Memory for spatial and object-specific cues in food-storing and non-storing birds

Two storer/non-storer pairs of species, marsh tit (Parus palustris)/blue tit (P. caeruleus) and jay (Garrulus glandarius)/jackdaw (Corvus monedula) were compared on a one-trial associative memory task. In phase I of a trial birds searched for a reward in one of four feeders which differed in their trial-unique spatial location and object-specific cues. Following a retention interval, the birds had to return to the same feeder to obtain a further reward. In control trials the array of feeders was unaltered, whilst in dissociation tests it was transformed to separate spatial location and object-specific cues.In control trials there was no difference in performance between species. In dissociation tests, the two storing species went first to the correct spatial location and second to the correct object-specific cues, whereas the two non-storing species went first with equal probability to the correct spatial and local object cues.Monocular occlusion was used to investigate differences between the two eye-systems. In control trials there was no effect of occlusion. In dissociation trials, all 4 species preferentially returned to the feeder with the correct object-specific cue when the left eye had been covered in phase I and to the feeder in the correct spatial position when the right eye had been covered in phase I.These results suggest that (a) food-storing birds differ from non-storers in responding preferentially to spatial information and (b) in storers and non-storers the right eye system shows a preference for object-specific cues and the left eye system for spatial cues.     

Random mobility and spatial structure often enhance cooperation

The effects of an unconditional move rule in the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma, Snowdrift and Stag Hunt games are studied. Spatial structure by itself is known to modify the outcome of many games when compared with a randomly mixed population, sometimes promoting, sometimes inhibiting cooperation. Here we show that random dilution and mobility may suppress the inhibiting factors of the spatial structure in the Snowdrift game, while enhancing the already larger cooperation found in the Prisoner's dilemma and Stag Hunt games.     

Spatial invasion of cooperation

The evolutionary puzzle of cooperation describes situations where cooperators provide a fitness benefit to other individuals at some cost to themselves. Under Darwinian selection, the evolution of cooperation is a conundrum, whereas non-cooperation (or defection) is not. In the absence of supporting mechanisms, cooperators perform poorly and decrease in abundance. Evolutionary game theory provides a powerful mathematical framework to address the problem of cooperation using the prisoner's dilemma. One well-studied possibility to maintain cooperation is to consider structured populations, where each individual interacts only with a limited subset of the population. This enables cooperators to form clusters such that they are more likely to interact with other cooperators instead of being exploited by defectors. Here we present a detailed analysis of how a few cooperators invade and expand in a world of defectors. If the invasion succeeds, the expansion process takes place in two stages: first, cooperators and defectors quickly establish a local equilibrium and then they uniformly expand in space. The second stage provides good estimates for the global equilibrium frequencies of cooperators and defectors. Under hospitable conditions, cooperators typically form a single, ever growing cluster interspersed with specks of defectors, whereas under more hostile conditions, cooperators form isolated, compact clusters that minimize exploitation by defectors. We provide the first quantitative assessment of the way cooperators arrange in space during invasion and find that the macroscopic properties and the emerging spatial patterns reveal information about the characteristics of the underlying microscopic interactions.     

The effect of dispersal and neighbourhood in games of cooperation

The prisoner's dilemma (PD) and the snowdrift (SD) games are paradigmatic tools to investigate the origin of cooperation. Whereas spatial structure (e.g. nonrandom spatial distribution of strategies) present in the spatially explicit models facilitates the emergence of cooperation in the PD game, recent investigations have suggested that spatial structure can be unfavourable for cooperation in the SD game. The frequency of cooperators in a spatially explicit SD game can be lower than it would be in an infinitely large well-mixed population. However, the source of this effect cannot be identified with certainty as spatially explicit games differ from well-mixed games in two aspects: (i) they introduce spatial correlations, (ii) and limited neighbourhood. Here we extend earlier investigations to identify the source of this effect, and thus accordingly we study a spatially explicit version of the PD and SD games with varying degrees of dispersal and neighbourhood size. It was found that dispersal favours selfish individuals in both games. We calculated the frequency of cooperators at strong dispersal limit, which in concordance with the numerical results shows that it is the short range of interactions (i.e. limited neighbourhood) and not spatial correlations that decreases the frequency of cooperators in spatially explicit models of populations. Our results demonstrate that spatial correlations are always beneficial to cooperators in both the PD and SD games. We explain the opposite effect of dispersal and neighbourhood structure, and discuss the relevance of distinguishing the two effects in general.     

Pattern formation and chaos in spatial ecological public goodsgames

Cooperators and defectors can coexist in ecological public goods games. When the game is played in two-dimensional continuous space, a reaction diffusion model produces highly irregular dynamics, in which cooperators and defectors survive in ever-changing configurations (Wakano et al., 2009. Spatial dynamics of ecological public goods. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 106, 7910-7914). The dynamics is related to the formation of Turing patterns, but the origin of the irregular dynamics is not well understood. In this paper, we present a classification of the spatio-temporal dynamics based on the dispersion relation, which reveals that the spontaneous pattern formation can be attributed to the dynamical interplay between two linearly unstable modes: temporal instability arising from a Hopf-bifurcation and spatial instability arising from a Turing-bifurcation. Moreover, we provide a detailed analysis of the highly irregular dynamics through Fourier analysis, the break-down of symmetry, the maximum Lyapunov exponent, and the excitability of the reaction-term dynamics. All results clearly support that the observed irregular dynamics qualifies as spatio-temporal chaos. A particularly interesting type of chaotic dynamics, which we call intermittent bursts, clearly demonstrates the effects of the two unstable modes where (local) periods of stasis alternate with rapid changes that may induce local extinction.     

Structuring process and closure principle in spatial and temporal reproduction tasks

The goal of the experiment reported was to replicate the previous Sarrazin’s (2000) study in order to verify, with an adequate methodological procedure, whether or not the closure principle applied in spatial and temporal reproduction tasks. The hypothesis defended was that the closure of the pattern is an intrinsic property of the structuring process in spatial memory. The stimuli consisted of eight visually presented dots that appeared sequentially with inter-dot distances corresponding to inter-dot durations. After a learning phase, participants reproduced the spatial (space condition) or temporal (time condition) characteristics of the target 60 times in succession. We analyzed the variance level for both element location and Inter-Element-Interval (IEI) on spatial and temporal responses. Two main results emerge from this experiment: (1) the critical dependency of the closure principle to the nature (spatial or temporal) of the response, (2) the importance to consider both locations and intervals as complementary information. These results are discussed in the light of physical system, in particular in term of compensation phenomenon and we proposed a mathematical model that replicates the qualitative feature of variance for both space and time conditions.     

The impact of flavonoids on spatial memory in rodents: from behaviour to underlying hippocampal mechanisms

Emerging evidence suggests that a group of dietary-derived phytochemicals known as flavonoids are able to induce improvements in memory, learning and cognition. Flavonoids have been shown to modulate critical neuronal signalling pathways involved in processes of memory, and therefore are likely to affect synaptic plasticity and long-term potentiation mechanisms, widely considered to provide a basis for memory. Animal dietary supplementation studies have further shown that flavonoid-rich foods are able to reverse age-related spatial memory and spatial learning impairments. A more accurate understanding of how a particular spatial memory task works and of which aspects of memory and learning can be assessed in each case, are necessary for a correct interpretation of data relating to diet-cognition experiments. Further understanding of how specific behavioural tasks relate to the functioning of hippocampal circuitry during learning processes might be also elucidative of the specific observed memory improvements. The overall goal of this review is to give an overview of how the hippocampal circuitry operates as a memory system during behavioural tasks, which we believe will provide a new insight into the underlying mechanisms of the action of flavonoids on cognition.     

Behavioral state-dependent episodic representations in rat CA1 neuronal activity during spatial alternation

Hippocampus is considered crucial for episodic memory, as confirmed by recent findings of “episode-dependent place cells” in rodent studies, and is known to show differential activity between active exploration and quiet immobility. Most place-cell studies have focused on active periods, so the hippocampal involvement in episodic representations is less well understood. Here, we draw a typology of episode-dependent hippocampal activity among three behavioral periods, presumably governed by different molecular mechanisms: Active exploration with type 1 theta, quiet alertness with type 2 theta, and consummation with large amplitude irregular activity. Five rats were trained to perform a delayed spatial alternation task with a nose-poke paradigm and 12 tetrodes were implanted for single-unit recordings. We obtained 135 CA1 pyramidal cells and found that 75 of these fired mainly during active exploration, whereas 42 fired mainly during quiet alertness and 18 during consummation. In each type of neuron, we found episode-dependent activity: 51/75, 22/42, and 15/18, respectively. These findings extend our knowledge on the hippocampal involvement in episodic memory: Episode dependency also exists during immobile periods, and functionally dissociated cell assemblies are engaged in the maintenance of episodic information throughout different events in a task sequence.     

Language and cooperation in hominin scavenging

Bickerton (2009, 2014) hypothesizes that language emerged as the solution to a scavenging problem faced by proto-humans. We design a virtual world to explore how people use words to persuade others to work together for a common end. By gradually reducing the vocabularies that the participants can use, we trace the process of solving the hominin scavenging problem. Our experiment changes the way we think about social dilemmas. Instead of asking how does a group overcome the self-interest of its constituents, the question becomes, how do constituents persuade one another to work together for a common end that yields a common benefit?     

Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas

The emergence and maintenance of cooperation by natural selection is an enduring conundrum in evolutionary biology, which has been studied using a variety of game theoretical models inspired by different biological situations. The most widely studied games are the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Snowdrift game and by-product mutualism for pairwise interactions, as well as Public Goods games in larger groups of interacting individuals. Here, we present a general framework for cooperation in social dilemmas in which all the traditional scenarios can be recovered as special cases. In social dilemmas, cooperators provide a benefit to the group at some cost, while defectors exploit the group by reaping the benefits without bearing the costs of cooperation. Using the concepts of discounting and synergy for describing how benefits accumulate when more than one cooperator is present in a group of interacting individuals, we recover the four basic scenarios of evolutionary dynamics given by (i) dominating defection, (ii) coexistence of defectors and cooperators, (iii) dominating cooperation and (iv) bi-stability, in which cooperators and defectors cannot invade each other. Generically, for groups of three or more interacting individuals further, more complex, dynamics can occur. Our framework provides the first unifying approach to model cooperation in different kinds of social dilemmas.     

神经节苷脂钠对缺血性脑卒中小鼠空间学习记忆能力的影响

摘要 目的：探讨神经节苷脂钠对缺血性脑卒中小鼠空间学习记忆能力的影响。方法：缺血性脑卒中小鼠模型(n=42)随机分为三组-模型组、氟西汀组与神经节苷脂钠组,每组14只小鼠。氟西汀组、神经节苷脂钠组、对照组分别给予10 mg/kg氟西汀与10 mg/kg神经节苷脂钠、等剂量生理盐水腹腔注射,1次/d,持续28 d。结果：氟西汀组、神经节苷脂钠组给药第7 d、14 d、28 d的逃避潜伏期、改良神经损伤严重程度评分(Modified neurological severity score,mNSS)低于模型组(P<0.05),穿越平台次数高于模型组(P<0.05),神经节苷脂钠组与氟西汀组对比差异有统计学意义(P<0.05)。氟西汀组、神经节苷脂钠组给药第28 d的海马组织B淋巴细胞瘤-2基因(B-cell lymphoma-2,Bcl-2)蛋白相对表达水平高于模型组(P<0.05),BCL2-Associated X(Bax)蛋白相对表达水平、脑卒中相对面积低于模型组(P<0.05),神经节苷脂钠组与氟西汀组对比差异有统计学意义(P<0.05)。结论：神经节苷脂钠在缺血性脑卒中小鼠的应用能促进恢复空间学习记忆能力,缓解神经损伤,抑制海马组织神经元细胞的凋亡,降低脑卒中面积。     

Memory dynamics in the honeybee

Reward learning in honeybees initiates a sequence of events which leads to long-lasting memory passing through multiple phases of transient memories. The study of memory dynamics is performed at the behavioral (both natural foraging behavior and appetitive conditioning), neural circuit and molecular levels. The results of these combined efforts lead to a model which assumes five kinds of sequential memories, each characterized by a set of behavioral and mechanistic properties. It is argued that these properties, although reflecting general characteristics of step-wise memory formation, are adapted to the species-specific adaptations in natural behavior, here to foraging at scattered and unreliable food sources. Accepted: 12 May 1999     

Evolution of cooperation: cooperation defeats defection in the cornfield model

"Cooperation" defines any behavior that enhances the fitness of a group (e.g. a community or species), but which, by its nature, can be exploited by selfish individuals, meaning, firstly, that selfish individuals derive an advantage from exploitation which is greater than the average advantage that accrues to unselfish individuals. Secondly, exploitation has no intrinsic fitness value except in the presence of the "cooperative behavior". The mathematics is described by the simple Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). It has previously been shown that koinophilia (the avoidance of sexual mates displaying unusual or atypical phenotypic features, such as mutations) stabilizes any inherited strategy in the simple or iterated PDG, meaning that it cannot be displaced by rare forms of alternative behavior which arise through mutation or occasional migration. In the present model equal numbers of cooperators and defectors (in the simple PDG) were randomly spread in a two-dimensional "cornfield" with uniformly distributed resources. Every individual was koinophilic, and interacted (sexually and in the PDG tournaments) only with individuals from within its immediate neighborhood. This model therefore tested whether cooperation can outcompete defection or selfishness in a straight, initially equally matched, evolutionary battle. The results show that in the absence of koinophilia cooperation was rapidly driven to extinction. With koinophilia there was a very rapid loss of cooperators in the first few generations, but thereafter cooperation slowly spread, ultimately eliminating defection completely. This result was critically dependent on sampling effects of neighborhoods. Small samples (resulting from low population densities or small neighborhood sizes) increase the probability that a chance neighborhood comes to consist predominantly of cooperators. A sexual preference for the most common phenotype in the neighborhood then makes that phenotype more common still. Once this occurs cooperation's spread becomes almost inevitable.     

Co-evolution of pre-play signaling and cooperation

A finite-population dynamic evolutionary model is presented, which shows that increasing the individual capacity of sending pre-play signals (without any pre-defined meaning), opens a route for cooperation. The population dynamics leads individuals to discriminate between different signals and react accordingly to the signals received. The proportion of time that the population spends in different states can be calculated analytically. We show that increasing the number of different signals benefits cooperative strategies, illustrating how cooperators may take profit from a diverse signaling portfolio to forecast future behaviors and avoid being cheated by defectors.     

GLM versus CCA spatial modeling of plant species distribution

Despite the variety of statistical methods available for static modeling of plant distribution, few studies directly compare methods on a common data set. In this paper, the predictive power of Generalized Linear Models (GLM) versus Canonical Correspondence Analysis (CCA) models of plant distribution in the Spring Mountains of Nevada, USA, are compared. Results show that GLM models give better predictions than CCA models because a species-specific subset of explanatory variables can be selected in GLM, while in CCA, all species are modeled using the same set of composite environmental variables (axes). Although both techniques can be readily ported to a Geographical Information System (GIS), CCA models are more readily implemented for many species at once. Predictions from both techniques rank the species models in the same order of quality; i.e. a species whose distribution is well modeled by GLM is also well modeled by CCA and vice-versa. In both cases, species for which model predictions have the poorest accuracy are either disturbance or fire related, or species for which too few observations were available to calibrate and evaluate the model. Each technique has its advantages and drawbacks. In general GLM will provide better species specific-models, but CCA will provide a broader overview of multiple species, diversity, and plant communities.     

When cooperation begets cooperation: the role of key individuals in galvanizing support

Life abounds with examples of conspecifics actively cooperating to a common end, despite conflicts of interest being expected concerning how much each individual should contribute. Mathematical models typically find that such conflict can be resolved by partial-response strategies, leading investors to contribute relatively equitably. Using a case study approach, we show that such model expectations can be contradicted in at least four disparate contexts: (i) bi-parental care; (ii) cooperative breeding; (iii) cooperative hunting; and (iv) human cooperation. We highlight that: (a) marked variation in contributions is commonplace; and (b) individuals can often respond positively rather than negatively to the contributions of others. Existing models have surprisingly limited power in explaining these phenomena. Here, we propose that, although among-individual variation in cooperative contributions will be influenced by differential costs and benefits, there is likely to be a strong genetic or epigenetic component. We then suggest that selection can maintain high investors (key individuals) when their contributions promote support by increasing the benefits and/or reducing the costs for others. Our intentions are to raise awareness in—and provide testable hypotheses of—two of the most poorly understood, yet integral, questions regarding cooperative ventures: why do individuals vary in their contributions and when does cooperation beget cooperation?     

Friendship, cliquishness, and the emergence of cooperation

The evolution of cooperation is a central problem in biology and the social sciences. While theoretical work using the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) has shown that cooperation among non-kin can be sustained among reciprocal strategies (i.e. tit-for-tat), these results are sensitive to errors in strategy execution, cyclical invasions by free riders, and the specific ecology of strategies. Moreover, the IPD assumes that a strategy's probability of playing the PD game with other individuals is independent of the decisions made by others. Here, we remove the assumption of independent pairing by studying a more plausible cooperative dilemma in which players can preferentially interact with a limited set of known partners and also deploy longer-term accounting strategies that can counteract the effects of random errors. We show that cooperative strategies readily emerge and persist in a range of noisy environments, with successful cooperative strategies (henceforth, cliquers) maintaining medium-term memories for partners and low thresholds for acceptable cooperation (i.e. forgiveness). The success of these strategies relies on their cliquishness-a propensity to defect with strangers if they already have an adequate number of partners. Notably, this combination of medium-term accounting, forgiveness, and cliquishness fits with empirical studies of friendship and other long-term relationships among humans.     

Simple scaling of cooperation in donor-recipient games

We present a simple argument which proves a general version of the scaling phenomenon recently observed in donor-recipient games by Tanimoto [Tanimoto, J., 2009. A simple scaling of the effectiveness of supporting mutual cooperation in donor-recipient games by various reciprocity mechanisms. BioSystems 96, 29–34].     

Self-deception as a mediator of cooperation and defection in varying social contexts described in the iterated prisoner''s dilemma

Deception and self-deception may be two related psychological capacities serving to enhance an individual's inclusive fitness. Self-deception has been defined as any psychological act in which one thought or belief is held at the expense of another. This study was designed to test the notion that we may deceive ourselves about our own intentions or the intentions of others in order to facilitate cooperation, if the cooperative behavior has the potential to improve fitness. We may also deceive ourselves in situations where we may need to compete with others, if not competing might represent a loss of fitness. The Self-Deceptio Questionnaire was administered to 80 women and 70 men to determine their levels of self-deception. A series of vignettes, conforming to the Prisoner's Dilemma game format, were administered in questionnaire material to measure participant's predispositions to cooperate or defect in three different contexts (family, mating, and neutral). Men predicted they would be less cooperative than women over all conditions, and participants anticipated cooperating more with kin than with non-kin. Moreover, participants who were high self-deceivers chose more cooperative responses in both family and mating contexts than those with low self-deception scores. Finally, the three-way interaction among sex, context, and level of self-deception suggested that the role of selfdeception in cooperation may vary according to the sex of the individual and the context.     

The evolution of function-valued traits for conditional cooperation

In this paper we study the evolution of function-valued traits for cooperation in environments that display varying degrees of population viscosity. Traits measure an individual's intrinsic propensity to cooperate in a standard bilateral Prisoner's dilemma and can be increasing, decreasing or constant functions of the probability to interact with individuals of ones own genotype. We first analyse adaptation to homogenous environments (with constant degree of viscosity). Comparing environments characterized by different degrees of viscosity, we find that the relation between viscosity and the equilibrium type distribution is not monotone. In fact, it is possible that in fluid populations (no viscosity) there is more cooperation in equilibrium than in populations with intermediate degrees of viscosity. In a second step we analyse heterogenous environments (with varying degrees of viscosity). We find that under very weak assumptions on the distribution of the viscosity parameter strictly increasing functions are always selected and under some parameter constellations they are uniquely so.