A survey of state insurance commissioners concerning genetic testing and life insurance.

Rapid advances in genetic testing have stimulated growing concern about the potential for misuse of genetic data by insurance companies, employers, and other third parties. Thus far, reports of genetically based discrimination in life insurance have been anecdotal. Reasoning that state insurance commissioners were likely to be aware of (1) the extent of current use of and interest in genetic tests by life insurers and (2) consumer complaints about insurance being denied because of genetic condition or because of genetic test results, we conducted a survey of that group. We received responses from 42 of the 51 jurisdictions. Our results suggest (1) that those who regulate the life insurance industry do not yet perceive genetic testing to pose a significant problem in how insurers rate applicants, (2) that life insurers have much legal latitude to require genetic tests, and (3) that so far few consumers have formally complained to commissioners about the use of genetic data by life insurers.     

Insurance and genetic testing: where are we now?

Basic research will spur development of genetic tests that are capable of presymptomatic prediction of disease, disability, and premature death in presently asymptomatic individuals. Concerns have been expressed about potential harms related to the use of genetic test results, especially loss of confidentiality, eugenics, and discrimination. Existing laws and administrative policies may not be sufficient to assure that genetic information is used fairly. To provide factual information and conceptual principles upon which sound social policy can be based, the Human Genome Initiative established an Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues Program. Among the first areas to be identified as a priority for study was insurance. This paper provides a review of life, health, and disability insurance systems, including basic principles, risk classification, and market and regulatory issues, and examines the potential impact of genetic information on the insurance industry.     

Reassessing insurers' access to genetic information: genetic privacy, ignorance, and injustice

Many countries have imposed strict regulations on the genetic information to which insurers have access. Commentators have warned against the emerging body of legislation for different reasons. This paper demonstrates that, when confronted with the argument that genetic information should be available to insurers for health insurance underwriting purposes, one should avoid appeals to rights of genetic privacy and genetic ignorance. The principle of equality of opportunity may nevertheless warrant restrictions. A choice-based account of this principle implies that it is unfair to hold people responsible for the consequences of the genetic lottery, since we have no choice in selecting our genotype or the expression of it. However appealing, this view does not take us all the way to an adequate justification of inaccessibility of genetic information. A contractarian account, suggesting that health is a condition of opportunity and that healthcare is an essential good, seems more promising. I conclude that if or when predictive medical tests (such as genetic tests) are developed with significant actuarial value, individuals have less reason to accept as fair institutions that limit access to healthcare on the grounds of risk status. Given the assumption that a division of risk pools in accordance with a rough estimate of people's level of (genetic) risk will occur, fairness and justice favour universal health insurance based on solidarity.     

A survey of medical directors of life insurance companies concerning use of genetic information.

Rapid advances in our ability to test persons presymptomatically for genetic diseases have generated increasing concern that genetic information will be abused by insurance companies. Reasoning that the insurance companies may have the strongest interest in using genetic data and that the medical directors of those companies with responsibility for rating applicants would be a good source of information on the use of such data, we conducted a large survey of medical directors of North American life insurance companies. We received responses from 27 medical directors. Our results suggest that (1) few insurers perform genetic tests on applicants, but most are interested in accessing genetic test information about applicants that already exists; (2) the degree of insurers' interest in using genetic test results may depend on the face amount of the policy applied for and on the specificity and sensitivity of the test; (3) many companies employ underwriting guidelines with respect to certain genetic conditions but may not always have specific actuarial data in house to support their rating decisions; (4) a considerable degree of subjectivity is involved in most insurers' rating decisions; and (5) some of the medical directors who responded to our survey are not fully informed about certain basic principles of medical genetics.     

Genetic testing and insurance. The Ad Hoc Committee on Genetic Testing/Insurance Issues.

The rapid expansion of opportunities for genetic testing has been accompanied by complex questions about the appropriate relationships between providers, patients, and insurers. Some of these questions involve large public-policy decisions, such as whether the government should guarantee access to health care for all citizens. Universal access to health care, without regard to past, present, or future risk of disease, could eliminate risk-oriented underwriting in health-care coverage. A positive response to that question will ameliorate other problems. Until universal access is reality, genetic testing and genetic diagnosis will raise important issues for the practicing geneticist. How much does a client need to know about insurance implications before consenting to a genetic test? Should patients be counseled to purchase insurance before being tested? Should genetic information be excluded from medical records before their release to insurance companies for routine reimbursements or underwriting? What are the ethical and legal responsibilities of the geneticist?     

The need for anonymous genetic counseling and testing.

Concerns are mounting about the risks of genetic discrimination resulting from the release of predictive and presymptomatic genetic test results to employers, insurers, and others. The ability to keep this information confidential is questionable, particularly in view of the expansion of electronic medical databases. One solution is to afford individuals access to anonymous genetic counseling and testing. Probands would be identified only by a code that would not reveal personal information, and test results would be stored, retrieved, and released solely on the basis of this code. The experience with anonymous HIV testing, while not completely analogous, suggests that such an approach would be both practical and effective.     

Genetic testing,life insurance,and adverse selection.

Life insurance is a key element of the UK social structure in terms of family protection and house purchase; it thus needs to be viewed in this broad context, rather than solely as a commercial activity. Insurers have not so far actively requested genetic tests for life insurance, but have insisted on knowing of and being able to act on existing genetic test information. The main reason given for this has been to avoid serious adverse selection; however, this has never been adequately estimated. Review of the different major categories of Mendelian genetic disorders suggests that the scope for adverse selection is extremely limited and that insurers would lose little, and possibly gain more, by foregoing the disclosure and use of this information in relation to life insurance policies of ''normal'' size and nature. The likely future use in service of genetic tests based on susceptibility or population screening makes it especially important that the issue is rapidly resolved for Mendelian disorders; so far there is no sign that insurers are willing to achieve this.     

Genetic discrimination and the law.

The use of genetic tests can lead to genetic discrimination, discrimination based solely on the nature of an individual's genotype. Instances of the discriminatory uses of genetic tests by employers and insurance companies have already been reported. The recently enacted Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), together with other federal and state laws, can be used to combat some forms of this discrimination. In this article we define and characterize genetic discrimination, discuss the applicability of the various relevant federal and state laws, including the ADA, in the areas of employment and insurance discrimination, explore the limitations of these laws, and, finally, suggest some means of overcoming these limitations.     

Actuarial considerations on genetic testing.

In the UK the majority of life insurers employ relatively liberal underwriting standards so that people can easily gain access to life assurance cover. Up to 95% of applicants are accepted at standard terms. If genetic testing becomes widespread then the buying habits of the public may change. Proportionately more people with a predisposition to major types of disease may take life assurance cover while people with no predisposition may take proportionately less. A model is used to show the possible effect. However, the time-scales are long and the mortality of assured people is steadily improving. The change in buying habits may result in the rate of improvement slowing down. In the whole population, the improvement in mortality is likely to continue and could improve faster if widespread genetic testing results in earlier diagnosis and treatment. Life insurers would not call for genetic tests and need not see the results of previous tests except for very large sums assured. In the UK, life insurers are unlikely to change their underwriting standards, and are extremely unlikely to bring in basic premium rating systems that give discounts on the premium or penalty points according to peoples genetic profile. The implications of widespread genetic testing on medical insurance and some health insurance covers may be more extreme.     

State legislative efforts to regulate use and potential misuse of genetic information.

The purpose of this study was to review existing and proposed legislation specifically intended to regulate the collection, use, and potential misuse of genetic data. The study encompasses laws relating to confidentiality, informed consent, discrimination, and related issues. It excludes from consideration legislation relating to medical records generally that may bear indirectly on genetic information. It also excludes both legislation relating to the regulation of DNA data collection for law enforcement purposes and state laws relating to the confidentiality of data collected by newborn-screening programs. While relatively few laws that explicitly regulate the treatment of genetic information have been enacted to date, a considerable amount of activity is currently underway in the nation's legislatures. Although most of the bills under consideration are not comprehensive in scope, they reflect a growing societal awareness that the uncontrolled dissemination and use of genetic data entails significant risks.     

Civilian and military genetics: nondiscrimination policy in a post-GINA world

Evidence is emerging of a growing societal consensus about appropriate and inappropriate uses of genetic information. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 provides new legal protections to Americans by prohibiting the discriminatory use of genetic information by health insurers and employers. Additionally, the United States military recently created new policies for fair use of genetic information in the determination of benefits for servicemen and servicewomen leaving military service. Although critical issues remain, such as the potential for genetic information to be used to deny people other forms of insurance, and how the military will use genetic medicine overall, significant progress has been made.     

Use of genetic data, employment and insurance: an international perspective

In this paper, I will say first of all a few words on what is novel in the potential exclusionary use of genetic information in the domains of work or insurance and to what extent legal protection specifically relating to genetic discrimination may be justified. Subsequently, I will briefly examine some of the proposed restrictions on the collection of genetic information for purposes of selection and the scope for international consensus on the issue; in doing so, I will deal separately with employment and private insurance. Finally, I will raise the question whether these issues require international handling and which international steps could be envisaged.     

Underlying ambiguities in genetic privacy legislation

Advances in genetic testing and research are creating increasing concern regarding genetic privacy. Current and proposed federal and state legislation has failed to provide adequate protection due to confusion over the meaning of privacy, inconsistency in the definition of genetic information, and lack of clarity with regard to the role of insurers in a market driven healthcare environment. Drawing on examples of current and proposed legislation, this paper explores these ambiguities with a view toward future health policy alternatives.     

Voluntary disclosure of BRCA1 mutation test results

This study assessed the probability that individuals tested for a BRCA1 gene mutation share their test results with family members, co-workers, and insurers. Members of a large kindred known to be at-risk for carrying a BRCA1 gene mutation were tested and they learned their results from a genetic counselor. During a follow-up interview, 4 months later, subjects were asked with whom they had shared their results. Respondents were most likely to have communicated results to family members, followed by co-workers, and insurers. Carrier status affected their willingness to disclose results to insurers. High rates of disclosure to family members should promote awareness of hereditary cancer risk. Selective disclosure to co-workers and insurers may promote information asymmetries that could affect employment and insurance markets.     

The Australian joint inquiry into the Protection of Human Genetic Information

The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) and the Australian Health Ethics Committee are currently engaged in an inquiry into the Protection of Human Genetic Information. In particular, the Attorney-General and the Minister for Health and Ageing have asked us to focus, in relation to human genetic information and tissue samples, on how best to ensure world's best practice in relation to: privacy protection; protection against unlawful discrimination; and the maintenance of high ethical standards in medical research and clinical practice. While initial concerns and controversies have related mainly to aspects of medical research (e.g. consent; re-use of samples) and access to private insurance coverage, relevant issues arise in a wide variety of contexts, including: employment; medical practice; tissue banks and genetic databases; health administration; superannuation; access to government services (e.g. schools, nursing homes); law enforcement; and use by government authorities (e.g. for immigration purposes) or other bodies (e.g. by sports associations). Under the Australian federal system, it is also the case that laws and practices may vary across states and territories. For example, neonatal genetic testing is standard, but storage and retention policies for the resulting 'Guthrie cards' differ markedly. Similarly, some states have developed highly linked health information systems (e.g. incorporating hospitals, doctors' offices and public records), while others discourage such linkages owing to concerns about privacy. The challenge for Australia is to develop policies, standards and practices that promote the intelligent use of genetic information, while providing a level of security with which the community feels comfortable. The inquiry is presently reviewing the adequacy of existing laws and regulatory mechanisms, but recognizes that it will be even more important to develop a broad mix of strategies, such as community and professional education, and the development of official standards and industry codes that reflect emerging international best practice in the area.     

Genetic information and insurance: some ethical issues.

Life is risky, and insurance provides one of the best developed ways of controlling risks. By pooling, and so transferring risks, those who turn out to suffer antecedently uncertain harms can be assured in advance that they will be helped if those harms arise; they can then plan their lives and activities with confidence that they are less at the mercy of ill fortune. Both publicly organized and commercial insurance can organize the pooling of risk in ways that are beneficial for all concerned. They provide standard ways of securing fundamental ethical values such as solidarity and mutuality. Although policy holders do not know or contract with one another, each benefits from the contribution of others to a shared scheme for pooling and so controlling risk. Although there is a limit to the degree to which commercially-based insurance, where premiums depend on risk level, can go beyond mutuality towards solidarity, in practice it too often achieves a measure of solidarity by taking a broad brush approach to pooling risk. However, the ordinary practices of insurance, and in particular of commercial insurance, also raise ethical questions. These may be put in simple terms by contrasting the way in which an insurance market discriminates between different people, on the basis of characteristics that (supposedly) determine their risk level, and our frequent abhorrence of discrimination, in particular on the basis on religious, racial and gender characteristics. Are the discriminations on which insurance practice relies upon as standard acceptable or not? The increasing availability of genetic information, which testing (of individuals) and screening (of populations) may provide, could lend urgency to these questions. Genetic information may provide a way of obtaining more accurate assessment of individual risks to health and life. This information could be used to discriminate more finely between the risk levels of different individuals, and then to alter the availability and the costs of health, life and unemployment insurance to them. Since all of these forms of insurance bear very directly on the way most people live, it will matter to them how (if at all) insurers take account of genetic information. Will use of this information improve or damage the capacity of insurance to provide confidence in the face of uncertain harms, and help if they happen? Will it discriminate in acceptable or in unacceptable ways? Will it support or damage the sorts of mutuality and solidarity various sorts of insurance schemes have successfully institutionalized?     

Attitudes and knowledge about presymptomatic genetic testing among individuals at high risk for familial,early-onset Alzheimer's disease

The study was conducted in a large Cuban family with early-onset familial Alzheimer's disease (AD). Fifty-six first-degree relatives of familial cases with AD were interviewed concerning their clinical and genetic knowledge about AD and their attitudes toward the possible use of presymptomatic genetic testing of AD. The individuals had only limited knowledge about their personal risk of developing AD. All 56 family members would use presymptomatic testing to know their own risk of AD. Confronted with a hypothetical reproductive choice, 50% would choose not to have children if they themselves had the mutation. A positive prenatal test would lead 48.2% of the participants to have an abortion, and 19.7% would continue the pregnancy regardless of the positive test result.     

The diffusion of new genetic tests for predicting disease.

This paper examines the pathways by which new genetic tests will become available to the public. In view of the scarcity of genetic specialists, the pathway is likely to involve primary care physicians. Other pathways entail state-mandated testing, community-based programs, or testing by laboratories without much involvement of primary care physicians. When testing does become available the "destination" will be either family-centered testing or population-oriented screening. The deterrent to screening will not be the inability to detect disease-causing mutations but the costs and attitudes of providers and the public. When tests are provided primarily to provide information about risks to future children, some people will oppose screening on religious or moral grounds. When there are no inexpensive treatments, some will fear that insurance companies and employers will use tests to deny them health care coverage. Some may not want to know their risks for disorders about which little can be done. For common, multifactorial disorders, genetic tests will have low predictive value. Because of these problems, the decision to be tested, regardless of the destination, requires that "testees" be fully informed and consent to testing. When acceptance rates are low, screening is less likely to be cost-effective; family-centered testing becomes the default destination.     

Attitudes of young patients with Parkinson's disease towards possible presymptomatic and prenatal genetic testing

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the opinions and attitudes of young patients with Parkinson's disease (PD) towards possible presymptomatic and prenatal genetic testing for their illness. Background: With progress in understanding of the genetic component in the etiology of PD, presymptomatic genetic testing may become available in subgroups of patients. METHODS: During a survey on sociodemographic and risk factors 111 PD patients (mean age 45 years: mean age at PD onset 36 years) were given a questionnaire with six items about possible presymptomatic and prenatal genetic testing. RESULTS: Fifty-seven patients (5196) had knowledge about presymptomatic and prenatal testing. Eighty patients (72%) would take a presymptomatic test, if they had an autosomal dominant form of PD and if the test were available. The most Important reasons given for taking the test were planning of partnership (40%) and family (48%). When being identified as a carrier of a presumed "Parkinson gene", 78 patients (70%) would decide not to have children. Sixty-three patients (57%) would choose to have prenatal testing. Attitudes were largely independent of sociodemographic and disease variables. CONCLUSIONS: When addressed as hypothetical persons at genetic risk, young patients with PD support possible presymptomatic genetic testing and, to a lesser extent, prenatal testing. Attitudes and reasons to participate in such hypothetical testing do not grossly differ from those of at-risk persons in established single-gene autosomal dominant disorders of late onset.     

Coverage of genetic technologies under national health reform.

This article examines the extent to which the technologies expected to emerge from genetic research are likely to be covered under Government-mandated health insurance programs such as those being proposed by advocates of national health reform. Genetic technologies are divided into three broad categories; genetic information services, including screening, testing, and counseling; experimental technologies; and gene therapy. This article concludes that coverage of these technologies under national health reform is uncertain. The basic benefits packages provided for in the major health reform plans are likely to provide partial coverage of experimental technologies; relatively broad coverage of information services; and varying coverage of gene therapies, on the basis of an evaluation of their costs, benefits, and the degree to which they raise objections on political and religious grounds. Genetic services that are not included in the basic benefits package will be available only to those who can purchase supplemental insurance or to those who can purchase the services with personal funds. The resulting multitiered system of access to genetic services raises serious questions of fairness.