, because high levels of habitat diversity are associated with edaphic variability. Future climatic tension zones should be surveyed for geomorphological features that capture rain or conserve soil moisture to identify potential refugia for humid forest species. Conservation corridors should span environmental gradients to ensure that species can shift range distributions. Riparian corridors provide protection to both terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems. Multiple potential altitudinal corridors exist in the Andes, but natural and anthropogenic bottlenecks will constrain the ability of species to shift their ranges and adapt to climate change. Planned infrastructure investments are a serious threat to the potential to consolidate corridors over the short and medium term.