Zum konzept der »inneren« selektion: Stellungnahme zu einer evolutionstheoretischen kontroverse

Recently the concept of natural selection in Darwin’s sense has been criticized by some authors. It has been argued that this concept does not explain certain phenomena of evolutionary change, especially in the reach of macroevolution. Some biologists, therefore, demanded for evolution a new model of selection which focuses internal factors in phytogeny. — This paper is a brief discussion of some aspects of “internal” selection and its meaning in contemporary evolutionary biology. The argument of the paper is that evolution can only be explained by a theory taking cognizance of interactions between external and internal selective agencies. Such a theory would be a systems theory of evolution.     

Kin selection and the Evolution of Mutualisms between Species

Hamilton's theory of kin selection has revolutionized and inspired fifty years of additional theories and experiments on social evolution. Whereas Hamilton's broader intent was to explain the evolutionary stability of cooperation, his focus on shared genetic history appears to have limited the application of his theory to populations within a single species rather than across interacting species. The evolutionary mechanisms for cooperation between species require both spatial and temporal correlations among interacting partners for the benefits to be not only predictable but of sufficient duration to be reliably delivered. As a consequence when the benefits returned by mutualistic partners are redirected to individuals other than the original donor, cooperation usually becomes unstable and parasitism may evolve. However, theoretically, such redirection of mutualistic benefits may actually reinforce, rather than undermine, mutualisms between species when the recipients of these redirected benefits are genetically related to the original donor. Here, I review the few mathematical models that have used Hamilton's theory of kin selection to predict the evolution of mutualisms between species. I go on to examine the applicability of these models to the most well‐studied case of mutualism, pollinating seed predators, where the role of kin selection may have been previously overlooked. Future detailed studies of the direct, and indirect, benefits of mutualism are likely to reveal additional possibilities for applying Hamilton's theory of kin selection to mutualisms between species.     

Psychological and Evolutionary Evidence for Altruism

Sober and Wilson have recentlyclaimed that evolutionary theory can do whatneither philosophy nor experimental psychologyhave been able to, namely, ``break the deadlock'in the egoism vs. altruism debate with anargument based on the reliability of altruisticmotivation. I analyze both their reliabilityargument and the experimental evidence ofsocial psychology in favor of altruism in termsof the folk-psychological ``laws' and inferencepatterns underlying them, and conclude thatthey both rely on the same patterns. I exposethe confusions that have led Sober and Wilsonto defend a reliability argument whilerejecting the experimental evidence of socialpsychology.     

INTERACTING PHENOTYPES AND THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS. III. SOCIAL EVOLUTION

Interactions among conspecifics influence social evolution through two distinct but intimately related paths. First, they provide the opportunity for indirect genetic effects (IGEs), where genes expressed in one individual influence the expression of traits in others. Second, interactions can generate social selection when traits expressed in one individual influence the fitness of others. Here, we present a quantitative genetic model of multivariate trait evolution that integrates the effects of both IGEs and social selection, which have previously been modeled independently. We show that social selection affects evolutionary change whenever the breeding value of one individual covaries with the phenotype of its social partners. This covariance can be created by both relatedness and IGEs, which are shown to have parallel roles in determining evolutionary response. We show that social selection is central to the estimation of inclusive fitness and derive a version of Hamilton's rule showing the symmetrical effects of relatedness and IGEs on the evolution of altruism. We illustrate the utility of our approach using altruism, greenbeards, aggression, and weapons as examples. Our model provides a general predictive equation for the evolution of social phenotypes that encompasses specific cases such as kin selection and reciprocity. The parameters can be measured empirically, and we emphasize the importance of considering both IGEs and social selection, in addition to relatedness, when testing hypotheses about social evolution.     

Darwin's explanation of races by means of sexual selection

In Darwin's Sacred Cause, Adrian Desmond and James Moore contend that "Darwin would put his utmost into sexual selection because the subject intrigued him, no doubt, but also for a deeper reason: the theory vindicated his lifelong commitment to human brotherhood" (2009: p. 360). Without questioning Desmond and Moore's evidence, I will raise some puzzles for their view. I will show that attention to the structure of Darwin's arguments in the Descent of Man shows that they are far from straightforward. As Desmond and Moore note, Darwin seems to have intended sexual selection in non-human animals to serve as evidence for sexual selection in humans. However, Darwin's account of sexual selection in humans was different from the canonical cases that Darwin described at great length. If explaining the origin of human races was the main reason for introducing sexual selection, and if sexual selection was a key piece of Darwin's anti-slavery arguments, then it is puzzling why Darwin would have spent so much time discussing cases that did not really support his argument for the origin of human races, and it is also puzzling that his argument for the origin of human races would be so (atypically) poor.     

Drift sometimes dominates selection,and vice versa: a reply to Clatterbuck,Sober and Lewontin

Clatterbuck et al. (Biol Philos 28: 577–592, 2013) argue that there is no fact of the matter whether selection dominates drift or vice versa in any particular case of evolution. Their reasons are not empirically based; rather, they are purely conceptual. We show that their conceptual presuppositions are unmotivated, unnecessary and overly complex. We also show that their conclusion runs contrary to current biological practice. The solution is to recognize that evolution involves a probabilistic sampling process, and that drift is a deviation from probabilistic expectation. We conclude that conceptually, there are no problems with distinguishing drift from selection, and empirically—as modern science illustrates—when drift does occur, there is a quantifiable fact of the matter to be discovered.     

Communication and collective action: language and the evolution of human cooperation

All social species face various “collective action problems” (CAPs) or “social dilemmas,” meaning problems in achieving cooperating when the best move from a selfish point of view yields an inferior collective outcome. Compared to most other species, humans are very good at solving these challenges, suggesting that something rather peculiar about human sociality facilitates collective action. This article proposes that language — the uniquely human faculty of symbolic communication — fundamentally alters the possibilities for collective action. I explore these issues using simple game-theoretic models and empirical evidence (both ethnographic and experimental). I review several standard mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation — mutualism, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity and signaling — highlighting their limitations when it comes to explaining large-group cooperation, as well as the ways in which language helps overcome those limitations. Language facilitates complex coordination and is essential for establishing norms governing production efforts and distribution of collective goods that motivate people to cooperate voluntarily in large groups. Language also significantly lowers the cost of detecting and punishing “free riders,” thus greatly enhancing the scope and power of standard conditional reciprocity. In addition, symbolic communication encourages new forms of collectively beneficial displays and reputation management — what evolutionists often term “signaling” and “indirect reciprocity.” Thus, language reinforces existing forces that favor the evolution of cooperation, as well as creating new opportunities for collective action not available even to our closest primate relatives.     

Dicent Symbols in Non-Human Semiotic Processes

Against the view that symbol-based semiosis is a human cognitive uniqueness, we have argued that non-human primates such as African vervet monkeys possess symbolic competence, as formally defined by Charles S. Peirce. Here I develop this argument by showing that the equivocal role ascribed to symbols by ??folk semiotics?? stems from an incomplete application of the Peircean logical framework for the classification of signs, which describes three kinds of symbols: rheme, dicent and argument. In an attempt to advance in the classifying semiotic processes, Peirce proposed several typologies, with different degrees of refinement. Around 1903, he developed a division into ten classes. According to this typology, symbols can be further analysed in three subclasses (rheme, dicent, argument). I proceed to demonstrate that vervet monkeys employ dicent symbols. There are remarkable implications of this argument since ??symbolic species theory?? fails to explore the vast Peircean semiotic philosophy to frame questions regarding the emergence and evolution of symbolic processes.     

Efficient social contracts and group selection

We consider the Stag Hunt in terms of Maynard Smith’s famous Haystack model. In the Stag Hunt, contrary to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, there is a cooperative equilibrium besides the equilibrium where every player defects. This implies that in the Haystack model, where a population is partitioned into groups, groups playing the cooperative equilibrium tend to grow faster than those at the non-cooperative equilibrium. We determine under what conditions this leads to the takeover of the population by cooperators. Moreover, we compare our results to the case of an unstructured population and to the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Finally, we point to some implications our findings have for three distinct ideas: Ken Binmore’s group selection argument in favor of the evolution of efficient social contracts, Sewall Wright’s Shifting Balance theory, and the equilibrium selection problem of game theory.     

The social evolution of bacterial pathogenesis

Many of the genes responsible for the virulence of bacterial pathogens are carried by mobile genetic elements that can be transferred horizontally between different bacterial lineages. Horizontal transfer of virulence-factor genes has played a profound role in the evolution of bacterial pathogens, but it is poorly understood why these genes are so often mobile. Here, I present a hypothetical selective mechanism maintaining virulence-factor genes on horizontally transmissible genetic elements. For virulence factors that are secreted extracellularly, selection within hosts may favour mutant 'cheater' strains of the pathogen that do not produce the virulence factor themselves but still benefit from factors produced by other members of the pathogen population within a host. Using simple mathematical models, I show that if this occurs then selection for infectious transmission between hosts favours pathogen strains that can reintroduce functional copies of virulence-factor genes into cheaters via horizontal transfer, forcing them to produce the virulence factor. Horizontal gene transfer is thus a novel mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. I discuss predictions of this hypothesis that can be tested empirically and its implications for the evolution of pathogen virulence.     

VARIATION IN ACOUSTIC SIGNALLING TRAITS EXHIBITS FOOTPRINTS OF SEXUAL SELECTION

Phenotypic variation is ubiquitous in nature and a precondition for adaptive evolution. However, theory predicts that the extent of phenotypic variation should decrease with increasing strength of selection on a trait. Comparative analyses of trait variability have repeatedly used this expectation to infer the type or strength of selection. Yet, the suggested influence of selection on trait variability has rarely been tested empirically. In the present study, I compare estimates of sexual selection strength and trait variability from published data. I constricted the analysis to acoustic courtship traits in amphibians and insects with known variability and corresponding results of female binary choice experiments on these traits. Trait variability and strength of sexual selection were significantly correlated, and both were correlated with signal duration. Because traits under stronger selection had lower variation even after the effect of signal duration was eliminated, I conclude that traces of the strength of selection can be observed with respect to variation of acoustic signaling traits in insects and amphibians. The analysis also shows that traits under stabilizing selection have significantly lower phenotypic variability than traits under directional selection.     

Why a convincing argument for causalism cannot entirely eschew population-level properties: discussion of Otsuka

Causalism is the thesis that natural selection can cause evolution. A standard argument for causalism involves showing that a hypothetical intervention on some population-level property that is identified with natural selection (e.g., variation in fitness) will result in evolution. In a pair of articles, one of which recently appeared in the pages of this journal, Jun Otsuka has put forward a quite different argument for causalism. Otsuka attempts to show that natural selection can cause evolution by considering a hypothetical intervention on an individual-level property. Specifically, Otsuka identifies natural selection with the causal relationship between a trait and fitness, claims an intervention on the strength of this relationship can cause evolution, then concludes that natural selection can cause evolution. Below I describe why Otsuka’s argument for causalism is unconvincing. Central to my criticism is that Otsuka’s argument works only if one adopts an indefensible account of natural selection, according to which natural selection can occur in the absence of trait or fitness variation. I go on to explain why any attempt to demonstrate the truth of causalism via a hypothetical intervention on an individual-level property would appear to require one to adopt an account of natural selection that is inadequate for the same reason. This in turn means the plausibility of causalism does indeed depend on the plausibility of the claim that population-level properties, which supervene on the properties of the individuals in the population, can be causally efficacious.     

Borrowed plumes: mimetic powers and the polymorphism of humans

In this paper, I speculate on imitation??s role in language development and, more significantly, on its connection to sexual selection. My analysis is grounded in an interpretation of Darwin??s Descent of Man. In addition to observing imitation??s role in language development according to the argument of the Descent, I explore the ability of human beings that allows for the imitation of both the beautiful and the terrible or repulsive. I suggest that humans, in their appreciation of the beautiful and formidable characters produced by a process of sexual selection, can appropriate these things in order to adorn themselves, thus imitating other non-human animals. This capacity points to a form of polymorphism manifest in human beings that is grounded in a psychological fluidity. Human beings, like birds, also have the power to use song in order to charm and challenge. Song and music provide the means by which imitation as seen in language development and sexual selection are intertwined, thus providing the important connection between the two main foci of my paper.     

The concurrent evolution of cooperation and the population structures that support it

The evolution of cooperation often depends upon population structure, yet nearly all models of cooperation implicitly assume that this structure remains static. This is a simplifying assumption, because most organisms possess genetic traits that affect their population structure to some degree. These traits, such as a group size preference, affect the relatedness of interacting individuals and hence the opportunity for kin or group selection. We argue that models that do not explicitly consider their evolution cannot provide a satisfactory account of the origin of cooperation, because they cannot explain how the prerequisite population structures arise. Here, we consider the concurrent evolution of genetic traits that affect population structure, with those that affect social behavior. We show that not only does population structure drive social evolution, as in previous models, but that the opportunity for cooperation can in turn drive the creation of population structures that support it. This occurs through the generation of linkage disequilibrium between socio-behavioral and population-structuring traits, such that direct kin selection on social behavior creates indirect selection pressure on population structure. We illustrate our argument with a model of the concurrent evolution of group size preference and social behavior.     

Social is Emotional

This is a biological approach to the philosophy of mind that feeds an investigation of the phenomena of “social” and “emotional”, both of which are widespread in nature. I scrutinize the non-dualistic Darwinian concept of the continuity of mind. For practical reasons, I address mind at different levels of organization: The systemic mind are the properties of which a common, coherent evolution works upon. Separated from this is “language-mind”: the crystallization of thought in words, which is a strictly human phenomenon. As the phenomenology of the body is a theory of philosophy that lie beyond language it can—to a certain extent—be extrapolated across a species boundary. In the process the phenomenology of the body comes to resemble biosemiotics and with this tool, I investigate a field study of social play behavior in canids. This leads to a possibility to study the non-human experience of emotion as “locally meaningful phenomena”.     

Natural selection and the joint evolution of toleranceand resistance as plant defenses

Plants can defend themselves against the damaging effects of herbivory in at least two ways. Resistant plants avoid or deter herbivores and are therefore fed upon less than susceptible plants. Tolerant plants are not eaten less than plants with little tolerance, but the effects of herbivore damage are not so detrimental to a tolerant plant as they are to a less tolerant plant. Biologists have suggested that these two strategies might represent two alternative and redundant defenses against herbivory since they appear to serve the same function for plants. I explore the relationship between resistance and tolerance, particularly with regards to how the joint evolution of these two traits will influence the evolution of plant defense. Although I briefly review some of the contributions of theory to the study of tolerance, I concentrate on an empirical, ecological genetic approach to the study of the evolution of these characters and the coevolution of tolerance and herbivores. In order to understand the evolution of any trait, we must understand the evolutionary forces acting on the trait. Specifically, we must understand how natural selection acts on tolerance. I review several studies that have specifically measured the form of selection acting on tolerance and tested the hypothesis that resistance and tolerance are alternative strategies. I also present a statistical analysis that does not support the hypothesis that herbivores are selective agents on tolerance. Finally, I consider a variety of constraints that possibly restrict the evolution of tolerance. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Genes, language, cognition, and culture: towards productive inquiry

The Queen Mary conference on “Integrating Genetic and Cultural Evolutionary Approaches to Language,” and the papers in this special issue, clearly illustrate the excitement and potential of trans-disciplinary approaches to language as an evolved biological capacity (phylogeny) and an evolving cultural entity (glossogeny). Excepting the present author, the presenters/authors are mostly young rising stars in their respective fields, and include scientists with backgrounds in linguistics, animal communication, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, anthropology, and computer science. On display was a clear willingness to engage with different approaches and terminology and a commitment to shared standards of scientific rigor, empirically driven theory, and logical argument. Because the papers assembled here, together with the introduction, speak for themselves, I will focus in this “extro-duction” on some of the terminological and conceptual difficulties which threaten to block this exciting wave of scientific progress in understanding language evolution, in both senses of that term. In particular I will first argue against the regrettably widespread practice of opposing cultural and genetic explanations of human cognition as if they were dichotomous. Second, I will unpack the debate concerning “general-purpose” and “domain-specific” mechanisms, which masquerades as a debate about nativism but is nothing of the sort. I believe that framing discussions of language in these terms has generated more heat than light, and that a modern molecular understanding of genes, development, behavior, and evolution renders many of the assumptions underlying this debate invalid.     

The evolution of costly displays,cooperation and religion: credibility enhancing displays and their implications for cultural evolution

This paper lays out an evolutionary theory for the cognitive foundations and cultural emergence of the extravagant displays (e.g., ritual mutilation, animal sacrifice and martyrdom) that have so tantalized social scientists, as well as more mundane actions that influence cultural learning and historical processes. In Part I, I use the logic of natural selection to build a theory for how and why seemingly costly displays influence the cognitive processes associated with cultural learning — why do “actions speak louder than words?” The core idea is that cultural learners can both avoid being manipulated by their models (those they are inclined to learn from) and more accurately assess their belief commitment by attending to displays or actions by the model that would seem costly to the model if he held beliefs different from those he expresses verbally. Part II examines the implications for cultural evolution of this learning bias in a simple evolutionary model. The model reveals the conditions under which this evolved bias can create stable sets of interlocking beliefs and practices, including quite costly practices. Part III explores how cultural evolution, driven by competition among groups or institutions stabilized at alternative sets of these interlocking belief-practice combinations, has led to the association of costly acts, often in the form of rituals, with deeper commitments to group beneficial ideologies, higher levels of cooperation within groups, and greater success in competition with other groups or institutions. I close by discussing the broader implications of these ideas for understanding various aspects of religious phenomena.     

Evolutionary models and the normative significance of stability

Many have expected that understanding the evolution of norms should, in some way, bear on our first-order normative outlook: How norms evolve should shape which norms we accept. But recent philosophy has not done much to shore up this expectation. Most existing discussions of evolution and norms either jump headlong into the is/ought gap or else target meta-ethical issues, such as the objectivity of norms. My aim in this paper is to sketch a different way in which evolutionary considerations can feed into normative thinking—focusing on stability. I will discuss two (related) forms of argument that utilize information about social stability drawn from evolutionary models, and employs it to assess claims in political philosophy. One such argument treats stability as feature of social states that may be taken into account alongside other features. The other uses stability as a constraint on the realization of social ideals, via a version of the ought-implies-can maxim. These forms of argument are not new; indeed they have a history going back at least to early modern philosophy. But their marriage with evolutionary information is relatively recent, has a significantly novel character, and has received little attention in recent moral and political philosophy.     

Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms

This paper provides strong evidence challenging the self-interest assumption that dominates the behavioral sciences and much evolutionary thinking. The evidence indicates that many people have a tendency to voluntarily cooperate, if treated fairly, and to punish noncooperators. We call this behavioral propensity “strong reciprocity” and show empirically that it can lead to almost universal cooperation in circumstances in which purely self-interested behavior would cause a complete breakdown of cooperation. In addition, we show that people are willing to punish those who behaved unfairly towards a third person or who defected in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a third person. This suggests that strong reciprocity is a powerful device for the enforcement of social norms involving, for example, food sharing or collective action. Strong reciprocity cannot be rationalized as an adaptive trait by the leading evolutionary theories of human cooperation (in other words, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, and costly signaling theory). However, multilevel selection theories of cultural evolution are consistent with strong reciprocity.