The politics of cloning: mapping the rhetorical convergence of embyros and stem cells in parliamentary debates

In April 2001, the 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFE Act) was amended to allow stem cell research to use human embryos. By identifying what Mulkay calls "discursive regularities" [Mulkay, M. (1993) Rhetorics of hope and fear in the great embryo debate, Social Studies of Science, 23, p. 723], this paper examines the rhetorical strategies of and manoeuvrings over the meanings of stem cells, cloning, and embryos within the parliamentary context. I focus upon the "return to the embryo question" and the significance" of this for the stem cell debates in terms of form and content. This feeds into an analysis of the ways in which two specific groups are discursively invoked and constructed--those with diseases and disabilities who have been identified as likely to benefit from stem cell therapies, and couples undergoing fertility treatment who are needed to donate spare embryos. In doing so, I draw upon similar analyses of the earlier embryo debates--those of Mulkay, Franklin, Kirejcyk and Spallone--leading up to the establishment of the 1990 HFE Act. In conjunction with these analyses, I am able to identify parallels between the rhetorical devices mobilized and the legislative outcomes.     

Creating Donors: The 2005 Swiss Law on Donation of ‘Spare’ Embryos to hESC Research

In November 2004, the Swiss population voted to accept a law on research using human embryonic stem cells. In this paper, we use Switzerland as a case study of the shaping of the ostensibly ethical debate on the use of embryos in embryonic stem cell research by legal, political and social constraints. We describe how the national and international context affected the content and wording of the law. We discuss the consequences of the revised law's separation of stem cell research from other forms of embryo research, its definitions of embryo and of spare embryos, and the introduction of donorship into the Swiss ethical debate on IVF. We focus on the exclusion of the potential embryo donors' voices and perspectives from the debate, and consider the effects of this exclusion on ethical discourse and the political process.     

Principles of ethical decision making regarding embryonic stem cell research in Germany

The availability of embryonic stem (ES) cells isolated from human blastocysts may open novel avenues for medical treatment of otherwise incurable diseases. Yet the generation of human ES cells requires the destruction of early human embryos. This confronts us with the moral problem of whether it is justifiable to sacrifice human life in order to treat other human life. This article outlines the development of the German debate about research with ES cells and explicates the arguments that are central to that debate with respect to the aims and means of research with ES cells. With regard to the means, the isolation of ES cells from human embryos raises the question of the moral status of the human embryo. A restrictive position acknowledges the human dignity of the embryo in its very early stage of development and claims that the embryo's life must be protected accordingly. In contrast, a gradualist position acknowledges human dignity, and therefore the full level of protection, only when the embryo has reached a certain stage of development. In addition, the intentions behind the generation of human embryos, i.e. exclusively for research purposes, and the mode of generating them, i.e. by nuclear transfer technology, have strong ethical relevance in the German debate. Based on these results, the ethical reasoning underlying the draft of a Stem Cell Act recently passed by the German Parliament is outlined.     

BROADENING THE SCOPE OF DEBATES AROUND STEM CELL RESEARCH

Over the last decade, stem cell research has generated an enormous amount of public, political and bioethical debate. These debates have overwhelmingly tended to focus on two moral issues: the moral status of human embryos and the duty to care for the sick and vulnerable. This preoccupation, especially on the question of moral status, has not only dichotomized the debate around two fundamentally incommensurable positions, it has come at the cost of other important issues largely being ignored. In highlighting some of the bioethical and regulatory deficiencies of this fixation, we draw on recent developments in the experimental use of autologous adult stem cells to argue for a more inclusive approach to the ethical issues surrounding stem cell research.     

A report from Australia: when a human life has not yet begun--according to the law

Victoria, Australia's Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984, the first legislation to regulate reproductive technologies, permits research on surplus embryos fertilized in vitro but prohibits the creation of embryos for research purposes. The failure to define when an embryo has come into existence or when fertilization has occurred has prevented the continuation of potentially valuable research directed at overcoming infertility. The Standing Review and Advisory Committee on Infertility must now consider the debate over when fertilization occurs, an event that is no longer regarded as a discrete or instantaneous act but as a process revealing no clear point at which a human individual begins to exist. Because the law requires a clear line of demarcation, any legislation in this area will face the problem of defining this point. Interpretation of a 1987 amendment to the 1984 Act may allow the fertilization of ova for purposes other than implantation.     

Moral qualms, future persons, and embryo research

Many people have moral qualms about embryo research, feeling that embryos must deserve some kind of protection, if not so much as is afforded to persons. This paper will show that these qualms serve to camouflage motives that are really prudential, at the cost of also obscuring the real ethical issues at play in the debate concerning embryo research and therapeutic cloning. This in turn leads to fallacious use of the Actions/Omissions Distinction and ultimately neglects the duties that we have towards future persons.     

Embryos,The Principle of Proportionality,and the Shaky Ground of Moral Respect

The debate concerning the moral permissibility of using human embryos in human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research has long centred on the question of the embryo's supposed right to life. However, in focussing only on this question, many opponents to hESC research have escaped rigorous scrutiny by making vague and unfounded appeals to the concept of moral respect in order to justify their opposition to certain hESC practices. In this paper, I offer a critical analysis of the concept of moral respect, and its use to support the intuitively appealing principle of proportionality in hESC research. I argue that if proponents of this principle are to justify its adoption by appealing to the concept of moral respect, they must explain two things concerning the nature of the moral respect owed to embryos. First, they must explain which particular aspect of the embryo is morally relevant, and why. Second, they must explain why some uses of embryos in research fail to acknowledge what is morally relevant about the embryo, and thereby involve a violation of the moral respect that they are due. I shall show that providing such explanations may be more difficult than it first appears.     

Distinguishing medical practice and research: the special case of IVF

The debate over the acceptability of human embryo research takes place within the context of a broader regulatory framework for experimentation with human subjects. Using the Australian situation for illustration, Gaze and Dawson examine the concepts of therapeutic, nontherapeutic, and destructive experimentation in medical practice. They explore the problems of applying these concepts to human embryo research by asking whether the embryo or the woman undergoing in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment is the experimental subject. They argue that when the embryo is treated as the sole subject, the woman is lost sight of, and that research that is therapeutic for the embryo may be nontherapeutic for her. Regulation of embryo research should take into account the relationship between research and the woman's treatment, the dependence of embryos upon women for gestation, and the empirical, uncertain nature of biomedical knowledge.     

"So, what is an embryo?" A comparative study of the views of those asked to donate embryos for hESC research in the UK and Switzerland

The moral status of the human embryo has gained much attention in debates over the acceptability, or otherwise, of human embryonic stem cell research. Far less attention has been paid to the suppliers of those embryos: people who have undergone IVF treatment to produce embryos to assist them to have a baby. It is sociologically and ethically important to understand their views and experiences of being asked to donate embryos for research if we are to fully understand the wider social and regulatory aspects of hESC science. This paper reports on parallel studies investigating these issues in the UK and in Switzerland. The studies reveal the inextricable entangling of the social and moral status of embryos. Since donors participate in different discursive domains and contexts (public, clinic, family) that shape their perception of "what" an embryo is, their views of embryos embody conflicting ideas and ambivalences.     

Segmentation and moral status in vivo and in vitro: a scientific perspective

A basic consideration in research on human embryos is the controversy about when the embryo acquires moral status. The author refutes the contention that segmentation is the determinant of moral status. She notes that segmentation, as a stage in embryonic development, does not coincide with the development of "irreversible individuality" upon which the segmentation argument depends. Dawson also finds a lack of clarity in the meaning of "individuality." These problems, she maintains, prevent segmentation from being morally important and render the proposed 14-day limit on embryo research unnecessary. Dawson concludes that to introduce a time restriction on embryo research is premature because it is based on an inadequate philosophical argument.     

The pros and cons of human therapeutic cloning in the public debate

Few issues linked to genetic research have raised as much controversial debate as the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer technology to create embryos specifically for stem cell research. Whereas European countries unanimously agree that reproductive cloning should be prohibited there is no agreement to be found on whether or not research into therapeutic cloning should be permitted. Since the UK took the lead and voted in favour of regulations allowing therapeutic cloning the public debate has intensified on the Continent. This debate reflects the wide spectrum of diverse religious and secular moralities that are prevalent in modern multicultural European democratic societies. Arguments range from putting forward strictly utilitarian views that weight the moral issues involved against the potential benefits that embryonic stem cell research may harbour to considering the embryo as a human being, endowed with human dignity and human rights from the moment of its creation, concluding that its use for research is unethical and should be strictly prohibited. Given the current state of dissension among the various European states, it is difficult to predict whether 'non-harmonisation' will prevail or whether in the long run 'harmonisation' of legislation that will allow stem cell research will evolve in the EU.     

The importance of valid disclosures in the human embryonic stem cell research debate

Abstract.  Misinformation erodes the legitimacy of any public debate. Since the start of human embryonic stem cell research deliberations in the USA, misinformation concerning the nature of human embryos, their availability for research, and the potential for using them to develop new medical therapies have been widespread and persistent. Basic facts, well understood by physicians and biologists, have been so misstated and misrepresented in the news media and political speeches that the general public has been put in a state of constant uncertainty. The solution to the present troubling condition is better education in the form of diligent, honest, and complete scientific disclosure by responsible scientists and physicians; and more care given to accurate reporting by news media. Several key aspects of newly emerging embryonic and non-embryonic stem cell technologies are defined and discussed as they relate to the debate over the use of human embryos for medical research. An important topic for consideration is how to disclose with clarity the scientific basis for human embryonic life. Thereafter, failings in proposed technologies for developing new therapies with human embryonic stem cells, that have been grossly under-reported, are examined. Finally, properties of adult stem cells are presented in contradistinction to embryonic stem cells, both in terms of adult stem cells as a scientifically better alternative to embryonic stem cells and in terms of the technological challenges that must be overcome to realize the potential of adult stem cells for new medical therapies.     

The future of sociobiology: Counting babies or studying proximate mechanisms

Much of the debate over applying the theory of evolution to the study of human behaviour has died down because most critics now realize that the political ramifications of sociobiology are no more, or no less, than those of behaviourism, psychoanalysis or cognitive science. But controversy remains. It is scientific, and concerns the 'proper' way to do human sociobiology. I contrast the perspective of those sociobiologists who use the approach of behavioural ecology, and who have come to be known as 'darwinian anthropologists' or 'darwinian social scientists', with their critics, who refer to themselves as evolutionary or 'darwinian psychologists', describe the research methods that each uses, and ask if those issues must also be confronted by those studying animals.     

Potentiality and human embryos

Consideration of the potentiality of human embryos to develop characteristics of personhood, such as intellect and will, has figured prominently in arguments against abortion and the use of human embryos for research. In particular, such consideration was the basis for the call of the US President's Council on Bioethics for a moratorium on stem cell research on human embryos. In this paper, I critique the concept of potentiality invoked by the Council and offer an alternative account. In contrast to the Council's view that an embryo's potentiality is determined by definition and is not affected by external conditions that may prevent certain possibilities from ever being realized, I propose an empirically grounded account of potentiality that involves an assessment of the physical and decisional conditions that may restrict an embryo's possibilities. In my view, some human embryos lack the potentiality to become a person that other human embryos have. Assuming for the sake of argument that the potential to become a person gives a being special moral status, it follows that some human embryos lack this status. This argument is then used to support Gene Outka's suggestion that it is morally permissible to experiment on 'spare' frozen embryos that are destined to be destroyed.     

WHEN DOES POTENTIALITY COUNT? A COMMENT ON LOCKWOOD

Michael Lockwood's essay, "Warnock v. Powell (and Harradine): when does potentiality count?," and Hare's response are two of three articles in this issue of Bioethics discussing potentiality and its implications for experimentation with human embryos. (See also Stephen Buckle's "Arguing from potential.") Hare responds to Lockwood's arguments on potential, an embryo's "interests," and what obligations these interests entail. In Hare's view, the interests are those of the grown person the embryo (or fetus or neonate) will become. In formulating regulations on embryo research, legislators ought to be concerned chiefly with the interests of the persons who may come into existence, grading harms differently for gametes, embryos, fetuses, and neonates, and balancing these against the expected good from the experiments.     

WARNOCK VERSUS POWELL (AND HARRADINE): WHEN DOES POTENTIALITY COUNT?*

Lockwood's essay is one of three in this issue of Bioethics on potentiality and its applicability to research with human embryos. (See also Richard M. Hare's "When does potentiality count? A comment on Lockwood," and Stephen Buckle's "Arguing from potential.") The author critiques the reasoning behind some of the proposals for regulating such research, particularly the recommendations of Britain's Warnock Committee and Enoch Powell's legislative response, the Unborn Children (Protection) Bill. Lockwood attempts to formulate a logically defensible and morally plausible position on potentiality, arguing that it is potential plus identity, which depends on brain development, which generates moral claims. He concludes that, while there may be practical reasons for banning embryo research after the nervous system begins to develop, it may not be morally wrong to experiment with miscarried fetuses whose brain is developing, but who are nonviable.     

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE TO SOCIO‐ETHICAL DEBATES ON FRESH EMBRYO DONATION FOR HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH

This article is a response to McLeod and Baylis (2007) who speculate on the dangers of requesting fresh ‘spare’ embryos from IVF patients for human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research, particularly when those embryos are good enough to be transferred back to the woman. They argue that these embryos should be frozen instead. We explore what is meant by ‘spare’ embryos. We then provide empirical evidence, from a study of embryo donation and of embryo donors' views, to substantiate some of their speculations about the problems associated with requesting fresh embryos. However, we also question whether such problems are resolved by embryo freezing, since further empirical evidence suggests that this raises other social and ethical problems for patients. There is little evidence that the request for embryos for research, in itself, causes patients distress. We suggest, however, that no requests for fresh embryos should be made in the first cycle of IVF treatment. Deferring the request to a later cycle ensures that potential donors are better informed (by experience and reflection) about the possible destinations of their embryos and about the definition of ‘spare embryos’. Both this article, and that by McLeod and Baylis, emphasize the need to consider the views and experiences of embryo donors when evaluating the ethics of embryo donation for hESC research.