Using social parasitism to test reproductive skew models in a primitively eusocial wasp

Remarkable variation exists in the distribution of reproduction (skew) among members of cooperatively breeding groups, both within and between species. Reproductive skew theory has provided an important framework for understanding this variation. In the primitively eusocial Hymenoptera, two models have been routinely tested: concessions models, which assume complete control of reproduction by a dominant individual, and tug-of-war models, which assume on-going competition among group members over reproduction. Current data provide little support for either model, but uncertainty about the ability of individuals to detect genetic relatedness and difficulties in identifying traits conferring competitive ability mean that the relative importance of concessions versus tug-of-war remains unresolved. Here, we suggest that the use of social parasitism to generate meaningful variation in key social variables represents a valuable opportunity to explore the mechanisms underpinning reproductive skew within the social Hymenoptera. We present a direct test of concessions and tug-of-war models in the paper wasp Polistes dominulus by exploiting pronounced changes in relatedness and power structures that occur following replacement of the dominant by a congeneric social parasite. Comparisons of skew in parasitized and unparasitized colonies are consistent with a tug-of-war over reproduction within P. dominulus groups, but provide no evidence for reproductive concessions.     

Genetic support for the evolutionary theory of reproductive transactions in social wasps

Recent evolutionary models of reproductive partitioning within animal societies (known as 'optimal skew', 'concessions' or 'transactional' models) predict that a dominant individual will often yield some fraction of the group's reproduction to a subordinate as an incentive to stay in the group and help rear the dominant's offspring. These models quantitatively predict how the magnitude of the subordinate's 'staying incentive' will vary with the genetic relatedness between dominant and subordinate, the overall expected group output and the subordinate's expected output if it breeds solitarily. We report that these predictions accord remarkably well with the observed reproductive partitioning between conesting dominant and subordinate queens in the social paper wasp Polistes fuscatus. In particular, the theory correctly predicts that (i) the dominant's share of reproduction, i.e. the skew, increases as the colony cycle progresses and (ii) the skew is positively associated both with the colony's productivity and with the relatedness between dominant and subordinate. Moreover, aggression between foundresses positively correlated with the skew, as predicted by transactional but not alternative tug-of-war models of societal evolution. Thus, our results provide the strongest (quantitative support yet for a unifying model of social evolution.     

Are reproductive skew models evolutionarily stable?

Reproductive skew theory has become a popular way to phrase problems and test hypotheses of social evolution. The diversity of reproductive skew models probably stems from the ease of generating new variations. However, I show that the logical basis of skew models, that is, the way in which group formation is modelled, makes use of hidden assumptions that may be problematical as they are unlikely to be fulfilled in all social systems. I illustrate these problems by re-analysing the basic concessive skew model with staying incentives. First, the model assumes that dispersal is an all-or-nothing response: all subordinates disperse as soon as concessions drop below a certain value. This leads to a discontinuous 'cliff-edge' shape of dominant fitness, and it is not clear that selection will balance a population at such an edge. Second, it is assumed that subordinates have perfect knowledge of their benefits if they stay in the group. I examine the effects of relaxing these two assumptions. Relaxing the first one strengthens reproductive skew theory, but relaxing the latter makes evolutionary stability disappear. In cases where subordinates cannot accurately measure benefits provided by the individual dominant with which they live, so that their behaviour instead evolves as a response to population-wide average benefits, the logic of reproductive skew models does not apply. This warns against too indiscriminate an application of reproductive skew theory to problems in social evolution: for example, transactional models of extra-pair paternity assume perfect knowledge of paternity, which is unlikely to hold true in nature. It is recommended that models specify the mechanisms by which individuals can adjust their behaviour to that of others, and pay attention to changes that occur in evolutionary versus behavioural time.     

Reproductive skew and the threat of eviction: a new perspective

Most recent models of the partitioning of reproduction attempt to explain patterns of skew on the assumption that dominant individuals have complete control over breeding opportunities within the group, but may nevertheless concede a share of direct reproduction to subordinates as an incentive to remain peacefully in the association. Although these models may be applicable to some animal societies, we argue that they fail to provide a comprehensive theory of skew. Instead, we suggest that subordinates may often be able to claim unsanctioned reproduction for themselves, but will be forced to exercise a degree of reproductive restraint lest they incite ejection by the dominant. Reproductive skew, in other words, may reflect the threat of ejection (inducing subordinate restraint) rather than the threat of subordinate departure (inducing reproductive concessions by dominants). We present a simple ESS model of reproductive skew under these circumstances, which demonstrates that a shift in emphasis from reproductive concessions by dominants to reproductive restraint on the part of subordinates, radically alters the predictions of skew models. High group productivity, high relatedness and (when group members are related) strong ecological constraints are all expected to lead to reduced skew (the opposite conclusions to those of previous, concession-based analyses). The reason is that these factors reduce the benefits (or increase the costs) of ejection to the dominant, who therefore does best to tolerate more subordinate reproduction.     

A skew model for the evolution of sociality via manipulation: why it is better to be feared than loved

Concession-based reproductive skew models predict that social groups can form via persuasion, whereby dominant individuals forfeit some reproduction to subordinates as an incentive to stay and help. We have developed an alternative skew model based on manipulation, whereby dominant individuals coerce subordinates into staying and helping by imposing costs on their independent reproductive prospects. Stable groups can evolve under a much wider range of genetic and ecological conditions under this manipulation model than under concession models. We describe evidence that various forms of pre-emptive and ongoing manipulation occur in nature and we discuss the implications of the model for the development of a general theory of social evolution.     

Tug-of-war has no borders: it is the missing model in reproductive skew theory

Cooperative breeding often results in unequal reproduction between dominant and subordinate group members. Transactional skew models attempt to predict how unequal reproduction can be before the groups themselves become unstable. A number of variants of transactional models have been developed, with a key difference being whether reproduction is controlled by one party or contested by all. It is shown here that ESS solutions for all situations of contested control over reproduction are given by the original tug-of-war model (TOW). Several interesting results follow. First, TOW can escalate enough to destabilize some types of groups. Particularly vulnerable are those that have low relatedness and gain little from cooperative breeding relative to solitary reproduction. Second, TOW can drastically reduce group productivity and especially the inclusive fitness of dominant individuals. Third, these results contrast strongly with those from variants of TOW models that include concessions to maintain group stability. Such models are shown to be special cases of the general and simpler TOW framework, and to have assumptions that may be biologically suspect. Finally, the overall analysis suggests that there is no mechanism within existing TOW framework that will prevent a costly struggle for reproductive control. Because social species rarely exhibit the high levels of aggression predicted by TOW models, alternative evolutionary mechanisms are considered that can limit conflict and produce more mutually beneficial outcomes. The further development of alternative models to predict patterns of reproductive skew are highly recommended.     

Female control of the distribution of paternity in cooperative breeders

Models of reproductive skew have shed light on why animal societies vary in the partitioning of reproduction among group members. However, their application to cooperative vertebrate societies remains controversial. A particular problem is that previous models assume that skew in paternity is determined by interactions among males and males only. This conflicts with observations from many species that indicate that females exert control over the distribution of paternity. Here we address this shortfall in the current theory by developing two models to explore the expected patterns of skew in three member groups in which a female controls the allocation of paternity among two males. The first "staying incentive" model extends previous "transactional" (or "concession") models to examine the conditions where females will be willing to share reproduction among a dominant and a subordinate male to retain the subordinate in the group. The second "work incentive" model explores patterns of skew where females allocate paternity in order to maximize the amount of care their offspring receive. The models make contrasting predictions about the nature of male-female conflict over reproduction and also about the relationships between skew and relatedness, ecological constraints, the relative quality of the subordinate male, and the relative cost of care for the two males. These divergent predictions provide a schema by which the evolutionary causes of variation in skew among males can be evaluated.     

Transactional skew and assured fitness return models fail to predict patterns of cooperation in wasps

Cooperative breeders often exhibit reproductive skew, where dominant individuals reproduce more than subordinates. Two approaches derived from Hamilton's inclusive fitness model predict when subordinate behavior is favored over living solitarily. The assured fitness return (AFR) model predicts that subordinates help when they are highly likely to gain immediate indirect fitness. Transactional skew models predict dominants and subordinates "agree" on a level of reproductive skew that induces subordinates to join groups. We show the AFR model to be a special case of transactional skew models that assumes no direct reproduction by subordinates. We use data from 11 populations of four wasp species (Polistes, Liostenogaster) as a test of whether transactional frameworks suffice to predict when subordinate behavior should be observed in general and the specific level of skew observed in cooperative groups. The general prediction is supported; in 10 of 11 cases, transactional models correctly predict presence or absence of cooperation. In contrast, the specific prediction is not consistent with the data. Where cooperation occurs, the model accurately predicts highly biased reproductive skew between full sisters. However, the model also predicts that distantly related or unrelated females should cooperate with low skew. This prediction fails: cooperation with high skew is the observed norm. Neither the generalized transactional model nor the special-case AFR model can explain this significant feature of wasp sociobiology. Alternative, nontransactional hypotheses such as parental manipulation and kin recognition errors are discussed.     

Concessions of an alpha male? Cooperative defence and shared reproduction in multi-male primate groups

By living in social groups with potential competitors, animals forgo monopolizing access to resources. Consequently, debate continues over how selection might favour sociality among competitors. For example, several models exist to account for the evolution of shared reproduction in groups. The 'concession model' hypothesizes that dominant reproducers benefit from the presence of subordinates, and hence tolerate some reproduction by subordinates. This mutual benefit to both dominants and subordinates may provide a foundation for the formation of social groups in which multiple members reproduce-a necessary step in the evolution of cooperation. To date, however, the concession model has received virtually no support in vertebrates. Instead, the vast majority of vertebrate data support 'limited control models', which posit that dominant reproducers are simply unable to prevent subordinates from reproducing. Here we present the most comprehensive evidence to date in support of the concession model in a vertebrate. We examined natural variation in the number of adult males in gelada (Theropithecus gelada) reproductive units to assess the extent of reproductive skew in multi-male units. Dominant ('leader') males in units that also had subordinate ('follower') males had a 30 per cent longer tenure than leaders in units that did not have followers, mainly because followers actively defended the group against potential immigrants. Follower males also obtained a small amount of reproduction in the unit, which may have functioned as a concession in return for defending the unit. These results suggest that dominants and subordinates may engage in mutually beneficial reproductive transactions, thus favouring male-male tolerance and cooperation.     

Power Struggles, Dominance Testing, and Reproductive Skew

Models of reproductive skew are concerned with the partitioning of reproduction between dominant and subordinate members of a group. In an interesting extension of these models, Reeve and Ratnieks briefly considered whether it might benefit subordinates to engage in aggressive behavior to test the fighting ability of a dominant. Their analysis suggested that such testing should be more probable in groups that feature high skew and, hence, perhaps among closer relatives (because high relatedness favors high skew). Here we explore in more detail the possibility of dominance testing. Three models that differ in the outcome of fights over dominance are presented: in the first model, the loser of the challenge is killed; in the second model, the loser is evicted from the nest; and, in the third model, the loser becomes (or remains) subordinate. In each case we consider the independent effects of the parameters that determine skew (namely, relatedness, group productivity, and ecological constraints) on the predicted level of dominance testing. We then construct an amalgamated model to examine situations where fights may lead to any one of the three outcomes. Our analysis reveals that, in the majority of cases, higher relatedness will in fact lead to lower levels of aggression. Moreover, dominance testing need not be associated with high skew. Rather, the relationship between skew and dominance testing will depend on which factor (relatedness, group productivity, or level of ecological constraints) is principally responsible for variation in the distribution of reproduction.     

Reproductive control via eviction (but not the threat of eviction) in banded mongooses

Considerable research has focused on understanding variation in reproductive skew in cooperative animal societies, but the pace of theoretical development has far outstripped empirical testing of the models. One major class of model suggests that dominant individuals can use the threat of eviction to deter subordinate reproduction (the ‘restraint’ model), but this idea remains untested. Here, we use long-term behavioural and genetic data to test the assumptions of the restraint model in banded mongooses (Mungos mungo), a species in which subordinates breed regularly and evictions are common. We found that dominant females suffer reproductive costs when subordinates breed, and respond to these costs by evicting breeding subordinates from the group en masse, in agreement with the assumptions of the model. We found no evidence, however, that subordinate females exercise reproductive restraint to avoid being evicted in the first place. This means that the pattern of reproduction is not the result of a reproductive ‘transaction’ to avert the threat of eviction. We present a simple game theoretical analysis that suggests that eviction threats may often be ineffective to induce pre-emptive restraint among multiple subordinates and predicts that threats of eviction (or departure) will be much more effective in dyadic relationships and linear hierarchies. Transactional models may be more applicable to these systems. Greater focus on testing the assumptions rather than predictions of skew models can lead to a better understanding of how animals control each other''s reproduction, and the extent to which behaviour is shaped by overt acts versus hidden threats.     

Costly young and reproductive skew in animal societies

Many recent models of reproductive skew explain subordinatereproduction as a staying incentive offered by dominants, whocan produce more young with a helper present than without. Here,we present a new, alternative explanation for subordinate reproduction,which applies whenever the fitness cost to a parent of producingyoung is an accelerating function of the number produced (ascommonly assumed in optimal clutch size theory). Under these circumstances,a dominant individual may be selected to offer a share of reproductionto a related subordinate, not as an incentive to stay, but becauseadditional offspring that would be expensive for the dominantto produce are cheap for the subordinate. "Beneficial sharing"of this kind is more likely the more closely related the subordinateis to the dominant, so that the model predicts a negative relationshipbetween skew and relatedness. This result runs directly counterto the positive relationship predicted by previous incentive-basedmodels. We explore the interaction of these contrasting effectsby developing an integrated model that allows for both beneficialsharing and staying incentives. When offspring are cheap to produce,this integrated model predicts that the incentive effect will dominate,and skew will increase with relatedness. When young are costly,in contrast, beneficial sharing will be of greater importance,and skew will decrease with relatedness.     

Social queuing in animal societies: a dynamic model of reproductive skew

Previously developed models of reproductive skew have overlooked one of the main reasons why subordinates might remain in a group despite restricted opportunities to breed: the possibility of social queuing, i.e. acquiring dominant status in the future. Here, we present a dynamic ESS model of skew in animal societies that incorporates both immediate and future fitness consequences of the decisions taken by group members, based on their probability of surviving from one season to the next (when post-breeding survival probabilities drop to zero, our analysis reduces to the model produced by Reeve and Ratnieks in 1993, which considered only a single breeding season). This allows us to compare the delayed benefits of philopatry and the immediate opportunities for independent breeding. We show that delayed benefits greatly reduce the need for dominants to offer reproductive concessions to retain subordinates peacefully in the group. Moreover, this effect is strong enough that differences in survival have a much greater impact on the group structure than differences in other parameters, such as relatedness. When the possibility of acceding to dominant status is taken into account, groups where the dominant completely monopolizes reproduction can be stable, even if they consist of unrelated individuals, and even if subordinates have a reasonably high probability of winning a fight for dominance. Finally, we show that stable groups are possible even if association leads to a decrease in current productivity. Subordinates may still stand to gain from group membership under these circumstances, as acquiring breeding positions by queuing may be more efficient than the attempt to establish a new territory. At the same time, the dominant may be unable to exclude unwelcome subordinates, may enjoy increased survival when they are present, or may gain indirect benefits from allowing relatives to stay and queue for dominance. We conclude that reproductive skew in animal groups, ranging from eusocial insect colonies to mating aggregations (leks), will be strongly influenced by the future prospects of group members.     

Patterns of reproductive skew in the polygynandrous acorn woodpecker

We compared observed levels of reproductive skew in the cooperatively breeding acorn woodpecker (Melanerpes formicivorus) with those predicted by two alternative transactional models. "Concession" models predict the degree to which parentage is shared assuming that a single dominant is in complete control of reproduction. Alternatively, "restraint" models predict reproductive sharing assuming that the dominant controls only whether subordinates remain in the group but does not control its share of reproduction. Reproductive skew is high among males: on average, the most successful male sires more than three times as many offspring as the next most successful male. Females share parentage equally and have lower constraints on dispersal and lower survival rates compared with males, which is consistent with predictions from the concessions model. Also as predicted by the concessions model, yearly variation in opportunities for dispersal before the breeding season correlates positively with skew. However, in contrast to concessions but consistent with the restraint model, skew decreases with relatedness. Thus, neither model consistently predicts patterns of reproductive skew in this species. We suggest that models of reproductive skew will need to include competitive interactions among potential breeders and mate choice before they will adequately predict patterns of reproductive partitioning in most vertebrate societies.     

Intracolonial conflict in the slave-making ant <Emphasis Type="Italic">Protomognathus americanus</Emphasis>: dominance hierarchies and individual reproductive success

Summary Social group viability results from a trade-off between cooperation and conflict, driven respectively by group and individual interests. Workers of the slave-making ants are known to have a high egg-laying potential, leading to a potential conflict over male production. Queenright and queenless nests of the slave-making ant Protomognathus americanus show a near-linear dominance hierarchy, and dominance rank is correlated with reproductive activity. Genetic and behavioural analysis revealed that the queen, when present in the nest, is behaviourally dominant and monopolises reproduction. In queenless nests, the haploid (male) brood is produced primarily by a single worker. We suggest the dominance hierarchy regulates male production, between the queen and her workers as well as among workers. Comparison of our results to another study allows us to place our data in an ecological context. This slave-making ant species appears to fit the concession model of reproductive skew: where resources (i.e. host nests) are poor, there is strong skew and where resources are richer reproduction is more egalitarian.Received 31 July 2003; revised 7 October 2003; accepted 9 October 2003.     

The past,present and future of reproductive skew theory and experiments

A major evolutionary question is how reproductive sharing arises in cooperatively breeding species despite the inherent reproductive conflicts in social groups. Reproductive skew theory offers one potential solution: each group member gains or is allotted inclusive fitness equal to or exceeding their expectation from reproducing on their own. Unfortunately, a multitude of skew models with conflicting predictions has led to confusion in both testing and evaluating skew theory. The confusion arises partly because one set of models (the ‘transactional’ type) answer the ultimate evolutionary question of what ranges of reproductive skew can yield fitness‐enhancing solutions for all group members. The second set of models (‘compromise’) give an evolutionarily proximate, game‐theoretic evolutionarily stable state (ESS) solution that determines reproductive shares based on relative competitive abilities. However, several predictions arising from compromise models require a linear payoff to increased competition and do not hold with non‐linear payoffs. Given that for most species it may be very difficult or impossible to determine the true relationship between effort devoted to competition and reproductive share gained, compromise models are much less predictive than previously appreciated. Almost all skew models make one quantitative prediction (e.g. realized skew must fall within ranges predicted by transactional models), and two qualitative predictions (e.g. variation in relatedness or competitive ability across groups affects skew). A thorough review of the data finds that these three predictions are relatively rarely supported. As a general rule, therefore, the evolution of cooperative breeding appears not to be dependent on the ability of group members to monitor relatedness or competitive ability in order to adjust their behaviour dynamically to gain reproductive share. Although reproductive skew theory fails to predict within‐group dynamics consistently, it does better at predicting quantitative differences in skew across populations or species. This suggests that kin selection can play a significant role in the evolution of sociality. To advance our understanding of reproductive skew will require focusing on a broader array of factors, such as the frequency of mistaken identity, delayed fitness payoffs, and selection pressures arising from across‐group competition. We furthermore suggest a novel approach to investigate the sharing of reproduction that focuses on the underlying genetics of skew. A quantitative genetics approach allows the partitioning of variance in reproductive share itself or that of traits closely associated with skew into genetic and non‐genetic sources. Thus, we can determine the heritability of reproductive share and infer whether it actually is the focus of natural selection. We view the ‘animal model’ as the most promising empirical method where the genetics of reproductive share can be directly analyzed in wild populations. In the quest to assess whether skew theory can provide a framework for understanding the evolution of sociality, quantitative genetics will be a central tool in future research.     

Reproductive skew in birds: models, problems and prospects

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in models to explain the partitioning of direct reproduction ('reproductive skew') among members of one sex within social groups. We review models of skew, identify problems of testing models, and consider how to make progress. One series of models assumes that dominants have complete control of subordinate reproduction, but may allow subordinates some reproduction as a way of enticing them to help or getting them to share the cost of reproduction. Another series of models assume that dominants have limited control of subordinate reproduction. Reproductive skew may also be affected by incest avoidance or control by the opposite sex. Models are largely untested because no study of birds has quantified all relevant parameters, and we see no prospect of this happening soon. A common simplifying approach is to test qualitative predictions about the effect on skew of relatedness among group members. However, these data alone cannot distinguish among models because models do not make unique predictions, partly because skew is also affected by other factors. A major problem in cooperatively-breeding birds is that any effect of relatedness will often be confounded by covariation with relatedness asymmetry and subordinate competitiveness. Progress can be made with the development of theory, controlling confounding variables through the choice of study species or types of social group, and, most importantly, testing assumptions underlying hypotheses.     

Reproductive tolerance in male primates: Old paradigms and new evidence

Within social groups of primates, males commonly compete over reproduction, but they may also rely on cooperation with other males. Theory suggests that it may be adaptive for male primates to tolerate some reproduction by other males if reproductive tolerance fosters cooperation, particularly that dominant males yield so‐called reproductive concessions to subordinates to entice their cooperation. We review four recent studies that claimed to have found evidence for reproductive concessions or similar forms of reproductive tolerance. However, upon critical reevaluation of their results, no study provides conclusive support for reproductive concessions as predicted by theoretical models. Yet two studies demonstrated a form of reproductive tolerance that cannot be explained by any of the existing models, and that seems to have evolved only in multi‐male, multi‐female societies with diverse strategic options for males. Our article provides guidance how to study this form of reproductive tolerance in the absence of a unifying model.     

Sex ratios and skew models: the special case of evolution of cooperation in polistine wasps

Cooperative breeding often involves reproductive dominance hierarchies. Such hierarchies have been proposed to form and to be maintained through an equitable skew in reproduction for both dominants and subordinates. The general form of skew models also predicts that cooperation can be stable only if cooperation greatly increases group reproductive success or subordinates are greatly constrained in their reproductive prospects relative to dominants. Neither, however, seems to be generally present in the colony initiation phase of temperate polistine wasps, although the behaviors of individuals within such groups are often consistent with skew model predictions. This apparent contradiction can be resolved in the context of a special case of the skew models that incorporate mother-offspring conflicts over sex ratios. Data suggest that all the needed preconditions are present for cooperating foundresses to gain an added benefit through producing male-biased investment ratios. Therefore, the special case model predicts that cooperation can evolve in Hymenoptera with both the observed high skews and reduced per capita group productivity. Further predictions of the special case model (e.g., mixed populations of single and multifoundresses) are also supported. Because the special case model is applicable only to haplodiploids, this may explain why cooperation in vertebrates rarely occurs without significant ecological or physiological constraints. Finally, comparisons to other social Hymenoptera taxa suggest that factors stabilizing cooperation between colony-initiating females may simultaneously constrain the evolution of morphologically specialized worker castes.     

Social and genetic structure of paper wasp cofoundress associations: tests of reproductive skew models

Recent models postulate that the members of a social group assess their ecological and social environments and agree a "social contract" of reproductive partitioning (skew). We tested social contracts theory by using DNA microsatellites to measure skew in 24 cofoundress associations of paper wasps, Polistes bellicosus. In contrast to theoretical predictions, there was little variation in cofoundress relatedness, and relatedness either did not predict skew or was negatively correlated with it; the dominant/subordinate size ratio, assumed to reflect relative fighting ability, did not predict skew; and high skew was associated with decreased aggression by the rank 2 subordinate toward the dominant. High skew was associated with increased group size. A difficulty with measuring skew in real systems is the frequent changes in group composition that commonly occur in social animals. In P. bellicosus, 61% of egg layers and an unknown number of non-egg layers were absent by the time nests were collected. The social contracts models provide an attractive general framework linking genetics, ecology, and behavior, but there have been few direct tests of their predictions. We question assumptions underlying the models and suggest directions for future research.