Forensic fictions: Science,television production,and modern storytelling

This essay uses interviews with television creators, writers, and producers to examine how media practitioners utilise, negotiate and transform forensic science in the production of televisual stories including the creation of unique visuals, character exploration, narrative progression, plot complication, thematic development, and adding a sense of authenticity. Television as a medium has its own structures and conventions, including adherence to a show’s franchise, which put constraints on how stories are told. I demonstrate how television writers find forensic science to be an ideal tool in navigating television’s narrative constraints by using forensics to create conflicts, new obstacles, potential solutions, and final solutions in their stories. I show how television writers utilise forensic science to provide the scientific certainty their characters require to catch the criminal, but also how uncertainty is introduced in a story through the interpretation of the forensics by the show’s characters. I also argue that televisual storytellers maintain a flexible notion of scientific realism based on the notion of possibility that puts them at odds with scientists who take a more demanding conception of scientific accuracy based on the concept of probability.     

Unconventional allies: interdisciplinary approaches to science policy and funding

Scientific research is an often misunderstood, undervalued and yet essential activity. Many nonscientists think that research is quick and easy, and that science is a compilation of established facts rather than rigorous conclusions based on available evidence. In addition, many nonscientists, and perhaps many scientists as well, forget that our social and financial investment is small relative to the massive and expensive problems that we all want scientific research to solve. Using biomedical research in the United States as an example, I will argue that countering this underinvestment in science will require broadening perspectives in the scientific community as well as coupling expanded individual advocacy and education efforts to an interdisciplinary advocacy approach. This approach is in many ways analogous to the unique solutions that emerge when scientists working in different disciplines leave their intellectual silos and work together.     

Idealized, Inaccurate but Successful: A Pragmatic Approach to Evaluating Models in Theoretical Ecology

Ecologists attempt to understand the diversity of life with mathematical models. Often, mathematical models contain simplifying idealizations designed to cope with the blooming, buzzing confusion of the natural world. This strategy frequently issues in models whose predictions are inaccurate. Critics of theoretical ecology argue that only predictively accurate models are successful and contribute to the applied work of conservation biologists. Hence, they think that much of the mathematical work of ecologists is poor science. Against this view, I argue that model building is successful even when models are predictively inaccurate for at least three reasons: models allow scientists to explore the possible behaviors of ecological systems; models give scientists simplified means by which they can investigate more complex systems by determining how the more complex system deviates from the simpler model; and models give scientists conceptual frameworks through which they can conduct experiments and fieldwork. Critics often mistake the purposes of model building, and once we recognize this, we can see their complaints are unjustified. Even though models in ecology are not always accurate in their assumptions and predictions, they still contribute to successful science.     

Weathering climate: telescoping change

As the scientific distinction between climate and weather suggests, knowledge about climate is supposed to be beyond indigenous peoples’ everyday experience of the environment in that it requires a long-term record. On the basis of ethnographic work among geoscientists in Scotland and West Greenland, I show that practitioners of this discipline have mastered the craft of turning ‘visible’ what is ‘invisible’ to the senses by playing with shorter time-scales. In thinking and communicating about the past, geoscientists would compress and accelerate long-term environmental processes, often at the cost of dissociating them from processes occurring at shorter time-scales, particularly the adaptation of living organisms. Attending to the historical circumstances around the development of this skill, I argue that it relates to an ideal of objectivity in science that corresponds to an optical understanding of time, inspired by the image of the telescope. Challenging the distinction between climate and weather, and the epistemic distance on which it rests, I discuss recent approaches in environmental anthropology that have uncritically adopted this distinction to distinguish indigenous knowledge of the environment from climate science. In conclusion, informed by research with indigenous peoples of the Arctic, I speculate on alternative ways of understanding climate knowledge, beyond the climate-weather distinction.     

Evolving Scientific Epistemologies and the Artifacts of Empirical Philosophy of Science: A Reply Concerning Mesosomes

In a 1993 paper, I argued that empirical treatments of the epistemologyused by scientists in experimental work are too abstract in practice tocounter relativist efforts to explain the outcome of scientificcontroversies by reference to sociological forces. This was because, atthe rarefied level at which the methodology of scientists is treated byphilosophers, multiple mutually inconsistent instantiations of theprinciples described by philosophers are employed by contestingscientists. These multiple construals change within a scientificcommunity over short time frames, and these different versions ofscientific methodology can determine the outcome of a controversy. Iillustrated with a comparatively detailed analysis of the methodologyused by biologists debating the existence of an entity called thebacterial mesosome between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s. This 1993piece has drawn several critiques in the philosophical literature. Inthis present piece I respond to these critiques and argue that they failto address the core argument of the original paper, and I reflectfurther on the methodologies of philosophers of science pursuingempirical or `naturalistic' epistemology.     

Neutrons, magnets, and photons: a career in structural biology

The purpose of Reflections articles, it seems, is to give elderly scientists a chance to write about the "good old days," when everyone walked to school in the snow. They enjoy this activity so much that your editor, Martha Fedor, must have known that I would accept her invitation to write such an article, no matter how much I demurred at first. As everyone knows, flattery will get you everywhere. It may comfort the apprehensive reader to learn that there is not going to be much walking to school in the snow in this story. On the contrary, rather than thinking how hard I had it during my scientific career, I find it inconceivable that anyone could have had a smoother ride. At the time I began my career, science was an expanding enterprise in the United States that welcomed the young. Only in such an opportunity-rich environment would someone like me have stood a chance. The contrast between that world and the dog-eat-dog world young scientists confront today is stark.     

Producing Absolute Truth: CSI Science as Wishful Thinking

ABSTRACT  Forensic science has come to be assigned an important role in contemporary crime fiction. In this article, I analyze the cultural repertoire of forensic science conveyed by the popular television show Crime Scene Investigation (CSI). I argue that CSI science, in delivering an absolute "truth" about how and by whom crimes have been committed, is equated with justice, effectively superseding nonfictional forensic science as well as nonfictional judicature as a whole. Thus, CSI as a cultural performance adds to the mediascape a repertoire of wishful-thinking science with which to think about perceptions of and desires for crime and justice in nonfictional society. This repertoire seems to be considered relevant enough to nonfictional society to cause concern about the judicial system, as expressed in discussions of the so-called " CSI effect."     

Ancient DNA studies

Now that the hype surrounding Jurassic Park has settled down and we have become relatively used to dramatic headlines announcing the recovery of DNA from exotic fossilized remains, scientists working on ancient DNA are beginning to reflect on the long-term prospects and implications of the subject.¹ The science of ancient DNA has grown exponentially since its birth only ten years ago, and despite serious technical difficulties, it promises to become a revolutionary research tool in anthropology and molecular evolution. The use of bone DNA typing in particular has already yielded useful insights into Polynesian prehistory as well as spectacular applications in the forensic identification of skeletal remains.     

The Practitioner of Science: Everyone her Own Historian

Carl Becker's classic 1931 address ``Everyman his own historian'holds lessons for historians of science today. Like the professional historians he spoke to, we are content to displaythe Ivory-Tower Syndrome, writing scholarly treatises only forone another, disdaining both the general reader and our naturalreadership, scientists. Following his rhetoric, I argue thatscientists are well aware of their own historicity, and wouldbe interested in lively and balanced histories of science. It isironic that the very professionalism that ought to equip us towrite such histories has imposed on us a powerful taboo that rendersus unable to do so. We who count ourselves sophisticated in describing the effects ofsocial forces upon past scientists have been remarkably unconsciousof the ways our own practices are being shaped by our need (and perhapsmore importantly, the needs of our teachers' teachers) to distinguish ourselves from scientists who write history. Our fear of presentism ingeneral and Whig history in particular is really a taboo, that is, anexcessive avoidance enforced by social pressure. It succeeds at makingour work distinct from histories written by scientists, but at the awful cost of blotting out the great fact of scientific progress.Scientists may be misguided in expecting us to celebrate great men,but they are right to demand from historians an analysis of the processof testing and improvement that is central to science. If progress in general is a problematic term, we could label the process ``emendation.' This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Variations of scalp, pubic and axillary hair

Hair examinations and comparisons conducted by forensic scientists often provide investigative and associative information. Apart from its length and its natural color, hair displays a morphologic diversity both macroscopically and microscopically. Pseudogenization of 相似文献   

The role of evolutionary processes in producing biodiversity patterns, and the interrelationships between taxonomic, functional and phylogenetic biodiversity

Patterns of biodiversity are ultimately the product of speciation and extinction. Speciation serves as the biodiversity pump while extinction serves as the agent that culls global to local levels of biodiversity. Linking these central processes to global and local patterns of biodiversity is a key challenge in both ecology and evolution. This challenge necessarily requires a simultaneous consideration of the species, phylogenetic, and functional diversity across space and the tree of life. In this review, I outline a research framework for biodiversity science that considers the evolutionary and ecological processes that generate and cull levels of biodiversity and that influence the inter-relationships between species, phylogenetic, and functional diversity. I argue that a biodiversity synthesis must begin with a consideration of the inherently ecological process of speciation and end with how global biodiversity is filtered into local-scale plant communities. The review ends with a brief outlook on future challenges for those studying biodiversity, including outstanding hypotheses that need testing and key data limitations.     

Why are programmes for offenders with personality disorder not informed by the relevant scientific findings?

This paper examines the evidence to justify intervening in those with personality disorder, specifically antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association 1994). The evidence from randomized controlled trials in the mental health literature is reviewed and found to be deficient with only five trials satisfying Cochrane criteria, all of which had a reduction in substance misuse as their primary outcome, rather than a change in the personality disorder per se.Next, I consider the contribution of Thomas Kuhn to explain why it is difficult to develop a scientific basis in forensic mental health. I argue that, because forensic mental health is inclusive in its purpose (interacting with the law, social services and the penal system, all of which have different rules and agendas), it is difficult to develop a consensus on fundamentals, this consensus being a hallmark of a science.Finally, I argue that despite the absence of evidence from mental health, providers for ASPD are in a fortunate position in being able to draw upon the correctional literature. This is relevant, provided that we agree that a reduction in offending is the primary outcome. While mental health can learn much from correctional practice, it can also enhance the efficacy of the latter by, for instance, drawing attention to the specific vulnerabilities of the personality structure that might impede programme delivery in correctional settings. Means of achieving a conjunction of mental health and correctional practice are urgently required as this would be beneficial to both.     

A conceptual framework for understanding the perspectives on the causes of the science–practice gap in ecology and conservation

Applying scientific knowledge to confront societal challenges is a difficult task, an issue known as the science–practice gap. In Ecology and Conservation, scientific evidence has been seldom used directly to support decision‐making, despite calls for an increasing role of ecological science in developing solutions for a sustainable future. To date, multiple causes of the science–practice gap and diverse approaches to link science and practice in Ecology and Conservation have been proposed. To foster a transparent debate and broaden our understanding of the difficulties of using scientific knowledge, we reviewed the perceived causes of the science–practice gap, aiming to: (i) identify the perspectives of ecologists and conservation scientists on this problem, (ii) evaluate the predominance of these perspectives over time and across journals, and (iii) assess them in light of disciplines studying the role of science in decision‐making. We based our review on 1563 sentences describing causes of the science–practice gap extracted from 122 articles and on discussions with eight scientists on how to classify these sentences. The resulting process‐based framework describes three distinct perspectives on the relevant processes, knowledge and actors in the science–practice interface. The most common perspective assumes only scientific knowledge should support practice, perceiving a one‐way knowledge flow from science to practice and recognizing flaws in knowledge generation, communication, and/or use. The second assumes that both scientists and decision‐makers should contribute to support practice, perceiving a two‐way knowledge flow between science and practice through joint knowledge‐production/integration processes, which, for several reasons, are perceived to occur infrequently. The last perspective was very rare, and assumes scientists should put their results into practice, but they rarely do. Some causes (e.g. cultural differences between scientists and decision‐makers) are shared with other disciplines, while others seem specific to Ecology and Conservation (e.g. inadequate research scales). All identified causes require one of three general types of solutions, depending on whether the causal factor can (e.g. inadequate research questions) or cannot (e.g. scientific uncertainty) be changed, or if misconceptions (e.g. undervaluing abstract knowledge) should be solved. The unchanged predominance of the one‐way perspective over time may be associated with the prestige of evidence‐based conservation and suggests that debates in Ecology and Conservation lag behind trends in other disciplines towards bidirectional views ascribing larger roles to decision‐makers. In turn, the two‐way perspective seems primarily restricted to research traditions historically isolated from mainstream conservation biology. All perspectives represented superficial views of decision‐making by not accounting for limits to human rationality, complexity of decision‐making contexts, fuzzy science–practice boundaries, ambiguity brought about by science, and different types of knowledge use. However, joint knowledge‐production processes from the two‐way perspective can potentially allow for democratic decision‐making processes, explicit discussions of values and multiple types of science use. To broaden our understanding of the interface and foster productive science–practice linkages, we argue for dialogue among different research traditions within Ecology and Conservation, joint knowledge‐production processes between scientists and decision‐makers and interdisciplinarity across Ecology, Conservation and Political Science in both research and education.     

In the trenches: lessons for scientists from California's Proposition 71 campaign

I describe a number of valuable lessons I learned from participating in California's Proposition 71 effort about the role that scientists and rigorous scientific advice can play in a public political process. I describe how scientists can provide valuable information and advice and how they can also gain a great deal from the experience that is valuable to a practicing research scientist. Finally, I argue that in the future, building similar broad coalitions to support biomedical and other areas of scientific research will be essential to protect publicly funded science. Thus, a key lesson from the Proposition 71 experience is that engagement of scientists with diverse nonscientific groups can make a big difference and that scientists must actively engage with the public in the future if we are to contribute robustly to the medical and economic health of our communities.     

Governing anticipatory technology practices. Forensic DNA phenotyping and the forensic genetics community in Europe

Forensic geneticists have attempted to make the case for continued investment in forensic genetics research, despite its seemingly consolidated evidentiary role in criminal justice, by shifting the focus to technologies that can provide intelligence. Forensic DNA phenotyping (FDP) is one such emerging set of techniques, promising to infer external appearance and ancestry of an unknown person. On this example, I consider the repertoire of anticipatory practices deployed by scientists, expanding the concept to not only focus on promissory but also include epistemic and operational aspects of anticipatory work in science. I explore these practices further as part of anticipatory self-governance efforts, attending to the European forensic genetics community and its construction of FDP as a reliable and legitimate technology field for use in delivering public goods around security and justice. In this context, I consider three types of ordering devices that translate anticipatory practices into anticipatory self-governance.     

Science funding and infrastructures in Europe

European science in crisis. Scared? Then read on; you should be. I argue that we cannot sit back for much longer and watch our best scientists emigrate to the USA for the most productive part of their career, and that European scientists should not tolerate a funding system that neither rewards an investigator's brilliance nor the innovative nature of their research. The EC Framework Programme is due for a face lift: scientists should wield the scalpel this time.     

Statistical basis for positive identification in forensic anthropology

Forensic scientists are often expected to present the likelihood of DNA identifications in US courts based on comparative population data, yet forensic anthropologists tend not to quantify the strength of an osteological identification. Because forensic anthropologists are trained first and foremost as physical anthropologists, they emphasize estimation problems at the expense of evidentiary problems, but this approach must be reexamined. In this paper, the statistical bases for presenting osteological and dental evidence are outlined, using a forensic case as a motivating example. A brief overview of Bayesian statistics is provided, and methods to calculate likelihood ratios for five aspects of the biological profile are demonstrated. This paper emphasizes the definition of appropriate reference samples and of the "population at large," and points out the conceptual differences between them. Several databases are introduced for both reference information and to characterize the "population at large," and new data are compiled to calculate the frequency of specific characters, such as age or fractures, within the "population at large." Despite small individual likelihood ratios for age, sex, and stature in the case example, the power of this approach is that, assuming each likelihood ratio is independent, the product rule can be applied. In this particular example, it is over three million times more likely to obtain the observed osteological and dental data if the identification is correct than if the identification is incorrect. This likelihood ratio is a convincing statistic that can support the forensic anthropologist's opinion on personal identity in court.     

Can freshwater mites act as forensic tools?

Determination of post-mortem interval often employs analysis of age structure and diversity of saprophilic arthropods (including mites) that have colonized corpses. The majority of research has focused on decomposition processes in terrestrial situations, with relatively few studies on the utility of freshwater invertebrates as forensic agents. Most freshwater mites are predators, detritivores or algivores, and hence seem unlikely candidates as tools for aging or determining original placement of corpses or other bodily remains. The main exceptions to this are some aquatic Astigmata, which have occasionally been observed feeding on the tissues of moribund aquatic animals. Here I investigate Canadian law literature and published forensic research to determine how frequently freshwater mites are included in court cases or are found attending dead bodies. I found only one questionable report of aquatic mites in over 30 years of material from legal databases. Three published research papers reported mites associated with vertebrate flesh in fresh water. Only one paper provided an identification of mites finer than ‘Acari’ or ‘water mites’. In this case, the mites were identified as Hydrozetes (Oribatida). In none of these papers were mites reported to be high in abundance or biomass, and in two of the three publications methodological problems and/or poor reporting of data raised doubts about interpretation of results. I conclude that based on their biology, there is little expectation that freshwater mites should be of great value as forensic tools, and this survey of legal and scientific literature supports my argument.     

The success of science and social norms

In this paper I characterize science in terms of both invisible hand social organization and selection. These two processes are responsible for different features of science. Individuals working in isolation cannot produce much in the way of the warranted knowledge. Individual biases severely limit how much secure knowledge an individual can generate on his or her own. Individuals working in consort are required, but social groups can be organized in many different ways. The key feature of the social organization in science is that only working scientists can confer the most important reward in science--use--and scientists must use each other's work in order to succeed in realizing this goal. An analysis of science as a selection process serves quite a different function. Individual scientists strive to come up with novel solutions to significant problems. The question then becomes how to be creative. From a selective perspective, science as a process involves the production of numerous alternatives and a selection among them. A single scientist solving an important problem makes science look very efficient. Treating science as a selection process casts it in a very different light. In this paper I combine an invisible hand mechanism with a selective perspective in order to explain why science is as successful as it is. I do not make recourse to evolutionary epistemology in any of its traditional senses.